23 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1911–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Wright v. City of Greensborogreen2 sentences2025The codified purpose of the ante-litem-notice requirement is, of course, to “give the municipality the opportunity to investigate potential claims, ascertain the evidence, and avoid unnecessary litigation.”2 And requiring a claimant to provide specific information to the municipality about her “claim and alleged injuries allows the municipality to make an informed decision about whether to accept the ‘offer of 2 City of Alpharetta v. Francis, 366 Ga. App. 454 , 456 (1) ( 883 SE2d 400 ) (2023) (punctuation omitted); accord Wright v. City of Greensboro, 350 Ga. App. 685, 689 (1) ( 830 SE2d 228 ) 2025The codified purpose of the ante-litem-notice requirement is, of course, to “give the municipality the opportunity to investigate potential claims, ascertain the evidence, and avoid unnecessary litigation.”2 And requiring a claimant to provide specific information to the municipality about her “claim and alleged injuries allows the municipality to make an informed decision about whether to accept the ‘offer of 2 City of Alpharetta v. Francis, 366 Ga. App. 454 , 456 (1) ( 883 SE2d 400 ) (2023) (punctuation omitted); accord Wright v. City of Greensboro, 350 Ga. App. 685, 689 (1) ( 830 SE2d 228 ) | 3 | 3 |
City of Greensboro v. Tony Rowlandgreen2 sentences2020In the event such claim is not settled by the municipal corporation and the claimant litigates such claim, the amount of monetary damage set forth in such claim shall not be binding on the claimant.7 4 City of Albany v. GA HY Imports, 348 Ga. App. 885 , 888 ( 825 SE2d 385 ) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). 5 City of Greensboro v. Rowland, 334 Ga. App. 148, 151 (2) ( 778 SE2d 409 ) (2015). 2020In the event such claim is not settled by the municipal corporation and the claimant litigates such claim, the amount of monetary damage set forth in such claim shall not be binding on the claimant.7 4 City of Albany v. GA HY Imports, 348 Ga. App. 885 , 888 ( 825 SE2d 385 ) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). 5 City of Greensboro v. Rowland, 334 Ga. App. 148, 151 (2) ( 778 SE2d 409 ) (2015). | 2 | 2 |
Farmer v. Georgia Department of Corrections.green2 sentences2025The codified purpose of the ante-litem-notice requirement is, of course, to “give the municipality the opportunity to investigate potential claims, ascertain the evidence, and avoid unnecessary litigation.”2 And requiring a claimant to provide specific information to the municipality about her “claim and alleged injuries allows the municipality to make an informed decision about whether to accept the ‘offer of 2 City of Alpharetta v. Francis, 366 Ga. App. 454 , 456 (1) ( 883 SE2d 400 ) (2023) (punctuation omitted); accord Wright v. City of Greensboro, 350 Ga. App. 685, 689 (1) ( 830 SE2d 228 ) 2025The codified purpose of the ante-litem-notice requirement is, of course, to “give the municipality the opportunity to investigate potential claims, ascertain the evidence, and avoid unnecessary litigation.”2 And requiring a claimant to provide specific information to the municipality about her “claim and alleged injuries allows the municipality to make an informed decision about whether to accept the ‘offer of 2 City of Alpharetta v. Francis, 366 Ga. App. 454 , 456 (1) ( 883 SE2d 400 ) (2023) (punctuation omitted); accord Wright v. City of Greensboro, 350 Ga. App. 685, 689 (1) ( 830 SE2d 228 ) | 1 | 1 |
City of Chamblee v. Maxwellgreen2 sentences2025The codified purpose of the ante-litem-notice requirement is, of course, to “give the municipality the opportunity to investigate potential claims, ascertain the evidence, and avoid unnecessary litigation.”2 And requiring a claimant to provide specific information to the municipality about her “claim and alleged injuries allows the municipality to make an informed decision about whether to accept the ‘offer of 2 City of Alpharetta v. Francis, 366 Ga. App. 454 , 456 (1) ( 883 SE2d 400 ) (2023) (punctuation omitted); accord Wright v. City of Greensboro, 350 Ga. App. 685, 689 (1) ( 830 SE2d 228 ) 2025The codified purpose of the ante-litem-notice requirement is, of course, to “give the municipality the opportunity to investigate