rational basis test in Tennessee

2013App. Dec. 19, 2005) perm. app. denied (Tenn. June 26, 2006) (“Tennessee courts have consistently held not only that the rational basis standard is a very low level of scrutiny, but also that the party challenging the rational basis of a statute bears the burden of proving that the legislative classification in that statute is unreasonable and arbitrary.”) (citing Harrison, 569 S.W.2d at 826 ).

2002The Tennessee Supreme Court, in Harrison v. Schrader, 569 S.W.2d 822 (Tenn.1978) further examined the parameters and application of the rational basis test: The classification must rest upon a reasonable basis.

2012However, “state legislatures have the initial discretion to determine what is ‘different’ and what is ‘the same’ and . . . they are given considerable latitude in making those determinations.” Id. (quoting Robinson, 29 S.W.3d at 480 ). “[U]nder the rational basis test, a statute may discriminate in favor of a certain class, as long as the discrimination is founded upon a reasonable distinction or difference in state policy.” Id. (citing Castlewood, Inc. v. Anderson County, 969 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tenn. 1998)).

2006Under the rational basis test, “a statute may discriminate in favor of a certain class . . . if the discrimination is founded -17- upon a reasonable distinction, or a difference in state policy.” Castlewood, Inc. v. Anderson County, 969 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tenn. 1998) (quoting Snow v. City of Memphis, 527 S.W.2d 55, 65 , (Tenn. 1975)).

2025RATIONAL BASIS TEST Plaintiffs assert that the Customer Visit Restrictions do not pass the rational basis test because there are no real and substantial differences between their businesses and the Exempt Businesses that are “germane to the purpose of the law.” Metro disagrees, asserting that the rational basis test asks only whether the law is reasonably related to a proper legislative interest. - 11 - Plaintiffs rely on State v. Tester, 879 S.W.2d 823 (Tenn. 1994) as providing the proper standard.

2022State v. Tester, 879 S.W.2d 823, 828 (Tenn. 1994) (citations omitted).

2025See Dr. Pepper Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Dyersburg, LLC v. Farr, 393 S.W.3d 201, 209 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011); Posey, 164 S.W.3d at 579 . “[D]epending on the nature of the right asserted or a class of persons affected,” our courts examine the law using one of three standards: (1) strict scrutiny; (2) heightened scrutiny; or (3) reduced scrutiny, a.k.a., “the rational basis test.” Riggs, 941 S.W.2d at 52 .

2024Under the rational basis inquiry, “if any reasonable justification for the law may be conceived, it must be upheld by the courts.” Id.

2014Again, under a rational basis analysis, “ ‘[i]f any possible reason can be conceived to justify the classification, or if the reasonableness be fairly debatable,’ then the legislation will not be struck down.” Admiralty Suites and Inns, LLC v. Shelby County, 138 S.W.3d 233, 240 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that the constitutionality of a tax statute is analyzed using the rational basis standard) (quoting Estrin v. Moss, 221 Tenn. 657 , 430 S.W.2d 345, 349 (1968)).

2014Again, under a rational basis analysis, “ ‘[i]f any possible reason can be conceived to justify the classification, or if the reasonableness be fairly debatable,’ then the legislation will not be struck down.” Admiralty Suites and Inns, LLC v. Shelby County, 138 S.W.3d 233, 240 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that the constitutionality of a tax statute is analyzed using the rational basis standard) (quoting Estrin v. Moss, 221 Tenn. 657 , 430 S.W.2d 345, 349 (1968)).

2013Where, as here, the legislative classification 14 Although our Supreme Court has “recogniz[ed] . . . [the] ‘historic[] and linguistic[] distinct[ness],’”of the equal protection provisions of the Tennessee Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, it “has followed the framework developed by the United States Constitution for analyzing equal protection claims.” Newton v. Cox, 878 S.W.2d 105 (Tenn. 1994) (citing Tenn. Small School Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 152-54 (Tenn. 1993)). -23- does not interfere with the exercise of a fundamental right nor does it

2012However, “state legislatures have the initial discretion to determine what is ‘different’ and what is ‘the same’ and . . . they are given considerable latitude in making those determinations.” Id. (quoting Robinson, 29 S.W.3d at 480 ). “[U]nder the rational basis test, a statute may discriminate in favor of a certain class, as long as the discrimination is founded upon a reasonable distinction or difference in state policy.” Id. (citing Castlewood, Inc. v. Anderson County, 969 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tenn. 1998)).

