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12 Virginia opinions name it 5 courts 1930–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Congdon v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2026See Congdon, 57 Va. App. at 695-96 . 2026See Congdon, 57 Va. App. at 695-96 . | 2 | 2 |
Mark Lee v. Harold Clarkegreen1 sentence2015Citing a recent habeas corpus decision from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, he argues that “other trial instructions . . . cannot substitute for an explicit instruction.” See Lee v. Clarke, 781 F.3d 114, 126 (4th Cir. 2015). | 1 | 1 |
Molash v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2013“However, the Supreme Court has held that Code § 18.2-117 implicitly requires proof of an element of mens rea or scienter, even though the requirement does not appear in the statute.” Molash v. Commonwealth, 3 Va.App. 243, 246 , 348 S.E.2d 868, 870 (1986). 2013“However, the Supreme Court has held that Code § 18.2-117 implicitly requires proof of an element of mens rea or scienter, even though the requirement does not appear in the statute.” Molash v. Commonwealth, 3 Va.App. 243, 246 , 348 S.E.2d 868, 870 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Charles Edward Parkergreen1 sentence2013See United States v. Parker, 522 F.2d 801, 803 (4th Cir.1975) (“Nowhere in that statute, however, is there an explicit requirement of criminal intent.”); see also Ketchum, 12 Va.App. at 262 , 403 S.E.2d at 384 (explaining that the text of Code § 18.2-117 “imposes an absolute duty on [the defendant] to return the rental car to its owner at the time and place stipulated by the rental agreement”). | 1 | 1 |
Ketchum v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2013See United States v. Parker, 522 F.2d 801, 803 (4th Cir.1975) (“Nowhere in that statute, however, is there an explicit requirement of criminal intent.”); see also Ketchum, 12 Va.App. at 262 , 403 S.E.2d at 384 (explaining that the text of Code § 18.2-117 “imposes an absolute duty on [the defendant] to return the rental car to its owner at the time and place stipulated by the rental agreement”). 2013See United States v. Parker, 522 F.2d 801, 803 (4th Cir.1975) (“Nowhere in that statute, however, is there an explicit requirement of criminal intent.”); see also Ketchum, 12 Va.App. at 262 , 403 S.E.2d at 384 (explaining that the text of Code § 18.2-117 “imposes an absolute duty on [the defendant] to return the rental car to its owner at the time and place stipulated by the rental agreement”). | 1 | 1 |
Frye v. Spottegreen2 sentences2010Before 1995, Virginia’s adoption statutes, as interpreted by-Virginia’s appellate courts, passed constitutional muster despite the absence of an explicit standard because the courts read into the statute the requirement that “[a]n adoption over objection by a natural parent should not be granted except upon clear and convincing evidence that the adoption would be in a child’s best interest and that it would be detrimental to continue the natural parent-child relationship.” Lyle, 14 Va.App. at 876 , 419 S.E.2d at 865 (emphasis added) (citing Frye v. Spotte, 4 Va.App. 530, 532 , 359 S.E.2d 315, 2010Before 1995, Virginia’s adoption statutes, as interpreted by-Virginia’s appellate courts, passed constitutional muster despite the absence of an explicit standard because the courts read into the statute the requirement that “[a]n adoption over objection by a natural parent should not be granted except upon clear and convincing evidence that the adoption would be in a child’s best interest and that it would be detrimental to continue the natural parent-child relationship.” Lyle, 14 Va.App. at 876 , 419 S.E.2d at 865 (emphasis added) (citing Frye v. Spotte, 4 Va.App. 530, 532 , 359 S.E.2d 315, | 1 | 1 |
Paschal v. Causeygreen1 sentence2010Before 1995, Virginia’s adoption statutes, as interpreted by-Virginia’s appellate courts, passed constitutional muster despite the absence of an explicit standard because the courts read into the statute the requirement that “[a]n adoption over objection by a natural parent should not be granted except upon clear and convincing evidence that the adoption would be in a child’s best interest and that it would be detrimental to continue the natural parent-child relationship.” Lyle, 14 Va.App. at 876 , 419 S.E.2d at 865 (emphasis added) (citing Frye v. Spotte, 4 Va.App. 530, 532 , 359 S.E.2d 315, | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Debra Levy v. Wegmans Food Markets, Inc.
green
2 sentences2022Third, and contrary to Henrico County’s argument, our decision in Levy v. Wegman’s Food Markets, Inc., 68 Va. App. 575 (2018), is inapplicable here. 2022Third, and contrary to Henrico County’s argument, our decision in Levy v. Wegman’s Food Markets, Inc., 68 Va. App. 575 (2018), is inapplicable here. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Conyers v. MARTIAL ARTS WORLD OF RICHMOND
green
2 sentences2016Standard of Review "Under well-established principles, an issue of statutory interpretation is a pure question of law which we review de novo." Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96 , 104, 639 S.E.2d 174 , 178 (2007). 2016Standard of Review "Under well-established principles, an issue of statutory interpretation is a pure question of law which we review de novo." Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96 , 104, 639 S.E.2d 174 , 178 (2007). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Carter v. Kentucky
green
2 sentences2015In that unique context, the Court concluded that “[t]he other trial instructions and arguments of counsel . . . were no substitution for the explicit instruction . . . requested.” Id. at 304 . 2015It further emphasized that the “constitutional obligation” of “a state trial judge” to give such an instruction depends “upon proper request.” Id. at 305 . -9- the trial and is enough to require you to find the [appellant] not guilty unless and until the Commonwealth proves each and every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis added); see Virginia Model Jury Instructions–Criminal No. 2.100 (2014). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Lyle v. Eskridge
green
1 sentence2010Before 1995, Virginia’s adoption statutes, as interpreted by-Virginia’s appellate courts, passed constitutional muster despite the absence of an explicit standard because the courts read into the statute the requirement that “[a]n adoption over objection by a natural parent should not be granted except upon clear and convincing evidence that the adoption would be in a child’s best interest and that it would be detrimental to continue the natural parent-child relationship.” Lyle, 14 Va.App. at 876 , 419 S.E.2d at 865 (emphasis added) (citing Frye v. Spotte, 4 Va.App. 530, 532 , 359 S.E.2d 315, | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling & Neale, Architects, Inc.
green
2 sentences2001The plaintiffs’ claims fall under an explicit exception in Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling & Neale, 236 Va. 419 , 374 S.E.2d 55 (1988). 2001The plaintiffs’ claims fall under an explicit exception in Sensenbrenner v. Rust, Orling & Neale, 236 Va. 419 , 374 S.E.2d 55 (1988). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Hinchey v. Ogden
green
1 sentence1989Hinchey v. Ogden, 226 Va. 234 (1983). | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Modaber v. Kelley
green
1 sentence1987The court has also considered the recent case of Modaber v. Kelley, 232 Va. 60 (1986). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
District of Columbia v. Brooke
green
2 sentences1930Assuming, therefore, and assuming only, not deciding (see District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U. S. 138, 149 , 29 S. Ct. 560 , 53 L. 1930Assuming, therefore, and assuming only, not deciding (see District of Columbia v. Brooke, 214 U. S. 138, 149 , 29 S. Ct. 560 , 53 L. | 1 | 1930–1930 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.