rational basis test in North Dakota

1994In Kavadas v. Lorenzen, 448 N.W.2d 219, 222-223 (N.D.1989), we explained our rationale for choosing between the intermediate level of scrutiny and the rational basis standard of review: "Hanson follows our equal protection cases in which we have generally applied the intermediate level of scrutiny to classifications which have completely prevented a class of injured persons from maintaining an action to recover for their injuries.

1994See also Skeen et al. v. State of Minnesota et al., 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn.1993) [although strict scrutiny applies in determining whether the Legislature has met a student’s fundamental right to a general and uniform system of public schools, rational basis applies to determining whether financing of the system is thorough and efficient], In Kavadas v. Lorenzen, 448 N.W.2d 219, 222-223 (N.D.1989), we explained our rationale for choosing between the intermediate level of scrutiny and the rational basis standard of review: “Hanson follows our equal protection eases in which we have generally appli

2025Co., Inc. v. Spaeth, 461 N.W.2d 91, 96 (N.D. 1990) (“Under this rational basis standard, we uphold legislation unless it is patently arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.”); Larimore Pub.

2025Co., Inc. v. Spaeth, 461 N.W.2d 91, 96 (N.D. 1990) (“Under this rational basis standard, we uphold legislation unless it is patently arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.”); Larimore Pub.

1994See State v. Knoefler, 279 N.W.2d 658, 662 (N.D.1979)." Because no inherently suspect or fundamental interest classifications warranting strict scrutiny are involved in this case, we *198 must choose between the rational basis standard and the intermediate standard.

1994See State v. Knoefler, 279 N.W.2d 658, 662 (N.D.1979).” Because no inherently suspect or fundamental interest classifications warranting strict scrutiny are involved in this case, we must choose between the rational basis standard and the intermediate standard.

2015Under rational basis review, “a statute withstands a substantive due process challenge if the state identifies a legitimate state interest that the legislature could rationally conclude was served by the statute.” (Citations omitted.) Alexander v. Whitman, 114 F.3d 1392, 1403 (3d Cir.1997).

1999Under rational basis review, “a statute withstands a substantive due process challenge if the state identifies a legitimate state interest that the legislature could rationally conclude was served by the statute.” (Citations omitted.) Alexander v. Whitman , 114 F.3d 1392, 1403 (3d Cir. 1997). [¶14] Substantive due process analysis requires a close correspondence between legislation and the goals it advances.

2008See Hudson v. State , 825 So.2d 460, 468 (Fla. Dist.

2008See Hudson v. State, 825 So.2d 460, 468 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2002); In re Detention of Samuelson, 189 Ill.2d 548 , 244 Ill.Dec. 929 , 727 N.E.2d 228, 236 (2000); In re Detention of Williams, 628 N.W.2d 447, 453 (Iowa 2001); In re Detention of Petersen v. State, 104 Wash.App. 283 , 36 P.3d 1053, 1057 (2000).

2003Kadrmas, 487 U.S. at 463 , 108 S.Ct. 2481 ; Baldock , at 446.

1998When no suspect class, fundamental right, or important substantive right is involved, we apply a rational basis standard and sustain the legislative classification unless it is patently arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.” [¶ 10] In Baldock , at 446, we considered an equal protection challenge to the seventy-five percent income classification in N.D.C.C. § 65-05.1-01(3).

2008Court , 429 N.W.2d 429 , 433 (N.D. 1988). [¶16] Many courts that have considered equal protection challenges to statutes governing the commitment of sexually dangerous individuals compared to statutes governing the commitment of mentally ill individuals have applied a rational basis standard of review and concluded there was not an equal protection violation.

2008Court, 429 N.W.2d 429 , 433 (N.D.1988). [¶ 16] Many courts that have considered equal protection challenges to statutes governing the commitment of sexually dangerous individuals compared to statutes governing the commitment of mentally ill individuals have applied a rational basis standard of review and concluded there was not an equal protection violation.

