rational basis test in Massachusetts

1998Marshfield Family Skateland, Inc. v. Marshfield, 389 Mass. 436, 445 (1983) [appeal dismissed, 464 U.S. 987 ] . . . "[U]nder the rational basis test, ‘the person making the challenge has an onerous burden of proof in establishing the invalidity of the statute.’ Commonwealth v. Henry’s Drywall Co., [ 366 Mass. 539, 541 (1974)]. . . ‘[I]f a statute or ordinance serves a legitimate purpose, and if the means the State adopted are rationally related to the achievement of that purpose, the legislation will withstand constitutional challenge’ (footnote omitted).

1998Shell Oil Co. v. Revere, 383 Mass. 682, 686 (1981). . . ‘[A] statutory classification will not be set aside as a denial of equal protection ... if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.’ Henry’s Drywall Co., [ 366 Mass. at 542 ].” Take Five Vending, Ltd., 415 Mass, at 748, quoting Marshfield Family Skateland, Inc., 389 Mass. at 446 . 17 Despite the deference to possible legislative intent embodied in the rational basis standard, the standard “is not a ‘toothless’ one.” Murphy v. Commissioner of the Dep’t of Indus.

1998Shell Oil Co. v. Revere, 383 Mass. 682, 686 (1981). . . ‘[A] statutory classification will not be set aside as a denial of equal protection ... if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.’ Henry’s Drywall Co., [ 366 Mass. at 542 ].” Take Five Vending, Ltd., 415 Mass, at 748, quoting Marshfield Family Skateland, Inc., 389 Mass. at 446 . 17 Despite the deference to possible legislative intent embodied in the rational basis standard, the standard “is not a ‘toothless’ one.” Murphy v. Commissioner of the Dep’t of Indus.

1998Marshfield Family Skateland, Inc. v. Marshfield, 389 Mass. 436, 445 (1983) [appeal dismissed, 464 U.S. 987 ] . . . "[U]nder the rational basis test, ‘the person making the challenge has an onerous burden of proof in establishing the invalidity of the statute.’ Commonwealth v. Henry’s Drywall Co., [ 366 Mass. 539, 541 (1974)]. . . ‘[I]f a statute or ordinance serves a legitimate purpose, and if the means the State adopted are rationally related to the achievement of that purpose, the legislation will withstand constitutional challenge’ (footnote omitted).

1998Shell Oil Co. v. Revere, 383 Mass. 682, 686 (1981). . . ‘[A] statutory classification will not be set aside as a denial of equal protection ... if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.’ Henry’s Drywall Co., [ 366 Mass. at 542 ].” Take Five Vending, Ltd., 415 Mass, at 748, quoting Marshfield Family Skateland, Inc., 389 Mass. at 446 . 17 Despite the deference to possible legislative intent embodied in the rational basis standard, the standard “is not a ‘toothless’ one.” Murphy v. Commissioner of the Dep’t of Indus.

1991It has been held that “[i]n applying the rational basis standard, ... ‘if a statute or ordinance serves a legitimate purpose, and if the means . . . adopted are rationally related to the achievement of that purpose, the legislation will withstand constitutional challenge (footnote omitted).’ ” Marshfield Family Skateland, Inc. v. Marshfield, supra at 446 , quoting from Shell Oil Co. v. Revere, 383 Mass. 682, 686 (1981).

2019See Take Five Vending, Ltd., 415 Mass. at 748 (“[I]f a statute or ordinance serves a legitimate purpose, and if the means the State adopted are rationally related to the achievement of that -9- purpose, the legislation will withstand constitutional challenge.").

1998A. Equal Protection “For the purpose of equal protection analysis, [the] standard of review under . . . the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights! 14 ] is the same as under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.” Tobin's Case, 424 Mass. 250, 252 (1997), quoting Dickerson v. Attorney Gen., 396 Mass. 740, 743 (1986). 15 Where a statutory classification like that made by the Towns-Near-the-Border Exception “involv[es] neither fundamental rights nor suspect classes,” it “will be reviewed under a rational basis test.” Take Five Vending, Ltd. v. Provincetown, 415 Mass. 741, 748 (1993) (

2024Health, 440 Mass. 309, 330 (2003).

