10 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 2001–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Tennessee v. Lanegreen1 sentence2025Braget’s plain error claims fail because, at a minimum, the claimed errors would not have been obvious to the district court. ¶19 “The Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth Amendment together with] the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, as applied to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment, both guarantee to a criminal defendant . . . the right to be present at all stages of the trial where his [or her] absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings.” Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 523 (2004) (cleaned up). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Corrygreen2 sentences2025See State v. Corry, 2024 UT App 142, ¶ 17 , 558 P.3d 128 . ¶16 Next, Braget asserts three ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 2025See State v. Corry, 2024 UT App 142, ¶ 17 , 558 P.3d 128 . ¶16 Next, Braget asserts three ineffective assistance of counsel claims. | 1 | 1 |
Kerr v. City of Salt Lakegreen2 sentences2015See Kerr v. City of Salt Lake, 2013 UT 75, ¶¶ 16, 21-23 , 322 P.3d 669 (rejecting a city's reliance on the "discretionary function" exception in a case of injury caused by the defective condition of a sidewalk; explaining that "[ble-cause all cities must decide how to allocate scarce public funds to maintain sidewalks, Salt Lake City's interpretation of the discretionary function exception would completely negate the explicit waiver of governmental immunity for defective or dangerous sidewalks"); Thayer v. Wash. Cnty. 2015See Kerr v. City of Salt Lake, 2013 UT 75, ¶¶ 16, 21-23 , 322 P.3d 669 (rejecting a city's reliance on the "discretionary function" exception in a case of injury caused by the defective condition of a sidewalk; explaining that "[ble-cause all cities must decide how to allocate scarce public funds to maintain sidewalks, Salt Lake City's interpretation of the discretionary function exception would completely negate the explicit waiver of governmental immunity for defective or dangerous sidewalks"); Thayer v. Wash. Cnty. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Colemangreen2 sentences2011See, eg., State v. Coleman, 48 Conn. App. 260 , 709 A.2d 590, 594 (1998) ("The defendant did not raise the defense of statute of limitations at trial He has, therefore, waived this defense...."); People v. Everard, 225 Mich.App. 455 , 571 N.W.2d 536, 540 (1997) (holding "[a] statute of limitations defense is a waivable affirmative defense" and that the defendant had waived it by not raising it in the trial court). 2011See, eg., State v. Coleman, 48 Conn. App. 260 , 709 A.2d 590, 594 (1998) ("The defendant did not raise the defense of statute of limitations at trial He has, therefore, waived this defense...."); People v. Everard, 225 Mich.App. 455 , 571 N.W.2d 536, 540 (1997) (holding "[a] statute of limitations defense is a waivable affirmative defense" and that the defendant had waived it by not raising it in the trial court). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Everardgreen2 sentences2011See, eg., State v. Coleman, 48 Conn. App. 260 , 709 A.2d 590, 594 (1998) ("The defendant did not raise the defense of statute of limitations at trial He has, therefore, waived this defense...."); People v. Everard, 225 Mich.App. 455 , 571 N.W.2d 536, 540 (1997) (holding "[a] statute of limitations defense is a waivable affirmative defense" and that the defendant had waived it by not raising it in the trial court). 2011See, eg., State v. Coleman, 48 Conn. App. 260 , 709 A.2d 590, 594 (1998) ("The defendant did not raise the defense of statute of limitations at trial He has, therefore, waived this defense...."); People v. Everard, 225 Mich.App. 455 , 571 N.W.2d 536, 540 (1997) (holding "[a] statute of limitations defense is a waivable affirmative defense" and that the defendant had waived it by not raising it in the trial court). | 1 | 1 |
Griffiths-Rast v. Sulzer Spine Techgreen1 sentence2008In support of this interpretation, he discusses Griffiths-Rast v. Sulzer Spine Tech, Inc., No. 2:02CV1267, 2005 WL 2237685 (D.Utah Sept. 14, 2005) (mem.), aff'd, 216 F. App'x 790, 792 (10th Cir.2007) (mem.), a federal court decision that concluded section 78-14-4(2) "provides an explicit exception to section 78-12-35." 4 Id. at *8. | 1 | 1 |
Taylor v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2001See Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 20 , 94 S.Ct. 194, 196 , 38 L.Ed.2d 174 (1973) (per curiam). 2001See Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 20 , 94 S.Ct. 194, 196 , 38 L.Ed.2d 174 (1973) (per curiam). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Elmer J. Benes v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2011But see United States v. Crossley, 224 F.3d 847, 858 (6th Cir.2000) ("We must follow the law of the Benes [v. United States, 276 F.2d 99, 108-09 (6th Cir.1960),] decision and hold that, absent an explicit waiver, the statute of limitations presents a bar to prosecution that may be raised for the first time on appeal."). 8 This position has also been adopted by a number of states that have considered the issue. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Rebecca K. Crossley (99-4076) Starla Grubich (99-4080),defendants-Appellantsgreen1 sentence2011But see United States v. Crossley, 224 F.3d 847, 858 (6th Cir.2000) ("We must follow the law of the Benes [v. United States, 276 F.2d 99, 108-09 (6th Cir.1960),] decision and hold that, absent an explicit waiver, the statute of limitations presents a bar to prosecution that may be raised for the first time on appeal."). 8 This position has also been adopted by a number of states that have considered the issue. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cedar City v. Braget