1996Lastly, if there is no fundamental or important substantive interest involved, we will consider the classification under a rational basis standard, where the legislation will be sustained unless it is "patently arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate government interest." Id. at 323.

1996Lastly, if there is no fundamental or important substantive interest involved, we will consider the classification under a rational basis standard, where the legislation will be sustained unless it is “patently arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate government interest.” Id. at 323 .

1994Const. D In urging the intermediate level of scrutiny, Haney relies, in addition to Benson , on this Court’s decision in Lee v. Job Service North Dakota, 440 N.W.2d at 519 , which applied the rational basis test to a classification relating to unemployment compensation benefits, and distinguished workers compensation benefits: “Unemployment benefits are a matter of legislative grace.

1994As we summarized in Lee v. Job Service North Dakota, 440 N.W.2d at 519 -20: “Under the rational basis standard of review, a.legislative classification will be sustained unless it is patently arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate government interest.

2003Bureau, 554 N.W.2d 441, 446 (N.D.1996) (citing NL Indus., Inc. v. North Dakota State Tax Comm’r, 498 N.W.2d 141, 149 (N.D.1993)); accord Haney, at 202; Leppert , at ¶ 18; State v. Knoefler, 325 N.W.2d 192, 195 (N.D.1982). “‘The Equal Protection Clause does not demand for purposes of rational-basis review that a legislature or governing decisionmaker actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification.’ ” NL Indus., Inc., at 149 (quoting Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15-16 , 112 S.Ct. 2326 , 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992)).

1997NL Industries, 498 N.W.2d at 149 . [¶ 32] Under the rational basis test, a legislative classification will be upheld unless it is patently arbitrary and bears no rational relationship to a legitimate government purpose.

2007See Polk, 449 A.2d at 17 ; Grimm, 635 A.2d at 462 . [¶ 31] The legislature has chosen the preponderance of evidence standard for physician discipline and this Court, the governing body for attorneys, has chosen the clear and convincing standard for attorney discipline.

2007See Polk, 449 A.2d at 17 ; Grimm, 635 A.2d at 462 . [¶31] The legislature has chosen the preponderance of evidence standard for physician discipline and this Court, the governing body for attorneys, has chosen the clear and convincing standard for attorney discipline.

1996This level of scrutiny is generally applied when "statutory classifications involve economic or social matters and do not deprive a class of plaintiffs from access to the courts." Bismarck Public School Dist. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 257 (N.D. 1994) (quoting Kavadas v. Lorenzen , 448 N.W.2d 219, 222 (N.D. 1989)).

1996This level of scrutiny is generally applied when “statutory classifications involve economic or social matters and do not deprive a class of plaintiffs from access to the courts.” Bismarck Public School Dist. 1 v. State, 511 N.W.2d 247, 257 (N.D.1994) (quoting Kavadas v. Lorenzen, 448 N.W.2d 219, 222 (N.D.1989)).

1988If we were to apply the rational basis standard what we said in Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc. v. North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy, 219 N.W.2d 140, 148 (N.D.1974), would be pertinent: "`It is also well established that a classification although discriminatory is not arbitrary nor violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it. [Cites omitted.] Furthermore, a court need not know the special reasons, motives, or policies of a State legislature in adopting a particular classification, so long as the poli

1988If we were to apply the rational basis standard what we said in Snyder’s Drug Stores, Inc. v. North Dakota State Board of Pharmacy, 219 N.W.2d 140, 148 (N.D.1974), would be pertinent: “ ‘It is also well established that a classification although discriminatory is not arbitrary nor violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if any state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it. [Cites omitted.] Furthermore, a court need not know the special reasons, motives, or policies of a State legislature in adopting a particular classification, so long as the pol

2003Again, although we purport in Herman to apply an intermediate standard of review, we find unstated legislative goals to uphold the constitutionality of the statute by citing to goals set forth in a Colorado decision and an Alabama decision, both of which applied the rational-basis test in their analysis. 277 N.W.2d at 453-54 . [¶41] I cannot find any case law or treatise that supports using the rational-basis analysis of determining a “legitimate state interest” as a quid pro quo for determining a “legislative goal” under the intermediate standard of review.

