rational basis test in Alaska

1999Under the rational basis test for equal protection analysis, in order for a classification to survive judicial scrutiny, the classification “must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.” McConkey v. Hart, 930 P.2d 402, 407-08 (Alaska 1996) (quoting Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 362 (Alaska 1976)). 24 . 669 P.2d 956, 957 (Alaska 1983). 25 .

1997As Hart points out in her briefs, this court uses the following test for an equal *408 protection challenge to a statute’s classification: 8 Under the rational basis test, in order for a classification to survive judicial scrutiny, the classification “must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so. that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.” Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 362 (Alaska 1976) (citing State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142, 145 (Alaska 1973)).

1997As Hart points out in her briefs, this court uses the following test for an equal *408 protection challenge to a statute’s classification: 8 Under the rational basis test, in order for a classification to survive judicial scrutiny, the classification “must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so. that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.” Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 362 (Alaska 1976) (citing State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142, 145 (Alaska 1973)).

1995In Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 362 (Alaska 1976) (quoting State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142, 145 (Alaska 1973) (footnote omitted)), we stated: Under the rational basis test, in order for a classification to survive judicial scrutiny, the classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.” We have upheld Alaska’s workers’ compensation scheme against an equal protection challenge under the Alaska Constitution as

1998The City argues that review should be based on the substitution of judgment standard, because this is a review of the statutory interpretation of the phrase “becomes due” in AS 23.30.155(e). 3 The rational basis standard of review “is used where the questions at issue implicate special agency expertise or the determination of fundamental policies within the scope of the agency’s statutory function.” Tesoro Alaska Petroleum Co. v. Kenai Pipe Line Co., 746 P.2d 896, 903 (Alaska 1987).

1995"The rational basis test is used where the questions at issue implicate special agency expertise or the determination of fundamental policies within the scope of the agency’s statutory function.” Tesoro Alaska Petroleum Co. v. Kenai Pipe Line Co., 746 P.2d 896, 903 (Alaska 1987).

1987E.g., Kelly v. Zamarello, 486 P.2d 906, 918 (Alaska 1971).

1983Kelly v. Zamarello, 486 P.2d 906, 918 (Alaska 1971). 7 The substitution of judgment standard is applied where the questions of law presented do not involve agency expertise and, thus, a court need not take the deferential stance embodied in the rational basis test.

2013For further discussion on the level of scrutiny, compare Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 904-06 (applying heightened scrutiny), with id. at 913 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (urging an initial rational basis analysis and concluding that challenged statute fails even that test), and id. at 916 (White, J., concurring) (concluding that challenged statute was irrational). 70 See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 505 (“We . . . have no occasion to consider what weight might be given to a citizen’s length of residence if the bona fides of her claim to state citizenship were questioned.”). 71 See Schikora v. State, Dep’t of R

1980Although the question is not a clear one, we conclude that the rational basis standard is applicable. [20] We recognize that the United States Supreme Court applied a strict scrutiny analysis in the cases of Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 92 S.Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972), and Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 450 , 94 S.Ct. 1076 , 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974), and that there is language, particularly in Dunn , which indicates that any durational residency requirement automatically triggers the strict scruti

1973Under the rational basis test, in order for a classification to survive judicial scrutiny, the classification “must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.” F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 , 40 S.Ct. 560, 561 , 64 L.Ed. 989, 990-91 (1920); accord, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 , 92 S.Ct. 251, 254 , 30 L.Ed.2d 225, 229 (1971).

1973Under the rational basis test, in order for a classification to survive judicial scrutiny, the classification “must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.” F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 , 40 S.Ct. 560, 561 , 64 L.Ed. 989, 990-91 (1920); accord, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 , 92 S.Ct. 251, 254 , 30 L.Ed.2d 225, 229 (1971).

1998Earth Resources Co. v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 665 P.2d 960, 964-65 (Alaska 1983). ' In this case, we must determine whether a particular IRC provision is excepted to or modified by the ANITA.

1988DISCUSSION A. Standard of Review In Earth Resources Company of Alaska v. State, Department of Revenue, 665 P.2d 960, 965 (Alaska 1983), we stated that: “the substitution of judgment standard of review should be applied by courts reviewing the [Revenue] Department’s application of the unitary business concept to a taxpayer’s business activity.” That case rejected the substantial evidence standard of review 3 as well as the rational basis standard. 4 The case at bar involves the same issue addressed in Earth Resources: the propriety of an agency determination of unitariness for multistate tax pu

1996Id. (citing Union Oil Co. of Cal. v. State, 804 P.2d 62, 64 (Alaska 1990)).

1993Union Oil Co. of California v. State, 804 P.2d 62, 64 (Alaska 1990).

