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88 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1902–2026 14 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Barnett v. Zion Park Districtgreen2 sentences2006The Barnett majority reasoned that the absence of an explicit exception for willful and wanton misconduct in section 3—108(a) of the Act meant that “the legislature must have intended to immunize liability for both negligence and willful and wanton misconduct.” Barnett, 171 Ill. 2d at 391-92 . 2006The Barnett majority reasoned that the absence of an explicit exception for willful and wanton misconduct in section 3-108(a) of the Act meant that "the legislature must have intended to immunize liability for both negligence and willful and wanton misconduct." Barnett, 171 Ill.2d at 391-92 , 216 Ill.Dec. 550 , 665 N.E.2d 808 . | 4 | 5 |
People v. Mastersongreen2 sentences2026Our supreme court noted that “the SDPA, unlike similar statutes in other states and our own [Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act], [did] not specifically address volitional capacity, it fail[ed] to define the term ‘mental disorder’ and it [did] not provide an explicit standard for gauging the probability or likelihood that the subject of the proceeding will commit sexual offenses in the future.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 328-29 . 2016Subsequently, our supreme court determined that the Act did not specifically address volitional capacity, failed to define the term " 'mental disorder,' " and did not provide "an explicit standard for gauging the probability or likelihood that the subject of the proceeding will commit sexual offenses in the future." People v. Masterson, 207 Ill. 2d 305, 329 (2003). | 3 | 6 |
Village of Bloomingdale v. CDG Enterprises, Inc.green2 sentences2014A public entity or public employee has immunity for acts in the course of enforcing any law, “unless such act or omission constitutes willful and wanton conduct.” 745 ILCS 10/2-202 (West 2008); see Village of Bloomingdale v. CDG Enterprises, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 484, 491 (2001). 2014A public entity or public employee has immunity for acts in the course of enforcing any law, "unless such act or omission constitutes willful and wanton conduct." 745 ILCS 10/2-202 (West 2008); see Village of Bloomingdale v. CDG Enterprises, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 484, 491 (2001). | 3 | 3 |
Gallagher v. Lenartgreen2 sentences2015See Poindexter v. State, 229 Ill. 2d 194, 207 , 890 N.E.2d 410, 419 (2008) (requiring a petitioner to exhaust all administrative remedies before appealing, which may result in a conservation of judicial resources); Gallagher v. Lenart, 226 Ill. 2d 208, 239 , 874 N.E.2d 43, 62 (2007) (requiring the existence of an explicit waiver of a compensation lien would mitigate settling parties’ expending “time and money arguing over the interpretation of settlement provisions, and valuable judicial resources will be conserved”); People v. Young, 82 Ill. 2d 234, 247 , 412 N.E.2d 501, 507 (1980) (declining 2015See Poindexter v. State, 229 Ill. 2d 194, 207 , 890 N.E.2d 410, 419 (2008) (requiring a petitioner to exhaust all administrative remedies before appealing, which may result in a conservation of judicial resources); Gallagher v. Lenart, 226 Ill. 2d 208, 239 , 874 N.E.2d 43, 62 (2007) (requiring the existence of an explicit waiver of a compensation lien would mitigate settling parties’ expending “time and money arguing over the interpretation of settlement provisions, and valuable judicial resources will be conserved”); People v. Young, 82 Ill. 2d 234, 247 , 412 N.E.2d 501, 507 (1980) (declining | 2 | 7 |
In re Marriage of Tutorgreen2 sentences2012See also Tutor, 2011 IL App (2d) 100187, ¶ 16 (party did not relinquish her right to postjudgment -5- interest where the agreed order did not contain an explicit waiver of that right). ¶ 21 Here, the agreed orders were silent on the issue of statutory interest pertaining to the arrearages. 2012See also Tutor, 2011 IL App (2d) 100187, ¶ 16 , 353 Ill.Dec. 726 , 956 N.E.2d 588 (party did not relinquish her right to postjudgment interest where the agreed order did not contain an explicit waiver of that right). ¶ 21 Here, the agreed orders were silent on the issue of statutory interest pertaining to the arrearages. | 2 | 3 |