potential claims, ascertain the evidence, and avoid unnecessary litigation.”2 And requiring a claimant to provide specific information to the municipality about her “claim and alleged injuries allows the municipality to make an informed decision about whether to accept the ‘offer of 2 City of Alpharetta v. Francis, 366 Ga. App. 454 , 456 (1) ( 883 SE2d 400 ) (2023) (punctuation omitted); accord Wright v. City of Greensboro, 350 Ga. App. 685, 689 (1) ( 830 SE2d 228 ) | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. City of Forsythgreen2 sentences2025The codified purpose of the ante-litem-notice requirement is, of course, to “give the municipality the opportunity to investigate potential claims, ascertain the evidence, and avoid unnecessary litigation.”2 And requiring a claimant to provide specific information to the municipality about her “claim and alleged injuries allows the municipality to make an informed decision about whether to accept the ‘offer of 2 City of Alpharetta v. Francis, 366 Ga. App. 454 , 456 (1) ( 883 SE2d 400 ) (2023) (punctuation omitted); accord Wright v. City of Greensboro, 350 Ga. App. 685, 689 (1) ( 830 SE2d 228 ) 2025The codified purpose of the ante-litem-notice requirement is, of course, to “give the municipality the opportunity to investigate potential claims, ascertain the evidence, and avoid unnecessary litigation.”2 And requiring a claimant to provide specific information to the municipality about her “claim and alleged injuries allows the municipality to make an informed decision about whether to accept the ‘offer of 2 City of Alpharetta v. Francis, 366 Ga. App. 454 , 456 (1) ( 883 SE2d 400 ) (2023) (punctuation omitted); accord Wright v. City of Greensboro, 350 Ga. App. 685, 689 (1) ( 830 SE2d 228 ) | 1 | 1 |
Georgia Ports Authority v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2025The codified purpose of the ante-litem-notice requirement is, of course, to “give the municipality the opportunity to investigate potential claims, ascertain the evidence, and avoid unnecessary litigation.”2 And requiring a claimant to provide specific information to the municipality about her “claim and alleged injuries allows the municipality to make an informed decision about whether to accept the ‘offer of 2 City of Alpharetta v. Francis, 366 Ga. App. 454 , 456 (1) ( 883 SE2d 400 ) (2023) (punctuation omitted); accord Wright v. City of Greensboro, 350 Ga. App. 685, 689 (1) ( 830 SE2d 228 ) 2025The codified purpose of the ante-litem-notice requirement is, of course, to “give the municipality the opportunity to investigate potential claims, ascertain the evidence, and avoid unnecessary litigation.”2 And requiring a claimant to provide specific information to the municipality about her “claim and alleged injuries allows the municipality to make an informed decision about whether to accept the ‘offer of 2 City of Alpharetta v. Francis, 366 Ga. App. 454 , 456 (1) ( 883 SE2d 400 ) (2023) (punctuation omitted); accord Wright v. City of Greensboro, 350 Ga. App. 685, 689 (1) ( 830 SE2d 228 ) | 1 | 1 |
Georgia Ports Authority v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2025The codified purpose of the ante-litem-notice requirement is, of course, to “give the municipality the opportunity to investigate potential claims, ascertain the evidence, and avoid unnecessary litigation.”2 And requiring a claimant to provide specific information to the municipality about her “claim and alleged injuries allows the municipality to make an informed decision about whether to accept the ‘offer of 2 City of Alpharetta v. Francis, 366 Ga. App. 454 , 456 (1) ( 883 SE2d 400 ) (2023) (punctuation omitted); accord Wright v. City of Greensboro, 350 Ga. App. 685, 689 (1) ( 830 SE2d 228 ) 2025The codified purpose of the ante-litem-notice requirement is, of course, to “give the municipality the opportunity to investigate potential claims, ascertain the evidence, and avoid unnecessary litigation.”2 And requiring a claimant to provide specific information to the municipality about her “claim and alleged injuries allows the municipality to make an informed decision about whether to accept the ‘offer of 2 City of Alpharetta v. Francis, 366 Ga. App. 454 , 456 (1) ( 883 SE2d 400 ) (2023) (punctuation omitted); accord Wright v. City of Greensboro, 350 Ga. App. 685, 689 (1) ( 830 SE2d 228 ) | 1 | 1 |
