explicit standard in Hawaii

2018Therefore, it is fair to conclude that he understood the court's explicit warning that there may be immigration consequences associated with his plea if he was not a U.S. citizen, and it is reasonable to expect that he would raise the issue with his attorney in that case, without imposing upon counsel a burden to inquire of every client that he or she represents. 1 See Carrillo v. State , 982 N.E.2d 468 , 474-475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (concluding that a trial court's plea dialogue with a criminal defendant that includes a query as to whether he or she is a United States citizen and, if necessar

2014Id. at 30 .

2013Id. at 303-04 , 944 P.2d at 100-01 .

2013Id. at 303-04 , 944 P.2d at 100-01 .

2006Id. at 31-32 , 960 P.2d at 1239-40 .

2006Id. at 31-32 , 960 P.2d at 1239-40 .

1992However, because the Court had not previously “articulated an explicit standard for differentiating between major and minor disputes[,]” Consolidated Rail, 491 U.S. at 302 , the Court in Consolidated Rail was compelled to do so.

1980VAGUENESS OF THE LOITERING PROVISION This court has recognized that a statute is void for vagueness if it fails to provide an explicit standard of enforcement, which in practice leaves the definition of its terms to law enforcement officers and “leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case. ” State v. Kaneakua, 61 Haw. 136 , 597 P.2d 590 (1979); State v. Huelsman, 60 Haw. 308 , 588 P.2d 394 (1978); State v. Kimball, 54 Haw. 83 , 503 P.2d 176 (1972); State v. Grahovac, 52 Haw. 527 , 480 P.2d 148 (1971).

1980VAGUENESS OF THE LOITERING PROVISION This court has recognized that a statute is void for vagueness if it fails to provide an explicit standard of enforcement, which in practice leaves the definition of its terms to law enforcement officers and “leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case. ” State v. Kaneakua, 61 Haw. 136 , 597 P.2d 590 (1979); State v. Huelsman, 60 Haw. 308 , 588 P.2d 394 (1978); State v. Kimball, 54 Haw. 83 , 503 P.2d 176 (1972); State v. Grahovac, 52 Haw. 527 , 480 P.2d 148 (1971).

1980VAGUENESS OF THE LOITERING PROVISION This court has recognized that a statute is void for vagueness if it fails to provide an explicit standard of enforcement, which in practice leaves the definition of its terms to law enforcement officers and “leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case. ” State v. Kaneakua, 61 Haw. 136 , 597 P.2d 590 (1979); State v. Huelsman, 60 Haw. 308 , 588 P.2d 394 (1978); State v. Kimball, 54 Haw. 83 , 503 P.2d 176 (1972); State v. Grahovac, 52 Haw. 527 , 480 P.2d 148 (1971).

1980VAGUENESS OF THE LOITERING PROVISION This court has recognized that a statute is void for vagueness if it fails to provide an explicit standard of enforcement, which in practice leaves the definition of its terms to law enforcement officers and “leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case. ” State v. Kaneakua, 61 Haw. 136 , 597 P.2d 590 (1979); State v. Huelsman, 60 Haw. 308 , 588 P.2d 394 (1978); State v. Kimball, 54 Haw. 83 , 503 P.2d 176 (1972); State v. Grahovac, 52 Haw. 527 , 480 P.2d 148 (1971).

1980VAGUENESS OF THE LOITERING PROVISION This court has recognized that a statute is void for vagueness if it fails to provide an explicit standard of enforcement, which in practice leaves the definition of its terms to law enforcement officers and “leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case. ” State v. Kaneakua, 61 Haw. 136 , 597 P.2d 590 (1979); State v. Huelsman, 60 Haw. 308 , 588 P.2d 394 (1978); State v. Kimball, 54 Haw. 83 , 503 P.2d 176 (1972); State v. Grahovac, 52 Haw. 527 , 480 P.2d 148 (1971).

1980VAGUENESS OF THE LOITERING PROVISION This court has recognized that a statute is void for vagueness if it fails to provide an explicit standard of enforcement, which in practice leaves the definition of its terms to law enforcement officers and “leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case. ” State v. Kaneakua, 61 Haw. 136 , 597 P.2d 590 (1979); State v. Huelsman, 60 Haw. 308 , 588 P.2d 394 (1978); State v. Kimball, 54 Haw. 83 , 503 P.2d 176 (1972); State v. Grahovac, 52 Haw. 527 , 480 P.2d 148 (1971).

1980VAGUENESS OF THE LOITERING PROVISION This court has recognized that a statute is void for vagueness if it fails to provide an explicit standard of enforcement, which in practice leaves the definition of its terms to law enforcement officers and “leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case. ” State v. Kaneakua, 61 Haw. 136 , 597 P.2d 590 (1979); State v. Huelsman, 60 Haw. 308 , 588 P.2d 394 (1978); State v. Kimball, 54 Haw. 83 , 503 P.2d 176 (1972); State v. Grahovac, 52 Haw. 527 , 480 P.2d 148 (1971).

1980VAGUENESS OF THE LOITERING PROVISION This court has recognized that a statute is void for vagueness if it fails to provide an explicit standard of enforcement, which in practice leaves the definition of its terms to law enforcement officers and “leaves judges and jurors free to decide, without any legally fixed standards, what is prohibited and what is not in each particular case. ” State v. Kaneakua, 61 Haw. 136 , 597 P.2d 590 (1979); State v. Huelsman, 60 Haw. 308 , 588 P.2d 394 (1978); State v. Kimball, 54 Haw. 83 , 503 P.2d 176 (1972); State v. Grahovac, 52 Haw. 527 , 480 P.2d 148 (1971).

1961At most, as stated in Ginoza v. Takai Electric Co., 40 Haw. 691 , 710: “ ‘The instruction * * * may be characterized as an incomplete direction.’ ” And as further stated in Ginom: “ ‘In such case, an appellant is in no position to complain, where he does *65 not ask for a more specific and explicit instruction.’ ” Defendant’s principal complaint is the refusal of his instruction No. 8 and the absence of any specific instruction to the jury to consider whether defendant could hear what was said by Kakuda, which instruction it is contended should have been given with other specific instructions.

1955In such case, an appellant is in no position to complain, where he does not ask for a more specific and explicit instruction.” (Peluso v. City Taxi Co., 41 Cal. App. 297, 301 , 182 Pac. 808, 809 ; Territory v. Furomori, 20 Haw. 344 .) Specification of error number 3 contends that the trial court erred in giving instruction number 16 defining a “new and independent cause”; in that the instruction as given implied that unless a new and independent cause could have of itself caused the injury, the causal connection was not broken.

1955In such case, an appellant is in no position to complain, where he does not ask for a more specific and explicit instruction.” (Peluso v. City Taxi Co., 41 Cal. App. 297, 301 , 182 Pac. 808, 809 ; Territory v. Furomori, 20 Haw. 344 .) Specification of error number 3 contends that the trial court erred in giving instruction number 16 defining a “new and independent cause”; in that the instruction as given implied that unless a new and independent cause could have of itself caused the injury, the causal connection was not broken.

1955In such case, an appellant is in no position to complain, where he does not ask for a more specific and explicit instruction.” (Peluso v. City Taxi Co., 41 Cal. App. 297, 301 , 182 Pac. 808, 809 ; Territory v. Furomori, 20 Haw. 344 .) Specification of error number 3 contends that the trial court erred in giving instruction number 16 defining a “new and independent cause”; in that the instruction as given implied that unless a new and independent cause could have of itself caused the injury, the causal connection was not broken.