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.green2 sentences2024See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 758 A.2d 485, 497 (Del. 2000). 2024See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 758 A.2d 485, 497 (Del. 2000). | 2 | 2 |
People v. McCauleygreen2 sentences2019See People v. McCauley, 163 Ill. 2d 414, 442 (1994) (“Authorities must inform suspects that if they cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided, and that they may ask for one at any time and upon doing so, the interrogation must cease.”). ¶ 58 Both the State and defendant agree that de novo review is appropriate for this question, which is solely a question of law. 2018See People v. McCauley , 163 Ill. 2d 414 , 442, 206 Ill.Dec. 671 , 645 N.E.2d 923 (1994) ("Authorities must inform suspects that if they cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided, and that they may ask for one at any time and upon doing so, the interrogation must cease."). ¶ 58 Both the State and defendant agree that de novo review is appropriate for this question, which is solely a question of law. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Younggreen2 sentences2015See Poindexter v. State, 229 Ill. 2d 194, 207 , 890 N.E.2d 410, 419 (2008) (requiring a petitioner to exhaust all administrative remedies before appealing, which may result in a conservation of judicial resources); Gallagher v. Lenart, 226 Ill. 2d 208, 239 , 874 N.E.2d 43, 62 (2007) (requiring the existence of an explicit waiver of a compensation lien would mitigate settling parties’ expending “time and money arguing over the interpretation of settlement provisions, and valuable judicial resources will be conserved”); People v. Young, 82 Ill. 2d 234, 247 , 412 N.E.2d 501, 507 (1980) (declining 2015See Poindexter v. State, 229 Ill. 2d 194, 207 , 890 N.E.2d 410, 419 (2008) (requiring a petitioner to exhaust all administrative remedies before appealing, which may result in a conservation of judicial resources); Gallagher v. Lenart, 226 Ill. 2d 208, 239 , 874 N.E.2d 43, 62 (2007) (requiring the existence of an explicit waiver of a compensation lien would mitigate settling parties’ expending “time and money arguing over the interpretation of settlement provisions, and valuable judicial resources will be conserved”); People v. Young, 82 Ill. 2d 234, 247 , 412 N.E.2d 501, 507 (1980) (declining | 2 | 2 |
Poindexter v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See Poindexter v. State, 229 Ill. 2d 194, 207 , 890 N.E.2d 410, 419 (2008) (requiring a petitioner to exhaust all administrative remedies before appealing, which may result in a conservation of judicial resources); Gallagher v. Lenart, 226 Ill. 2d 208, 239 , 874 N.E.2d 43, 62 (2007) (requiring the existence of an explicit waiver of a compensation lien would mitigate settling parties’ expending “time and money arguing over the interpretation of settlement provisions, and valuable judicial resources will be conserved”); People v. Young, 82 Ill. 2d 234, 247 , 412 N.E.2d 501, 507 (1980) (declining 2015See Poindexter v. State, 229 Ill. 2d 194, 207 , 890 N.E.2d 410, 419 (2008) (requiring a petitioner to exhaust all administrative remedies before appealing, which may result in a conservation of judicial resources); Gallagher v. Lenart, 226 Ill. 2d 208, 239 , 874 N.E.2d 43, 62 (2007) (requiring the existence of an explicit waiver of a compensation lien would mitigate settling parties’ expending “time and money arguing over the interpretation of settlement provisions, and valuable judicial resources will be conserved”); People v. Young, 82 Ill. 2d 234, 247 , 412 N.E.2d 501, 507 (1980) (declining | 2 | 2 |
Cuculich v. Thomson Consumer Electronics, Inc.green2 sentences2008See Cuculich v. Thompson Consumer Electronics, Inc., 317 Ill. 2008See Cuculich v. Thompson Consumer Electronics, Inc., 317 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Scottgreen2 sentences2006Based on the statute’s explicit requirement that the defendant waive a jury “in open court” (Scott, 186 Ill. 2d at 288 (Bilandic, J., specially concurring)), Scott makes clear that the defendant must be present in open court when a jury waiver, written or otherwise, is at least discussed. 2006Based on the statute's explicit requirement that the defendant waive a jury "in open court" ( Scott, 186 Ill.2d at 288 , 238 Ill.Dec. 36 , 710 N.E.2d 833 (Bilandic, J., specially concurring)), Scott makes clear that the defendant must be present in open court when a jury waiver, written or otherwise, is at least discussed. | 2 | 2 |
