explicit waiver in New Mexico

2002See id.; Hanson, 47 F.3d at 1065 (concluding that “[w]ithout an explicit waiver, the [tribe] is immune from suit in state court-even if the suit results from commercial activity occurring off the [tribe’s] reservation.”); see also DeFeo v. Ski Apache Resort, 120 N.M. 640, 643 , 904 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Ct. App.1995) (holding that tribe did not waive sovereign immunity through on-reservation commercial activity, which precluded state court from hearing a personal injury case).

1998See Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 172 , 97 S.Ct. 2616 , 53 L.Ed.2d 667 (1977) (“Absent an effective waiver or consent, it is settled that a state court may not exercise jurisdiction over a recognized Indian tribe.”); Sac & Fox Nation v. Hanson, 47 F.3d 1061, 1065 (10th Cir.1995) (without an explicit waiver, the Nation is immune from suit in state courts, even if suit results from commercial activity occurring off the Nation’s reservation); DeFeo v. Ski Apache Resort, 120 N.M. 640, 642 , 904 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Ct.App.1995). {14} Although sovereign immunity may be waive

2010We note, however, that DeFeo also contains the following language: “Without an explicit waiver, the Nation is immune from suit in state court — even if the suit results from commercial activity occurring of the Nation’s reservation.” Id. {7} Worker next asserts that Lopez v. Ski Apache Resort, 114 N.M. 202 , 836 P.2d 648 (Ct.App.1992), stands for the proposition that Ski Apache is not immune from suit where a skier was injured within the boundaries of New Mexico.

2002See id.; Hanson, 47 F.3d at 1065 (concluding that “[w]ithout an explicit waiver, the [tribe] is immune from suit in state court-even if the suit results from commercial activity occurring off the [tribe’s] reservation.”); see also DeFeo v. Ski Apache Resort, 120 N.M. 640, 643 , 904 P.2d 1065, 1068 (Ct. App.1995) (holding that tribe did not waive sovereign immunity through on-reservation commercial activity, which precluded state court from hearing a personal injury case).

2002See Commonwealth v. Corsetti, 387 Mass. 1 , 438 N.E.2d 805, 810 (1982) (affirming contempt in the absence of an explicit warning when the contemnor “was not taken by surprise”).

2002See Commonwealth v. Corsetti, 387 Mass. 1 , 438 N.E.2d 805, 810 (1982) (affirming contempt in the absence of an explicit warning when the contemnor “was not taken by surprise”).

2026Therefore, he insists this Court rely upon the New 16 Mexico savings statute’s remedial nature and liberally construe the statute to 17 maintain our “focus on protecting plaintiffs’ substantive rights.” Id. ¶¶ 16, 19; see 18 also Albuquerque Hilton Inn v. Haley, 1977-NMSC-051 , ¶ 7, 90 N.M. 510 , 565 P.2d 3 “(Text only)” indicates the omission of nonessential punctuation marks— including internal quotation marks, ellipses, and brackets—that are present in the text of the quoted source, leaving the quoted text otherwise unchanged. 1 1027 (noting that courts should liberally construe the applica

2025See, e.g., Wright, 525 10 U.S. at 80-82 (refusing to interpret a CBA arbitration clause as waiving an 11 employee’s statutory right to a judicial forum without an explicit waiver); see also 12 Mendoza v. Isleta Resort & Casino, 2020-NMSC-006, ¶ 20 , 460 P.3d 467 13 (“‘Generally, the goal of contract interpretation is to ascertain the intentions of the 14 contracting parties’ . . . without manufacturing a new agreement.” (citation 15 omitted)).

2025See, e.g., Wright, 525 10 U.S. at 80-82 (refusing to interpret a CBA arbitration clause as waiving an 11 employee’s statutory right to a judicial forum without an explicit waiver); see also 12 Mendoza v. Isleta Resort & Casino, 2020-NMSC-006, ¶ 20 , 460 P.3d 467 13 (“‘Generally, the goal of contract interpretation is to ascertain the intentions of the 14 contracting parties’ . . . without manufacturing a new agreement.” (citation 15 omitted)).