Royston, Rayzor, Vickery, & Williams, Llp v. Francisco \Frank\" Lopez"green1 sentence2020See also Royston, Rayzor, Vickery & Williams, LLP v. Lopez, 467 SW3d 494, 506-508 (Tex. 2015) (Guzman, J., concurring) (explaining that defining the parameters of an ethics rule requiring attorneys to fully inform clients about the potential consequences of arbitration before entering into an agreement mandating arbitration of legal malpractice claims is “more aptly suited to [the bar] rulemaking process, which invites the input of the bench and bar,” and that “[g]uidance is essential, but rather than articulating best-practices standards by judicial fiat, the rulemaking process provides a bet | 1 | 1 |
Tiismann v. Linda Martin Homes Corp.green2 sentences2015State ofGa., 226 Ga. App. 543 ( 487 SE2d 112 ) (1997),] automatically tolls the running of the statute of limitation while the demand for payment is pending.” Greene v. Team Properties, 247 Ga. App. 544, 547 (2) ( 544 SE2d 726 ) (2001), overruled on other grounds, Tiismann v. Linda Martin Homes Corp., 279 Ga. 137, 140 ( 610 SE2d 68 ) (2005). 2015State ofGa., 226 Ga. App. 543 ( 487 SE2d 112 ) (1997),] automatically tolls the running of the statute of limitation while the demand for payment is pending.” Greene v. Team Properties, 247 Ga. App. 544, 547 (2) ( 544 SE2d 726 ) (2001), overruled on other grounds, Tiismann v. Linda Martin Homes Corp., 279 Ga. 137, 140 ( 610 SE2d 68 ) (2005). | 1 | 1 |
Greene v. Team Properties, Inc.green2 sentences2015State ofGa., 226 Ga. App. 543 ( 487 SE2d 112 ) (1997),] automatically tolls the running of the statute of limitation while the demand for payment is pending.” Greene v. Team Properties, 247 Ga. App. 544, 547 (2) ( 544 SE2d 726 ) (2001), overruled on other grounds, Tiismann v. Linda Martin Homes Corp., 279 Ga. 137, 140 ( 610 SE2d 68 ) (2005). 2015State ofGa., 226 Ga. App. 543 ( 487 SE2d 112 ) (1997),] automatically tolls the running of the statute of limitation while the demand for payment is pending.” Greene v. Team Properties, 247 Ga. App. 544, 547 (2) ( 544 SE2d 726 ) (2001), overruled on other grounds, Tiismann v. Linda Martin Homes Corp., 279 Ga. 137, 140 ( 610 SE2d 68 ) (2005). | 1 | 1 |
Aflac, Inc. v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2011The record is silent on whether the Eichholz firm had contracts with the OSP clients containing similar terms. 14 262 Ga. 612 ( 422 SE2d 859 ) (1992). 15 Id. at 612-613 . 16 262 Ga. App. 345 ( 585 SE2d 704 ) (2003). 17 Id. at 349-352 (2). 18 See generally Cowart, supra (a defendant moving for summary judgment satisfies his burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact by, inter alia, presenting evidence negating an essential element of the plaintiffs claims); Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 ( 405 SE2d 474 ) (1991). 19 See Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Bar Rule 2011The record is silent on whether the Eichholz firm had contracts with the OSP clients containing similar terms. 14 262 Ga. 612 ( 422 SE2d 859 ) (1992). 15 Id. at 612-613 . 16 262 Ga. App. 345 ( 585 SE2d 704 ) (2003). 17 Id. at 349-352 (2). 18 See generally Cowart, supra (a defendant moving for summary judgment satisfies his burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact by, inter alia, presenting evidence negating an essential element of the plaintiffs claims); Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 ( 405 SE2d 474 ) (1991). 19 See Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Bar Rule | 1 | 1 |
Spurlock v. Department of Human Resourcesgreen2 sentences2011(Emphasis supplied.) See Spurlock v. Dept. of Human Resources, 286 Ga. 512, 516 (3) ( 690 SE2d 378 ) (2010). 2011(Emphasis supplied.) See Spurlock v. Dept. of Human Resources, 286 Ga. 512, 516 (3) ( 690 SE2d 378 ) (2010). | 1 | 1 |