Leonardi v. Loyola University of Chicagogreen2 sentences2026Johnson, 2025 IL App (1st) 230087, ¶ 59 . ¶ 203 In doing so, Johnson recognized our supreme court’s holding that a defendant: - 47 - Nos. 1-24-0450 and 1-24-0451 (consolidated) “ ‘has the right not only to rebut evidence tending to show that defendant’s acts are negligent and the proximate cause of claimed injuries, but also has the right to endeavor to establish by competent evidence that the conduct of a third person, or some other causative factor, is the sole proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.’ ” (Emphases in original.) Id. ¶ 58 (quoting Leonardi v. Loyola University of Chicago, 168 2026Johnson, 2025 IL App (1st) 230087, ¶ 59 . ¶ 203 In doing so, Johnson recognized our supreme court’s holding that a defendant: - 47 - Nos. 1-24-0450 and 1-24-0451 (consolidated) “ ‘has the right not only to rebut evidence tending to show that defendant’s acts are negligent and the proximate cause of claimed injuries, but also has the right to endeavor to establish by competent evidence that the conduct of a third person, or some other causative factor, is the sole proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.’ ” (Emphases in original.) Id. ¶ 58 (quoting Leonardi v. Loyola University of Chicago, 168 | 1 | 4 |
People v. Maidengreen2 sentences2026See People v. Maiden, 2013 IL App (2d) 120016, ¶ 27 . 2016Maiden, 2013 IL App (2d) 120016, ¶ 26 . | 1 | 2 |
Gapinske v. Town of Conditgreen2 sentences1994The court held that section 3-104 immunizes not only negligent conduct, but also wilful and wanton conduct. ( Gapinske, 250 Ill.App.3d at 1050 , 189 Ill.Dec. 334 , 619 N.E.2d 1383 ; see also Wood, 229 Ill.App.3d at 354 , 170 Ill.Dec. 590 , 593 N.E.2d 132 .) The Gapinske court based its holding on the absence of language limiting the immunity to negligent conduct and the legislature's ability to provide such limiting language when it intends to do so. ( Gapinske, 250 Ill.App.3d at 1050 , 189 Ill.Dec. 334 , 619 N.E.2d 1383 .) The court held out as an example section 3-106 of the Act, which conta 1994The court held that section 3-104 immunizes not only negligent conduct, but also wilful and wanton conduct. ( Gapinske, 250 Ill.App.3d at 1050 , 189 Ill.Dec. 334 , 619 N.E.2d 1383 ; see also Wood, 229 Ill.App.3d at 354 , 170 Ill.Dec. 590 , 593 N.E.2d 132 .) The Gapinske court based its holding on the absence of language limiting the immunity to negligent conduct and the legislature's ability to provide such limiting language when it intends to do so. ( Gapinske, 250 Ill.App.3d at 1050 , 189 Ill.Dec. 334 , 619 N.E.2d 1383 .) The court held out as an example section 3-106 of the Act, which conta | 1 | 2 |
| Landis v. Marc Realty, L.L.C.green | 1 | 1 |
| Joseph Construction Co. v. Board of Trustees of Governors State Universitygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Pecorarogreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Westgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. One 1998 GMCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Beasleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Marriage of Tutorgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In Re Special Education of Walkergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wood v. Village of Grayslakegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Parmar v. Madigan
green
2 sentences2018The court expressly ruled that section 15 of the Estate Tax Act "is not an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity." ¶ 12 The appellate court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 2017 IL App (2d) 160286 , ¶ 42, 412 Ill.Dec. 551 , 75 N.E.3d 1064 . 2018The court expressly ruled that section 15 of the Estate Tax Act "is not an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity." ¶ 12 The appellate court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. 2017 IL App (2d) 160286 , ¶ 42, 412 Ill.Dec. 551 , 75 N.E.3d 1064 . | 3 | 2017–2018 |
Murray v. Chicago Youth Center
green
