rational basis test in North Carolina

2023See Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 180 , 594 S.E.2d 1, 15 (2004) (“[I]f the statute impacts neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class, we employ the rational basis test.”).

2023See Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 180 , 594 S.E.2d 1, 15 (2004) (“[I]f the statute impacts neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class, we employ the rational basis test.”).

2024When the right involved is not fundamental, we apply the rational basis test and ask “whether the [government action] in question is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.” Standley, 362 N.C. at 332 (cleaned up).

2022Otherwise, we apply the rational basis test, which only requires that the government action “in question [be] rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.” Standley, 362 N.C. at 332 , 661 S.E.2d at 731 . ¶ 48 Plaintiffs argue that the RLCEP infringes on “the fundamental right to travel[.]” “[T]he right to travel on public streets is a fundamental segment of liberty” such that “the absolute prohibition of such travel requires substantially more justification than the regulation of it by traffic lights or rules of the road.” State v. Dobbins, 277 N.C. 484, 499 , 178 S.E.2d 449, 457-58

2025Because there is at least some conceivable basis for the government’s action here, we reverse the Court of Appeals.6 See White v. Pate, 308 N.C. 759 , 766–767 (1983) (“The rational basis standard merely requires that the governmental classification bear some rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate interest of government.” (cleaned up)).

2013Under the rational basis standard, we look to see if the “classification bear[s] some rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate interest of government.” Id.

2011Thus, it is clear, as agreed by the parties, that the rational basis test applies here. *550 The pertinent inquiry under rational basis scrutiny is whether the "distinctions which are drawn by a challenged statute or action bear some rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate governmental interest." Texfi Industries v. City of Fayetteville, 301 N.C. 1, 11 , 269 S.E.2d 142, 149 (1980).

2011Thus, it is clear, as agreed by the parties, that the rational basis test applies here. *550 The pertinent inquiry under rational basis scrutiny is whether the "distinctions which are drawn by a challenged statute or action bear some rational relationship to a conceivable legitimate governmental interest." Texfi Industries v. City of Fayetteville, 301 N.C. 1, 11 , 269 S.E.2d 142, 149 (1980).

2014“Similar to the rational basis test for equal protection challenges, ‘as long as there could be some rational basis for enacting [the statute at issue], this Court may not invoke [principles of due process] to disturb the statute.’ ” Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 181 , 594 S.E.2d 1, 15 (2004) (quoting Lowe, 313 N.C. at 462 , 329 S.E.2d at 650 ) (alterations in *138 Rhyne).

2014“Similar to the rational basis test for equal protection challenges, ‘as long as there could be some rational basis for enacting [the statute at issue], this Court may not invoke [principles of due process] to disturb the statute.’ ” Rhyne v. K-Mart Corp., 358 N.C. 160, 181 , 594 S.E.2d 1, 15 (2004) (quoting Lowe, 313 N.C. at 462 , 329 S.E.2d at 650 ) (alterations in *138 Rhyne).

2022Otherwise, we apply the rational basis test, which only requires that the government action “in question [be] rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.” Standley, 362 N.C. at 332 , 661 S.E.2d at 731 . ¶ 48 Plaintiffs argue that the RLCEP infringes on “the fundamental right to travel[.]” “[T]he right to travel on public streets is a fundamental segment of liberty” such that “the absolute prohibition of such travel requires substantially more justification than the regulation of it by traffic lights or rules of the road.” State v. Dobbins, 277 N.C. 484, 499 , 178 S.E.2d 449, 457-58

2022Otherwise, we apply the rational basis test, which only requires that the government action “in question [be] rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.” Standley, 362 N.C. at 332 , 661 S.E.2d at 731 . ¶ 48 Plaintiffs argue that the RLCEP infringes on “the fundamental right to travel[.]” “[T]he right to travel on public streets is a fundamental segment of liberty” such that “the absolute prohibition of such travel requires substantially more justification than the regulation of it by traffic lights or rules of the road.” State v. Dobbins, 277 N.C. 484, 499 , 178 S.E.2d 449, 457-58

2021See Fowler, 197 N.C.

2021See Fowler, 197 N.C.

2015See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 , 112 S. Ct. 2326, 2331 , 120 L.

2015See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 , 112 S. Ct. 2326, 2331 , 120 L.

1996Customers Ass’n, 336 N.C. 657, 681 , 446 S.E.2d 332, 346 (1994). *135 Under the rational basis test, statutes “come before the Court with a presumption of validity.” In re Assessment of Use Taxes Against Village Publishing Corp., 312 N.C. 211, 221 , 322 S.E.2d 155, 162 (1984), appeal dismissed, 472 U.S. 1001 , 86 L.

1996Customers Ass’n, 336 N.C. 657, 681 , 446 S.E.2d 332, 346 (1994). *135 Under the rational basis test, statutes “come before the Court with a presumption of validity.” In re Assessment of Use Taxes Against Village Publishing Corp., 312 N.C. 211, 221 , 322 S.E.2d 155, 162 (1984), appeal dismissed, 472 U.S. 1001 , 86 L.