Banciu v. Banciugreen2 sentences2008In the event of a hearing or trial on the issue of child support, the guidelines enumerated in this Code section are intended by the General Assembly to be guidelines only and any court so applying these guidelines shall not abrogate its responsibility in making the final determination of child support based on the evidence presented to it at the time of the hearing or trial.”); see also Farrish v. Farrish, 279 Ga. 551, 552 ( 615 SE2d 510 ) (2005) (“In the absence of any mathematical formula, fact-finders are given a wide latitude in fixing the amount of . . . child support [under former OCGA 2008In the event of a hearing or trial on the issue of child support, the guidelines enumerated in this Code section are intended by the General Assembly to be guidelines only and any court so applying these guidelines shall not abrogate its responsibility in making the final determination of child support based on the evidence presented to it at the time of the hearing or trial.”); see also Farrish v. Farrish, 279 Ga. 551, 552 ( 615 SE2d 510 ) (2005) (“In the absence of any mathematical formula, fact-finders are given a wide latitude in fixing the amount of . . . child support [under former OCGA | 1 | 1 |
Messaadi v. Messaadigreen2 sentences2008In the event of a hearing or trial on the issue of child support, the guidelines enumerated in this Code section are intended by the General Assembly to be guidelines only and any court so applying these guidelines shall not abrogate its responsibility in making the final determination of child support based on the evidence presented to it at the time of the hearing or trial.”); see also Farrish v. Farrish, 279 Ga. 551, 552 ( 615 SE2d 510 ) (2005) (“In the absence of any mathematical formula, fact-finders are given a wide latitude in fixing the amount of . . . child support [under former OCGA 2008In the event of a hearing or trial on the issue of child support, the guidelines enumerated in this Code section are intended by the General Assembly to be guidelines only and any court so applying these guidelines shall not abrogate its responsibility in making the final determination of child support based on the evidence presented to it at the time of the hearing or trial.”); see also Farrish v. Farrish, 279 Ga. 551, 552 ( 615 SE2d 510 ) (2005) (“In the absence of any mathematical formula, fact-finders are given a wide latitude in fixing the amount of . . . child support [under former OCGA | 1 | 1 |
Farrish v. Farrishgreen2 sentences2008In the event of a hearing or trial on the issue of child support, the guidelines enumerated in this Code section are intended by the General Assembly to be guidelines only and any court so applying these guidelines shall not abrogate its responsibility in making the final determination of child support based on the evidence presented to it at the time of the hearing or trial.”); see also Farrish v. Farrish, 279 Ga. 551, 552 ( 615 SE2d 510 ) (2005) (“In the absence of any mathematical formula, fact-finders are given a wide latitude in fixing the amount of . . . child support [under former OCGA 2008In the event of a hearing or trial on the issue of child support, the guidelines enumerated in this Code section are intended by the General Assembly to be guidelines only and any court so applying these guidelines shall not abrogate its responsibility in making the final determination of child support based on the evidence presented to it at the time of the hearing or trial.”); see also Farrish v. Farrish, 279 Ga. 551, 552 ( 615 SE2d 510 ) (2005) (“In the absence of any mathematical formula, fact-finders are given a wide latitude in fixing the amount of . . . child support [under former OCGA | 1 | 1 |
Synthetic Industries v. Campgreen2 sentences1992See Synthetic Indus, v. Camp, 196 Ga. App. 637 ( 396 SE2d 518 ). 1992See Synthetic Indus, v. Camp, 196 Ga. App. 637 ( 396 SE2d 518 ). | 1 | 1 |
Bible v. Biblegreen2 sentences1990We need not determine whether it is sufficient only to comply substantially with the expressly mandated procedures of OCGA § 15-11-37 (b) and (c) (compare OCGA § 1-3-1 (c) with Bible v. Bible, 259 Ga. 418, 419 ( 383 SE2d 108 )), as the court has failed to comply, even *304 substantially, therewith. 1990We need not determine whether it is sufficient only to comply substantially with the expressly mandated procedures of OCGA § 15-11-37 (b) and (c) (compare OCGA § 1-3-1 (c) with Bible v. Bible, 259 Ga. 418, 419 ( 383 SE2d 108 )), as the court has failed to comply, even *304 substantially, therewith. | 1 | 1 |