2 sentences2014By including the prefatory language in section 2-201, “Except as otherwise provided by Statute,” the legislature indicated that “section 2-201 immunity is contingent upon whether other provisions, either within the Act or some other statute, creates exceptions to or limitations on that immunity.” Murray, 224 Ill. 2d at 232 . ¶ 13 Section 2-202 creates an explicit exception to the immunities granted in section 2-201. 2014By including the prefatory language in section 2-201, "Except as otherwise provided by Statute," the legislature indicated that "section 2-201 immunity is contingent upon whether other provisions, either within the Act or some other statute, creates exceptions to or limitations on that immunity." Murray, 224 Ill. 2d at 232 . ¶ 13 Section 2-202 creates an explicit exception to the immunities granted in section 2-201. | 3 | 2014–2014 |
Douglas v. Arlington Park Racecourse, LLC
green
2 sentences2025Although the sole proximate cause defense is “simply one way a defendant argues that the plaintiff failed to carry its burden of proof on proximate cause” (Douglas, 2018 IL App (1st) 162962, ¶ 36 ), Leonardi makes clear that, when supported by the evidence, a defendant is entitled to an explicit instruction “that the conduct of a third person, or some other causative factor, is the sole proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.” Leonardi, 168 Ill. 2d at 101 . 2025Although the sole proximate cause defense is “simply one way a defendant argues that the plaintiff failed to carry its burden of proof on proximate cause” (Douglas, 2018 IL App (1st) 162962, ¶ 36 ), Leonardi makes clear that, when supported by the evidence, a defendant is entitled to an explicit instruction “that the conduct of a third person, or some other causative factor, is the sole proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.” Leonardi, 168 Ill. 2d at 101 . | 2 | 2025–2025 |
Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings & Investment Plan
green
2 sentences2019Kennedy held that, to comply with ERISA, a plan administrator must abide by the plan documents and distribute pension benefits to the former spouse who is named as the decedent’s beneficiary, even when the former spouse “purported to waive her entitlement by a federal common law waiver embodied in a divorce decree that was not a QDRO.” Kennedy, 555 U.S. at 288 . 2018Kennedy held that, to comply with ERISA, a plan administrator must abide by the plan documents and distribute pension benefits to the former spouse who is named as the decedent's beneficiary, even when the former spouse "purported to waive her entitlement by a federal common law waiver embodied in a divorce decree that was not a QDRO." Kennedy , 555 U.S. at 288 , 129 S.Ct. 865 . | 2 | 2018–2019 |
Egelhoff v. Egelhoff Ex Rel. Breiner
green
2 sentences2018At oral argument, Betty's counsel conceded that, regardless of the propriety of the trial court's holding regarding the TDMA, we may affirm the trial court, if we agree that the divorce decree constituted an explicit waiver of her interest in the 401(k) account. ¶ 35 With respect to the trial court's holding regarding the TDMA, Betty's sole argument in her opening appellate brief is that "ERISA supercedes and pre-empts" the TDMA, relying on Egelhoff v. Egelhoff , 532 U.S. 141 , 121 S.Ct. 1322 , 149 L.Ed.2d 264 (2001). 2018At oral argument, Betty's counsel conceded that, regardless of the propriety of the trial court's holding regarding the TDMA, we may affirm the trial court, if we agree that the divorce decree constituted an explicit waiver of her interest in the 401(k) account. ¶ 35 With respect to the trial court's holding regarding the TDMA, Betty's sole argument in her opening appellate brief is that "ERISA supercedes and pre-empts" the TDMA, relying on Egelhoff v. Egelhoff , 532 U.S. 141 , 121 S.Ct. 1322 , 149 L.Ed.2d 264 (2001). | 2 | 2018–2019 |
Wendorf v. Landers
green
2 sentences2019Wendorf, 755 F. Supp. 2d at 978 . 2018Wendorf , 755 F.Supp.2d at 978 . | 2 | 2018–2019 |
Williams Ex Rel. Williams v. Davenport
green
2 sentences2015Williams, 306 Ill. 2015Williams, 306 Ill. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Rozela
green
2 sentences2015Id. 2015Rozela, 345 Ill. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
DeWitt v. Fleming
green
