explicit standard in Iowa

1997(Emphasis added.) He argues that this provision fails to “provide an explicit standard for those who apply it,” State v. Pierce, 287 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Iowa 1980), because it does not provide guidance for the juvenile court in deciding whether to relieve a juvenile offender of the duty to register.

1991In discussing a void-for-vagueness challenge to a statute, our supreme court has stated: “[T]o withstand a constitutional attack, a penal statute must satisfy two standards: ‘(1) it must give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, and (2) it must provide an explicit standard for those who apply it.’ ” Saadiq v. State, 387 N.W.2d 315, 321 (Iowa 1986) (quoting State v. Pierce, 287 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Iowa 1980)).

1977Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 , 108-109, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-2299 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 227-228 (1972); State v. Price, 237 N.W.2d 813, 815 (Iowa 1976).

1977Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 , 108-109, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-2299 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 227-228 (1972); State v. Price, 237 N.W.2d 813, 815 (Iowa 1976).

1991In discussing a void-for-vagueness challenge to a statute, our supreme court has stated: “[T]o withstand a constitutional attack, a penal statute must satisfy two standards: ‘(1) it must give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, and (2) it must provide an explicit standard for those who apply it.’ ” Saadiq v. State, 387 N.W.2d 315, 321 (Iowa 1986) (quoting State v. Pierce, 287 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Iowa 1980)).

1990McKee, 392 N.W.2d at 494 . [[Image here]] “Thus, to withstand a constitutional attack, a penal statute must satisfy two standards: (1) it must give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, and (2) it must provide an explicit standard for those who apply it.” Saadiq, 387 N.W.2d at 321 .

2024See Kaster, 454 N.W.2d at 878 (“[A] penal statute must satisfy two standards: (1) it must give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, and (2) it must provide an explicit standard for those who apply it.” (quoting State v. Duncan, 414 N.W.2d 91, 96 (Iowa 1987) (en banc))); see also State v. Buchanan, 549 N.W.2d 291, 294 (Iowa 1996) (defining “knowledge” as “a conscious awareness,” and “[k]nowingly” as “a knowledge of the existence of the facts constituting the crime” (first quoting Iowa State Bar Ass’n, Iowa Criminal Jury Instruction 200.3 (1995); then quoting Stat

2024See Kaster, 454 24 N.W.2d at 878 (“[A] penal statute must satisfy two standards: (1) it must give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, and (2) it must provide an explicit standard for those who apply it.” (quoting State v. Duncan, 414 N.W.2d 91, 96 (Iowa 1987) (en banc))); see also State v. Buchanan, 549 N.W.2d 291, 294 (Iowa 1996) (defining “knowledge” as “a conscious awareness,” and “[k]nowingly” as “a knowledge of the existence of the facts constituting the crime” (first quoting Iowa State Bar Ass’n, Iowa Criminal Jury Instruction 200.3 (1995); then quoting S

2021See, e.g., United States v. Atkinson, 354 F. App’x 250, 252 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1184 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Hernandez, 242 F.3d 110 , 113–14 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam); Jones v. United States, 167 F.3d 1142 , 1144–46 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Robert K.

2021See, e.g., United States v. Atkinson, 354 F. App’x 250, 252 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1184 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Hernandez, 242 F.3d 110 , 113–14 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam); Jones v. United States, 167 F.3d 1142 , 1144–46 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Robert K.

2021See, e.g., United States v. Atkinson, 354 F. App’x 250, 252 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1184 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Hernandez, 242 F.3d 110 , 113–14 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam); Jones v. United States, 167 F.3d 1142 , 1144–46 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Robert K.

2021See, e.g., United States v. Atkinson, 354 F. App’x 250, 252 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1184 (10th Cir. 2001); United States v. Hernandez, 242 F.3d 110 , 113–14 (2d Cir. 2001) (per curiam); Jones v. United States, 167 F.3d 1142 , 1144–46 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Robert K.

1984State v. Pearce, 287 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Iowa 1980); Williams v. Osmundson, 281 N.W.2d 622, 625 (Iowa 1979).

1982State v. Pierce, 287 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Iowa 1980); Williams v. Osmundson, 281 N.W.2d 622, 625 (Iowa 1979).

1976Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 , 108-109, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-2299 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 227 (1972); State v. Robinson, 183 N.W.2d 190, 193 (Iowa 1971).” This statement from In Re Juvenile, 364 Mass. 531 , 306 N.E.2d 822, 827 (1974), is pertinent at this point: “The ‘void for vagueness’ argument usually rests on one or both of two theories, either that there has been a delegation of legislative authority with standards for its exercise which are not sufficient to bar arbitrary or discriminatory administrative action or that the statute is so unclear in what it permits or forbids that a

1976Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 , 108-109, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298-2299 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222, 227 (1972); State v. Robinson, 183 N.W.2d 190, 193 (Iowa 1971).” State v. Willis, 218 N.W.2d 921, 923 (Iowa 1974).

