rational basis test in Arizona

2018Under the rational basis test, legislation will be upheld "so long as (1) the court can find some legitimate state interest to be served by the legislation and (2) the facts permit the court to conclude that the legislative classification rationally furthers the state's legitimate interest." Kenyon v. Hammer , 142 Ariz. 69 , 78, 688 P.2d 961 , 970 (1984) (citations omitted).

2018Under the rational basis test, legislation will be upheld "so long as (1) the court can find some legitimate state interest to be served by the legislation and (2) the facts permit the court to conclude that the legislative classification rationally furthers the state's legitimate interest." Kenyon v. Hammer , 142 Ariz. 69 , 78, 688 P.2d 961 , 970 (1984) (citations omitted).

2010When an ordinance affects neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right, however, the rational basis test applies, and the ordinance will be upheld so long as it is “rationally and reasonably related to furthering some legitimate government interest.” Id. ¶ 18 The strict scrutiny test would apply in this case only if a fundamental right were affected by the challenged ordinances. 5 The Arizona Constitution may create a fundamental right either explicitly or implicitly.

2003Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 163 Ariz. 560, 566 , 789 P.2d 1061, 1067 (1990) (“To withstand scrutiny [under the rational basis test], however, the statute must not be arbitrary or irrational ... ”).

2020The statute will survive a due process challenge under the rational basis standard if it “has any conceivable rational basis to further a legitimate governmental interest.” Id.

2018The question, then, is whether that possibility (which is not presented by the facts of this case) means that A.R.S. § 25-409(C), or at least the "born out of wedlock" requirement of that statute, is unconstitutional under the rational basis test. ¶ 19 Under rational basis scrutiny, a statute will be upheld "if it has any conceivable rational basis to further a legitimate governmental interest." Ariz. Downs v. Ariz. Horsemen's Found ., 130 Ariz. 550 , 555, 637 P.2d 1053 , 1058 (1981) ; accord Romer v. Evans , 517 U.S. 620 , 631, 116 S.Ct. 1620 , 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996).

1996A court, under the rational basis test, may consider “either the actual basis on which the legislature acted or any hypothetical basis on which it might have acted.” Church v. Rawson Drug & Sundry Co., 173 Ariz. 342, 350 , 842 P.2d 1355, 1363 (App.1992), (quoting Carr v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 758 F.Supp. 1330, 1334 (D.Ariz.1991)).

1996A court, under the rational basis test, may consider “either the actual basis on which the legislature acted or any hypothetical basis on which it might have acted.” Church v. Rawson Drug & Sundry Co., 173 Ariz. 342, 350 , 842 P.2d 1355, 1363 (App.1992), (quoting Carr v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 758 F.Supp. 1330, 1334 (D.Ariz.1991)).

1996The Court in Kenyon distinguished its earlier decision in Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576 , 570 P.2d 744 (1977), which had applied the rational basis test to other provisions of the same act.

1996The Court in Kenyon distinguished its earlier decision in Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576 , 570 P.2d 744 (1977), which had applied the rational basis test to other provisions of the same act.

2018Using the rational basis test, the court found the statute treats "adopted children differently than natural born [ 5 ] children for third party visitation." The court concluded that " § 25-409(C)(2) treats adopted children and natural born children differently and that difference in treatment" contravenes "the Legislature's intent in drafting § 8-117(A) to put adopted children and naturally born children on equal footing in matters of law." Citing McGowan v. Maryland , 366 U.S. 420 , 425, 81 S.Ct. 1101 , 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961), the court concluded that denying adopted children the love, care, a

2018Using the rational basis test, the court found the statute treats "adopted children differently than natural born [ 5 ] children for third party visitation." The court concluded that " § 25-409(C)(2) treats adopted children and natural born children differently and that difference in treatment" contravenes "the Legislature's intent in drafting § 8-117(A) to put adopted children and naturally born children on equal footing in matters of law." Citing McGowan v. Maryland , 366 U.S. 420 , 425, 81 S.Ct. 1101 , 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961), the court concluded that denying adopted children the love, care, a

2018But when neither a suspect class nor fundamental right is involved, we will uphold government action if it is "rationally related to a legitimate government purpose." Navarro , 201 Ariz. at 298, ¶ 25 , 34 P.3d at 977 (citation omitted). ¶ 12 The rational basis test does not require the State to choose "the least intrusive, nor most effective, means of achieving its goals." State v. Hammonds , 192 Ariz. 528 , 532, ¶ 15, 968 P.2d 601 , 605 (App. 1998). "[A]bsolute equality and complete conformity of legislative classifications are not constitutionally required." City of Tucson v. Grezaffi , 200

