88 Connecticut opinions name it 3 courts 1980–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Connecticut courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritzgreen2 sentences2000See United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 , 174 , 179 , 101 S.Ct. 453 , 66 L.Ed.2d 368 (1980), reh. denied, 450 U.S. 960 , 101 S.Ct. 1421 , 67 L.Ed.2d 385 (1981); Johnson v. Mehan, 225 Conn. 528 , 536 , 626 A.2d 24 (1993). 2000See United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 , 174 , 179 , 101 S.Ct. 453 , 66 L.Ed.2d 368 (1980), reh. denied, 450 U.S. 960 , 101 S.Ct. 1421 , 67 L.Ed.2d 385 (1981); Johnson v. Mehan, 225 Conn. 528 , 536 , 626 A.2d 24 (1993). | 4 | 4 |
City of New Orleans v. Dukesgreen2 sentences1992"Under the rational basis test, `[t]he court's function . . . is to decide whether the purpose of the legislation is a legitimate one, and whether the particular enactment is designed to accomplish that purpose in a fair and reasonable way.' Pierce v. Albanese, 144, Conn. 241, 249, 129 A.2d 606 , appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 15 , 78 S.Ct. 36 , 2 L.Ed.2d 21 (1957); see New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 , 303 , 96 S.Ct. 2513 , 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 520 , 425, 81 S.Ct. 1101 , 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); Caldor's Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc. 177 Conn. 304 , 315 , 417 A.2d 343 1992"Under the rational basis test, `[t]he court's function . . . is to decide whether the purpose of the legislation is a legitimate one, and whether the particular enactment is designed to accomplish that purpose in a fair and reasonable way.' Pierce v. Albanese, 144, Conn. 241, 249, 129 A.2d 606 , appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 15 , 78 S.Ct. 36 , 2 L.Ed.2d 21 (1957); see New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 , 303 , 96 S.Ct. 2513 , 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 520 , 425, 81 S.Ct. 1101 , 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); Caldor's Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc. 177 Conn. 304 , 315 , 417 A.2d 343 | 4 | 4 |
State v. Higginsgreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., State v. Higgins, 265 Conn. 35 , 68–69, 826 A.2d 1126 (2003) (discussing, as part of equal protection claim analysis, whether defendant raised claim that statute is underinclusive or overinclusive). 2021See, e.g., State v. Higgins, 265 Conn. 35 , 68–69, 826 A.2d 1126 (2003) (discussing, as part of equal protection claim analysis, whether defendant raised claim that statute is underinclusive or overinclusive). | 2 | 2 |
Vance v. Bradleygreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 , 108–109, 99 S. Ct. 939 , 59 L. 2021See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 , 108–109, 99 S. Ct. 939 , 59 L. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Morangreen2 sentences2019See State v. Moran, 264 Conn. 593, 615 , 825 A.2d 111 (2003). 2019See State v. Moran, 264 Conn. 593, 615 , 825 A.2d 111 (2003). | 2 | 2 |
Bhinder v. Sun Co.green2 sentences2004Co., 233 Conn. 437, 457 , 664 A.2d 279 (1995); see Bhinder v. Sun Co., 263 Conn. 358, 374 , 819 A.2d 822 (2003) (“retroactive legislation only must meet the most deferential standard of review, namely, the rational basis test”). 17 Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that the city was deprived of a protected property interest, we nevertheless conclude that §§ 7-433c and 31-306 (a) (2) constitute rational means to further a legitimate legislative purpose and, accordingly, satisfy the requirements of due process. 2004Co., 233 Conn. 437, 457 , 664 A.2d 279 (1995); see Bhinder v. Sun Co., 263 Conn. 358, 374 , 819 A.2d 822 (2003) (“retroactive legislation only must meet the most deferential standard of review, namely, the rational basis test”). 17 Even if we were to assume, arguendo, that the city was deprived of a protected property interest, we nevertheless conclude that §§ 7-433c and 31-306 (a) (2) constitute rational means to further a legitimate legislative purpose and, accordingly, satisfy the requirements of due process. | 2 | 2 |
Donahue v. Town of Southingtongreen2 sentences2006See Donahue v. Southington, 259 Conn. 783 , 794 n. 7, 792 A.2d 76 (2002). [11] A search for a legitimate state interest typically signifies a rational basis analysis. 2006See Donahue v. Southington, 259 Conn. 783 , 794 n. 7, 792 A.2d 76 (2002). [11] A search for a legitimate state interest typically signifies a rational basis analysis. | 2 | 2 |