2019In determining whether treating the two groups differently is constitutional, “one of three standards of scrutiny applies, depending on the nature of the right asserted or the class of persons affected: (1) strict scrutiny; (2) heightened scrutiny; or (3) reduced scrutiny, applying the rational basis test.” Gallaher, 104 S.W.3d at 460 .

2012As a result, we must use reduced 4 In Gallaher, 104 S.W.3d at 461 , our Supreme Court considered an equal protection challenge to another section of the Child Support Guidelines. -6- scrutiny, under the rational basis test, in analyzing Father’s claim.

2004In applying the rational basis test, courts presume that the legislature acted constitutionally and will uphold the statute “if any state of facts can reasonably be conceived to justify the classification or if the reasonableness of the class is fairly debatable . . .” City of Chattanooga, 54 S.W.3d at 276 (quoting Bates v. Alexander, 749 S.W.2d 742, 743 (Tenn. 1988); Phillips v. State, 202 Tenn. 402, 410-11 , 304 S.W.2d 614, 617 (1957); Knoxtenn Theatres v. McCanless, 177 Tenn. 497, 505 , 151 S.W.2d 164, 167 (1941).

2001In applying the rational basis test, courts presume that the legislature acted constitutionally and will uphold the statute “if any state of facts can reasonably be conceived to justify the classification or if the unreasonableness of the class is fairly debatable. . . .” City of Chattanooga, 54 S.W.3d at 276 (quoting Bates v. Alexander, 749 S.W.2d 742, 743 (Tenn. 1988)).

2024“Under this framework, one of three standards of scrutiny applies, depending upon the nature of the right asserted or the class of persons affected: (1) strict scrutiny; (2) heightened scrutiny; or (3) reduced scrutiny, applying the rational basis test.” Id.

2014“Under this framework, one of three standards of scrutiny applies, depending upon the nature of the right asserted or the class of persons affected: (1) strict scrutiny; (2) heightened scrutiny; or (3) reduced scrutiny, applying the rational basis test.” Id. (citing Robinson, 29 S.W.3d at 481 ).

2013Where, as here, the legislative classification 14 Although our Supreme Court has “recogniz[ed] . . . [the] ‘historic[] and linguistic[] distinct[ness],’”of the equal protection provisions of the Tennessee Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, it “has followed the framework developed by the United States Constitution for analyzing equal protection claims.” Newton v. Cox, 878 S.W.2d 105 (Tenn. 1994) (citing Tenn. Small School Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 152-54 (Tenn. 1993)). -23- does not interfere with the exercise of a fundamental right nor does it

2013Employing the rational basis test, the Court found “it conceivable that the General Assembly concluded that the contingency cap . . . would further the purposes of the Medical Malpractice Act by reducing malpractice insurance costs and, therefore reduce the cost of health care to the public.” Id. at 110 .

2014Again, under a rational basis analysis, “ ‘[i]f any possible reason can be conceived to justify the classification, or if the reasonableness be fairly debatable,’ then the legislation will not be struck down.” Admiralty Suites and Inns, LLC v. Shelby County, 138 S.W.3d 233, 240 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that the constitutionality of a tax statute is analyzed using the rational basis standard) (quoting Estrin v. Moss, 221 Tenn. 657 , 430 S.W.2d 345, 349 (1968)).

2014Again, under a rational basis analysis, “ ‘[i]f any possible reason can be conceived to justify the classification, or if the reasonableness be fairly debatable,’ then the legislation will not be struck down.” Admiralty Suites and Inns, LLC v. Shelby County, 138 S.W.3d 233, 240 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that the constitutionality of a tax statute is analyzed using the rational basis standard) (quoting Estrin v. Moss, 221 Tenn. 657 , 430 S.W.2d 345, 349 (1968)).

2006The strict scrutiny test “imposes upon those challenging the constitutionality of a statute the greatest burden of proof.” Brown, 915 S.W.2d at 413 (citing Tennessee Small School Sys. v. McWherter, 851 S.W.2d 139, 153 (Tenn. 1993)).

1996In Brown v. Campbell County Board of Education, 915 S.W.2d 407 (Tenn.1995), we discussed the three levels of scrutiny applicable to discrimination claims and concluded that claims such as these, in which the class allegedly discriminated against is not a suspect class, should be scrutinized under the rational basis test.

