62 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1932–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Franks v. Delawaregreen2 sentences2017According to Glenn, in evaluating the validity of the search warrant in the cases in which the State charged him with crimes, the trial court excised a sentence from the peace-officer’s affidavit that states: “Surveillance observed JAMARLON GLENN deliver a white cup to [the distributor].” See id. at 156 (“In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit’s false material set to one side, the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the se 2015"In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit's false material set to one side, the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit." Franks, 438 U.S. at 156 , 98 S.Ct. at 2676 . | 5 | 19 |
Harris v. Stategreen2 sentences2014In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit’s false material set to one side, the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit. -5- 04-13-00828-CR 438 U.S. 154 , 155–56 (1978); see Harris v. State, 227 S.W.3d 83, 85 (Tex. Crim. 2010In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit’s false material set to one side, the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit. 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978); see Harris v. State, 227 S.W.3d 83, 85 (Tex. Crim. | 3 | 3 |
Cosio v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See Cosio, 353 S.W.3d at 776 (even without an election by the State, it is still incumbent on the trial court "to submit a [jury] charge that does not allow for the possibility of a non-unanimous verdict”; in the event that such an instruction is submitted, while the jury does not have to say by its verdict which incident it relied upon to convict, it must still attain unanimity on a particular incident). . 2014In the face of an uncertain record, we have insisted, 49 See Cosio, 353 S.W.3d at 776 (even without an election by the State, it is still incumbent on the trial court “to submit a [jury] charge that does not allow for the possibility of a non-unanimous verdict”; in the event that such an instruction is submitted, while the jury does not have to say by its verdict which incident it relied upon to convict, it must still attain unanimity on a particular incident). | 2 | 2 |
Ex Parte Lewisgreen2 sentences2008In such "a trial tainted by prejudicial... prosecutorial error," "[t]he important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error." United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609 , 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1080 , 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976); see Lewis, 219 S.W.3d at 379 (Price, J., dissenting) ("And, at some point, prosecutorial misconduct may become so egregious that it cannot fairly be said that the defendant has retained primary control over the decision whether to proceed to verdict or abort the p 2008In such “a trial tainted by prejudicial ... prosecutorial error,” “[t]he important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error.” United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609 , 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1080 , 47 L.Ed.2d 267 (1976); see Lewis, 219 S.W.3d at 379 (Price, J., dissenting) (“And, at some point, prosecu-torial misconduct may become so egregious that it cannot fairly be said that the defendant has retained primary control over the decision whether to proceed to verdict or abort the | 2 | 2 |
Cates v. Stategreen1 sentence2021Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 , 155–56 (1978); see Cates v. State, 120 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
Echeta v. Stategreen1 sentence2018See Echeta v. State, 510 S.W.3d 100, 105 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, order) (providing appointed counsel the opportunity to file a new brief in the event of an error in form due to counsel disclosing potential grounds for appeal but failing to provide a professional evaluation). | 1 | 1 |
Owens, Charles Ray Jr. v. Stategreen1 sentence2016See Owens v. State, 473 S.W.3d 812, 816 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
May v. Buckgreen2 sentences2015When the arbitration panel issued its award on May 7, 2007 , Ponderosa instantly filed suit in the 191st District Court of Dallas County, Texas (the “191st District Court”) seeking confirmation of the award. (2RR – Joint Ex. 7; CR:752 (FOF No. 15).) On June 1, 2007, Illinova wrote Ponderosa that Illinova intended to challenge the arbitration award. (2RR – Joint Ex. 9.) In the June 1 letter, Illinova further stated that it “desires to make an unconditional tender to [Ponderosa] of the sum of $16,941,000.00 (the “Tender 3 Amount”) toward the full satisfaction of the Award in order to terminate t 2015When the arbitration panel issued its award on May 7, 2007 , Ponderosa instantly filed suit in the 191st District Court of Dallas County, Texas (the “191st District Court”) seeking confirmation of the award. (2RR – Joint Ex. 7; CR:752 (FOF No. 15).) On June 1, 2007, Illinova wrote Ponderosa that Illinova intended to challenge the arbitration award. (2RR – Joint Ex. 9.) In the June 1 letter, Illinova further stated that it “desires to make an unconditional tender to [Ponderosa] of the sum of $16,941,000.00 (the “Tender 3 Amount”) toward the full satisfaction of the Award in order to terminate t | 1 | 1 |
