explicit waiver in Alaska

2025Because Bachner’s arguments regarding the takings clause and uncured lease default are entirely premised on these unsupported allegations, they must fail.21 Bachner also argues the State violated the covenant of good faith and fair dealing and was unjustly enriched by exclusively occupying the entire first floor of the 19 See Baxley v. State, 958 P.2d 422, 433 (Alaska 1998). 20 See Alaska R.

2024Res. v. Timber & Wood Prods., 906 N.W.2d 707 , 714-16 (Wis. 2017) (concluding tribe’s compliance with Forest Croplands Law did not amount to consent to be sued in enforcement of law); Sheffer v. Buffalo Run Casino, PTE, Inc., 315 P.3d 359, 371 (Okla. 2013) (holding tribe did not waive sovereign immunity by applying for and accepting liquor license); Cohen v. Little Six, Inc., 543 N.W.2d 376, 380 (Minn. App. 1996) (deciding tribal corporation did not waive sovereign immunity by registering as foreign corporation and agreeing to be “subject to the laws of [Minnesota]”), aff’d, 561 N.W.2d 889 (Mi

2024Res. v. Timber & Wood Prods., 906 N.W.2d 707 , 714-16 (Wis. 2017) (concluding tribe’s compliance with Forest Croplands Law did not amount to consent to be sued in enforcement of law); Sheffer v. Buffalo Run Casino, PTE, Inc., 315 P.3d 359, 371 (Okla. 2013) (holding tribe did not waive sovereign immunity by applying for and accepting liquor license); Cohen v. Little Six, Inc., 543 N.W.2d 376, 380 (Minn. App. 1996) (deciding tribal corporation did not waive sovereign immunity by registering as foreign corporation and agreeing to be “subject to the laws of [Minnesota]”), aff’d, 561 N.W.2d 889 (Mi

2019In McCormick v. Anchorage, we explained (when interpreting the former statute), that by enacting AS 28.35.038, the Alaska Legislature explicitly granted municipalities the power under certain circumstances to enact impoundment and forfeiture ordinances that are inconsistent with the other provisions of Title 28.14 In other words, the legislature intended AS 28.35.038 to be a specific carve-out for impoundment 12 See Simpson v. Anchorage, 635 P.2d 1197, 1203 (Alaska App. 1981). 13 See former AS 28.35.038 (enacted by SLA 1983, ch. 77, § 23). 14 McCormick v. Anchorage, 999 P.2d 155, 167 (Alaska A

2019In McCormick v. Anchorage, we explained (when interpreting the former statute), that by enacting AS 28.35.038, the Alaska Legislature explicitly granted municipalities the power under certain circumstances to enact impoundment and forfeiture ordinances that are inconsistent with the other provisions of Title 28.14 In other words, the legislature intended AS 28.35.038 to be a specific carve-out for impoundment 12 See Simpson v. Anchorage, 635 P.2d 1197, 1203 (Alaska App. 1981). 13 See former AS 28.35.038 (enacted by SLA 1983, ch. 77, § 23). 14 McCormick v. Anchorage, 999 P.2d 155, 167 (Alaska A

2012As this Court recently noted in Olson v. State, 262 P.3d 227, 231 (Alaska App.2011), the cireumstances of a custodial interrogation-"the actions and words of the person interrogated"-may give rise to a reasonable inference that the person waived their Miranda rights, even in the absence of an explicit waiver.

2003See Samissa Anchorage, Inc. v. State, 57 P.3d 676 (Alaska 2002) (reaffirming that AS 09.50.250 and .280 do not allow for prejudgment interest in cases brought as administrative appeals that could not have been brought under section .250). 42 . 92 Wash.2d 521 , 598 P.2d 1372 (1979). 43 .

2003See Samissa Anchorage, Inc. v. State, 57 P.3d 676 (Alaska 2002) (reaffirming that AS 09.50.250 and .280 do not allow for prejudgment interest in cases brought as administrative appeals that could not have been brought under section .250). 42 . 92 Wash.2d 521 , 598 P.2d 1372 (1979). 43 .

2003See Samissa Anchorage, Inc. v. State, 57 P.3d 676 (Alaska 2002) (reaffirming that AS 09.50.250 and .280 do not allow for prejudgment interest in cases brought as administrative appeals that could not have been brought under section .250). 42 . 92 Wash.2d 521 , 598 P.2d 1372 (1979). 43 .

1998But compare Knix v. State, 922 P.2d 913, 917-19 (Alaska App.1996) (indicating that, when a defendant chooses not to take the stand, a trial judge complies with LaVigne if the judge clearly notifies the defendant that it is the defendant’s choice whether or not to testify, even if the defendant then refuses to enter an explicit waiver of the right to testify)- At Mute’s trial, after the State rested, the defense attorney conferred with Mute and then informed Judge Greene that (1) Mute had decided not to testify, and (2) the defense would not be presenting any other witnesses.

1990Hammonds v. State, 442 P.2d 39, 42 (Alaska 1968) (“Waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a known right.”).