2024See Kaster, 454 N.W.2d at 878 (“[A] penal statute must satisfy two standards: (1) it must give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, and (2) it must provide an explicit standard for those who apply it.” (quoting State v. Duncan, 414 N.W.2d 91, 96 (Iowa 1987) (en banc))); see also State v. Buchanan, 549 N.W.2d 291, 294 (Iowa 1996) (defining “knowledge” as “a conscious awareness,” and “[k]nowingly” as “a knowledge of the existence of the facts constituting the crime” (first quoting Iowa State Bar Ass’n, Iowa Criminal Jury Instruction 200.3 (1995); then quoting Stat

2024See Kaster, 454 24 N.W.2d at 878 (“[A] penal statute must satisfy two standards: (1) it must give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, and (2) it must provide an explicit standard for those who apply it.” (quoting State v. Duncan, 414 N.W.2d 91, 96 (Iowa 1987) (en banc))); see also State v. Buchanan, 549 N.W.2d 291, 294 (Iowa 1996) (defining “knowledge” as “a conscious awareness,” and “[k]nowingly” as “a knowledge of the existence of the facts constituting the crime” (first quoting Iowa State Bar Ass’n, Iowa Criminal Jury Instruction 200.3 (1995); then quoting S

2024See Kaster, 454 N.W.2d at 878 (“[A] penal statute must satisfy two standards: (1) it must give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, and (2) it must provide an explicit standard for those who apply it.” (quoting State v. Duncan, 414 N.W.2d 91, 96 (Iowa 1987) (en banc))); see also State v. Buchanan, 549 N.W.2d 291, 294 (Iowa 1996) (defining “knowledge” as “a conscious awareness,” and “[k]nowingly” as “a knowledge of the existence of the facts constituting the crime” (first quoting Iowa State Bar Ass’n, Iowa Criminal Jury Instruction 200.3 (1995); then quoting Stat

2024See Kaster, 454 24 N.W.2d at 878 (“[A] penal statute must satisfy two standards: (1) it must give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, and (2) it must provide an explicit standard for those who apply it.” (quoting State v. Duncan, 414 N.W.2d 91, 96 (Iowa 1987) (en banc))); see also State v. Buchanan, 549 N.W.2d 291, 294 (Iowa 1996) (defining “knowledge” as “a conscious awareness,” and “[k]nowingly” as “a knowledge of the existence of the facts constituting the crime” (first quoting Iowa State Bar Ass’n, Iowa Criminal Jury Instruction 200.3 (1995); then quoting S

2016Vagueness and Overbreadth Challenge to Mental-Injury Statute Rachel next attacks section 232.2(6)(c)(1) as “unconstitutionally vague” both on its face and as applied to her, and alternatively as “unconstitutionally overbroad.” Vagueness challenges are generally directed toward penal statutes, which “must give a person of ordinary intelligence fair warning of what is 12 prohibited, and, in order to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement . . . it must provide an explicit standard for those who apply [them].” See State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348, 353 (Iowa 1976).

1982"A penal statute must give a person of ordinary intelligence fair warning of what is prohibited, and, in order to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, it must provide an explicit standard for those who apply it." State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348, 353 (Iowa 1976).

2010See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Miller, 568 N.W.2d 665, 667 (Iowa 1997).

2010See Iowa Supreme Ct. Bd. of Prof'l Ethics & Conduct v. Miller, 568 N.W.2d 665, 667 (Iowa 1997).

1994Price, 237 N.W.2d at 815 .

1994Price, 237 N.W.2d at 815 .

2024See Kaster, 454 N.W.2d at 878 (“[A] penal statute must satisfy two standards: (1) it must give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited, and (2) it must provide an explicit standard for those who apply it.” (quoting State v. Duncan, 414 N.W.2d 91, 96 (Iowa 1987) (en banc))); see also State v. Buchanan, 549 N.W.2d 291, 294 (Iowa 1996) (defining “knowledge” as “a conscious awareness,” and “[k]nowingly” as “a knowledge of the existence of the facts constituting the crime” (first quoting Iowa State Bar Ass’n, Iowa Criminal Jury Instruction 200.3 (1995); then quoting Stat

2019But the State urges: “Counsel need not urge the giving of every possible instruction to display competency, even where an instruction would otherwise be available.” Brewer v. State, 444 N.W.2d 77, 85 (Iowa 1989).

2017The evil the legislature could have intended to be criminalized is “a person who by force or intimidation procures the consent.” See Adams, 554 N.W.2d at 689 (“The wording of the statute, however, is important for what is not stated as well as for what is stated.

2016Where the statute under attack is remedial or civil rather than penal in nature, courts require “a less strict standard of definiteness.” See Miller v. Iowa Real Estate Comm’n., 274 N.W.2d 288, 292 (Iowa 1979).

2015Although not an explicit rule or standard, “[g]enerally, courts have approved out-of-country visitation when the country is a signatory to the Hague 1 See http://travel.state.gov/content/childabduction/english/country/hague-party- countries.html 7 Convention and there is insufficient proof of an intention to wrongfully retain the child.” Abouzahr v. Matera-Abouzahr, 824 A.2d 268, 281 (N.J.

2005See TLC Home Health Care, L.L.C. v. Iowa Dept. of Human Services, 638 N.W.2d 708, 715 (Iowa 2002) (noting the legislature’s failure to include an explicit exception for insulin injections in the Iowa Medicaid statute, and concluding that “[i]f the legislature intends such an exception, it is its duty, not the court’s, to provide the exception in the statute”).

1993Nevertheless “the Constitution does not require impossible standards; all that is required is that the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.” Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491 , 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1312 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1498, 1511 (1957).

1993Nevertheless “the Constitution does not require impossible standards; all that is required is that the language conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.” Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491 , 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1312 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1498, 1511 (1957).

1993A criminal statute “must give a person of ordinary intelligence fair warning of what is prohibited, and, in order to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement, it must provide an explicit standard for those who apply it.” State v. Speck, 242 N.W.2d 287, 290 (Iowa 1976).