Means v. United Fidelity Life Insurance Co.green2 sentences2015This includes but is not limited to recoveries against such third party, against any liability coverage for such third party or against automobile insurance in the event a claim is made under the uninsured or underinsured motorist coverages. (emphases added). 12 807 F.2d 457 (5th Cir.1987). 13 Id. at 458–59. 14 Id. at 460 . 15 Id. (citing 550 S.W.2d 302, 309 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). 16 550 S.W.2d at 308 . 17 Id. at 309 . 18 Id. 19 775 S.W.2d 679, 683 (Tex.App.-Austin 1989, writ denied). 20 Id. 21 Id. at 683–84. 22 Id. (citing Girard Fire & Marine Ins. 2015This includes but is not limited to recoveries against such third party, against any liability coverage for such third party or against automobile insurance in the event a claim is made under the uninsured or underinsured motorist coverages. (emphases added). 12 807 F.2d 457 (5th Cir.1987). 13 Id. at 458–59. 14 Id. at 460 . 15 Id. (citing 550 S.W.2d 302, 309 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). 16 550 S.W.2d at 308 . 17 Id. at 309 . 18 Id. 19 775 S.W.2d 679, 683 (Tex.App.-Austin 1989, writ denied). 20 Id. 21 Id. at 683–84. 22 Id. (citing Girard Fire & Marine Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Lexington Insurance Co. v. Graygreen2 sentences2015This includes but is not limited to recoveries against such third party, against any liability coverage for such third party or against automobile insurance in the event a claim is made under the uninsured or underinsured motorist coverages. (emphases added). 12 807 F.2d 457 (5th Cir.1987). 13 Id. at 458–59. 14 Id. at 460 . 15 Id. (citing 550 S.W.2d 302, 309 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). 16 550 S.W.2d at 308 . 17 Id. at 309 . 18 Id. 19 775 S.W.2d 679, 683 (Tex.App.-Austin 1989, writ denied). 20 Id. 21 Id. at 683–84. 22 Id. (citing Girard Fire & Marine Ins. 2015This includes but is not limited to recoveries against such third party, against any liability coverage for such third party or against automobile insurance in the event a claim is made under the uninsured or underinsured motorist coverages. (emphases added). 12 807 F.2d 457 (5th Cir.1987). 13 Id. at 458–59. 14 Id. at 460 . 15 Id. (citing 550 S.W.2d 302, 309 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). 16 550 S.W.2d at 308 . 17 Id. at 309 . 18 Id. 19 775 S.W.2d 679, 683 (Tex.App.-Austin 1989, writ denied). 20 Id. 21 Id. at 683–84. 22 Id. (citing Girard Fire & Marine Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Matthews v. Pickett Countygreen1 sentence2015To suggest that a protected person has no such right would posit a lacuna between a protected person’s rights and an officer’s duties—a result that would be hard to reconcile with the Colorado Legislature’s dual goals of putting an end to police indifference and empowering potential victims of domestic abuse. 17 See also Matthews v. Pickett County, 996 S.W.2d 162, 165 (Tenn.1999) (“The order of protection in this case was not issued for the public’s protection in general. | 1 | 1 |
Liggins v. Stategreen1 sentence2002See Tex. Penal Code § 2.03 (Vernon 1994); see, e.g., Liggins v. State, 979 S.W.2d 56, 60 (Tex. App.-Waco 1998, pet. ref'd) (rejecting State's argument that entrapment defense was not subject to factual sufficiency challenge in case in which the trial court submitted the issue to the jury). | 1 | 1 |
Goodwin v. Stategreen1 sentence2001See id. at 476 . | 1 | 1 |
Price v. Stategreen1 sentence1996See id. | 1 | 1 |
| James v. Janegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Taylor v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Halseygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Dinitz
green
2 sentences2010“The important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error.” Id. at 609 , 96 S.Ct. at 1080 . 2010“The important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error.” Id. at 609 , 96 S.Ct. at 1080 . | 5 | 1998–2010 |
Oregon v. Kennedy
green
2 sentences1998Under the United States Constitution, it is not enough that there exist sufficient grounds for a mistrial; the defendant must in essence be forced to move for one: Where the prosecutorial error even of a degree sufficient to warrant a mistrial has occurred, "[t]he important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error." Id. at 676 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 (brackets in original; citation omitted). 1998Under the United States Constitution, it is not enough that there exist sufficient grounds for a mistrial; the defendant must in essence be forced to move for one: Where the prosecutorial error even of a degree sufficient to warrant a mistrial has occurred, "[t]he important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error." Id. at 676 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 (brackets in original; citation omitted). | 4 | 1983–1998 |