1995In Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 362 (Alaska 1976) (quoting State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142, 145 (Alaska 1973) (footnote omitted)), we stated: Under the rational basis test, in order for a classification to survive judicial scrutiny, the classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.” We have upheld Alaska’s workers’ compensation scheme against an equal protection challenge under the Alaska Constitution as

1979See also 1 A. Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 2.40, at 10 (1978 and Supp. 1979) ("In compensation, unlike tort, the only injuries compensated for are those which produce disability and thereby presumably affect earning power."). [41] See Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 362 (Alaska 1976), quoting State v. Wylie, 516 P.2d 142, 145 (Alaska 1973) (footnote omitted), where we stated: Under the rational basis test, in order for a classification to survive judicial scrutiny, the classification `must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and sub

1987See, e.g., Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm’n v. Apokedak, 606 P.2d 1255, 1267 (Alaska 1980) ("[E]qual protection, even under Alaska’s stricter standard ...”); State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 11 (Alaska 1978) (reaffirming that the test under the Alaska equal protection clause at the lower, non-fundamental right level requires a more exacting scrutiny); Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 362-63 (Alaska 1976) (A more flexible and demanding standard will be applied; facts will no longer be hypothesized as was the case under the traditional rational basis standard.). .

1987X Senators = or 156,787.20 = Anchorage Population ---------- ---------- -------------------- 20 Senators 368,420.29 State Population [35] See, e.g., Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n v. Apokedak, 606 P.2d 1255, 1267 (Alaska 1980) ("[E]qual protection, even under Alaska's stricter standard ..."); State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 11 (Alaska 1978) (reaffirming that the test under the Alaska equal protection clause at the lower, non-fundamental right level requires a more exacting scrutiny); Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 362-63 (Alaska 1976) (A more flexible and demanding standard will be applied

1990In cases involving permit denials due to alleged defects in the Limited Entry Act or regulations promulgated under the Act, the proper standard of review is the rational basis test. 606 P.2d at 1262 .

1987X Senators = or 156,787.20 = Anchorage Population ---------- ---------- -------------------- 20 Senators 368,420.29 State Population [35] See, e.g., Commercial Fisheries Entry Comm'n v. Apokedak, 606 P.2d 1255, 1267 (Alaska 1980) ("[E]qual protection, even under Alaska's stricter standard ..."); State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 11 (Alaska 1978) (reaffirming that the test under the Alaska equal protection clause at the lower, non-fundamental right level requires a more exacting scrutiny); Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 362-63 (Alaska 1976) (A more flexible and demanding standard will be applied

1980Although the question is not a clear one, we conclude that the rational basis standard is applicable. [20] We recognize that the United States Supreme Court applied a strict scrutiny analysis in the cases of Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 92 S.Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972), and Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 450 , 94 S.Ct. 1076 , 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974), and that there is language, particularly in Dunn , which indicates that any durational residency requirement automatically triggers the strict scruti

1980Although the question is not a clear one, we conclude that the rational basis standard is applicable. [20] We recognize that the United States Supreme Court applied a strict scrutiny analysis in the cases of Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 , 89 S.Ct. 1322 , 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 , 92 S.Ct. 995 , 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972), and Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 450 , 94 S.Ct. 1076 , 39 L.Ed.2d 306 (1974), and that there is language, particularly in Dunn , which indicates that any durational residency requirement automatically triggers the strict scruti

1980For example, in State v. Adams, 522 P.2d 1125 (Alaska 1974), we struck down a one-year durational residency requirement for eligibility to file for a divorce, very similar to the one upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 , 95 S.Ct. 553 , 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975). [10] Our cases, still functioning under the two-tier approach, continued to regard durational residency requirements as automatically triggering strict scrutiny, and rejected the distinctions by which federal equal protection cases in this area separated strict scrutiny cases from rational basis cases.

1980For example, in State v. Adams, 522 P.2d 1125 (Alaska 1974), we struck down a one-year durational residency requirement for eligibility to file for a divorce, very similar to the one upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 , 95 S.Ct. 553 , 42 L.Ed.2d 532 (1975). [10] Our cases, still functioning under the two-tier approach, continued to regard durational residency requirements as automatically triggering strict scrutiny, and rejected the distinctions by which federal equal protection cases in this area separated strict scrutiny cases from rational basis cases.

2020Res., 104 P.3d 125, 128 (Alaska 2004); see also O’Callaghan v. Rue, 996 P.2d 88, 94-95 (Alaska 2000). 12 Chalovich, 104 P.3d at 128 . 13 Id. –8– 2684 determinations which we also review under a rational basis standard.14 We may defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute if undefined terms appear in the statute.15 The record in the present case shows that the Board of Fisheries was concerned that the absence of a statutory or regulatory definition of “anchor roller” was causing inconsistent enforcement of AS 16.05.835, the maximum length statute.