2025See Dr. Pepper Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Dyersburg, LLC v. Farr, 393 S.W.3d 201, 209 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011); Posey, 164 S.W.3d at 579 . “[D]epending on the nature of the right asserted or a class of persons affected,” our courts examine the law using one of three standards: (1) strict scrutiny; (2) heightened scrutiny; or (3) reduced scrutiny, a.k.a., “the rational basis test.” Riggs, 941 S.W.2d at 52 .

2014First, in Dr. Pepper Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Dyersburg, LLC v. Farr, 393 S.W.3d 201 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011), this Court upheld the constitutionality of a bottling tax that treated in-state manufacturers differently than out-of- state manufacturers.

2020Bd. of Comm’rs, 656 S.W.2d 338, 342 (Tenn. 1983) (quoting State ex rel.

2018Further, as a legislative decision, the rational basis test is satisfied if there is a “conceivable”3 or “possible”4 reason for the Commission’s decision. 3 Cato, 2002 WL 1042179 , at *2. 4 Fallin, 656 S.W.2d at 342 . 6 The record shows that residents of the Candlewood Subdivision, which abuts the Property, opposed the request for rezoning.

1996In a recent decision the Colorado Supreme Court held that “[c]lassifications based on age are not suspect or special warranting strict scrutiny or intermediate review.” Industrial Claim Appeals Office v. Romero, 912 P.2d 62, 66 (Colo.1996) (citing Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 , 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2566-67 , 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976)).

1996In a recent decision the Colorado Supreme Court held that “[c]lassifications based on age are not suspect or special warranting strict scrutiny or intermediate review.” Industrial Claim Appeals Office v. Romero, 912 P.2d 62, 66 (Colo.1996) (citing Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313-14 , 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2566-67 , 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976)).

2022Sys., 851 S.W.2d at 153 (quoting Doe v. Norris, 751 S.W.2d 834, 841 (Tenn. 1988)).

1998See Doe v. Norris, 751 S.W.2d 834 (Tenn.1988).

2003We note that “[i]n construing statutes, it is our duty to adopt a construction which will sustain a statute and avoid constitutional conflict if any reasonable construction exists that satisfies the requirements of the Constitution.” Nolichuckey, 896 S.W.2d at 788 (quoting Davis-Kidd Booksellers, Inc. v. McWherter, 866 S.W.2d 520, 529 (Tenn. 1993)).

2003We note that “[i]n construing statutes, it is our duty to adopt a construction which will sustain a statute and avoid constitutional conflict if any reasonable construction exists that satisfies the requirements of the Constitution.” Nolichuckey, 896 S.W.2d at 788 (quoting Davis-Kidd Booksellers, Inc. v. McWherter, 866 S.W.2d 520, 529 (Tenn.1993)).

2003City of Tullahoma v. Bedford County, 938 S.W.2d 408, 412 (Tenn.1997); Brentwood Liquors Corp. v. Fox, 496 S.W.2d 454, 457 (Tenn.1973); Nolichuckey Sand Co., Inc. v. Huddleston, 896 S.W.2d 782, 788 (Tenn.Ct.App.1994).

2003We note that “[i]n construing statutes, it is our duty to adopt a construction which will sustain a statute and avoid constitutional conflict if any reasonable construction exists that satisfies the requirements of the Constitution.” Nolichuckey, 896 S.W.2d at 788 (quoting Davis-Kidd Booksellers, Inc. v. McWherter, 866 S.W.2d 520, 529 (Tenn.1993)).

2003City of Tullahoma v. Bedford County, 936 S.W.2d 408, 412 (Tenn. 1997); Brentwood Liquors Corp. v. Fox, 496 S.W.2d 454, 457 (Tenn. 1973); Nolichuckey Sand Co., Inc. v. Huddleston, 896 S.W.2d 782, 788 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994).

2003City of Tullahoma v. Bedford County, 938 S.W.2d 408, 412 (Tenn.1997); Brentwood Liquors Corp. v. Fox, 496 S.W.2d 454, 457 (Tenn.1973); Nolichuckey Sand Co., Inc. v. Huddleston, 896 S.W.2d 782, 788 (Tenn.Ct.App.1994).

2003However, we recognize that the Tennessee Supreme Court, in the 1990 case of Hart v. City of Johnson City, applied a rational basis analysis in determining whether population classifications set out in an amendment to a statute authorizing municipal annexation contests violated Article XI, Section 9 because the amendment was a special law. 801 S.W.2d 512, 515 (Tenn.1990) (“[W]e have never upheld class legislation in annexation statutes.

