event hearing in Michigan

2017The important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error. [Id. (emphasis added; citations omitted).] 3 On the basis of the italicized sentence above, Johnson held that “the defendant must therefore do something positively in order to indicate he or she is exercising that primary control.” Johnson, 396 Mich at 432-433 .

2017The important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error. [Id. (emphasis added; citations omitted).] 3 On the basis of the italicized sentence above, Johnson held that “the defendant must therefore do something positively in order to indicate he or she is exercising that primary control.” Johnson, 396 Mich at 432-433 .

2015See MCL 333.17766e. -8- the affidavit. [Franks v Delaware, 438 US 154, 155-156 ; 98 S Ct 2674 ; 57 L Ed 2d 667 (1978).] To support striking information from the search warrant affidavit, the defendant must “show by a preponderance of the evidence that the affiant has knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth inserted false material into the affidavit and that the false material is necessary to a finding of probable cause.” People v Williams, 134 Mich App 639, 643 ; 351 NW2d 878 (1984) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2015See MCL 333.17766e. -8- the affidavit. [Franks v Delaware, 438 US 154, 155-156 ; 98 S Ct 2674 ; 57 L Ed 2d 667 (1978).] To support striking information from the search warrant affidavit, the defendant must “show by a preponderance of the evidence that the affiant has knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth inserted false material into the affidavit and that the false material is necessary to a finding of probable cause.” People v Williams, 134 Mich App 639, 643 ; 351 NW2d 878 (1984) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

1993Similar concerns were expressed by this Court in Sanders, supra. The Sanders panel concluded that the sanctions provisions of the court rule should be routinely enforced and attorney fees granted, except in the event of an unusually large verdict, or in the event of a defense verdict rendered in the face of catastrophic damages. 163 Mich App 692 -693.

1991Similar concerns were expressed by this Court in Sanders, supra. The Sanders panel concluded that the sanctions provisions of the court rule should be routinely enforced and attorney fees *645 granted, except in the event of an unusually large verdict, or in the event of a defense verdict rendered in the face of catastrophic damages. 163 Mich App 692 -693.

1993In Stamp v Hagerman, 181 Mich App 332, 339 ; 448 NW2d 849 (1989), another panel concluded that, while not controlling, the good faith or reasonable conduct of the parties properly may be considered by a trial court in resolving the question whether attorney fees are appropriate. [ 188 Mich App 644 -645.] The Court concluded: In this case, the sole reason given by the trial court for denial of attorney fees was that plaintiffs reasonably refused the counteroffer.

1993In Stamp v Hagerman, 181 Mich App 332, 339 ; 448 NW2d 849 (1989), another panel concluded that, while not controlling, the good faith or reasonable conduct of the parties properly may be considered by a trial court in resolving the question whether attorney fees are appropriate. [ 188 Mich App 644 -645.] The Court concluded: In this case, the sole reason given by the trial court for denial of attorney fees was that plaintiffs reasonably refused the counteroffer.

1988Where prosecutorial error even of a degree sufficient to warrant a mistrial has occurred, "[t]he important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error.” United States v Dinitz, [ 424 US 600, 609 ; 96 S Ct 1075 ; 47 L Ed 2d 267 (1976)].

1988Where prosecutorial error even of a degree sufficient to warrant a mistrial has occurred, "[t]he important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error.” United States v Dinitz, [ 424 US 600, 609 ; 96 S Ct 1075 ; 47 L Ed 2d 267 (1976)].

2021Id. at 710 .

2020The holding in Franks was not abrogated by the United States Supreme Court’s subsequent recognition in United States v Leon, 468 US 897, 922-924 ; 104 S Ct 3405 ; 82 L Ed 2d 677 (1984) of a “good-faith” exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule for searches conducted pursuant to objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant; suppression is still an “appropriate remedy” if the affiant misled the magistrate or judge issuing the warrant by including information in the affidavit that the affiant “knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth”

2020The holding in Franks was not abrogated by the United States Supreme Court’s subsequent recognition in United States v Leon, 468 US 897, 922-924 ; 104 S Ct 3405 ; 82 L Ed 2d 677 (1984) of a “good-faith” exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule for searches conducted pursuant to objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant; suppression is still an “appropriate remedy” if the affiant misled the magistrate or judge issuing the warrant by including information in the affidavit that the affiant “knew was false or would have known was false except for his reckless disregard of the truth”

2019Only where the governmental conduct in question is intended to “goad” the defendant into moving for a mistrial may a defendant raise the bar of double jeopardy to a second trial after having succeeded in aborting the first on his own motion. [Oregon v Kennedy, 456 US 667, 675-676 ; 102 S Ct 2083 ; 72 L Ed 2d 416 (1982) (quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted).] Defendant’s arguments that the prosecutor intended to goad a mistrial are unavailing.