2018But when neither a suspect class nor fundamental right is involved, we will uphold government action if it is "rationally related to a legitimate government purpose." Navarro , 201 Ariz. at 298, ¶ 25 , 34 P.3d at 977 (citation omitted). ¶ 12 The rational basis test does not require the State to choose "the least intrusive, nor most effective, means of achieving its goals." State v. Hammonds , 192 Ariz. 528 , 532, ¶ 15, 968 P.2d 601 , 605 (App. 1998). "[A]bsolute equality and complete conformity of legislative classifications are not constitutionally required." City of Tucson v. Grezaffi , 200

2018But when neither a suspect class nor fundamental right is involved, we will uphold government action if it is "rationally related to a legitimate government purpose." Navarro , 201 Ariz. at 298, ¶ 25 , 34 P.3d at 977 (citation omitted). ¶ 12 The rational basis test does not require the State to choose "the least intrusive, nor most effective, means of achieving its goals." State v. Hammonds , 192 Ariz. 528 , 532, ¶ 15, 968 P.2d 601 , 605 (App. 1998). "[A]bsolute equality and complete conformity of legislative classifications are not constitutionally required." City of Tucson v. Grezaffi , 200

2018But when neither a suspect class nor fundamental right is involved, we will uphold government action if it is "rationally related to a legitimate government purpose." Navarro , 201 Ariz. at 298, ¶ 25 , 34 P.3d at 977 (citation omitted). ¶ 12 The rational basis test does not require the State to choose "the least intrusive, nor most effective, means of achieving its goals." State v. Hammonds , 192 Ariz. 528 , 532, ¶ 15, 968 P.2d 601 , 605 (App. 1998). "[A]bsolute equality and complete conformity of legislative classifications are not constitutionally required." City of Tucson v. Grezaffi , 200

1979NOTES [*] Although we have previously upheld the forcible rape statute against an equal protection attack in State v. Kelly, 111 Ariz. 181 , 526 P.2d 720 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 935 , 95 S.Ct. 1143 , 43 L.Ed.2d 411 (1975), that case was decided using the rational basis test which Craig v. Boren, supra , makes inappropriate.

1979NOTES [*] Although we have previously upheld the forcible rape statute against an equal protection attack in State v. Kelly, 111 Ariz. 181 , 526 P.2d 720 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 935 , 95 S.Ct. 1143 , 43 L.Ed.2d 411 (1975), that case was decided using the rational basis test which Craig v. Boren, supra , makes inappropriate.

2018See Jackson , 199 Ariz. at 312-13 ¶ 26, 18 P.3d at 106-07 (applying rational basis to a constitutional challenge to A.R.S. § 25-409(F) (2000), currently codified at A.R.S. § 25-409(H) ); accord Graville v. Dodge , 195 Ariz. 119 , 125-126 ¶¶ 26-27, 985 P.2d 604 , 610-11 (App. 1999).

2018See Jackson , 199 Ariz. at 312-13 ¶ 26, 18 P.3d at 106-07 (applying rational basis to a constitutional challenge to A.R.S. § 25-409(F) (2000), currently codified at A.R.S. § 25-409(H) ); accord Graville v. Dodge , 195 Ariz. 119 , 125-126 ¶¶ 26-27, 985 P.2d 604 , 610-11 (App. 1999).

2008See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 , 105 S.Ct. 3249 , 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (Applying the rational-basis standard of review, “legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”). ¶ 7 The Equal Protection Clauses of both the state and federal constitutions “generally require that all persons subject to state legislation shall be treated alike under similar circumstances.” Crerand, 176 Ariz. at 151 , 859 P.2d at 774 .

2008See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 , 105 S.Ct. 3249 , 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (Applying the rational-basis standard of review, “legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”). ¶ 7 The Equal Protection Clauses of both the state and federal constitutions “generally require that all persons subject to state legislation shall be treated alike under similar circumstances.” Crerand, 176 Ariz. at 151 , 859 P.2d at 774 .

2025See Martin v. Reinstein, 195 Ariz. 293, 310, ¶ 53 (App. 1999) (explaining the rational-basis test is applied to equal-protection claims in civil commitment cases).

2025See Martin v. Reinstein, 195 Ariz. 293, 310, ¶ 53 (App. 1999) (explaining the rational-basis test is applied to equal-protection claims in civil commitment cases).

