explicit waiver in District of Columbia

2015We do agree, however, with the government’s alternative argument that unexplained delay is a factor that is potentially relevant to the adjudication of the nonadvisement claim on the merits. 6 In Ramsey v. United States, 569 A.2d. 142 (D.C.1990), we addressed a similar claim in the context of a criminal defendant’s effort to withdraw a guilty.plea based on the alleged ineffectiveness of his counsel under D.C.Code § 23-110.

2015We do agree, however, with the government‟s alternative argument that unexplained delay is a factor that is potentially relevant to the adjudication of the nonadvisement claim on the merits.6 In Ramsey v. United States, 569 A.2d 142 (D.C. 1990), we addressed a similar claim in the context of a criminal defendant‟s effort to withdraw a guilty plea based on the alleged ineffectiveness of his counsel under D.C.

2015The Supreme Court subsequently indicated that its ruling requiring an explicit statutory waiver before the government can be ordered to pay interest on an award applies only when a successful plaintiff or claimant challenges the federal govem- *951 merit’s immunity from interest payments, and that the ruling does not apply to states: “That rule, which is applicable to the immunity of the United States ..., provides an ‘added gloss of strictness,’ only where the United States’ liability for interest is at issue.” Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 , 281 n. 3, 109 S.Ct. 2463 , 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (19

2015The Supreme Court subsequently indicated that its ruling requiring an explicit statutory waiver before the government can be ordered to pay interest on an award applies only when a successful plaintiff or claimant challenges the federal govem- *951 merit’s immunity from interest payments, and that the ruling does not apply to states: “That rule, which is applicable to the immunity of the United States ..., provides an ‘added gloss of strictness,’ only where the United States’ liability for interest is at issue.” Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 , 281 n. 3, 109 S.Ct. 2463 , 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (19

2015The unpublished opinions on which the -government relies are less than helpful — at least one, for example, appears to be clearly distinguishable, see, e.g., Den Van Nguyen v. State, 128 Hawai'i 311 , 288 P.3d 129 (Ct.App.2012) (table) (relying upon a court rule that contained an explicit waiver rule for issues raised for the first time in post-conviction proceedings, see 2012 WL 4454735 , at *2) — and do not,’ in any event, convince us to read our statute in a manner inconsistent with its text and underlying policy.

2015The unpublished opinions on which the -government relies are less than helpful — at least one, for example, appears to be clearly distinguishable, see, e.g., Den Van Nguyen v. State, 128 Hawai'i 311 , 288 P.3d 129 (Ct.App.2012) (table) (relying upon a court rule that contained an explicit waiver rule for issues raised for the first time in post-conviction proceedings, see 2012 WL 4454735 , at *2) — and do not,’ in any event, convince us to read our statute in a manner inconsistent with its text and underlying policy.

2015The Supreme Court subsequently indicated that its ruling requiring an explicit statutory waiver before the government can be ordered to pay interest on an award applies only when a successful plaintiff or claimant challenges the federal govem- *951 merit’s immunity from interest payments, and that the ruling does not apply to states: “That rule, which is applicable to the immunity of the United States ..., provides an ‘added gloss of strictness,’ only where the United States’ liability for interest is at issue.” Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 , 281 n. 3, 109 S.Ct. 2463 , 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (19

2015The Supreme Court subsequently indicated that its ruling requiring an explicit statutory waiver before the government can be ordered to pay interest on an award applies only when a successful plaintiff or claimant challenges the federal govem- *951 merit’s immunity from interest payments, and that the ruling does not apply to states: “That rule, which is applicable to the immunity of the United States ..., provides an ‘added gloss of strictness,’ only where the United States’ liability for interest is at issue.” Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274 , 281 n. 3, 109 S.Ct. 2463 , 105 L.Ed.2d 229 (19

2015Appellee asserts that an agency in the District of Columbia is authorized to award interest even lacking' an express statutory provision permitting such an award, citing, inter alia, OHR v. DOC, 40 A.3d at 923 .

2013However, Edwards does not say that police must “obtain” a valid waiver (in the sense that they must re-advise the suspect of his rights and get him to write or say again that he is waiving them); rather, Edwards establishes, a waiver must have “occurred.” Edwards, 451 U.S. at 486 n. 9, 101 S.Ct. 1880 .

2013However, Edwards does not say that police must “obtain” a valid waiver (in the sense that they must re-advise the suspect of his rights and get him to write or say again that he is waiving them); rather, Edwards establishes, a waiver must have “occurred.” Edwards, 451 U.S. at 486 n. 9, 101 S.Ct. 1880 .