Zapata v. Burnsgreen2 sentences1999The court’s function under the rational basis test “is to decide whether the classification and disparate treatment inherent in a statute bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state end and are based on reasons related to the accomplishment of that goal.” Zapata v. Burns, 207 Conn. 496, 507 , 542 A.2d 700 (1988); Daily v. New Britain Machine Co., 200 Conn. 562, 577 , 512 A.2d 893 (1986). 1999The court’s function under the rational basis test “is to decide whether the classification and disparate treatment inherent in a statute bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state end and are based on reasons related to the accomplishment of that goal.” Zapata v. Burns, 207 Conn. 496, 507 , 542 A.2d 700 (1988); Daily v. New Britain Machine Co., 200 Conn. 562, 577 , 512 A.2d 893 (1986). | 1 | 7 |
Caldor's, Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc.green2 sentences1992"Under the rational basis test, `[t]he court's function . . . is to decide whether the purpose of the legislation is a legitimate one, and whether the particular enactment is designed to accomplish that purpose in a fair and reasonable way.' Pierce v. Albanese, 144, Conn. 241, 249, 129 A.2d 606 , appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 15 , 78 S.Ct. 36 , 2 L.Ed.2d 21 (1957); see New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 , 303 , 96 S.Ct. 2513 , 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 520 , 425, 81 S.Ct. 1101 , 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); Caldor's Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc. 177 Conn. 304 , 315 , 417 A.2d 343 1992"Under the rational basis test, `[t]he court's function . . . is to decide whether the purpose of the legislation is a legitimate one, and whether the particular enactment is designed to accomplish that purpose in a fair and reasonable way.' Pierce v. Albanese, 144, Conn. 241, 249, 129 A.2d 606 , appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 15 , 78 S.Ct. 36 , 2 L.Ed.2d 21 (1957); see New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 , 303 , 96 S.Ct. 2513 , 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 520 , 425, 81 S.Ct. 1101 , 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); Caldor's Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc. 177 Conn. 304 , 315 , 417 A.2d 343 | 1 | 4 |
Hammond v. Commissioner of Correctiongreen2 sentences2007See Hammond v. Commissioner of Correction, 259 Conn. 855, 888 , 792 A.2d 774 (2002) (if statute “does not implicate a fundamental right, we review [it] under a rational basis test” and “[i]n such circumstances, the state must show only that the law is not arbitrary or capricious, that is, that it bears a reasonable relation to some legitimate state purpose”). 2007See Hammond v. Commissioner of Correction, 259 Conn. 855, 888 , 792 A.2d 774 (2002) (if statute “does not implicate a fundamental right, we review [it] under a rational basis test” and “[i]n such circumstances, the state must show only that the law is not arbitrary or capricious, that is, that it bears a reasonable relation to some legitimate state purpose”). | 1 | 3 |
Johnson v. Meehangreen2 sentences1994See also Johnson v. Meehan , 225 Conn. 528 , 535 , 626 A.2d 244 (1993) (where a plaintiff advances an equal protection claim, the court must ascertain whether the rational basis test or the more stringent strict scrutiny test should be used to assess the constitutionality of the statute). 1994See also Johnson v. Meehan , 225 Conn. 528 , 535 , 626 A.2d 244 (1993) (where a plaintiff advances an equal protection claim, the court must ascertain whether the rational basis test or the more stringent strict scrutiny test should be used to assess the constitutionality of the statute). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Matosgreen2 sentences2021We previously have held that ‘‘[this] explicit prohibition of discrimination because of physical [or mental] disability defines . . . constitutionally protected class[es] of persons whose rights are protected by requiring encroachments on these rights to pass a strict scrutiny test.’’ Daly v. DelPonte, 225 Conn. 499 , 513–14, 624 A.2d 876 (1993). ‘‘In the absence of a claim of deprivation of a funda- mental right [or the targeting of a suspect class], we have scrutinized such questions under a rational basis test. . . . [Under that standard] [t]he party claiming a constitutional violation bear 2021We previously have held that ‘‘[this] explicit prohibition of discrimination because of physical [or mental] disability defines . . . constitutionally protected class[es] of persons whose rights are protected by requiring encroachments on these rights to pass a strict scrutiny test.’’ Daly v. DelPonte, 225 Conn. 499 , 513–14, 624 A.2d 876 (1993). ‘‘In the absence of a claim of deprivation of a funda- mental right [or the targeting of a suspect class], we have scrutinized such questions under a rational basis test. . . . [Under that standard] [t]he party claiming a constitutional violation bear | 1 | 2 |