2009Our Supreme Court recently noted the rational basis standard in Britt: "This Court has held that regulation of the right to bear arms is a proper exercise of the General Assembly's police power, but that any regulation must be at least reasonable and not prohibitive, and must bear a fair relation to the preservation of the public peace and safety." Britt, 363 N.C. at 549 , 681 S.E.2d at 322 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 4.

2009Our Supreme Court recently noted the rational basis standard in Britt: "This Court has held that regulation of the right to bear arms is a proper exercise of the General Assembly's police power, but that any regulation must be at least reasonable and not prohibitive, and must bear a fair relation to the preservation of the public peace and safety." Britt, 363 N.C. at 549 , 681 S.E.2d at 322 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 4.

2016Id.; accord id. at 191, 202, 689 S.E.2d at 395, 402 (holding that Heller had "no effect" upon the level of scrutiny for "as applied" challenges to N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1 under either the Second Amendment or Article I, Section 30 ); but see Johnston v. State of N.C., 224 N.C.App. 282 , 293-94, 297, 735 S.E.2d 859 , 868-71 (2012) (relying on Heller and U.S. v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673 (4th Cir.2010), to utilize "intermediate scrutiny" for an "as applied" challenge to N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1 under the Second Amendment; noting that "use of the rational basis standard may [no longer] be appropriate" for exam

2012If rational basis review results in less protection of the right to bear arms under the North Carolina Constitution than the United States Constitution, “use of the rational basis standard may not be appropriate[.]” 6 Whitaker, 201 N.C.

2011Id. at 206.

2011Id. at 206 .

1983In rejecting the argument that such laws denied equal protection, the Court applied the rational basis standard and Mr. Chief Justice Warren pointed out for the Court that: “[W]e have held that the Equal Protection Clause relates to equality between persons as such, rather than between areas and that territorial uniformity is not g. constitutional prerequisite.” 366 U.S. at 427 , 6 L.Ed. 2d at 400 , 81 S.Ct. at 1106 .

1983In rejecting the argument that such laws denied equal protection, the Court applied the rational basis standard and Mr. Chief Justice Warren pointed out for the Court that: “[W]e have held that the Equal Protection Clause relates to equality between persons as such, rather than between areas and that territorial uniformity is not g. constitutional prerequisite.” 366 U.S. at 427 , 6 L.Ed. 2d at 400 , 81 S.Ct. at 1106 .

2024Under this test, “any conceivable legitimate purpose is sufficient,” id. (cleaned up), and the act is not arbitrary so long as it bears a “rational . . . relation to the public health, morals, order, or safety, or the general welfare,” G I Surplus Store, Inc. v. Hunter, 257 N.C. 206, 210 (1962) (cleaned up).

2023Jones, 975 F.3d at 1030 ; see also Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying rational basis review to felon re-enfranchisement law); Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) (applying rational basis review to statutes disenfranchising felons); Owens v. Barnes, 711 F.2d 25, 27 (3d Cir. 1983) (“[T]he standard of equal protection scrutiny to be applied when the state makes classifications relating to disenfranchisement of felons is the traditional rational basis standard.”); Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110 , 1114–15 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that state laws on

2023Jones, 975 F.3d at 1030 ; see also Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying rational basis review to felon re-enfranchisement law); Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) (applying rational basis review to statutes disenfranchising felons); Owens v. Barnes, 711 F.2d 25, 27 (3d Cir. 1983) (“[T]he standard of equal protection scrutiny to be applied when the state makes classifications relating to disenfranchisement of felons is the traditional rational basis standard.”); Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110 , 1114–15 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that state laws on

2023Jones, 975 F.3d at 1030 ; see also Johnson v. Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying rational basis review to felon re-enfranchisement law); Hayden v. Paterson, 594 F.3d 150, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) (applying rational basis review to statutes disenfranchising felons); Owens v. Barnes, 711 F.2d 25, 27 (3d Cir. 1983) (“[T]he standard of equal protection scrutiny to be applied when the state makes classifications relating to disenfranchisement of felons is the traditional rational basis standard.”); Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110 , 1114–15 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that state laws on

2016See, e.g., In re R.L.C., 361 N.C. 287, 295 , 643 S.E.2d 920, 924 (noting that, in the context of an as-applied due process challenge, evaluating “whether the law in question is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose” does not require “courts to determine the actual goal or purpose of the government action at issue” and allows the reviewing court to uphold the legislation -25- CITY OF ASHEVILLE V.

2016See, e.g., In re R.L.C., 361 N.C. 287, 295 , 643 S.E.2d 920, 924 (noting that, in the context of an as-applied due process challenge, evaluating “whether the law in question is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose” does not require “courts to determine the actual goal or purpose of the government action at issue” and allows the reviewing court to uphold the legislation -25- CITY OF ASHEVILLE V.