Allen Kane's Major Dodge, Inc. v. Barnesgreen2 sentences1990Held: An employer is considered vicariously liable for injuries caused by a servant under the doctrine of respondeat superior if the latter “was at the time of the injury acting within the scope of his employment and on the business of. the [employer].” Allen Kane’s Major Dodge v. Barnes, 243 Ga. 776, 777 ( 257 SE2d 186 ) (1979). 1990Held: An employer is considered vicariously liable for injuries caused by a servant under the doctrine of respondeat superior if the latter “was at the time of the injury acting within the scope of his employment and on the business of. the [employer].” Allen Kane’s Major Dodge v. Barnes, 243 Ga. 776, 777 ( 257 SE2d 186 ) (1979). | 1 | 1 |
| Williams v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Chiles v. City of Smyrnagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kirouac v. Healeygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Department of Transportation v. Kinggreen2 sentences2020But see Ga. Dept. of Transp. v. King, 341 Ga. App. 102, 104 ( 798 SE2d 492 ) (2017) (a claimant against the State must strictly comply with the ante litem provisions of OCGA § 50-21-26 (a), because the statute represents a waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity). 6 See Ga. L. 2014, p. 125, § 1. 7 OCGA § 36-33-5 (e). 4 Subsection (f) requires a claimant to serve the ante litem notice “upon the mayor or the chairperson of the city council or city commission[.]”8 A plaintiff must strictly comply with subsection (f).9 However, neither this Court nor the Supreme Court of Georgia has expressly add 2020But see Ga. Dept. of Transp. v. King, 341 Ga. App. 102, 104 ( 798 SE2d 492 ) (2017) (a claimant against the State must strictly comply with the ante litem provisions of OCGA § 50-21-26 (a), because the statute represents a waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity). 6 See Ga. L. 2014, p. 125, § 1. 7 OCGA § 36-33-5 (e). 4 Subsection (f) requires a claimant to serve the ante litem notice “upon the mayor or the chairperson of the city council or city commission[.]”8 A plaintiff must strictly comply with subsection (f).9 However, neither this Court nor the Supreme Court of Georgia has expressly add | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Franks v. Delaware
green
2 sentences2021This investigator then asked Mr. Bates to contact his neighbor and to have him report back to our location so that I could speak with him.” 13 content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit. 438 U. S. at 155-156 . 1979Accordingly, under Franks v. Dp’ ' are, supra, the search warrant was not invalidated if the Drake statement were excluded. | 2 | 1979–2021 |
Harrell v. City of Griffin
green
1 sentence2020But see Ga. Dept. of Transp. v. King, 341 Ga. App. 102, 104 ( 798 SE2d 492 ) (2017) (a claimant against the State must strictly comply with the ante litem provisions of OCGA § 50-21-26 (a), because the statute represents a waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity). 6 See Ga. L. 2014, p. 125, § 1. 7 OCGA § 36-33-5 (e). 4 Subsection (f) requires a claimant to serve the ante litem notice “upon the mayor or the chairperson of the city council or city commission[.]”8 A plaintiff must strictly comply with subsection (f).9 However, neither this Court nor the Supreme Court of Georgia has expressly add | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Howard v. State
green
2 sentences2015State ofGa., 226 Ga. App. 543 ( 487 SE2d 112 ) (1997),] automatically tolls the running of the statute of limitation while the demand for payment is pending.” Greene v. Team Properties, 247 Ga. App. 544, 547 (2) ( 544 SE2d 726 ) (2001), overruled on other grounds, Tiismann v. Linda Martin Homes Corp., 279 Ga. 137, 140 ( 610 SE2d 68 ) (2005). 2015State ofGa., 226 Ga. App. 543 ( 487 SE2d 112 ) (1997),] automatically tolls the running of the statute of limitation while the demand for payment is pending.” Greene v. Team Properties, 247 Ga. App. 544, 547 (2) ( 544 SE2d 726 ) (2001), overruled on other grounds, Tiismann v. Linda Martin Homes Corp., 279 Ga. 137, 140 ( 610 SE2d 68 ) (2005). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Brandon v. Newman
green