Ramos v. Town of Vernongreen2 sentences2021We previously have held that ‘‘[this] explicit prohibition of discrimination because of physical [or mental] disability defines . . . constitutionally protected class[es] of persons whose rights are protected by requiring encroachments on these rights to pass a strict scrutiny test.’’ Daly v. DelPonte, 225 Conn. 499 , 513–14, 624 A.2d 876 (1993). ‘‘In the absence of a claim of deprivation of a funda- mental right [or the targeting of a suspect class], we have scrutinized such questions under a rational basis test. . . . [Under that standard] [t]he party claiming a constitutional violation bear 2021We previously have held that ‘‘[this] explicit prohibition of discrimination because of physical [or mental] disability defines . . . constitutionally protected class[es] of persons whose rights are protected by requiring encroachments on these rights to pass a strict scrutiny test.’’ Daly v. DelPonte, 225 Conn. 499 , 513–14, 624 A.2d 876 (1993). ‘‘In the absence of a claim of deprivation of a funda- mental right [or the targeting of a suspect class], we have scrutinized such questions under a rational basis test. . . . [Under that standard] [t]he party claiming a constitutional violation bear | 1 | 2 |
Eugene W. Tyler v. Trammell E. Vickery, Ralph Banks, Jr. v. Trammell E. Vickery, James E. C. Perry v. Edward S. Sell, Jr.green2 sentences1992Campbell v. Board of Education, supra, 105 . "[T]he focus of the rational relationship test is not whether the state has superior means available to accomplish its objectives but whether the means it has chosen is a reasonable one." Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089 , 1102 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 42 U.S. 940 (1976). 1992Courts generally employ a rational basis test to determine whether a grading procedure is constitutional. “[T]he focus of the rational relationship test is not whether the state has superior means available to accomplish its objectives, but whether the means it has chosen is a reasonable one.” Tyler v. Vickery, 517 F.2d 1089, 1102 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 940 , 96 S. Ct. 2660 , 49 L. | 1 | 2 |
| Boddie v. Connecticutgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Shadburne-Vinton v. Dalkon Shield Trustgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wesley Theological Seminary of the United Methodist Church v. United States Gypsum Companygreen | 1 | 1 |
| cluster 781247green | 1 | 1 |
| San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Pawtucket v. Sundlungreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hernandez v. Roblesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Romer v. Evansgreen | 1 | 1 |
| City Recycling, Inc. v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Fulton Corp. v. Faulknergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Langworthy v. Marylandgreen | 1 | 1 |
| General Food Vending Inc. v. Town of Westfieldgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Raogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Campbell v. Board of Educationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ramos v. Town of Vernongreen2 sentences2021We previously have held that ‘‘[this] explicit prohibition of discrimination because of physical [or mental] disability defines . . . constitutionally protected class[es] of persons whose rights are protected by requiring encroachments on these rights to pass a strict scrutiny test.’’ Daly v. DelPonte, 225 Conn. 499 , 513–14, 624 A.2d 876 (1993). ‘‘In the absence of a claim of deprivation of a funda- mental right [or the targeting of a suspect class], we have scrutinized such questions under a rational basis test. . . . [Under that standard] [t]he party claiming a constitutional violation bear 2021We previously have held that ‘‘[this] explicit prohibition of discrimination because of physical [or mental] disability defines . . . constitutionally protected class[es] of persons whose rights are protected by requiring encroachments on these rights to pass a strict scrutiny test.’’ Daly v. DelPonte, 225 Conn. 499 , 513–14, 624 A.2d 876 (1993). ‘‘In the absence of a claim of deprivation of a funda- mental right [or the targeting of a suspect class], we have scrutinized such questions under a rational basis test. . . . [Under that standard] [t]he party claiming a constitutional violation bear | 1 | 2 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Blakeslee Arpaia Chapman, Inc. v. EI Constructors, Inc.
