explicit waiver in Michigan

2024Id. at 198 , citing Cortolano & Barone, Inc v Morano Constr Corp, 724 F Supp 88, 98 (SD NY, 1989), and Cyclo Floor Machine Corp v Nat’l Housewares, Inc, 296 F Supp 665, 682 (D Utah, 1968).

2024People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 640-641 ; 588 NW2d 480 (1998).

2024People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 640-641 ; 588 NW2d 480 (1998).

2024MacIntyre, 267 Mich App at 452 .

2018Courts requiring an explicit warning regarding the right to the presence of counsel during the interrogation-as opposed to simply the right to an attorney-have "stressed the importance of informing defendants that they have the right to the actual physical presence of an attorney," United States v. Noti , 731 F.2d 610 , 615 (C.A. 9, 1984), and emphasized the significance of advising defendants of the temporal immediacy of the right to counsel, see, e.g., State v. Williams , 144 So.3d 56 , 59, 2013-1300 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/14/14) (recognizing that Miranda does not require a verbatim recitation bu

2018See, e.g., People v Kowalski, 489 Mich 488, 505 ; 803 NW2d 200 (2011); Marshall Lasser, PC v George, 252 Mich App 104, 109 ; 651 NW2d 158 (2002) (“Plaintiff cannot now be heard to complain about the lack of a jury trial on the issue of damages, when by its own unequivocal conduct it waived this right.”); People v Fetterley, 229 Mich App 511, 520 ; 583 NW2d 199 (1998) (holding that a defendant could not “expressly acquiesce[ ] to the [trial] court’s handling of” a matter “and then raise it as an error before this Court”).

2018See, e.g., People v Kowalski, 489 Mich 488, 505 ; 803 NW2d 200 (2011); Marshall Lasser, PC v George, 252 Mich App 104, 109 ; 651 NW2d 158 (2002) (“Plaintiff cannot now be heard to complain about the lack of a jury trial on the issue of damages, when by its own unequivocal conduct it waived this right.”); People v Fetterley, 229 Mich App 511, 520 ; 583 NW2d 199 (1998) (holding that a defendant could not “expressly acquiesce[ ] to the [trial] court’s handling of” a matter “and then raise it as an error before this Court”).

2018Courts requiring an explicit warning regarding the right to the presence of counsel during the interrogation-as opposed to simply the right to an attorney-have "stressed the importance of informing defendants that they have the right to the actual physical presence of an attorney," United States v. Noti , 731 F.2d 610 , 615 (C.A. 9, 1984), and emphasized the significance of advising defendants of the temporal immediacy of the right to counsel, see, e.g., State v. Williams , 144 So.3d 56 , 59, 2013-1300 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/14/14) (recognizing that Miranda does not require a verbatim recitation bu

2018Courts requiring an explicit warning regarding the right to the presence of counsel during the interrogation-as opposed to simply the right to an attorney-have "stressed the importance of informing defendants that they have the right to the actual physical presence of an attorney," United States v. Noti , 731 F.2d 610 , 615 (C.A. 9, 1984), and emphasized the significance of advising defendants of the temporal immediacy of the right to counsel, see, e.g., State v. Williams , 144 So.3d 56 , 59, 2013-1300 (La.App. 4 Cir. 6/14/14) (recognizing that Miranda does not require a verbatim recitation bu

2016Observing that the Legislature did not intend to punish everyone who makes a minor threat, but rather only those “who ‘maliciously’ threaten others,” id. at 135 , the Court defined “malice” as: “1.

2016A defendant violates the statute when he or she (1) either orally or by a written or printed communication, maliciously threatens (2) to accuse another of any crime or offense, or to injure the person or property or mother, father, spouse or child of another (3) with the intent to extort money or any pecuniary advantage whatever, or with the intent to compel the person threatened to do or refrain from doing any act against his or her will. [Id. at 128- 129.] According to the Court, “the Legislature’s inclusion of a malice requirement provides law enforcement, judges, and juries with an explici

2015See People v Messenger, 221 Mich App 171, 180 ; 561 NW2d 463 (1997) (holding that reversal was not required since the prosecutor’s improper questioning was curable by a limiting instruction). “ ‘An appellant may not merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, nor may he give only cursory treatment [of an issue] with little or no citation of supporting authority.’ ” People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 587 ; 629 NW2d 411 (2001) (citation omitted).

2015See People v Messenger, 221 Mich App 171, 180 ; 561 NW2d 463 (1997) (holding that reversal was not required since the prosecutor’s improper questioning was curable by a limiting instruction). “ ‘An appellant may not merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his claims, nor may he give only cursory treatment [of an issue] with little or no citation of supporting authority.’ ” People v Watson, 245 Mich App 572, 587 ; 629 NW2d 411 (2001) (citation omitted).

2012Simply because the Legislature has not included an explicit instruction that “a technically imperfect petition necessarily precludes an election regarding the matter therein addressed,” does not mean that the Legislature intended inclusion of deficient petitions as Bloomfield Charter Twp reasoned.32 Bloomfield Charter Twp inferred too much from the legislative silence and effectively ignored the mandatory 30 Id. at 23 . 31 Id. at 25 . 32 Id. at 22 . 14 language that the Legislature chose to use when stating the form and content requirements of MCL 168.482.