2 sentences2011The record is silent on whether the Eichholz firm had contracts with the OSP clients containing similar terms. 14 262 Ga. 612 ( 422 SE2d 859 ) (1992). 15 Id. at 612-613 . 16 262 Ga. App. 345 ( 585 SE2d 704 ) (2003). 17 Id. at 349-352 (2). 18 See generally Cowart, supra (a defendant moving for summary judgment satisfies his burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact by, inter alia, presenting evidence negating an essential element of the plaintiffs claims); Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 ( 405 SE2d 474 ) (1991). 19 See Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Bar Rule 2011The record is silent on whether the Eichholz firm had contracts with the OSP clients containing similar terms. 14 262 Ga. 612 ( 422 SE2d 859 ) (1992). 15 Id. at 612-613 . 16 262 Ga. App. 345 ( 585 SE2d 704 ) (2003). 17 Id. at 349-352 (2). 18 See generally Cowart, supra (a defendant moving for summary judgment satisfies his burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact by, inter alia, presenting evidence negating an essential element of the plaintiffs claims); Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 ( 405 SE2d 474 ) (1991). 19 See Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Bar Rule | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Lau's Corp., Inc. v. Haskins
green
2 sentences2011The record is silent on whether the Eichholz firm had contracts with the OSP clients containing similar terms. 14 262 Ga. 612 ( 422 SE2d 859 ) (1992). 15 Id. at 612-613 . 16 262 Ga. App. 345 ( 585 SE2d 704 ) (2003). 17 Id. at 349-352 (2). 18 See generally Cowart, supra (a defendant moving for summary judgment satisfies his burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact by, inter alia, presenting evidence negating an essential element of the plaintiffs claims); Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 ( 405 SE2d 474 ) (1991). 19 See Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Bar Rule 2011The record is silent on whether the Eichholz firm had contracts with the OSP clients containing similar terms. 14 262 Ga. 612 ( 422 SE2d 859 ) (1992). 15 Id. at 612-613 . 16 262 Ga. App. 345 ( 585 SE2d 704 ) (2003). 17 Id. at 349-352 (2). 18 See generally Cowart, supra (a defendant moving for summary judgment satisfies his burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact by, inter alia, presenting evidence negating an essential element of the plaintiffs claims); Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 ( 405 SE2d 474 ) (1991). 19 See Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Bar Rule | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Cowart v. Widener
green
1 sentence2011The record is silent on whether the Eichholz firm had contracts with the OSP clients containing similar terms. 14 262 Ga. 612 ( 422 SE2d 859 ) (1992). 15 Id. at 612-613 . 16 262 Ga. App. 345 ( 585 SE2d 704 ) (2003). 17 Id. at 349-352 (2). 18 See generally Cowart, supra (a defendant moving for summary judgment satisfies his burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact by, inter alia, presenting evidence negating an essential element of the plaintiffs claims); Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 ( 405 SE2d 474 ) (1991). 19 See Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Bar Rule | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Camp v. Peetluk
green
2 sentences2011The record is silent on whether the Eichholz firm had contracts with the OSP clients containing similar terms. 14 262 Ga. 612 ( 422 SE2d 859 ) (1992). 15 Id. at 612-613 . 16 262 Ga. App. 345 ( 585 SE2d 704 ) (2003). 17 Id. at 349-352 (2). 18 See generally Cowart, supra (a defendant moving for summary judgment satisfies his burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact by, inter alia, presenting evidence negating an essential element of the plaintiffs claims); Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 ( 405 SE2d 474 ) (1991). 19 See Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Bar Rule 2011The record is silent on whether the Eichholz firm had contracts with the OSP clients containing similar terms. 14 262 Ga. 612 ( 422 SE2d 859 ) (1992). 15 Id. at 612-613 . 16 262 Ga. App. 345 ( 585 SE2d 704 ) (2003). 17 Id. at 349-352 (2). 18 See generally Cowart, supra (a defendant moving for summary judgment satisfies his burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact by, inter alia, presenting evidence negating an essential element of the plaintiffs claims); Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 ( 405 SE2d 474 ) (1991). 19 See Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Bar Rule | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Davis v. Findley