green
2 sentences2002Id., 757 . 2002Id., 757 . | 10 | 2002–2002 |
Daly v. DelPonte
green
2 sentences2021We previously have held that ‘‘[this] explicit prohibition of discrimination because of physical [or mental] disability defines . . . constitutionally protected class[es] of persons whose rights are protected by requiring encroachments on these rights to pass a strict scrutiny test.’’ Daly v. DelPonte, 225 Conn. 499 , 513–14, 624 A.2d 876 (1993). ‘‘In the absence of a claim of deprivation of a funda- mental right [or the targeting of a suspect class], we have scrutinized such questions under a rational basis test. . . . [Under that standard] [t]he party claiming a constitutional violation bear 2021We previously have held that ‘‘[this] explicit prohibition of discrimination because of physical [or mental] disability defines . . . constitutionally protected class[es] of persons whose rights are protected by requiring encroachments on these rights to pass a strict scrutiny test.’’ Daly v. DelPonte, 225 Conn. 499 , 513–14, 624 A.2d 876 (1993). ‘‘In the absence of a claim of deprivation of a funda- mental right [or the targeting of a suspect class], we have scrutinized such questions under a rational basis test. . . . [Under that standard] [t]he party claiming a constitutional violation bear | 6 | 1993–2021 |
Krasnov v. United States
green
2 sentences1997Under the rational basis test, the court's function is "to decide whether the purpose of the legislature is a legitimate one and whether the particular enactment is designed to accomplish that purpose in a fair and reasonable way." Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241 , 249 , appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 15 , 78 S.Ct. 36 , 2 L.Ed.2d 21 (1957). 1992"Under the rational basis test, `[t]he court's function . . . is to decide whether the purpose of the legislation is a legitimate one, and whether the particular enactment is designed to accomplish that purpose in a fair and reasonable way.' Pierce v. Albanese, 144, Conn. 241, 249, 129 A.2d 606 , appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 15 , 78 S.Ct. 36 , 2 L.Ed.2d 21 (1957); see New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 , 303 , 96 S.Ct. 2513 , 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 520 , 425, 81 S.Ct. 1101 , 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); Caldor's Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc. 177 Conn. 304 , 315 , 417 A.2d 343 | 5 | 1984–1997 |
Albanese v. Pierce
green
2 sentences1997Under the rational basis test, the court's function is "to decide whether the purpose of the legislature is a legitimate one and whether the particular enactment is designed to accomplish that purpose in a fair and reasonable way." Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241 , 249 , appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 15 , 78 S.Ct. 36 , 2 L.Ed.2d 21 (1957). 1992"Under the rational basis test, `[t]he court's function . . . is to decide whether the purpose of the legislation is a legitimate one, and whether the particular enactment is designed to accomplish that purpose in a fair and reasonable way.' Pierce v. Albanese, 144, Conn. 241, 249, 129 A.2d 606 , appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 15 , 78 S.Ct. 36 , 2 L.Ed.2d 21 (1957); see New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 , 303 , 96 S.Ct. 2513 , 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 520 , 425, 81 S.Ct. 1101 , 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); Caldor's Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc. 177 Conn. 304 , 315 , 417 A.2d 343 | 5 | 1984–1997 |
Pierce v. Albanese
green
2 sentences1997Under the rational basis test, the court's function is "to decide whether the purpose of the legislature is a legitimate one and whether the particular enactment is designed to accomplish that purpose in a fair and reasonable way." Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241 , 249 , appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 15 , 78 S.Ct. 36 , 2 L.Ed.2d 21 (1957). 1992"Under the rational basis test, `[t]he court's function . . . is to decide whether the purpose of the legislation is a legitimate one, and whether the particular enactment is designed to accomplish that purpose in a fair and reasonable way.' Pierce v. Albanese, 144, Conn. 241, 249, 129 A.2d 606 , appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 15 , 78 S.Ct. 36 , 2 L.Ed.2d 21 (1957); see New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 , 303 , 96 S.Ct. 2513 , 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 520 , 425, 81 S.Ct. 1101 , 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); Caldor's Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc. 177 Conn. 304 , 315 , 417 A.2d 343 | 5 | 1984–1997 |
Charles v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R.