2020Res., 104 P.3d 125, 128 (Alaska 2004); see also O’Callaghan v. Rue, 996 P.2d 88, 94-95 (Alaska 2000). 12 Chalovich, 104 P.3d at 128 . 13 Id. –8– 2684 determinations which we also review under a rational basis standard.14 We may defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute if undefined terms appear in the statute.15 The record in the present case shows that the Board of Fisheries was concerned that the absence of a statutory or regulatory definition of “anchor roller” was causing inconsistent enforcement of AS 16.05.835, the maximum length statute.

2020Res., 104 P.3d 125, 128 (Alaska 2004); see also O’Callaghan v. Rue, 996 P.2d 88, 94-95 (Alaska 2000). 12 Chalovich, 104 P.3d at 128 . 13 Id. –8– 2684 determinations which we also review under a rational basis standard.14 We may defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute if undefined terms appear in the statute.15 The record in the present case shows that the Board of Fisheries was concerned that the absence of a statutory or regulatory definition of “anchor roller” was causing inconsistent enforcement of AS 16.05.835, the maximum length statute.

2020Res., 104 P.3d 125, 128 (Alaska 2004); see also O’Callaghan v. Rue, 996 P.2d 88, 94-95 (Alaska 2000). 12 Chalovich, 104 P.3d at 128 . 13 Id. –8– 2684 determinations which we also review under a rational basis standard.14 We may defer to an agency’s interpretation of a statute if undefined terms appear in the statute.15 The record in the present case shows that the Board of Fisheries was concerned that the absence of a statutory or regulatory definition of “anchor roller” was causing inconsistent enforcement of AS 16.05.835, the maximum length statute.

2013See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 505 , 119 S.Ct. 1518 ("We ... have no occasion to consider what weight might be given to a citizen's length of residence if the bona fides of her claim to state citizenship were questioned."). .

2013For further discussion on the level of scrutiny, compare Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 904-06 (applying heightened scrutiny), with id. at 913 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (urging an initial rational basis analysis and concluding that challenged statute fails even that test), and id. at 916 (White, J., concurring) (concluding that challenged statute was irrational). 70 See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 505 (“We . . . have no occasion to consider what weight might be given to a citizen’s length of residence if the bona fides of her claim to state citizenship were questioned.”). 71 See Schikora v. State, Dep’t of R

2013For further discussion on the level of scrutiny, compare Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 904-06 (applying heightened scrutiny), with id. at 913 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (urging an initial rational basis analysis and concluding that challenged statute fails even that test), and id. at 916 (White, J., concurring) (concluding that challenged statute was irrational). 70 See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 505 (“We . . . have no occasion to consider what weight might be given to a citizen’s length of residence if the bona fides of her claim to state citizenship were questioned.”). 71 See Schikora v. State, Dep’t of R

2013For further discussion on the level of scrutiny, compare Soto-Lopez, 476 U.S. at 904-06 (applying heightened scrutiny), with id. at 913 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (urging an initial rational basis analysis and concluding that challenged statute fails even that test), and id. at 916 (White, J., concurring) (concluding that challenged statute was irrational). 70 See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 505 (“We . . . have no occasion to consider what weight might be given to a citizen’s length of residence if the bona fides of her claim to state citizenship were questioned.”). 71 See Schikora v. State, Dep’t of R

2008Dev., Div. of Ins., 171 P.3d. 1110, 1115 (Alaska 2007) ("In questions of law involving an agency's expertise ... a rational basis standard is applied and we defer to an agency's determination so long as it is reasonable."). 17 .

2007In support of this contention, the dissent characterizes Gilbert, 803 P.2d 391 , as holding, "[i]n effect," that "the conventional rational-basis standard applies if the regulation deals with an issue of resource allocation that article VIII, section 4 allows the board to address and if the board finds that existing circumstances make it necessary to decide the issue." Bryner Dissent at 1228.

2007In support of this contention, the dissent characterizes Gilbert, 803 P.2d 391 , as holding, "[i]n effect,” that "the conventional rational-basis standard applies if the regulation deals with an issue of resource allocation that article VIII, section 4 allows the board to address and if the board finds that existing circumstances make it necessary to decide the issue.” Bryner Dissent at 1228.

1999Under the rational basis test for equal protection analysis, in order for a classification to survive judicial scrutiny, the classification “must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.” McConkey v. Hart, 930 P.2d 402, 407-08 (Alaska 1996) (quoting Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 362 (Alaska 1976)). 24 . 669 P.2d 956, 957 (Alaska 1983). 25 .

1999Id. 26 .

1999Under the rational basis test for equal protection analysis, in order for a classification to survive judicial scrutiny, the classification “must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.” McConkey v. Hart, 930 P.2d 402, 407-08 (Alaska 1996) (quoting Isakson v. Rickey, 550 P.2d 359, 362 (Alaska 1976)). 24 . 669 P.2d 956, 957 (Alaska 1983). 25 .

1998See Arnett v. Baskous, 856 P.2d 790 , 791 n. 1 (Alaska 1993).