explicit instruction in Delaware

2026Id.

2024This factor is not essential to our holding and we do not decide its weight, if any, in a future Miranda custody analysis. 73 Howes, 565 U.S. at 509 . 74 Opening Br. at 2. 75 Because waiver is not applicable to this case, we also need not address Coello’s argument to adopt an explicit waiver requirement for waiving Miranda rights, even if it had been properly 16 C.

2024Resolving this case requires delving deeper into when a controller owes fiduciary 11 Id. at 1080–82. 12 Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 Harv.

2023Rather, he argues that, in the absence of an explicit standard in the text of Rule 6(e)(1), court approval to record grand jury proceedings should be treated as a gate-keeping function, i.e., as a formality to be granted as a matter of course upon request.47 At oral argument, however, counsel for Mr. Ponzo conceded that if the Court construes Rule 6(e)(1) to 42 611 A.2d 956 (Del. 1992). 43 Mot. for Court Approval of Recording of Grand Jury Testimony ¶ 8. 44 74 A.3d 645 (Del. 2013). 45 See id. at 650–51 (explaining that applying a technical approach to discovery requests is contrary to the purp

2023Rather, he argues that, in the absence of an explicit standard in the text of Rule 6(e)(1), court approval to record grand jury proceedings should be treated as a gate-keeping function, i.e., as a formality to be granted as a matter of course upon request.47 At oral argument, however, counsel for Mr. Ponzo conceded that if the Court construes Rule 6(e)(1) to 42 611 A.2d 956 (Del. 1992). 43 Mot. for Court Approval of Recording of Grand Jury Testimony ¶ 8. 44 74 A.3d 645 (Del. 2013). 45 See id. at 650–51 (explaining that applying a technical approach to discovery requests is contrary to the purp

2023Rather, he argues that, in the absence of an explicit standard in the text of Rule 6(e)(1), court approval to record grand jury proceedings should be treated as a gate-keeping function, i.e., as a formality to be granted as a matter of course upon request.47 At oral argument, however, counsel for Mr. Ponzo conceded that if the Court construes Rule 6(e)(1) to 42 611 A.2d 956 (Del. 1992). 43 Mot. for Court Approval of Recording of Grand Jury Testimony ¶ 8. 44 74 A.3d 645 (Del. 2013). 45 See id. at 650–51 (explaining that applying a technical approach to discovery requests is contrary to the purp

2022Mem. § I. 37 Defs.’ Opening Br. at 20. 38 See, e.g., Manti, 261 A.3d at 1211; Schock, 732 A.2d at 225 n.21. 39 See Stockholders Agreement § 3(e). 40 Advance Realty, 2014 WL 4374261 , at *13. 8 (iv) explicitly prohibit the Plaintiffs from voting against the transaction, asserting appraisal rights, and refusing to execute certain transaction documents.41 Had the drafters desired to eliminate fiduciary duties, they could have similarly enumerated such an explicit waiver.

2022The Confrontation Clause is not implicated where juvenile adjudications are used for general impeachment, but it is where “impeachment is used to establish specific bias.”12 Reid held that when a trial judge is called upon to balance the Confrontation Clause and Rule 609(d), the judge should ask whether the evidence of a juvenile adjudication is “(1) offered to show bias (i.e., the motive to lie in the specific case) and (2) important to the assertion of that bias.”13 This Court also stated that “[t]his second prong tracks the explicit requirement of Rule 609(d) that evidence be ‘necessary for

2006Burns, 519 A.2d at 649 . 23 . 13 Del.

1989See Rollins International, Inc. v. International Hydronics Corp., Del.Supr., 303 A.2d 660 (1973); Marshall v. Hill, Del.Super., 93 A.2d 524 (1952).

1989Schick, Inc. v. ACTWU, Del.Ch., 533 A.2d 1235 (1987) citing 13A Wright & Miller & Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 3532 (1982). *687 The Delaware Declaratory Judgment Act, as it existed prior to 1983, contained an explicit requirement that the court act only when presented with an “actual controversy”. 6 10 Del.C. § 6501.

1988Stacey v. State, 358 A.2d at 380 ; United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185, 187-89 (3d Cir.1982).