green
2 sentences1997Under the rational basis test, the court's function is "to decide whether the purpose of the legislature is a legitimate one and whether the particular enactment is designed to accomplish that purpose in a fair and reasonable way." Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241 , 249 , appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 15 , 78 S.Ct. 36 , 2 L.Ed.2d 21 (1957). 1992"Under the rational basis test, `[t]he court's function . . . is to decide whether the purpose of the legislation is a legitimate one, and whether the particular enactment is designed to accomplish that purpose in a fair and reasonable way.' Pierce v. Albanese, 144, Conn. 241, 249, 129 A.2d 606 , appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 15 , 78 S.Ct. 36 , 2 L.Ed.2d 21 (1957); see New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 , 303 , 96 S.Ct. 2513 , 49 L.Ed.2d 511 (1976); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 520 , 425, 81 S.Ct. 1101 , 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961); Caldor's Inc. v. Bedding Barn, Inc. 177 Conn. 304 , 315 , 417 A.2d 343 | 5 | 1984–1997 |
Circuit-Wise, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services
green
2 sentences1997“Under the rational basis test, [t]he court’s function . . . is to decide whether the purpose of the legislation is a legitimate one and whether the particular enactment is designed to accomplish that purpose in a fair and reasonable way.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Circuit-Wise, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 215 Conn. 292, 300 , 576 A.2d 1259 (1990). 1997“Under the rational basis test, [t]he court’s function . . . is to decide whether the purpose of the legislation is a legitimate one and whether the particular enactment is designed to accomplish that purpose in a fair and reasonable way.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Circuit-Wise, Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 215 Conn. 292, 300 , 576 A.2d 1259 (1990). | 4 | 1996–1998 |
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents
green
2 sentences2021Id., 447 (‘‘[i]f the statute does not impact a fundamental right, then we apply the [rational basis] test to the statute’’). ‘‘[W]hen conducting rational basis review we will not overturn such [government action] unless the varying treatment of different groups or per- sons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combina- tion of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the [government’s] actions were irrational.’’ (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 84 , 120 S. Ct. 631 , 145 L. 2021Id., 447 (‘‘[i]f the statute does not impact a fundamental right, then we apply the [rational basis] test to the statute’’). ‘‘[W]hen conducting rational basis review we will not overturn such [government action] unless the varying treatment of different groups or per- sons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combina- tion of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the [government’s] actions were irrational.’’ (Inter- nal quotation marks omitted.) Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 84 , 120 S. Ct. 631 , 145 L. | 2 | 2021–2021 |
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.
green
2 sentences2008In summarizing the rational basis test, the court referred to the fact that, where the group involved has characteristics relevant to state interests, "courts have been very reluctant, as they should be in our federal system and with our respect for the separation of powers, to closely scrutinize legislative choices...." (Emphasis added.) Id., at 441, 105 S.Ct. 3249 . 2008The court then turned to its explanation of why it rejected quasi-suspect classification for the mentally retarded, stating: "[T]he distinctive legislative response, both national and state, to the plight of those who are mentally retarded demonstrates not only that they have unique problems, but also that lawmakers have been addressing their difficulties in a manner that belies a continuing antipathy or prejudice and a corresponding need for more intrusive oversight by the judiciary. " (Emphasis added.) Id., at 443, 105 S.Ct. 3249 . | 2 | 2006–2008 |
Broadley v. Board of Education
green
2 sentences2006See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, supra, 517 U.S. at 632 , 116 S.Ct. 1620 ; Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., supra, 473 U.S. at 446 , 105 S.Ct. 3249 ; Broadley v. Board of Education, 229 Conn. 1 , 9 n. 16, 639 A.2d 502 (1994); State v. Campbell, 224 Conn. 168, 186 , 617 A.2d 889 (1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 919 , 113 S.Ct. 2365 , 124 L.Ed.2d 271 (1993); Zapata v. Burns, 207 Conn. 496, 505 , 542 A.2d 700 (1988). [12] Although the target of harsh criticism; see, e.g., N. Lund & J. 2006See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, supra, 517 U.S. at 632 , 116 S.Ct. 1620 ; Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., supra, 473 U.S. at 446 , 105 S.Ct. 3249 ; Broadley v. Board of Education, 229 Conn. 1 , 9 n. 16, 639 A.2d 502 (1994); State v. Campbell, 224 Conn. 168, 186 , 617 A.2d 889 (1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 919 , 113 S.Ct. 2365 , 124 L.Ed.2d 271 (1993); Zapata v. Burns, 207 Conn. 496, 505 , 542 A.2d 700 (1988). [12] Although the target of harsh criticism; see, e.g., N. Lund & J. | 2 | 1997–2006 |
Ryszkiewicz v. City of New Britain
green