2 sentences2008We believe that an explicit rule of law that promissory estoppel exists only for defensive purposes in Illinois promotes the stability and integrity of Illinois jurisprudence and provides attorneys practicing in Illinois, as well as their clients, with a clear, stable guidepost to which they may conform themselves." DeWitt, 357 Ill.App.3d at 573-75 , 293 Ill.Dec. 446 , 828 N.E.2d 756 . 2008We believe that an explicit rule of law that promissory estoppel exists only for defensive purposes in Illinois promotes the stability and integrity of Illinois jurisprudence and provides attorneys practicing in Illinois, as well as their clients, with a clear, stable guidepost to which they may conform themselves." DeWitt, 357 Ill.App.3d at 573-75 , 293 Ill.Dec. 446 , 828 N.E.2d 756 . | 2 | 2008–2008 |
In Re Estate of Dierkes
green
2 sentences2007The adoption of an explicit-waiver rule in this context is consistent with this court’s previous recognition in In re Estate of Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d 326 (2000), that “[t]he plain language of section 5(b) shows that an employer’s reimbursement of workers’ compensation payments from an employee’s third-party recovery is crucial to the workers’ compensation scheme.” (Emphasis added.) Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d at 331 . 2007The adoption of an explicit-waiver rule in this context is consistent with this court’s previous recognition in In re Estate of Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d 326 (2000), that “[t]he plain language of section 5(b) shows that an employer’s reimbursement of workers’ compensation payments from an employee’s third-party recovery is crucial to the workers’ compensation scheme.” (Emphasis added.) Dierkes, 191 Ill. 2d at 331 . | 2 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Allen
green
2 sentences2006The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that defendant had “adequately alleged plain error” where the trial court abused its discretion in requiring defendant to wear an electronic stun belt as a restraining device at trial without the explicit analysis and finding of necessity required by People v. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d 261 (1977). 354 Ill. 2006The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that defendant had "adequately alleged plain error" where the trial court abused its discretion in requiring defendant to wear an electronic stun belt as a restraining device at trial without the explicit analysis and finding of necessity required by People v. Boose, 66 Ill.2d 261 , 5 Ill.Dec. 832 , 362 N.E.2d 303 (1977). 354 Ill.App.3d 442, 446 , 290 Ill.Dec. 284 , 821 N.E.2d 335 . | 2 | 2006–2006 |
People v. Boose
green
2 sentences2006The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that defendant had “adequately alleged plain error” where the trial court abused its discretion in requiring defendant to wear an electronic stun belt as a restraining device at trial without the explicit analysis and finding of necessity required by People v. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d 261 (1977). 354 Ill. 2006The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that defendant had "adequately alleged plain error" where the trial court abused its discretion in requiring defendant to wear an electronic stun belt as a restraining device at trial without the explicit analysis and finding of necessity required by People v. Boose, 66 Ill.2d 261 , 5 Ill.Dec. 832 , 362 N.E.2d 303 (1977). 354 Ill.App.3d 442, 446 , 290 Ill.Dec. 284 , 821 N.E.2d 335 . | 2 | 2006–2006 |
Lindahl v. Independent School District No. 306
green
2 sentences2003Rs. 2(G)(1), (G)(2) (1983)).) It does not appear, however, that either the Ohio or Minnesota statute contained an explicit requirement that the location of the meeting be “convenient”; those statutes merely required that the meeting be “open.” Wyse, slip op. at_ ( 1995 WL 547784 , at *4); Lindahl, 270 Minn, at 167, 133 N.W.2d at 26 . 2003Rs. 2(G)(1), (G)(2) (1983)).) It does not appear, however, that either the Ohio or Minnesota statute contained an explicit requirement that the location of the meeting be "convenient"; those statutes merely required that the meeting be "open." Wyse , 1995 WL 547784 , at *4; Lindahl , 270 Minn. at 167 , 133 N.W.2d at 26 . | 2 | 2003–2003 |
Shelbyville Mutual Insurance v. Sunbeam Leisure Products Co.