2011Health, supra. Under the rational basis standard, a statute is constitutionally sound if it is reasonably related to the furtherance of a valid State interest.

2020"In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect" or it enforces a rule that "results in some inequality." Id., quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).

2010Opinion of the Justices, 368 Mass. 831, 845 (1975), quoting from Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (“If the classification has some ‘reasonable basis,’ it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification ‘is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality’ ”).

2020New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-304 (1976); accord Steinbergh v. Rent Control Bd. of Cambridge, 410 Mass. 160, 164 (1991).

1997As the defendants note the plaintiffs’ assertion that the statute has been violated essentially calls for a rational basis analysis of the type applied to equal protection claims where there is no “fundamental interest” or inherently “suspect classification.” See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).

2011Accs., 415 Mass. 218, 226-227 (1993) (Murphy), quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).

1989The rational basis test “includes a requirement that an impartial lawmaker could logically believe that the classification would serve a legitimate public purpose that transcends the harm to the members of the disadvantaged class.” Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 452 (1985) (Stevens, J., concurring).

1985In reviewing the constitutionality of statutes subject to a rational basis test, we adhere to principles of judicial restraint based upon our "recognition of the inability and undesirability of the judiciary substituting its notion of correct policy for that of a popularly elected Legislature." Zayre Corp. v. Attorney Gen., 372 Mass. 423, 433 (1977).

1985In reviewing the constitutionality of statutes subject to a rational basis test, we adhere to principles of judicial restraint based upon our “recognition of the inability and undesirability of the judiciary substituting its notion of correct policy for that of a popularly elected Legislature.” Zayre Corp. v. Attorney Gen., 372 Mass. 423, 433 (1977).

1998A. Equal Protection “For the purpose of equal protection analysis, [the] standard of review under . . . the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights! 14 ] is the same as under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution.” Tobin's Case, 424 Mass. 250, 252 (1997), quoting Dickerson v. Attorney Gen., 396 Mass. 740, 743 (1986). 15 Where a statutory classification like that made by the Towns-Near-the-Border Exception “involv[es] neither fundamental rights nor suspect classes,” it “will be reviewed under a rational basis test.” Take Five Vending, Ltd. v. Provincetown, 415 Mass. 741, 748 (1993) (

1993A statute subjected to rational basis scrutiny “will be upheld as long as it is rationally related to the furtherance of a legitimate State interest.” Dickerson v. Attorney Gen., 396 Mass. 740, 743 (1986).

2011Accs., 415 Mass. 218, 226-227 (1993) (Murphy), quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985).

1998Accidents, 415 Mass. 218, 233 (1993).

2010Opinion of the Justices, 368 Mass. 831, 845 (1975), quoting from Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) (“If the classification has some ‘reasonable basis,’ it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification ‘is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality’ ”).

1995Opinion of the Justices, 368 Mass. 831, 845 (1975), quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).

2004Suffice it to say that a statutory classification need be supported only “by a conceivable, rational basis,” Fine v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 401 Mass. 639, 641 (1988), and that the Legislature “is not required to justify its classifications, nor to provide a record or finding in support of them.” Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 645, 650 (1977).

1993See Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., supra. See also Paro v. Longwood Hosp., 373 Mass. 645, 650 (1977).

1992See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976); Dickerson, supra at 743 .

1992See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976); Dickerson, supra at 743 .

1998Marshfield Family Skateland, Inc. v. Marshfield, 389 Mass. 436, 445 (1983) [appeal dismissed, 464 U.S. 987 ] . . . "[U]nder the rational basis test, ‘the person making the challenge has an onerous burden of proof in establishing the invalidity of the statute.’ Commonwealth v. Henry’s Drywall Co., [ 366 Mass. 539, 541 (1974)]. . . ‘[I]f a statute or ordinance serves a legitimate purpose, and if the means the State adopted are rationally related to the achievement of that purpose, the legislation will withstand constitutional challenge’ (footnote omitted).