1982A more explicit instruction, such as “sentencing is not to be considered by you,” would have tended to cure any error, as would a caution that “it would be a violation of your duty as jurors if you were to convict the defendant of a felony because of a belief that other authorities will review your verdict and accord leniency to the defendant if necessary.” See, e.g., People v. Ramos, Cal.Supr., 30 Cal.3d 553 , 180 Cal. Rptr. 266 , 639 P.2d 908 (1982), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 49 , 74 L.Ed.2d 56 (U.S., 1982); People v. Morse, Cal.Supr., 60 Cal.2d 631 , 36 Cal.Rpr. 201, 388 P.2d 33 (1

1982A more explicit instruction, such as “sentencing is not to be considered by you,” would have tended to cure any error, as would a caution that “it would be a violation of your duty as jurors if you were to convict the defendant of a felony because of a belief that other authorities will review your verdict and accord leniency to the defendant if necessary.” See, e.g., People v. Ramos, Cal.Supr., 30 Cal.3d 553 , 180 Cal. Rptr. 266 , 639 P.2d 908 (1982), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 49 , 74 L.Ed.2d 56 (U.S., 1982); People v. Morse, Cal.Supr., 60 Cal.2d 631 , 36 Cal.Rpr. 201, 388 P.2d 33 (1

1982A more explicit instruction, such as “sentencing is not to be considered by you,” would have tended to cure any error, as would a caution that “it would be a violation of your duty as jurors if you were to convict the defendant of a felony because of a belief that other authorities will review your verdict and accord leniency to the defendant if necessary.” See, e.g., People v. Ramos, Cal.Supr., 30 Cal.3d 553 , 180 Cal. Rptr. 266 , 639 P.2d 908 (1982), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 49 , 74 L.Ed.2d 56 (U.S., 1982); People v. Morse, Cal.Supr., 60 Cal.2d 631 , 36 Cal.Rpr. 201, 388 P.2d 33 (1

1982A more explicit instruction, such as “sentencing is not to be considered by you,” would have tended to cure any error, as would a caution that “it would be a violation of your duty as jurors if you were to convict the defendant of a felony because of a belief that other authorities will review your verdict and accord leniency to the defendant if necessary.” See, e.g., People v. Ramos, Cal.Supr., 30 Cal.3d 553 , 180 Cal. Rptr. 266 , 639 P.2d 908 (1982), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 49 , 74 L.Ed.2d 56 (U.S., 1982); People v. Morse, Cal.Supr., 60 Cal.2d 631 , 36 Cal.Rpr. 201, 388 P.2d 33 (1

1982A more explicit instruction, such as “sentencing is not to be considered by you,” would have tended to cure any error, as would a caution that “it would be a violation of your duty as jurors if you were to convict the defendant of a felony because of a belief that other authorities will review your verdict and accord leniency to the defendant if necessary.” See, e.g., People v. Ramos, Cal.Supr., 30 Cal.3d 553 , 180 Cal. Rptr. 266 , 639 P.2d 908 (1982), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 49 , 74 L.Ed.2d 56 (U.S., 1982); People v. Morse, Cal.Supr., 60 Cal.2d 631 , 36 Cal.Rpr. 201, 388 P.2d 33 (1

1982A more explicit instruction, such as “sentencing is not to be considered by you,” would have tended to cure any error, as would a caution that “it would be a violation of your duty as jurors if you were to convict the defendant of a felony because of a belief that other authorities will review your verdict and accord leniency to the defendant if necessary.” See, e.g., People v. Ramos, Cal.Supr., 30 Cal.3d 553 , 180 Cal. Rptr. 266 , 639 P.2d 908 (1982), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 49 , 74 L.Ed.2d 56 (U.S., 1982); People v. Morse, Cal.Supr., 60 Cal.2d 631 , 36 Cal.Rpr. 201, 388 P.2d 33 (1

1975The reported case [Custodio v. Bauer [ 251 Cal.App.2d 303 ] 59 Cal.Rptr. 463 (1967)] with its statement that when unwanted, the addition of a normal child to the family can be the cause of compensable injury, is the only explicit exception to this view.” 5}{ ‡ jJ< Sji Sf* Other arguments made by plaintiffs are deemed to be without merit. * * * * * * In concluding this opinion we want to say a few words about and to the child who is the subject of the lawsuit'.

1975The reported case [Custodio v. Bauer [ 251 Cal.App.2d 303 ] 59 Cal.Rptr. 463 (1967)] with its statement that when unwanted, the addition of a normal child to the family can be the cause of compensable injury, is the only explicit exception to this view.” 5}{ ‡ jJ< Sji Sf* Other arguments made by plaintiffs are deemed to be without merit. * * * * * * In concluding this opinion we want to say a few words about and to the child who is the subject of the lawsuit'.