2 sentences2001In Ryszkiewsicz v. New Britain, [ 193 Conn. 589, 597-98 , 479 A.2d 793 (1984)], we applied the rational basis test to a statute despite the plaintiffs claim that it must face strict scrutiny because it impinges on the fundamental right to recover damages for injuries from tortious acts, citing the Connecticut constitution, article first, § 10. 2001In Ryszkiewsicz v. New Britain, [ 193 Conn. 589, 597-98 , 479 A.2d 793 (1984)], we applied the rational basis test to a statute despite the plaintiffs claim that it must face strict scrutiny because it impinges on the fundamental right to recover damages for injuries from tortious acts, citing the Connecticut constitution, article first, § 10. | 2 | 1993–2001 |
Town of Beacon Falls v. Posick
green
2 sentences2000"The test of illegality is whether the regulation is rationally related to the protection of the public health, safety and general welfare of the community. . . . [C]ourts can interfere CT Page 13108 only in those extreme circumstances where the action taken is unreasonable, discriminatory or arbitrary." Beacon Falls v. Posick, 212 Conn. 570 , 585 , 563 A.2d 285 (1989). "[A] presumption of validity is accorded to municipal ordinances. 2000"The test of illegality is whether the regulation is rationally related to the protection of the public health, safety and general welfare of the community. . . . [C]ourts can interfere CT Page 13108 only in those extreme circumstances where the action taken is unreasonable, discriminatory or arbitrary." Beacon Falls v. Posick, 212 Conn. 570 , 585 , 563 A.2d 285 (1989). "[A] presumption of validity is accorded to municipal ordinances. | 2 | 1992–2000 |
Gallacher v. Commissioner of Revenue Services
green
2 sentences1997"The first step in confronting the plaintiffs' equal protection argument is to ascertain whether the rational basis test or the more stringent strict scrutiny test applies." Gallacher v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 221 Conn. 166 , 181 , 602 A.2d 996 (1992). 1997"The first step in confronting the plaintiffs' equal protection argument is to ascertain whether the rational basis test or the more stringent strict scrutiny test applies." Gallacher v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 221 Conn. 166 , 181 , 602 A.2d 996 (1992). | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Keogh v. City of Bridgeport
green
2 sentences1997"When a statutory classification impinges upon an inherently suspect class or affects a CT Page 2182 fundamental personal right, the statute is subject to strict scrutiny and is justified only by a compelling state interest." Keogh v. Bridgeport, 187 Conn. 53 , 66 , 444 A.2d 225 (1982). 1997"When a statutory classification impinges upon an inherently suspect class or affects a CT Page 2182 fundamental personal right, the statute is subject to strict scrutiny and is justified only by a compelling state interest." Keogh v. Bridgeport, 187 Conn. 53 , 66 , 444 A.2d 225 (1982). | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Frazier v. Manson
green
2 sentences1997Frazier v. Manson, 176 Conn. 638 , 646-647 , 451 A.2d 408 (1979). 1997Frazier v. Manson, 176 Conn. 638 , 646-47 , 451 A.2d 408 (1979). | 2 | 1997–1997 |
Harbor Insurance v. Groppo
green
2 sentences1996Co. v. Groppo, 208 Conn. 505, 509 , 544 A.2d 1221 (1988). 1995“Under the rational basis test, the court’s function ... is to decide whether the purpose of the legislation is a legitimate one and whether the particular enactment is designed to accomplish that purpose in a fair and reasonable way.” (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 509 . | 2 | 1995–1996 |
| United States v. Carlton green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Federal Communications Commission v. Beach Communications, Inc. green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Society Insurance v. Labor & Industry Review Commission green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Hart v. United States green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Martinez v. Cockrell green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| United States v. Carolene Products Co. green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| State v. Campbell green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. Limon green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Johnson v. Florida green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Splawn v. United States green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Campbell v. Connecticut green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Serrano v. Aetna Insurance green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Grover v. Town of Manchester green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Richardson v. Illinois green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Howell v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. of Virginia green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Mullaly v. Smyth green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Foti v. Richardson green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Barket, Levy & Fine, Inc. v. St. Louis Thermal Energy Corporation Bi-State Development Agency of the Missouri-Illinois Metropolitan District green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| cluster 704081 green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Heller v. Doe Ex Rel. Doe green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Keegan v. Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Clarke v. Comissioner of Correction green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Keegan v. Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.