green
1 sentence2025Plain Error ¶18 Braget raises two claims of plain error, specifically, that the district court plainly erred by (1) failing “to discuss with [Braget] on the record whether she was knowingly waiving her right to be present” and (2) failing “to receive an explicit waiver of [Braget’s] right to confrontation.” “To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that (i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more 20230535-CA 7 2025 UT App 39 Cedar City v. Braget | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Dean
green
2 sentences2025Plain Error ¶18 Braget raises two claims of plain error, specifically, that the district court plainly erred by (1) failing “to discuss with [Braget] on the record whether she was knowingly waiving her right to be present” and (2) failing “to receive an explicit waiver of [Braget’s] right to confrontation.” “To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that (i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more 20230535-CA 7 2025 UT App 39 Cedar City v. Braget 2025Plain Error ¶18 Braget raises two claims of plain error, specifically, that the district court plainly erred by (1) failing “to discuss with [Braget] on the record whether she was knowingly waiving her right to be present” and (2) failing “to receive an explicit waiver of [Braget’s] right to confrontation.” “To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that (i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more 20230535-CA 7 2025 UT App 39 Cedar City v. Braget | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Anderson v. Kriser
green
1 sentence2020Law Inst. 1977) (describing the tort of “fraudulent concealment” as containing an explicit requirement that the defendant acted “intentionally,” but describing the tort of “fraudulent nondisclosure” as containing no such requirement). ¶62 The majority points out that our supreme court has used the terms “fraudulent concealment” and “fraudulent nondisclosure” more or less interchangeably, and has even noted that the elements of the two torts are “essentially the same,” see supra ¶ 21 (citing Anderson, 2011 UT 66 , ¶ 22 n.11), and infers from that fact that the apparently-combined tort must look | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Utah Down Syndrome Foundation, Inc. v. Utah Down Syndrome Ass'n
green
2 sentences2016But he chose to ignore this court's explicit instruction to seek intervention in favor of seekmg extraordinary relief. 122 Gilbert defends his tactical decision by arguing that he did not want to intervene because doing so would have "defeated his argument that the District Court lacked in personam jurisdiction over him." He relies on language from the concurring opinion in Utah Down Syndrome Foundation stating that "[nlonparties claiming that the court lacks jurisdiction over them cannot be expected to voluntarily submit themselves to that jurisdiction-by moving to intervene-thereby laying wa 2016But he chose to ignore this court's explicit instruction to seek intervention in favor of seekmg extraordinary relief. 122 Gilbert defends his tactical decision by arguing that he did not want to intervene because doing so would have "defeated his argument that the District Court lacked in personam jurisdiction over him." He relies on language from the concurring opinion in Utah Down Syndrome Foundation stating that "[nlonparties claiming that the court lacks jurisdiction over them cannot be expected to voluntarily submit themselves to that jurisdiction-by moving to intervene-thereby laying wa | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Creviston
green
1 sentence2016R. 801(d), or if an explicit exception to the hearsay rule allows for the introduction of the hearsay statement at issue, see id. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Eldridge v. Farnsworth
green
2 sentences2016Husband characterizes Eldridge as holding that "the filing of a lis pendens did not constitute a wrongful lien because of the explicit exception in [Utah Code section 88-9-2(2).]" (Citing Eldridge, 2007 UT App 243, ¶¶ 47-49 , 166 P.3d 639 .) On this basis, Husband asserts that "a lis pendens cannot be a (wrongful lien' as defined under Utah's Wrongful Lien Statute, because the filing of a lis pendens under § T8B-6-1308 is explicitly exempt from Utah's Wrongful Lien Statute under § [8]8-9-2(2)." 187 However, Husband's argument mis construes the holding of Fidridge In El-dridge, the trial court 2016Husband characterizes Eldridge as holding that "the filing of a lis pendens did not constitute a wrongful lien because of the explicit exception in [Utah Code section 88-9-2(2).]" (Citing Eldridge, 2007 UT App 243, ¶¶ 47-49 , 166 P.3d 639 .) On this basis, Husband asserts that "a lis pendens cannot be a (wrongful lien' as defined under Utah's Wrongful Lien Statute, because the filing of a lis pendens under § T8B-6-1308 is explicitly exempt from Utah's Wrongful Lien Statute under § [8]8-9-2(2)." 187 However, Husband's argument mis construes the holding of Fidridge In El-dridge, the trial court | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Patterson v. American Fork City
green
2 sentences2008"Where the legislature has imposed a specific exhaustion requirement such as that contained in section [10-92-801], we will en-foree it strictly." Patterson, 2003 UT 7, ¶ 17 , 67 P.3d 466 . 2008"Where the legislature has imposed a specific exhaustion requirement such as that contained in section [10-92-801], we will en-foree it strictly." Patterson, 2003 UT 7, ¶ 17 , 67 P.3d 466 . | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.