rational basis test in New Hampshire

2011When, as in this case, the interest at stake is not a fundamental right, see Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 931 (1980) (right to recover for personal injuries is an important substantive right, but is not a fundamental right), overruled on other grounds by Cmty. Res. for Justice v. City of Manchester, 154 N.H. 748 (2007), the court applies the rational basis test.

2006We therefore held that the right was “sufficiently important to require that the restrictions imposed on those rights be subjected to a more rigorous judicial scrutiny than allowed under the rational basis test.” Id. at 932 .

1993Absent a showing that a suspect class, fundamental right, or substantive right is involved, “economic classifications are typically subject to the rational basis test.” Petition of State Employees’ Assoc. & Goulette, 129 N.H. 536, 540 , 529 A.2d 968, 971 (1987) (unequal pay scale of State employees reviewed under rational basis test); Couture v. Couture, 124 N.H. 500, 502 , 471 A.2d 1191, 1192 (1984) (classification between divorced parents with minor children and divorced adults without minor children in alimony scheme under RSA 458:19 considered under rational basis test); Boehner v. State,

1993Absent a showing that a suspect class, fundamental right, or substantive right is involved, “economic classifications are typically subject to the rational basis test.” Petition of State Employees’ Assoc. & Goulette, 129 N.H. 536, 540 , 529 A.2d 968, 971 (1987) (unequal pay scale of State employees reviewed under rational basis test); Couture v. Couture, 124 N.H. 500, 502 , 471 A.2d 1191, 1192 (1984) (classification between divorced parents with minor children and divorced adults without minor children in alimony scheme under RSA 458:19 considered under rational basis test); Boehner v. State,

2019"The rational basis test under the State Constitution requires that legislation be only rationally related to a legitimate government interest." Boulders at Strafford v. Town of Strafford , 153 N.H. 633 , 641, 903 A.2d 1021 (2006).

2019"The rational basis test under the State Constitution requires that legislation be only rationally related to a legitimate government interest." Boulders at Strafford v. Town of Strafford , 153 N.H. 633 , 641, 903 A.2d 1021 (2006).

2007“In determining whether an ordinance is a reasonable exercise of the municipality’s police powers and, therefore, can withstand a substantive due process challenge, we have consistently applied the rational basis test.” Id.

2007"In determining whether an ordinance is a reasonable exercise of the municipality's police powers and, therefore, can withstand a substantive due process challenge, we have consistently applied the rational basis test." Id.

2006Finally, the trial court cited the rational basis test for substantive due process claims; namely, ‘“whether the claimants proved that the provision constitutes a restriction on property rights that is not rationally related to the town’s legitimate goals.’” Casperson v. Town of Lyme, 139 N.H. 637, 642 (1995) (quoting Asselin v. Town of Conway, 137 N.H. 368, 372 (1993)).

1995Further, I believe that, given an appropriate occasion, we should review our holding in Asselin v. Town of Conway, 137 N.H. 368, 372 , 628 A.2d 247, 250 (1993), that substantive due process challenges to zoning ordinances are evaluated under the rational basis standard, while equal protection challenges to those same ordinances are reviewed with heightened scrutiny.

1993Absent a showing that a suspect class, fundamental right, or substantive right is involved, “economic classifications are typically subject to the rational basis test.” Petition of State Employees’ Assoc. & Goulette, 129 N.H. 536, 540 , 529 A.2d 968, 971 (1987) (unequal pay scale of State employees reviewed under rational basis test); Couture v. Couture, 124 N.H. 500, 502 , 471 A.2d 1191, 1192 (1984) (classification between divorced parents with minor children and divorced adults without minor children in alimony scheme under RSA 458:19 considered under rational basis test); Boehner v. State,

1993Absent a showing that a suspect class, fundamental right, or substantive right is involved, “economic classifications are typically subject to the rational basis test.” Petition of State Employees’ Assoc. & Goulette, 129 N.H. 536, 540 , 529 A.2d 968, 971 (1987) (unequal pay scale of State employees reviewed under rational basis test); Couture v. Couture, 124 N.H. 500, 502 , 471 A.2d 1191, 1192 (1984) (classification between divorced parents with minor children and divorced adults without minor children in alimony scheme under RSA 458:19 considered under rational basis test); Boehner v. State,

2006In another context we have stated, “Under the rational basis analysis, the party challenging [specific] legislation has the burden to prove that whatever classification is promulgated is arbitrary or without some reasonable justification.” LeClair v. LeClair, 137 N.H. 213, 223 (1993) (quotation omitted) (applying rational basis review to RSA chapter 458).

2001Under the rational basis test, “legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” LeClair, 137 N.H. at 223 (quotation omitted).

2007See Akins v. Secretary of State, 154 N.H. 67, 71 (2006) (“[Generally, when governmental action impinges upon a fundamental right, such matters are entitled to review under strict judicial scrutiny.”).

