explicit instruction in Georgia

2025In that case, justification was the appellant’s sole defense, and, accordingly, the jury was instructed on justification generally and was also instructed that justification is a defense to any crime 2 We note that the opinion in Floyd came after trial in this case, but “whether an error is clear or obvious is judged at the time of the appellate court’s review.” Lyman v. State, 301 Ga. 312, 318 (2) (800 SE2d 333) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted). 12 arising from such conduct.

2025In that case, justification was the appellant’s sole defense, and, accordingly, the jury was instructed on justification generally and was also instructed that justification is a defense to any crime 2 We note that the opinion in Floyd came after trial in this case, but “whether an error is clear or obvious is judged at the time of the appellate court’s review.” Lyman v. State, 301 Ga. 312, 318 (2) (800 SE2d 333) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted). 12 arising from such conduct.

2025In sum, Johnson recognized that a felon who possesses a gun is not categorically barred from raising a justification defense and he may avail himself of the defense with respect to a charge of felon-in-possession and felony murder predicated on such an offense. 11 And in Floyd,2 we decided, in the context of a claim of ineffective assistance, that trial counsel was deficient under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 ( 104 SCt 2052 , 80 LE2d 674) (1984), for failing to understand the law governing a convicted felon’s statutory right to use a firearm in self-defense, which resulted in counse

2025And in Floyd,2 we decided, in the context of a claim of ineffective assistance, that trial counsel was deficient under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984), for failing to understand the law governing a convicted felon’s statutory right to use a firearm in self-defense, which resulted in counsel’s failure “to ensure that the jury knew — either through an explicit instruction on OCGA § 16-11-138 or through clear argument — that [the appellant] had an absolute defense to felony murder predicated on felon-in-possession if the jury believed that the shooting w

2024And there is nothing in the record or our case law that would support the conclusion that under these particular circumstances, it could be a reasonable strategic decision to fail to ensure that the jury knew — either through an explicit instruction on OCGA § 16-11-138 or 22 through clear argument — that Appellant had an absolute defense to felony murder predicated on felon-in-possession if the jury believed that the shooting was in self-defense.13 See id.; Benham v. State, 277 Ga. 516, 517-518 (591 SE2d 824) (2004) (trial counsel’s failure to request defense-of-habitation instruction was due

2024And there is nothing in the record or our case law that would support the conclusion that under these particular circumstances, it could be a reasonable strategic decision to fail to ensure that the jury knew — either through an explicit instruction on OCGA § 16-11-138 or 22 through clear argument — that Appellant had an absolute defense to felony murder predicated on felon-in-possession if the jury believed that the shooting was in self-defense.13 See id.; Benham v. State, 277 Ga. 516, 517-518 (591 SE2d 824) (2004) (trial counsel’s failure to request defense-of-habitation instruction was due

2021Moreover, since the agreement to terminate the controversy already had been created, [Allstate’s] subsequent proffer of a release form which [Nelson] believed was not in compliance with the understanding of the parties [was] not . . . a rejection of the previously accepted offer.4 This is true particularly in light of the language accompanying Allstate’s first proposed release: “If this meets with your approval, please have your client sign. . . 3 (Punctuation omitted.) Herring v. Dunning, 213 Ga. App. 695, 699 ( 446 SE2d 199 ) (1994), quoting Sheffield v. Whitfield, 6 Ga. App. 762, 764 (2) (

2021Moreover, since the agreement to terminate the controversy already had been created, [Allstate’s] subsequent proffer of a release form which [Nelson] believed was not in compliance with the understanding of the parties [was] not . . . a rejection of the previously accepted offer.4 This is true particularly in light of the language accompanying Allstate’s first proposed release: “If this meets with your approval, please have your client sign. . . 3 (Punctuation omitted.) Herring v. Dunning, 213 Ga. App. 695, 699 ( 446 SE2d 199 ) (1994), quoting Sheffield v. Whitfield, 6 Ga. App. 762, 764 (2) (

2021Moreover, since the agreement to terminate the controversy already had been created, [Allstate’s] subsequent proffer of a release form which [Nelson] believed was not in compliance with the understanding of the parties [was] not . . . a rejection of the previously accepted offer.4 This is true particularly in light of the language accompanying Allstate’s first proposed release: “If this meets with your approval, please have your client sign. . . 3 (Punctuation omitted.) Herring v. Dunning, 213 Ga. App. 695, 699 ( 446 SE2d 199 ) (1994), quoting Sheffield v. Whitfield, 6 Ga. App. 762, 764 (2) (

2021Moreover, since the agreement to terminate the controversy already had been created, [Allstate’s] subsequent proffer of a release form which [Nelson] believed was not in compliance with the understanding of the parties [was] not . . . a rejection of the previously accepted offer.4 This is true particularly in light of the language accompanying Allstate’s first proposed release: “If this meets with your approval, please have your client sign. . . 3 (Punctuation omitted.) Herring v. Dunning, 213 Ga. App. 695, 699 ( 446 SE2d 199 ) (1994), quoting Sheffield v. Whitfield, 6 Ga. App. 762, 764 (2) (

2019See also Payne v. Chatman, 267 Ga. 873, 875 ( 485 SE2d 723 ) (1997) (“Thus, the 17 Additional analysis of the relevant statutory language is found below in Division 2 (a). legislation which provides the right to contest a primary election by providing an explicit framework for dealing with the issues of the contest also sets forth the mechanisms for expediting the action in the trial and appellate courts.”).

2019See also Payne v. Chatman, 267 Ga. 873, 875 ( 485 SE2d 723 ) (1997) (“Thus, the 17 Additional analysis of the relevant statutory language is found below in Division 2 (a). legislation which provides the right to contest a primary election by providing an explicit framework for dealing with the issues of the contest also sets forth the mechanisms for expediting the action in the trial and appellate courts.”).

2015Here, Waffle House has demonstrated that it is entitled to reasonable attorney fees pursuant to this sub-section. 5 (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Evers v. Evers, 277 Ga. 132, 132 (1) ( 587 SE2d 22 ) (2003), citing Green v. McCart, 273 Ga. 862, 863 (1) ( 548 SE2d 303 ) (2001).

2015Here, Waffle House has demonstrated that it is entitled to reasonable attorney fees pursuant to this sub-section. 5 (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Evers v. Evers, 277 Ga. 132, 132 (1) ( 587 SE2d 22 ) (2003), citing Green v. McCart, 273 Ga. 862, 863 (1) ( 548 SE2d 303 ) (2001).

2015Here, Waffle House has demonstrated that it is entitled to reasonable attorney fees pursuant to this sub-section. 5 (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Evers v. Evers, 277 Ga. 132, 132 (1) ( 587 SE2d 22 ) (2003), citing Green v. McCart, 273 Ga. 862, 863 (1) ( 548 SE2d 303 ) (2001).

2015Here, Waffle House has demonstrated that it is entitled to reasonable attorney fees pursuant to this sub-section. 5 (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) Evers v. Evers, 277 Ga. 132, 132 (1) ( 587 SE2d 22 ) (2003), citing Green v. McCart, 273 Ga. 862, 863 (1) ( 548 SE2d 303 ) (2001).