green
2 sentences2011The record is silent on whether the Eichholz firm had contracts with the OSP clients containing similar terms. 14 262 Ga. 612 ( 422 SE2d 859 ) (1992). 15 Id. at 612-613 . 16 262 Ga. App. 345 ( 585 SE2d 704 ) (2003). 17 Id. at 349-352 (2). 18 See generally Cowart, supra (a defendant moving for summary judgment satisfies his burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact by, inter alia, presenting evidence negating an essential element of the plaintiffs claims); Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 ( 405 SE2d 474 ) (1991). 19 See Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Bar Rule 2011The record is silent on whether the Eichholz firm had contracts with the OSP clients containing similar terms. 14 262 Ga. 612 ( 422 SE2d 859 ) (1992). 15 Id. at 612-613 . 16 262 Ga. App. 345 ( 585 SE2d 704 ) (2003). 17 Id. at 349-352 (2). 18 See generally Cowart, supra (a defendant moving for summary judgment satisfies his burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact by, inter alia, presenting evidence negating an essential element of the plaintiffs claims); Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins, 261 Ga. 491 ( 405 SE2d 474 ) (1991). 19 See Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, Bar Rule | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Chambless Ford Tractor, Inc. v. McGlaun Farms, Inc.
green
1 sentence1990In the event of such a violation, an “appellate court will ordinarily vacate the judgment and remand the action to the trial court for the preparation of appropriate findings.” See generally Chambless, supra at 674 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Dallas Blue Haven Pools, Inc. v. Taslimi
green
2 sentences1988Although OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) does not require that a hearing be set on a motion for summary judgment where none is requested, see Dallas Blue Haven Pools v. Taslimi, 180 Ga. App. 734 ( 350 SE2d 265 ) (1986), aff’d 256 Ga. 739 ( 354 SE2d 160 ) (1987), it unambiguously permits the respondent to serve opposing affidavits at any time “prior to the date of the hearing” in the event that a hearing is set. 1988Although OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) does not require that a hearing be set on a motion for summary judgment where none is requested, see Dallas Blue Haven Pools v. Taslimi, 180 Ga. App. 734 ( 350 SE2d 265 ) (1986), aff’d 256 Ga. 739 ( 354 SE2d 160 ) (1987), it unambiguously permits the respondent to serve opposing affidavits at any time “prior to the date of the hearing” in the event that a hearing is set. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Dallas Blue Haven Pools, Inc. v. Taslimi
green
2 sentences1988Although OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) does not require that a hearing be set on a motion for summary judgment where none is requested, see Dallas Blue Haven Pools v. Taslimi, 180 Ga. App. 734 ( 350 SE2d 265 ) (1986), aff’d 256 Ga. 739 ( 354 SE2d 160 ) (1987), it unambiguously permits the respondent to serve opposing affidavits at any time “prior to the date of the hearing” in the event that a hearing is set. 1988Although OCGA § 9-11-56 (c) does not require that a hearing be set on a motion for summary judgment where none is requested, see Dallas Blue Haven Pools v. Taslimi, 180 Ga. App. 734 ( 350 SE2d 265 ) (1986), aff’d 256 Ga. 739 ( 354 SE2d 160 ) (1987), it unambiguously permits the respondent to serve opposing affidavits at any time “prior to the date of the hearing” in the event that a hearing is set. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Williams v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Durrett v. Woods green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Napier v. Varner green | 1 | 1948–1948 |
| Dixon v. Tucker green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Camp v. Horton green | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| Brannon v. State green | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| Jones v. Graham neutral | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| Brown, Shipley & Co. v. Clayton green | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.