2019See Coleman, 230 Ariz. at 358 ¶ 19 (stating that “if the conduct is not ‘sufficiently imbued with elements of communication,’ then the regulation need only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest” (quoting Anderson, 621 F. 3d at 1059 )). ¶98 Third, content-neutral regulations “that impose an incidental burden on speech” are subject to intermediate scrutiny.

2019See Coleman, 230 Ariz. at 358 ¶ 19 (stating that “if the conduct is not ‘sufficiently imbued with elements of communication,’ then the regulation need only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest” (quoting Anderson, 621 F. 3d at 1059 )). ¶98 Third, content-neutral regulations “that impose an incidental burden on speech” are subject to intermediate scrutiny.

2019See Coleman, 230 Ariz. at 358 ¶ 19 (stating that “if the conduct is not ‘sufficiently imbued with elements of communication,’ then the regulation need only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest” (quoting Anderson, 621 F. 3d at 1059 )). ¶98 Third, content-neutral regulations “that impose an incidental burden on speech” are subject to intermediate scrutiny.

2019See Coleman, 230 Ariz. at 358 ¶ 19 (stating that “if the conduct is not ‘sufficiently imbued with elements of communication,’ then the regulation need only be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest” (quoting Anderson, 621 F. 3d at 1059 )). ¶98 Third, content-neutral regulations “that impose an incidental burden on speech” are subject to intermediate scrutiny.

2019In contrast, the City argues the Ordinance purely regulates discriminatory conduct, not speech, and therefore is subject to the rational basis test. ¶96 First, “laws that by their terms distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content based.” Turner Broad., 512 U.S. at 643 ; see also Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015).

2019Thus, such laws “are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.” Id. at 2226 . ¶97 Second, content-neutral laws that regulate non-expressive conduct, and not speech, are subject to the rational basis test.

2008See id. at 572, 578 , 123 S.Ct. 2472 (applying a rational basis test rather than the strict scrutiny test for fundamental rights); see also id. at 594, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that majority did not identify right as fundamental).

2008See id. at 572, 578 , 123 S.Ct. 2472 (applying a rational basis test rather than the strict scrutiny test for fundamental rights); see also id. at 594, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that majority did not identify right as fundamental).

2008Comm’n, 115 Ariz. 254, 256 , 564 P.2d 943, 945 (App. 1977)). ¶ 32 We apply the rational basis test to determine the constitutionality of Gilbert’s decision to locate the pipeline in the middle of Canyon State Academy’s campus.

2008Comm’n, 115 Ariz. 254, 256 , 564 P.2d 943, 945 (App. 1977)). ¶ 32 We apply the rational basis test to determine the constitutionality of Gilbert’s decision to locate the pipeline in the middle of Canyon State Academy’s campus.

2005The state’s interest, characterized as “compelling” in Fuenning, a fortiori satisfies the rational basis standard. 139 Ariz. at 595 , 680 P.2d at 126.

2005The state’s interest, characterized as “compelling” in Fuenning, a fortiori satisfies the rational basis standard. 139 Ariz. at 595 , 680 P.2d at 126.

1998Moreover, “we may consider either the legislature’s actual purpose or any hypothetical basis upon which it could have acted.” Lerma, 186 Ariz. at 233 , 921 P.2d at 33 . ¶ 35 In view of the significant policy considerations discussed above, we have no doubt that the Act passes muster under the rational basis test.

1998Moreover, “we may consider either the legislature’s actual purpose or any hypothetical basis upon which it could have acted.” Lerma, 186 Ariz. at 233 , 921 P.2d at 33 . ¶ 35 In view of the significant policy considerations discussed above, we have no doubt that the Act passes muster under the rational basis test.

2008See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 , 105 S.Ct. 3249 , 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (Applying the rational-basis standard of review, “legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”). ¶ 7 The Equal Protection Clauses of both the state and federal constitutions “generally require that all persons subject to state legislation shall be treated alike under similar circumstances.” Crerand, 176 Ariz. at 151 , 859 P.2d at 774 .

2008See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 , 105 S.Ct. 3249 , 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (Applying the rational-basis standard of review, “legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”). ¶ 7 The Equal Protection Clauses of both the state and federal constitutions “generally require that all persons subject to state legislation shall be treated alike under similar circumstances.” Crerand, 176 Ariz. at 151 , 859 P.2d at 774 .

2018The question, then, is whether that possibility (which is not presented by the facts of this case) means that A.R.S. § 25-409(C), or at least the "born out of wedlock" requirement of that statute, is unconstitutional under the rational basis test. ¶ 19 Under rational basis scrutiny, a statute will be upheld "if it has any conceivable rational basis to further a legitimate governmental interest." Ariz. Downs v. Ariz. Horsemen's Found ., 130 Ariz. 550 , 555, 637 P.2d 1053 , 1058 (1981) ; accord Romer v. Evans , 517 U.S. 620 , 631, 116 S.Ct. 1620 , 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996).