In Re Luna
green
2 sentences2015Fee–Splitting Provision The arbitration agreements provide that, in the event of a claim, all fees related to arbitration— including but not limited to mediation fees, the arbitrators' fees, costs of procuring a location for a hearing, and court reporter fees—will be split equally between the employer and the employee, with the employee's contribution capped at an amount equal to “the gross compensation earned by the Employee in Employee's highest earning month in the twelve months prior to the time the arbitrator issues his award.” The court of appeals held that this provision “weigh[ed] heav 2008Fee-Splitting Provision The arbitration agreements provide that, in the event of a claim, all fees related to arbitration — including but not limited to mediation fees, the arbitrators’ fees, costs of procuring a location for a hearing, and court reporter fees — will be split equally between the employer and the employee, with the employee’s contribution capped at an amount equal to “the gross compensation earned by the Employee in Employee’s highest earning month in the twelve months prior to the time the arbitrator issues his award.” The court of appeals held that this provision “weighted] h | 2 | 2008–2015 |
Louis H. Oss and Michelle S. Oss v. United Services Automobile Association
green
2 sentences2015This includes but is not limited to recoveries against such third party, against any liability coverage for such third party or against automobile insurance in the event a claim is made under the uninsured or underinsured motorist coverages. (emphases added). 12 807 F.2d 457 (5th Cir.1987). 13 Id. at 458–59. 14 Id. at 460 . 15 Id. (citing 550 S.W.2d 302, 309 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). 16 550 S.W.2d at 308 . 17 Id. at 309 . 18 Id. 19 775 S.W.2d 679, 683 (Tex.App.-Austin 1989, writ denied). 20 Id. 21 Id. at 683–84. 22 Id. (citing Girard Fire & Marine Ins. 2015This includes but is not limited to recoveries against such third party, against any liability coverage for such third party or against automobile insurance in the event a claim is made under the uninsured or underinsured motorist coverages. (emphases added). 12 807 F.2d 457 (5th Cir.1987). 13 Id. at 458–59. 14 Id. at 460 . 15 Id. (citing 550 S.W.2d 302, 309 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)). 16 550 S.W.2d at 308 . 17 Id. at 309 . 18 Id. 19 775 S.W.2d 679, 683 (Tex.App.-Austin 1989, writ denied). 20 Id. 21 Id. at 683–84. 22 Id. (citing Girard Fire & Marine Ins. | 2 | 2007–2015 |
In Re VLK
green
1 sentence2020Id. at ___. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Kelley-Coppedge, Inc. v. Highlands Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence2019But neither a waiver nor a release is the functional equivalent of a promise not to assert a claim. 14 Waiver and release provide parties who contract for them with an affirmative defense to liability in the event a claim is made while an agreement not to make a claim is a contractual undertaking that carries with it the potential for an affirmative claim for relief by the non-breaching party in the event of breach.15 11 See Kelley-Coppedge, Inc., 980 S.W.2d at 464 . 12 See National Property Holdings, L.P. v. Westergren, 453 S.W.3d 419 , 428–29 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam). 13 See id. 14 See id. 1 | 1 | 2019–2019 |
National Property Holdings, L.P. v. Westergren
green
2 sentences2019But neither a waiver nor a release is the functional equivalent of a promise not to assert a claim. 14 Waiver and release provide parties who contract for them with an affirmative defense to liability in the event a claim is made while an agreement not to make a claim is a contractual undertaking that carries with it the potential for an affirmative claim for relief by the non-breaching party in the event of breach.15 11 See Kelley-Coppedge, Inc., 980 S.W.2d at 464 . 12 See National Property Holdings, L.P. v. Westergren, 453 S.W.3d 419 , 428–29 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam). 13 See id. 14 See id. 1 2019But neither a waiver nor a release is the functional equivalent of a promise not to assert a claim. 14 Waiver and release provide parties who contract for them with an affirmative defense to liability in the event a claim is made while an agreement not to make a claim is a contractual undertaking that carries with it the potential for an affirmative claim for relief by the non-breaching party in the event of breach.15 11 See Kelley-Coppedge, Inc., 980 S.W.2d at 464 . 12 See National Property Holdings, L.P. v. Westergren, 453 S.W.3d 419 , 428–29 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam). 13 See id. 14 See id. 1 | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Wasson Interests, Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville, Texas