green
2 sentences1998Shelbyville Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sunbeam Leisure Products Co. , 262 Ill. 1998Shelbyville Mutual Insurance Co. v. Sunbeam Leisure Products Co., 262 Ill. | 2 | 1998–1998 |
Doe v. Calumet City
green
2 sentences1994There, the court's discussion centered around section 2-202 of the Act, which contains an explicit exception for wilful and wanton conduct. ( Doe, 161 Ill.2d at 388-90 , 204 Ill.Dec. 274 , 641 N.E.2d 498 .) The Doe court merely recognized that a plaintiff seeking to bypass the immunities provided for in sections 4-102 and 4-107 of the Act may rely either upon the judicially created special duty exception or the exception in section 2-202 for wilful and wanton conduct. ( Doe, 161 Ill.2d at 388-90 , 204 Ill.Dec. 274 , 641 N.E.2d 498 .) Neither exception has any application here. 1994There, the court's discussion centered around section 2-202 of the Act, which contains an explicit exception for wilful and wanton conduct. ( Doe, 161 Ill.2d at 388-90 , 204 Ill.Dec. 274 , 641 N.E.2d 498 .) The Doe court merely recognized that a plaintiff seeking to bypass the immunities provided for in sections 4-102 and 4-107 of the Act may rely either upon the judicially created special duty exception or the exception in section 2-202 for wilful and wanton conduct. ( Doe, 161 Ill.2d at 388-90 , 204 Ill.Dec. 274 , 641 N.E.2d 498 .) Neither exception has any application here. | 2 | 1994–1994 |
Adams v. Ward
green
2 sentences1993Dec. 864 , 515 N.E.2d 849 .) To find statutory misconduct the employer must meet three requirements: (1) a showing of deliberate and willful conduct, which is (2) based on a reasonable rule of the employer which (3) harmed the employer or another employee. ( Adams v. Ward (1990), 206 Ill.App.3d 719, 724 , 151 Ill.Dec. 782 , 565 N.E.2d 53 .) The employer is excused from proving actual harm if it can show that the employee has repeated the conduct at issue despite a prior explicit warning. 1993App. 3d 719, 724 , 565 N.E.2d 53 .) The employer is excused from proving actual harm if it can show that the employee has repeated the conduct at issue despite a prior explicit warning. | 2 | 1993–1993 |
| Johnson v. Advocate Health & Hospitals Corp. green | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| cluster 10863433 neutral | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| Heritage Commons Partners v. Village of Summit green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Country Club Estates Condominium Association v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| O'Toole v. Central Laborers' Pension & Welfare Funds green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Leetaru v. The Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Village of Rosemont v. Lentin Lumber Co. green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Bill v. Education Officers Electoral Board of Community Consolidated School District No. 181 green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| In re Commitment of Walker green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| OneWest Bank, FSB v. Topor green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Boatmen's National Bank v. Direct Lines, Inc. green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Harder v. Kelly green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| KSAC CORP. v. Recycle Free, Inc. green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Wicker v. Consolidated Rail Corporation green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| cluster 696222 green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Eck v. McHenry County Public Building Commission green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Serrano v. Chicago Board of Education neutral | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Pesce v. Board of Review of Department of Employment Security green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Brochu green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Co. v. Frierdich green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| People v. Brown green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| People v. Jones green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Arco Petroleum Products Co. v. R & D Automotive, Inc. green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| People v. Gulley green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.