1993A party claiming standing to challenge the validity of a statute under the rational basis standard of review “has an *641 onerous burden of proof.” Marshfield Family Skateland, Inc. v. Marshfield, 389 Mass. 436, 446 , appeal dismissed, 464 U.S. 987 (1983).

2019L. c. 265, § 47, as a legislatively imposed "punishment[ ] for a given offense," and, consequently, considered "only whether that mandatory sentence meets the rational basis test." Guzman , supra , citing Commonwealth v. Therriault , 401 Mass. 237 , 241-242, 515 N.E.2d 1198 (1987).

2019L. c. 265, § 47, as a legislatively imposed "punishment[ ] for a given offense," and, consequently, considered "only whether that mandatory sentence meets the rational basis test." Guzman , supra , citing Commonwealth v. Therriault , 401 Mass. 237 , 241-242, 515 N.E.2d 1198 (1987).

2018Ctr., Inc. , 405 Mass. 423 , 429, 541 N.E.2d 329 (1989), cert. denied, *337 493 U.S. 1056 , 110 S.Ct. 866 , 107 L.Ed.2d 949 (1990).

2018Ctr., Inc. , 405 Mass. 423 , 429, 541 N.E.2d 329 (1989), cert. denied, *337 493 U.S. 1056 , 110 S.Ct. 866 , 107 L.Ed.2d 949 (1990).

2002See Mathews v. Diaz, supra at 82-83 .

2001The Commissioner argues that this residency requirement was authorized by the 1996 Act and, therefore, under the Supreme Court’s decision in Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976), must be examined under the rational basis test.

2001The rationale for subjecting legislative classifications based on alienage to strict judicial scrutiny is that aliens are a discrete and insular minority with virtually no political power who are susceptible to being abused by our political process and therefore entitled to “heightened judicial solicitude.” See Graham, 403 U.S. at 372 .

1977See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (national origin): 4 Sex-related classifications have not been subject to the same degree of scrutiny, although they have been afforded a higher level of scrutiny than the rational basis analysis, traditional where suspect classifications and fundamental rights are not implicated.

2025Like the statute governing firearm license applications by Massachusetts residents, § 131F as in effect in June 2022 passes muster under the rational basis test because it served the legitimate purposes of giving the State Police Colonel discretion “to keep firearms out of the hands of persons who are not categorically disqualified, e.g., convicted felons, but who nevertheless pose a palpable risk that they would not use a firearm responsibly if allowed to carry in public.” Cf. Chief of Police of City of Worcester v. Holden, 470 Mass. 845, 854 (2015).

2023Doherty v. Merck & Co., 892 F.3d 493, 500 (1st Cir. 2018).

2020New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-304 (1976); accord Steinbergh v. Rent Control Bd. of Cambridge, 410 Mass. 160, 164 (1991).

2020Id.

2020So ordered. 14While we have concluded that the statutory September 1 deadline only needs to satisfy the rational basis standard, it also likely would satisfy a strict scrutiny analysis, see Chelsea Collaborative, Inc., 480 Mass. at 35 (to satisfy strict scrutiny, regulation "must be narrowly tailored and advance a compelling state interest"), as well as the intermediate level of scrutiny -- "less exacting than strict scrutiny but more searching than mere rational basis review" -- advocated by the concurrence in the Chelsea Collaborative decision.

2018Whether to apply the rational basis test or strict scrutiny to the requirement that a prospective voter register twenty days in advance of an election depends on whether that requirement significantly interferes with the fundamental right to vote. 22 See **37 *334 Doe No. 1 , 479 Mass. at 392 , 95 N.E.3d 241 ; McSweeney , 422 Mass. at 656 , 665 N.E.2d 11 ; Cepulonis , 389 Mass. at 932 , 935 , 452 N.E.2d 1137 .

2018Whether to apply the rational basis test or strict scrutiny to the requirement that a prospective voter register twenty days in advance of an election depends on whether that requirement significantly interferes with the fundamental right to vote. 22 See **37 *334 Doe No. 1 , 479 Mass. at 392 , 95 N.E.3d 241 ; McSweeney , 422 Mass. at 656 , 665 N.E.2d 11 ; Cepulonis , 389 Mass. at 932 , 935 , 452 N.E.2d 1137 .