green
1 sentence2017For support, the Group relies on Wasson Interests, Ltd. v. City of Jacksonville , 489 S.W.3d 427 (Tex. 2016), which holds a city does not have immunity from suit for proprietary acts. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Almanza v. State
green
1 sentence2015In the event that error was not preserved, Article 36.19 mandates that there shall be no reversal “unless it appears from the record that the defendant has not had a fair and impartial trial.” With regard to error that was not preserved at trial, a reversal is warranted “only if the error is so egregious and created such harm that he [the defendant] has not had a fair and impartial trial.” Almanza, supra, at 171 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Girard Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Farmer
neutral
1 sentence2015Co. v. Farmer, 53 S.W.2d 1016 (Tex.Com.App.1932, judgm't adopted); Duval County Ranch Co. v. Alamo Lumber Co., 663 S.W.2d 627 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Quincy Mut. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Duval County Ranch Co. v. Alamo Lumber Co.
green
1 sentence2015Co. v. Farmer, 53 S.W.2d 1016 (Tex.Com.App.1932, judgm't adopted); Duval County Ranch Co. v. Alamo Lumber Co., 663 S.W.2d 627 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1983, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Quincy Mut. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Brumit v. State
green
1 sentence2015In the context of this exchange, we do not construe the trial court’s reference to Lowe’s acknowledgment of his possible prison term in the event of a violation as a “clear showing of bias.” Brumit, 206 S.W.3d at 645 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Centex Corp. v. Dalton
green
1 sentence2015A condition precedent is “an event that must this requirement and permits Wilkins to maintain his suit. happen or be performed before a right can accrue to enforce In doing so, the Court encourages all seed buyers who wish an obligation.” Centex Corp. v. Dalton, 840 S.W.2d 952 , 956 to circumvent the Act's arbitration requirement to simply (Tex.1992). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph
green
2 sentences2014No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 10 Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) 121 S.Ct. 513 , 84 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 2014No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 10 Green Tree Financial Corp.-Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000) 121 S.Ct. 513 , 84 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Miller v. State
green
1 sentence2014Miller, 33 S.W.3d at 261 . . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Reyes v. State
red
2 sentences2000This issue was expressly addressed in Reyes, supra, which held that failure to comply with Geesa was not subject to a harm analysis. 2000This issue was expressly addressed in Reyes, supra, which held that failure to comply with Geesa was not subject to a harm analysis. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| James v. Jane green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Malloy v. Newman green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Outlaw v. Bowen green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Nardis Sportswear v. Simmons green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Adams v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Davis v. State green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Roper v. State green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Marini v. State green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Richardson v. State green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Reed v. State green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| State Department of Public Safety v. Cox green | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Jones v. Kinney neutral | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Daniels v. Town of Milwaukee neutral | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Jackson v. Clemson neutral | 1 | 1956–1956 |
| Somers v. O'Brien neutral | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| Knight v. Chicago Corp. green | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| Bouldin v. Miller green | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| Knight v. Chicago Corp. green | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| Miller v. Chicago Portrait Co. green | 1 | 1954–1954 |
| Granberry v. Jackson neutral | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Rose v. Brantley neutral | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Oilmen's Reciprocal Ass'n v. Coe neutral | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Riggs v. Horde neutral | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Hunt v. Askew green | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.