2018The question, then, is whether that possibility (which is not presented by the facts of this case) means that A.R.S. § 25-409(C), or at least the "born out of wedlock" requirement of that statute, is unconstitutional under the rational basis test. ¶ 19 Under rational basis scrutiny, a statute will be upheld "if it has any conceivable rational basis to further a legitimate governmental interest." Ariz. Downs v. Ariz. Horsemen's Found ., 130 Ariz. 550 , 555, 637 P.2d 1053 , 1058 (1981) ; accord Romer v. Evans , 517 U.S. 620 , 631, 116 S.Ct. 1620 , 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996).

1991Under the rational basis test, the equal protection clause “is only violated if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the state’s objectives.” Bryant, 156 Ariz. at 196 , 751 P.2d at 512 .

1991Under the rational basis test, the equal protection clause “is only violated if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the state’s objectives.” Bryant, 156 Ariz. at 196 , 751 P.2d at 512 .

2020Faraji argues that the City must proffer a legitimate reason for its action, but under the rational basis test defendants "need not offer any rational basis so long as this Court can conceive of one." Theile v. Michigan, 891 F.3d 240, 243 (6th Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted); see also Goodyear Farms v. City of Avondale, 148 Ariz. 216, 219 (1986) ("Under [the] 'rational basis' test, a legislative classification will not be set aside if any set of facts rationally justifying it is demonstrated to or perceived by the courts.").

2001Id. at 219-22 , 714 P.2d at 389-92 , citing Carlyn v. City of Akron, 726 F.2d 287 (6th Cir.1984); Berry v. Bourne, 588 F.2d 422 (4th Cir.1978); Township of Jefferson v. City of West Carrollton, 517 F.Supp. 417 (S.D.Ohio 1981), aff'd. 718 F.2d 1099 (6th Cir.1983); Doenges v. City of Salt Lake City, *517 614 P.2d 1237 (Utah 1980); Torres v. Village of Capitan, 92 N.M. 64 , 582 P.2d 1277 (1978).

2018But when neither a suspect class nor fundamental right is involved, we will uphold government action if it is "rationally related to a legitimate government purpose." Navarro , 201 Ariz. at 298, ¶ 25 , 34 P.3d at 977 (citation omitted). ¶ 12 The rational basis test does not require the State to choose "the least intrusive, nor most effective, means of achieving its goals." State v. Hammonds , 192 Ariz. 528 , 532, ¶ 15, 968 P.2d 601 , 605 (App. 1998). "[A]bsolute equality and complete conformity of legislative classifications are not constitutionally required." City of Tucson v. Grezaffi , 200

2018But when neither a suspect class nor fundamental right is involved, we will uphold government action if it is "rationally related to a legitimate government purpose." Navarro , 201 Ariz. at 298, ¶ 25 , 34 P.3d at 977 (citation omitted). ¶ 12 The rational basis test does not require the State to choose "the least intrusive, nor most effective, means of achieving its goals." State v. Hammonds , 192 Ariz. 528 , 532, ¶ 15, 968 P.2d 601 , 605 (App. 1998). "[A]bsolute equality and complete conformity of legislative classifications are not constitutionally required." City of Tucson v. Grezaffi , 200

2016The rational basis test does not require the legislature to choose “the least intrusive, nor most effective, means of achieving its goals.” State v. Hammonds, 192 Ariz. 528, 532, ¶ 15 , 968 P.2d 601 (App.1998) (citing Ohio Bureau of Emp’t Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 491 , 97 S.Ct. 1898 , 52 L.Ed.2d 513 (1977)).

2016The rational basis test does not require the legislature to choose “the least intrusive, nor most effective, means of achieving its goals.” State v. Hammonds, 192 Ariz. 528, 532, ¶ 15 , 968 P.2d 601 (App.1998) (citing Ohio Bureau of Emp’t Servs. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 491 , 97 S.Ct. 1898 , 52 L.Ed.2d 513 (1977)).

2003I, § 8, cl. 4; see Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-85 , 96 S.Ct. 1883 , 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976) (finding that congressional restrictions on welfare benefits for aliens are subject to a rational basis analysis).

2003I, § 8, cl. 4; see Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-85 , 96 S.Ct. 1883 , 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976) (finding that congressional restrictions on welfare benefits for aliens are subject to a rational basis analysis).