2007See Akins v. Sec’y of State, 154 N.H. 67, 71 (2006); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720, 728 (1997); cf. Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40, 48-49 (1974) (applying rational basis review to equal protection challenge to statute requiring convicted defendants to repay costs of defense).

2006Indeed, as Justice Souter acknowledged, and the Brannigan court ignored, even post-Carson we have “recogniz[ed] candidly that the rational basis test and the test derived from Royster have in some instances been treated as interchangeable.” Dover, 133 N.H. at 122 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Deflorio, 128 N.H. 309, 315 (1986) (fair and substantial relation test “assumed to be equivalent to rational basis test”)).

1990This court, indeed, has gone one step further in recognizing candidly that the rational basis test and the test derived from Royster have in some instances been treated as interchangeable, see State v. Deflorio, 128 N.H. 309, 315 , 512 A.2d 1133, 1136 (1986).

1993Under the rational basis test, “‘legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”’ LaPorte, 134 N.H. at 76 , 587 A.2d at 1239 (quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)).

1993In the absence of a suspect class or fundamental right, the rational basis test applies, and the classification is presumed to be valid if it “is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).

2021Id.

2007We directed the trial court that, in applying the rational basis test, it could “properly consider whether differences between the utilities justif[ied] varying treatment by the legislature.” Id.

2017The rational basis test “requires that the legislation be only rationally related to a legitimate government interest.” Cmty. Res. for Justice v. City of Manchester, 154 N.H. 748, 756 (2007) (quotations omitted).

2011When, as in this case, the interest at stake is not a fundamental right, see Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 931 (1980) (right to recover for personal injuries is an important substantive right, but is not a fundamental right), overruled on other grounds by Cmty. Res. for Justice v. City of Manchester, 154 N.H. 748 (2007), the court applies the rational basis test.

2008NGS relies upon Petition of Abbott, 139 N.H. 412 (1985), and Arsenault v. Abbott Furniture Corp., 122 N.H. 521 (1982), to contend that we should apply the rational basis test.

1988In Arsenault v. Abbott Furniture Corp., 122 N.H. 521, 522 , 446 A.2d 1174, 1175 (1982), we considered an equal protection challenge to the benefit scheme under the workers’ compensation act, RSA chapter 281, which we resolved by application of the rational basis test.

2014See Rochester III, 156 N.H. at 630-31 ; see also Hofland, 151 N.H. at 325-26 (noting selective enforcement and classification as alternative means of establishing equal protection violation). *657 “The equal protection clause protects an entity from state action which selects it out for discriminatory treatment by subjecting it to taxes not imposed on others of the same class.” Rochester III, 156 N.H. at 630 (quotation and brackets omitted). “[T]o determine whether [FairPoint’s] right to equal protection is being violated, we must apply the rational basis test.” Id. (quotation omitted).

2014See Rochester III, 156 N.H. at 630-31 ; see also Hofland, 151 N.H. at 325-26 (noting selective enforcement and classification as alternative means of establishing equal protection violation). *657 “The equal protection clause protects an entity from state action which selects it out for discriminatory treatment by subjecting it to taxes not imposed on others of the same class.” Rochester III, 156 N.H. at 630 (quotation and brackets omitted). “[T]o determine whether [FairPoint’s] right to equal protection is being violated, we must apply the rational basis test.” Id. (quotation omitted).

2012State v. Haas, 155 N.H. 612, 613 (2007).

2011See State v. Haas, 155 N.H. 612, 613 (2007); see also Medeiros v. Vincent, 431 F.3d 25, 32 (1st Cir. 2005).

2011McKenzie v. Town of Eaton Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 154 N.H. 773, 778 (2007).

2007McKenzie v. Town of Eaton Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 154 N.H. 773, 778 (2007).

2006At other times we have stated that a zoning ordinance must “bear[] a reasonable relationship to its objective,” and that the police power, while wide ranging, will fail the rational basis test if it creates “unreasonable restrictions which deprive [citizens] of the reasonable use of their land.” Dow, 148 N.H. at 124 (quotation omitted); Powers v. Town of Hampton, 125 N.H. 273, 276 (1984); Metzger, 117 N.H. at 502 .

2006In doing so we applied the rational basis test to require that legislation must “not unduly restrict fundamental rights,” id., and asked whether the restrictions were “unnecessary to accomplish a legitimate public purpose,” Metzger, 117 N.H. at 503 .

2006Finally, the trial court cited the rational basis test for substantive due process claims; namely, ‘“whether the claimants proved that the provision constitutes a restriction on property rights that is not rationally related to the town’s legitimate goals.’” Casperson v. Town of Lyme, 139 N.H. 637, 642 (1995) (quoting Asselin v. Town of Conway, 137 N.H. 368, 372 (1993)).