2003However, we recognize that the Tennessee Supreme Court, in the 1990 case of Hart v. City of Johnson City, applied a rational basis analysis in determining whether population classifications set out in an amendment to a statute authorizing municipal annexation contests violated Article XI, Section 9 because the amendment was a special law. 801 S.W.2d 512, 515 (Tenn. 1990) (“[W]e have never upheld class legislation in annexation statutes.

1980Prior to that time, it had created a two-tier standard for the evaluation of classifications by state legislatures, see City of Memphis, supra, subjecting them to strict scrutiny only when there was an impermissible interference with fundamental rights and subjecting all others to the rational basis test.

1980Prior to that time, it had created a two-tier standard for the evaluation of classifications by state legislatures, see City of Memphis, supra , subjecting them to strict scrutiny only when there was an impermissible interference with fundamental rights and subjecting all others to the rational basis test.

2025See Application of Park, 484 P.2d 690 , 696 n.27 (Alaska 1971); Darces v. Woods, 679 P.2d 458, 467 (Cal. 1984); Stuart v. Comm’r of Correction, 834 A.2d 52, 56 (Conn. 2003); Child Support Enf’t Agency v. Doe, 125 P.3d 461, 469 (Haw. 2005); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009); League of Women Voters of Kansas v. Schwab, 549 P.3d 363 , 383 (Kan. 2024); Acorn v. City of New Orleans, 377 So. 2d 1206, 1216 (La. 1979); Sutherland v. State, 537 So. 2d 1360, 1362 (Miss. 1989); Arneson v. State By & Through Dep’t of Admin., Teachers’ Ret.

2025See Application of Park, 484 P.2d 690 , 696 n.27 (Alaska 1971); Darces v. Woods, 679 P.2d 458, 467 (Cal. 1984); Stuart v. Comm’r of Correction, 834 A.2d 52, 56 (Conn. 2003); Child Support Enf’t Agency v. Doe, 125 P.3d 461, 469 (Haw. 2005); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009); League of Women Voters of Kansas v. Schwab, 549 P.3d 363 , 383 (Kan. 2024); Acorn v. City of New Orleans, 377 So. 2d 1206, 1216 (La. 1979); Sutherland v. State, 537 So. 2d 1360, 1362 (Miss. 1989); Arneson v. State By & Through Dep’t of Admin., Teachers’ Ret.

2025Rev. 581 , 615 (2011) (arguing that, under the multi-tiered scheme of judicial scrutiny, “‘similarly situated’ is another way of stating the fundamental values of the Equal Protection Clause” and “can be collapsed” into the rational basis inquiry); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 , 884 n.9 (Iowa 2009) (questioning usefulness of similarly situated analysis as threshold test and noting that it is often infused “with principles traditionally applied in the complete equal protection analysis”). -9- but suggests that comparing Plaintiffs’ businesses to the Exempt Businesses is not an “apples-to-app

2025See Application of Park, 484 P.2d 690 , 696 n.27 (Alaska 1971); Darces v. Woods, 679 P.2d 458, 467 (Cal. 1984); Stuart v. Comm’r of Correction, 834 A.2d 52, 56 (Conn. 2003); Child Support Enf’t Agency v. Doe, 125 P.3d 461, 469 (Haw. 2005); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009); League of Women Voters of Kansas v. Schwab, 549 P.3d 363 , 383 (Kan. 2024); Acorn v. City of New Orleans, 377 So. 2d 1206, 1216 (La. 1979); Sutherland v. State, 537 So. 2d 1360, 1362 (Miss. 1989); Arneson v. State By & Through Dep’t of Admin., Teachers’ Ret.

2025See Application of Park, 484 P.2d 690 , 696 n.27 (Alaska 1971); Darces v. Woods, 679 P.2d 458, 467 (Cal. 1984); Stuart v. Comm’r of Correction, 834 A.2d 52, 56 (Conn. 2003); Child Support Enf’t Agency v. Doe, 125 P.3d 461, 469 (Haw. 2005); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009); League of Women Voters of Kansas v. Schwab, 549 P.3d 363 , 383 (Kan. 2024); Acorn v. City of New Orleans, 377 So. 2d 1206, 1216 (La. 1979); Sutherland v. State, 537 So. 2d 1360, 1362 (Miss. 1989); Arneson v. State By & Through Dep’t of Admin., Teachers’ Ret.

2025In an equal protection challenge, the rational basis test “examines ‘whether the classifications have a reasonable relationship to a legitimate state interest.’” Hughes v. Tenn. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 514 S.W.3d 707, 716 (Tenn. 2017) (quoting Tenn. Small Sch.