2012On appeal, NEE, the Amigos Bravos Groups, and the River Parties were entitled to make this same choice to participate. {31} On a previous occasion, when faced with the absence of an explicit rule governing proper parties to an administrative appeal, this Court concluded that, “[i]n the absence of a statutory provision as to parties, the question with respect to who may or must be joined as parties to a proceeding to review the decisions and orders of an administrative agency is governed by the rules as to parties in civil actions generally.” Plummer v. Johnson, 61 N.M. 423, 427-28 , 301 P.2d 5

2012On appeal, NEE, the Amigos Bravos Groups, and the River Parties were entitled to make this same choice to participate. {31} On a previous occasion, when faced with the absence of an explicit rule governing proper parties to an administrative appeal, this Court concluded that, “[i]n the absence of a statutory provision as to parties, the question with respect to who may or must be joined as parties to a proceeding to review the decisions and orders of an administrative agency is governed by the rules as to parties in civil actions generally.” Plummer v. Johnson, 61 N.M. 423, 427-28 , 301 P.2d 5

2010However, the Court in Lopez makes no mention of tribal sovereign immunity. {8} Worker also argues that commercial off-reservation activity by a tribal entity is not protected by sovereign immunity under Padilla v. Pueblo of Acoma, 107 N.M. 174, 179-80 , 754 P.2d 845, 850-51 (1988) (holding that “the district court may exercise jurisdiction over an Indian tribe when the tribe is engaged in activity off of the reservation as an unincorporated association registered and authorized to do business in this state and is sued in that capacity for breach of a written contract”).

2010However, the Court in Lopez makes no mention of tribal sovereign immunity. {8} Worker also argues that commercial off-reservation activity by a tribal entity is not protected by sovereign immunity under Padilla v. Pueblo of Acoma, 107 N.M. 174, 179-80 , 754 P.2d 845, 850-51 (1988) (holding that “the district court may exercise jurisdiction over an Indian tribe when the tribe is engaged in activity off of the reservation as an unincorporated association registered and authorized to do business in this state and is sued in that capacity for breach of a written contract”).

2003Before ordering dismissal with prejudice on a motion for summary judgment for failure to respond, a district court should consider: “(1) the degree of actual prejudice to the [opposing party], (2) the amount of interference with the judicial process, and (3) the culpability of the litigant.” Meade, 841 F.2d at 1520 n. 7 (citations omitted); see also Reed, 312 F.3d at 1195 (stating that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals “generally requires the district court to perform an explicit analysis of the Meade factors prior to dismissal”); Woodmore v. Git-N-Go, 790 F.2d 1497, 1499 (10th Cir.1986) (per

2003Before ordering dismissal with prejudice on a motion for summary judgment for failure to respond, a district court should consider: “(1) the degree of actual prejudice to the [opposing party], (2) the amount of interference with the judicial process, and (3) the culpability of the litigant.” Meade, 841 F.2d at 1520 n. 7 (citations omitted); see also Reed, 312 F.3d at 1195 (stating that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals “generally requires the district court to perform an explicit analysis of the Meade factors prior to dismissal”); Woodmore v. Git-N-Go, 790 F.2d 1497, 1499 (10th Cir.1986) (per

2003Before ordering dismissal with prejudice on a motion for summary judgment for failure to respond, a district court should consider: “(1) the degree of actual prejudice to the [opposing party], (2) the amount of interference with the judicial process, and (3) the culpability of the litigant.” Meade, 841 F.2d at 1520 n. 7 (citations omitted); see also Reed, 312 F.3d at 1195 (stating that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals “generally requires the district court to perform an explicit analysis of the Meade factors prior to dismissal”); Woodmore v. Git-N-Go, 790 F.2d 1497, 1499 (10th Cir.1986) (per

1998See Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 172 , 97 S.Ct. 2616 , 53 L.Ed.2d 667 (1977) (“Absent an effective waiver or consent, it is settled that a state court may not exercise jurisdiction over a recognized Indian tribe.”); Sac & Fox Nation v. Hanson, 47 F.3d 1061, 1065 (10th Cir.1995) (without an explicit waiver, the Nation is immune from suit in state courts, even if suit results from commercial activity occurring off the Nation’s reservation); DeFeo v. Ski Apache Resort, 120 N.M. 640, 642 , 904 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Ct.App.1995). {14} Although sovereign immunity may be waive

1998See Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Department of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 172 , 97 S.Ct. 2616 , 53 L.Ed.2d 667 (1977) (“Absent an effective waiver or consent, it is settled that a state court may not exercise jurisdiction over a recognized Indian tribe.”); Sac & Fox Nation v. Hanson, 47 F.3d 1061, 1065 (10th Cir.1995) (without an explicit waiver, the Nation is immune from suit in state courts, even if suit results from commercial activity occurring off the Nation’s reservation); DeFeo v. Ski Apache Resort, 120 N.M. 640, 642 , 904 P.2d 1065, 1067 (Ct.App.1995). {14} Although sovereign immunity may be waive