explicit waiver in Wisconsin

2007Washington first contends that a jail is not a "facility" as the term is used in § 252.07(9)(a), which authorizes confinement to a "facility where proper care and treatment will be provided and spread of the disease will be prevented." Washington disputes the court of appeals' conclusion that the absence of an explicit bar on jail confinement makes jail a permissible placement option, see Washington, 292 Wis.2d 258, ¶ 12 , 716 N.W.2d 176 , asserting that the absence of an express *122 authorization of jail confinement demonstrates that it is an impermissible placement option, given the statute

2007Washington first contends that a jail is not a "facility" as the term is used in § 252.07(9)(a), which authorizes confinement to a "facility where proper care and treatment will be provided and spread of the disease will be prevented." Washington disputes the court of appeals' conclusion that the absence of an explicit bar on jail confinement makes jail a permissible placement option, see Washington, 292 Wis. 2d 258, ¶ 12 , asserting that the absence of an express authorization of jail confinement demonstrates that it is an impermissible placement option, given the statute's nonpunitive, publi

2020The City of Oshkosh concedes this issue; therefore, we will address the merits of Hamill’s case. 3 No. 2020AP867 to suspect that the individual has committed, was committing, or is about to commit a crime.” Post, 301 Wis. 2d 1, ¶13 .

2020STAT. § 971.31(10), containing an explicit exception that preserves the right to appeal denied motions to suppress when a defendant pleads guilty or no contest, applies only to criminal cases, County of Racine v. Smith, 122 Wis. 2d 431, 436-37 , 362 N.W.2d 439 (Ct. App. 1984), Hamill asks this court in its discretion to review his appeal.

2020STAT. § 971.31(10), containing an explicit exception that preserves the right to appeal denied motions to suppress when a defendant pleads guilty or no contest, applies only to criminal cases, County of Racine v. Smith, 122 Wis. 2d 431, 436-37 , 362 N.W.2d 439 (Ct. App. 1984), Hamill asks this court in its discretion to review his appeal.

2019LeMere v. LeMere, 2003 WI 67, ¶25 , 262 Wis. 2d 426 , 663 N.W.2d 789 . ¶14 Here, the circuit court considered the applicable statutory factors— many of which overlap with the factors impacting maintenance—and it awarded each party the personal property that was in their possession at that time.

2019LeMere v. LeMere, 2003 WI 67, ¶25 , 262 Wis. 2d 426 , 663 N.W.2d 789 . ¶14 Here, the circuit court considered the applicable statutory factors— many of which overlap with the factors impacting maintenance—and it awarded each party the personal property that was in their possession at that time.

2007Washington first contends that a jail is not a "facility" as the term is used in § 252.07(9)(a), which authorizes confinement to a "facility where proper care and treatment will be provided and spread of the disease will be prevented." Washington disputes the court of appeals' conclusion that the absence of an explicit bar on jail confinement makes jail a permissible placement option, see Washington, 292 Wis.2d 258, ¶ 12 , 716 N.W.2d 176 , asserting that the absence of an express *122 authorization of jail confinement demonstrates that it is an impermissible placement option, given the statute

2005Hannemann, 273 Wis. 2d 457, ¶ 19 .

2005Hannemann, 273 Wis. 2d 457, ¶ 19 .

1988In addition, since the specific statute controls when a specific statute and a general statute relate to the same subject matter, Kramer v. Hayward , 57 Wis.2d 302 , 311 , 203 N.W.2d 871 (1973), the explicit requirement in section 979.10 of a coroner's permit for all cremations would take precedent over the more general death provisions in chapters 69 and 157 if they were read as valid alternatives to section 979.10 . *Page 222 Moving to your first question, it is my opinion that university medical schools may obtain corpses for scientific study without obtaining a cremation permit from a coro

1988In addition, since the specific statute controls when a specific statute and a general statute relate to the same subject matter, Kramer v. Hayward , 57 Wis.2d 302 , 311 , 203 N.W.2d 871 (1973), the explicit requirement in section 979.10 of a coroner's permit for all cremations would take precedent over the more general death provisions in chapters 69 and 157 if they were read as valid alternatives to section 979.10 . *Page 222 Moving to your first question, it is my opinion that university medical schools may obtain corpses for scientific study without obtaining a cremation permit from a coro

1987Wisconsin followed with State v. Taylor, 60 Wis. 2d 506 , 210 N.W.2d 873 (1973), which withdrew the Hayes language requiring the presence of counsel or an explicit waiver of counsel at a lineup prior to the institution of formal charges.

1987Wisconsin followed with State v. Taylor, 60 Wis. 2d 506 , 210 N.W.2d 873 (1973), which withdrew the Hayes language requiring the presence of counsel or an explicit waiver of counsel at a lineup prior to the institution of formal charges.

1984State v. Raduege, 100 Wis. 2d 27 , 301 N.W.2d 259 (Ct. App. 1980), extended, apparently as a matter of law, the Booth decision to hold that it was possible to test the used ampoule for material evidence as to guilt or innocence and, hence, there was an explicit presumption of materiality, a presumption that was only implicit in Booth .

1984State v. Raduege, 100 Wis. 2d 27 , 301 N.W.2d 259 (Ct. App. 1980), extended, apparently as a matter of law, the Booth decision to hold that it was possible to test the used ampoule for material evidence as to guilt or innocence and, hence, there was an explicit presumption of materiality, a presumption that was only implicit in Booth .

1983Redd v. Brooke, 96 Nev. 9, 11 , 604 P.2d 360 (1980).

1983Redd v. Brooke, 96 Nev. 9, 11 , 604 P.2d 360 (1980).

1978An example of an insurance policy which expressly prohibited waiver of rights prior to loss appears in Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Parsons, 129 N.Y. 86, 87-8 , 29 N.E. 87 (1891).

1978An example of an insurance policy which expressly prohibited waiver of rights prior to loss appears in Phoenix Insurance Co. v. Parsons, 129 N.Y. 86, 87-8 , 29 N.E. 87 (1891).