2012Simply because the Legislature has not included an explicit instruction that “a technically imperfect petition necessarily precludes an election regarding the matter therein addressed,” does not mean that the Legislature intended inclusion of deficient petitions as Bloomfield Charter Twp reasoned.32 Bloomfield Charter Twp inferred too much from the legislative silence and effectively ignored the mandatory 30 Id. at 23 . 31 Id. at 25 . 32 Id. at 22 . 14 language that the Legislature chose to use when stating the form and content requirements of MCL 168.482.

2008But the Court did state: This is not a case in which the State has denied a defendant the benefit of a specific provision of the Bill of Rights, such as the right to counsel, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 , 92 S.Ct. 2006 , 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972), or in which the prosecutor’s remarks so prejudiced a specific right, such as the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, as to amount to a denial of that right.

2008But the Court did state: This is not a case in which the State has denied a defendant the benefit of a specific provision of the Bill of Rights, such as the right to counsel, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 , 92 S.Ct. 2006 , 32 L.Ed.2d 530 (1972), or in which the prosecutor’s remarks so prejudiced a specific right, such as the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, as to amount to a denial of that right.

2008Id. *179 Donnelly does not state an explicit rule for determining when prosecutorial misconduct constitutes constitutional error, and when it constitutes nonconstitutional error.

2007Id. at 699 .

2007In Stefani v Capital Tire, Inc, 169 Mich App 32 ; 425 NW2d 500 (1988), this Court addressed the effect of an explicit clause requiring a tenant to insure the leased premises against fire loss on the tenant’s responsibility for negligently caused fire damage.

2007In Stefani v Capital Tire, Inc, 169 Mich App 32 ; 425 NW2d 500 (1988), this Court addressed the effect of an explicit clause requiring a tenant to insure the leased premises against fire loss on the tenant’s responsibility for negligently caused fire damage.

2007Although the trial court improperly instructed the jury that it could consider MRE 404(b) testimony for the limited purpose of judging the believability of the testimony contrary to this Court's explicit instruction in People v. Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich. 43, 69-70 , 614 N.W.2d 888 (2000), defendant has failed to demonstrate prejudicial error where the prosecution presented a strong case against him, and the MRE 404(b) evidence was properly admitted to show defendant's system, plan, or scheme in committing the acts.

2007Although the trial court improperly instructed the jury that it could consider MRE 404(b) testimony for the limited purpose of judging the believability of the testimony contrary to this Court's explicit instruction in People v. Sabin (After Remand), 463 Mich. 43, 69-70 , 614 N.W.2d 888 (2000), defendant has failed to demonstrate prejudicial error where the prosecution presented a strong case against him, and the MRE 404(b) evidence was properly admitted to show defendant's system, plan, or scheme in committing the acts.

2004Under the view taken by the majority of the federal circuits, “[e]ven where erisa preempts state law with respect to determining beneficiary status under an ERISA-regulated benefits plan, erisa does not preempt an explicit waiver of interest by a nonparticipant beneficiary of such a plan.” Melton v Melton, 324 F3d 941 , 945 (CA 7, 2003); see also Silber v Silber, 99 NY2d 395, 402, 404 ; 786 NE2d 1263 (2003); Pressley, supra. We concur with the majority view and resolve this case accordingly. 3 B.

2004The majority states: Under the view taken by the majority of the federal circuits, “[e]ven where erisa preempts state law with respect to determining beneficiary status under an ERISA-regulated benefits plan, erisa does not preempt an explicit waiver of interest by a nonparticipant beneficiary of such a plan.” Melton v Melton, 324 F3d 941 , 945 (CA 7, 2003); see also Silber v Silber, 99 NY2d 395, 402, 404 ; 786 NE2d 1263 (2003); [Metropolitan Life Ins Co v] Pressley, [ 82 F3d 126 (CA 6, 1996)].

2004Generally, a plaintiff does not satisfy the requirement of standing by alleging that governmental action was unconstitutional, if the only harm alleged has been caused by someone else, or if the illegality in question is only a violation of some other person's legal right. [ Id. ] See also Lujan, supra at 562 , 112 S.Ct. 2130 . [10] "This explicit requirement [of a case or controversy] is the constitutional key to understanding the forms and limits of judicial power." McDowell, Curbing the Courts (Louisiana State Press, 1988) at 195.

2004Under the view taken by the majority of the federal circuits, “[e]ven where erisa preempts state law with respect to determining beneficiary status under an ERISA-regulated benefits plan, erisa does not preempt an explicit waiver of interest by a nonparticipant beneficiary of such a plan.” Melton v Melton, 324 F3d 941 , 945 (CA 7, 2003); see also Silber v Silber, 99 NY2d 395, 402, 404 ; 786 NE2d 1263 (2003); Pressley, supra. We concur with the majority view and resolve this case accordingly. 3 B.

2004The majority states: Under the view taken by the majority of the federal circuits, “[e]ven where erisa preempts state law with respect to determining beneficiary status under an ERISA-regulated benefits plan, erisa does not preempt an explicit waiver of interest by a nonparticipant beneficiary of such a plan.” Melton v Melton, 324 F3d 941 , 945 (CA 7, 2003); see also Silber v Silber, 99 NY2d 395, 402, 404 ; 786 NE2d 1263 (2003); [Metropolitan Life Ins Co v] Pressley, [ 82 F3d 126 (CA 6, 1996)].

1995Id. at 1584 .

1995Id. at 1584 .

1978Lewis v Lewis, 73 Mich App 563 ; 252 NW2d 237 (1977).

1978Lewis v Lewis, 73 Mich App 563 ; 252 NW2d 237 (1977).