2019Only where the governmental conduct in question is intended to “goad” the defendant into moving for a mistrial may a defendant raise the bar of double jeopardy to a second trial after having succeeded in aborting the first on his own motion. [Oregon v Kennedy, 456 US 667, 675-676 ; 102 S Ct 2083 ; 72 L Ed 2d 416 (1982) (quotation marks, brackets, and citations omitted).] Defendant’s arguments that the prosecutor intended to goad a mistrial are unavailing.

2017However, the Parole Board may issue a 60 month continuance in the event the violation of parole involves firearm [sic].” In an MDOC document titled “Parole Violation Worksheet and Decision,” both a parole agent and her supervisor recommended petitioner’s return for a revocation hearing after the preliminary examination “due to zero tolerance policy,” “because probable cause was found for weapons.” “It is often the case that an agency’s policies and practices will indicate the manner in which it is exercising its discretion.” Garner v Jones, 529 US 244, 256-57 ; 120 S Ct 1362 ; 146 L Ed 2d 236

2017However, the Parole Board may issue a 60 month continuance in the event the violation of parole involves firearm [sic].” In an MDOC document titled “Parole Violation Worksheet and Decision,” both a parole agent and her supervisor recommended petitioner’s return for a revocation hearing after the preliminary examination “due to zero tolerance policy,” “because probable cause was found for weapons.” “It is often the case that an agency’s policies and practices will indicate the manner in which it is exercising its discretion.” Garner v Jones, 529 US 244, 256-57 ; 120 S Ct 1362 ; 146 L Ed 2d 236

2008In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit’s false material set to one side, the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit. [Franks v Delaware, 438 US 154, 155-156 ; 98 S Ct 2674 ; 57 L Ed 2d 667 (1978) (emphasis added).] *23 See also People v Stumpf, 196 Mich App 218, 224 ; 492 NW2

2008In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit’s false material set to one side, the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit. [Franks v Delaware, 438 US 154, 155-156 ; 98 S Ct 2674 ; 57 L Ed 2d 667 (1978) (emphasis added).] *23 See also People v Stumpf, 196 Mich App 218, 224 ; 492 NW2

1996Gudewicz v Matt’s Catering, Inc, 188 Mich App 639, 644-645 ; 470 NW2d 654 (1991).

1996Gudewicz v Matt’s Catering, Inc, 188 Mich App 639, 644-645 ; 470 NW2d 654 (1991).

1995Steward v Poole, 196 Mich App 25, 29 ; 492 NW2d 475 (1992).

1995Steward v Poole, 196 Mich App 25, 29 ; 492 NW2d 475 (1992).

1986See People v Poindexter, 90 Mich App 599 ; 282 NW2d 411 (1979), lv den 407 Mich 876 (1979); People v Williams, 134 *228 Mich App 639; 351 NW2d 878 (1984); People v Howey, 118 Mich App 431 ; 325 NW2d 451 (1982), lv den 418 Mich 882 (1983); People v Ward, 107 Mich App 38 ; 308 NW2d 664 (1981), lv den 417 Mich 938 (1983).

1986See People v Poindexter, 90 Mich App 599 ; 282 NW2d 411 (1979), lv den 407 Mich 876 (1979); People v Williams, 134 *228 Mich App 639; 351 NW2d 878 (1984); People v Howey, 118 Mich App 431 ; 325 NW2d 451 (1982), lv den 418 Mich 882 (1983); People v Ward, 107 Mich App 38 ; 308 NW2d 664 (1981), lv den 417 Mich 938 (1983).

1986See People v Poindexter, 90 Mich App 599 ; 282 NW2d 411 (1979), lv den 407 Mich 876 (1979); People v Williams, 134 *228 Mich App 639; 351 NW2d 878 (1984); People v Howey, 118 Mich App 431 ; 325 NW2d 451 (1982), lv den 418 Mich 882 (1983); People v Ward, 107 Mich App 38 ; 308 NW2d 664 (1981), lv den 417 Mich 938 (1983).

1986See People v Poindexter, 90 Mich App 599 ; 282 NW2d 411 (1979), lv den 407 Mich 876 (1979); People v Williams, 134 *228 Mich App 639; 351 NW2d 878 (1984); People v Howey, 118 Mich App 431 ; 325 NW2d 451 (1982), lv den 418 Mich 882 (1983); People v Ward, 107 Mich App 38 ; 308 NW2d 664 (1981), lv den 417 Mich 938 (1983).

1978The respondent characterizes a defendant's mistrial motion as a waiver of `his right not to be placed twice in jeopardy' and argues that to be valid the waiver must meet the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary standard set forth in Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458 ; [ 58 S Ct 1019 ; 82 L Ed 1461 ; 146 ALR 357 (1938)].

1978The respondent characterizes a defendant's mistrial motion as a waiver of `his right not to be placed twice in jeopardy' and argues that to be valid the waiver must meet the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary standard set forth in Johnson v Zerbst, 304 US 458 ; [ 58 S Ct 1019 ; 82 L Ed 1461 ; 146 ALR 357 (1938)].

1912Koehler v. Abey, 168 Mich. 113 ( 133 N. W. 923 ), and cases cited.

1912Koehler v. Abey, 168 Mich. 113 ( 133 N. W. 923 ), and cases cited.