2003Again, although we purport in Herman to apply an intermediate standard of review, we find unstated legislative goals to uphold the constitutionality of the statute by citing to goals set forth in a Colorado decision and an Alabama decision, both of which applied the rational-basis test in their analysis. 277 N.W.2d at 453-54 . [¶41] I cannot find any case law or treatise that supports using the rational-basis analysis of determining a “legitimate state interest” as a quid pro quo for determining a “legislative goal” under the intermediate standard of review.

1988However, our analysis in this case cannot end with the rational basis inquiry, for it appears to us that an inference exists that the property in question concerns a homestead which, [6] in our state, involves an "important substantive right" which requires an examination of this matter under the intermediate standard of review that we have applied in Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D.1974); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D.1978); Herman v. Magnuson, 277 N.W.2d 445 (N.D.1979); and Patch v. Sebelius, supra .

1988However, our analysis in this case cannot end with the rational basis inquiry, for it appears to us that an inference exists that the property in question concerns a homestead which, 6 in our state, involves an “important substantive right” which requires an examination of this matter under the intermediate standard of review that we have applied in Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771 (N.D.1974); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D.1978); Herman v. Magnuson, 277 N.W.2d 445 (N.D.1979); and Patch v. Sebelius, supra. Our state has long recognized the significance of a homestead as evidenced by A

1994Mauch v. Manufacturers Sales & Service, Inc., 345 N.W.2d 338 (N.D.1984) [rational basis test applicable to comparative negligence provi sions of Section 9-10-07, N.D.C.C.]; Law v. Maercklein, 292 N.W.2d 86 (N.D.1980) [rational basis test applicable to statute allowing only residents to participate in the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund]; Tharaldson v. Unsatisfied Judgment Fund, 225 N.W.2d 39 (N.D.1974) [rational basis test applicable to statute limiting recovery from Unsatisfied Judgment Fund to $5,000 in eases in which the tortfeasor can not be ascertained, while permitting a $10,000 recovery from

1989Mauch v. Manufacturers Sales & Service, Inc., 345 N.W.2d 338 (N.D.1984) [rational basis test applicable to comparative negligence provisions of Section 9-10-07, N.D.C.C.]; Law v. Maercklein, 292 N.W.2d 86 (N.D.1980) [rational basis test applicable to statute allowing only residents to participate in the Unsatisfied Judgment Fund]; Tharaldson v. Unsatisfied Judgment Fund, 225 N.W.2d 39 (N.D.1974) [rational basis test applicable to statute limiting recovery from Unsatisfied Judgment Fund to $5,000 in cases in *223 which the tortfeasor can not be ascertained, while permitting a $10,000 recovery f

1994Relying on Kadrmas v. Dickinson Public Schools, 402 N.W.2d 897 (N.D.1987), aff'd 487 U.S. 450 , 108 S.Ct. 2481 , 101 L.Ed.2d 399 (1988), the defendants argue that education funding involves “classic” social and economic legislation, which is scrutinized under the rational basis standard rather than under heightened scrutiny.

1994The appropriate standard of review, therefore, is the rational basis test, which is “the traditional standard for scrutinizing legislation facing equal protection attack and is most often utilized in cases involving economic and social welfare legislation.” Kadrmas, 402 N.W.2d at 902 .

1988Nygaard, supra. The burden is then on the challenger to establish “that the classification bears no reasonable relation to a conceivable legislative purpose.” Id. at 359 , quoting Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 268 N.W.2d 741, 758 (N.D.1978).

1988Nygaard, supra. The burden is then on the challenger to establish “that the classification bears no reasonable relation to a conceivable legislative purpose.” Id. at 359 , quoting Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 268 N.W.2d 741, 758 (N.D.1978).