2011Moreover, “[t]rial courts and appellate courts seem equally capable of analyzing the second factor [a]nd the third Gore criterion ... seems more suited to the expertise of appellate courts.” Cooper Indus., Inc., supra, 532 U.S. at 440 , 121 S.Ct. 1678 .

2011Moreover, “[t]rial courts and appellate courts seem equally capable of analyzing the second factor [a]nd the third Gore criterion ... seems more suited to the expertise of appellate courts.” Cooper Indus., Inc., supra, 532 U.S. at 440 , 121 S.Ct. 1678 .

2010Appellants assert that this type of transaction could be a "sale” under our recent decision in CB Richard Ellis Real Estate Services, Inc. v. Spitz, 950 A.2d 704 (D.C.2008).

2008Id. 18 .

2000GWU argues that despite the verdict against Dr. Olding (in turn necessitating a verdict against GWU) the jury might have predicated its verdict against the hospital at least partly on Dr. Williams’ negligence, since the court instructed that the plaintiffs’ were seeking to hold GWU liable for her fault “independently of anything that Dr. Olding may have done.” But, assuming as we must that the jury followed the instructions given it, see Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 , 107 S.Ct. 1702 , 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987), this seems quite implausible given the verdict against Dr. Olding and the exp

2000GWU argues that despite the verdict against Dr. Olding (in turn necessitating a verdict against GWU) the jury might have predicated its verdict against the hospital at least partly on Dr. Williams’ negligence, since the court instructed that the plaintiffs’ were seeking to hold GWU liable for her fault “independently of anything that Dr. Olding may have done.” But, assuming as we must that the jury followed the instructions given it, see Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 , 107 S.Ct. 1702 , 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987), this seems quite implausible given the verdict against Dr. Olding and the exp

1991Id. at 632 .

1990Although the law of the case doctrine is discretionary and does not preclude a reexamination of the issues affected by newly discovered facts, see, e.g., Safir v. Dole, 231 U.S.App.D.C. 63 , 69 n. 3, 718 F.2d 475 , 481 n. 3, cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1206 , 104 S.Ct. 2389 , 81 L.Ed.2d 347 (1983), we take no issue with Judge Webber’s view since to have allowed plaintiff another continuance would have mocked the explicit warning given by Judge Weisberg a year and a half earlier. 8 .

1990Although the law of the case doctrine is discretionary and does not preclude a reexamination of the issues affected by newly discovered facts, see, e.g., Safir v. Dole, 231 U.S.App.D.C. 63 , 69 n. 3, 718 F.2d 475 , 481 n. 3, cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1206 , 104 S.Ct. 2389 , 81 L.Ed.2d 347 (1983), we take no issue with Judge Webber’s view since to have allowed plaintiff another continuance would have mocked the explicit warning given by Judge Weisberg a year and a half earlier. 8 .

1990Although the law of the case doctrine is discretionary and does not preclude a reexamination of the issues affected by newly discovered facts, see, e.g., Safir v. Dole, 231 U.S.App.D.C. 63 , 69 n. 3, 718 F.2d 475 , 481 n. 3, cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1206 , 104 S.Ct. 2389 , 81 L.Ed.2d 347 (1983), we take no issue with Judge Webber’s view since to have allowed plaintiff another continuance would have mocked the explicit warning given by Judge Weisberg a year and a half earlier. 8 .

1990Although the law of the case doctrine is discretionary and does not preclude a reexamination of the issues affected by newly discovered facts, see, e.g., Safir v. Dole, 231 U.S.App.D.C. 63 , 69 n. 3, 718 F.2d 475 , 481 n. 3, cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1206 , 104 S.Ct. 2389 , 81 L.Ed.2d 347 (1983), we take no issue with Judge Webber’s view since to have allowed plaintiff another continuance would have mocked the explicit warning given by Judge Weisberg a year and a half earlier. 8 .

1990Although the law of the case doctrine is discretionary and does not preclude a reexamination of the issues affected by newly discovered facts, see, e.g., Safir v. Dole, 231 U.S.App.D.C. 63 , 69 n. 3, 718 F.2d 475 , 481 n. 3, cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1206 , 104 S.Ct. 2389 , 81 L.Ed.2d 347 (1983), we take no issue with Judge Webber’s view since to have allowed plaintiff another continuance would have mocked the explicit warning given by Judge Weisberg a year and a half earlier. 8 .