2002Cf. Caspersen, 139 N.H. at 646 (Brock, C.J., concurring) (suggesting that given an appropriate occasion, we should review our holding that substantive due process challenges to zoning ordinances are evaluated under the rational basis standard); see also Quirk v. Town of New Boston, 140 N.H. 124, 129 (1995).

1989The rational basis test requires that statutory restrictions “must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.” State v. Callaghan, 125 N.H. 449, 451 , 480 A.2d 209, 210-11 (1984) (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920)).

1985In order to be constitutional under our middle tier test the zoning ordinances of Chesterfield “must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.” Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 932 , 424 A.2d 825, 831 (1980) (quoting State v. Scoville, 113 N.H. 161, 163 , 304 A.2d 366, 369 (1973) (quoting F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920))); Allgeyer v. Lincoln, 125 N.H. 503, 509 , 484 A.2d 1079, 1083 (1984).

1986See State v. Scoville, 113 N.H. 161, 163-64 , 304 A.2d 366, 368-69 (1973) (“reasonable, not arbitrary [having a] fair and substantial relation” test assumed to be equivalent to rational basis test; classification of seventeen-year-old violators as adult criminals is rational and consistent with constitutional principles).

1986See State v. Scoville, 113 N.H. 161, 163-64 , 304 A.2d 366, 368-69 (1973) (“reasonable, not arbitrary [having a] fair and substantial relation” test assumed to be equivalent to rational basis test; classification of seventeen-year-old violators as adult criminals is rational and consistent with constitutional principles).

2024Id. [¶31] Because the constitutional right to a remedy is an “important substantive right,” we apply intermediate scrutiny.

2023Security, 118 N.H. 673, 678 (1978) (adopting Supreme Court’s balancing test); Lennartz v. Oak Point Assocs., 167 N.H. 459, 462-63 (2015) (referring to the rational basis test, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny standards by which courts review equal protection challenges and explaining the intermediate scrutiny standard in detail).

2009“The ability to take one step at a time, to alter the rules for one subset (to see what happens) without changing the rules for everyone, is one of the most important legislative powers protected by the rational-basis standard.” Johnson v. Daley, 339 F.3d 582, 596 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 935 (2004); see Estate of Cargill v. City of Rochester, 119 N.H. 661, 668 (1979) (“In enacting a particular statute, . . . the legislature may address itself to only that phase of a problem that appears most acute, even if the net result resembles a crazy quilt more than a carefully balanced sc

1985Indeed, taking this broader view, the result would be the same whether we judged these equal protection claims under the rational basis test, see Cargill v. City of Rochester, 119 N.H. 661 , 406 A.2d 704 (1979); Belkner v. Preston, 115 N.H. 15 , 332 A.2d 168 (1975), or under the middle tier test of Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925 , 424 A.2d 825 (1980).

1986In Belkner v. Preston, 115 N.H. 15 , 332 A.2d 168 (1975), we considered the constitutionality of the time limitation contained in RSA 556:10, and applied a rational basis test.

1986In Belkner v. Preston, 115 N.H. 15 , 332 A.2d 168 (1975), we considered the constitutionality of the time limitation contained in RSA 556:10, and applied a rational basis test.

2008NGS relies upon Petition of Abbott, 139 N.H. 412 (1985), and Arsenault v. Abbott Furniture Corp., 122 N.H. 521 (1982), to contend that we should apply the rational basis test.

2001See Abbott, 139 N.H. at 418 .

2006This uncertainty must be seen as a further condition not only facilitating the identification (or misidentification) of the Carson standard with the rational basis test, as we have seen, but also placing temptation in the way of those inclined to impose a far stricter standard in the name of intermediate scrutiny____ Dover, 133 N.H. at 123 (Souter, J., dissenting).

2006Indeed, as Justice Souter acknowledged, and the Brannigan court ignored, even post-Carson we have “recogniz[ed] candidly that the rational basis test and the test derived from Royster have in some instances been treated as interchangeable.” Dover, 133 N.H. at 122 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing State v. Deflorio, 128 N.H. 309, 315 (1986) (fair and substantial relation test “assumed to be equivalent to rational basis test”)).

2006But even then, the cases cited in Boulders’ memorandum of law below — Dow and Quirk v. Town of New Boston, 140 N.H. 124 (1995) — make reference to or apply both the substantive due process and equal protection standards, thus leaving it uncertain as to what type of claim Boulders had raised.

2002Cf. Caspersen, 139 N.H. at 646 (Brock, C.J., concurring) (suggesting that given an appropriate occasion, we should review our holding that substantive due process challenges to zoning ordinances are evaluated under the rational basis standard); see also Quirk v. Town of New Boston, 140 N.H. 124, 129 (1995).

2004See Estate of Robitaille, 149 N.H. at 596-97 .

2004Id. at 596-97 .

2025See id.