event violation in Maryland

2005A defendant’s motion for a mistrial constitutes “a deliberate election on his part to forgo his valued right to have his guilt or innocence determined before the first trier of fact.” Where *339 prosecutorial error even of a degree sufficient to warrant a mistrial has occurred, “[t]he important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error. ” 456 U.S. at 675-76 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 (emphasis supplied).

2005A defendant’s motion for a mistrial constitutes “a deliberate election on his part to forgo his valued right to have his guilt or innocence determined before the first trier of fact.” Where *339 prosecutorial error even of a degree sufficient to warrant a mistrial has occurred, “[t]he important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error. ” 456 U.S. at 675-76 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 (emphasis supplied).

2026Applying the event test, the court also concluded that even assuming two negligent acts, “there was, at the most, concurrent negligence which was the proximate cause of one event, for which event liability was incurred by the appellant.” Id. 28 occurrence, the trial court should assess that contention by applying the cause test, as discussed in this opinion, based on the jury’s factual findings.

2009Corp. v. Mariner, 144 Md.App. 188, 198-99 , 797 A.2d 110 (2002).

2009Corp. v. Mariner, 144 Md.App. 188, 198-99 , 797 A.2d 110 (2002).

2006In the event that at the hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit’s false material set to one side, the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit. 430 U.S. at 155-56, 97 S.Ct. 996 .

2006In the event that at the hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit's false material set to one side, the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit. 430 U.S. at 155-56, 97 S.Ct. 996 .

2005See In re Dewayne H., 290 Md. 401, 405-07 , 430 A.2d 76, 79-80 (1981) (holding that the failure to prescribe a sanction for non-conformance with time limitations within a statute and its corresponding rule indicated that its effect was intended to be directory and not mandatory); Resetar v. State Board of Education, 284 Md. 537, 547-50 , 399 A.2d 225, 230-32 (1979) (holding that the County Board’s regulation was directoiy because it “provide[d] no penalty and ma[d]e no provision in the event of a violation of the limit imposed”); Maryland State Bar Association v. Frank, 272 Md. 528, 533 , 325

2005See In re Dewayne H., 290 Md. 401, 405-07 , 430 A.2d 76, 79-80 (1981) (holding that the failure to prescribe a sanction for non-conformance with time limitations within a statute and its corresponding rule indicated that its effect was intended to be directory and not mandatory); Resetar v. State Board of Education, 284 Md. 537, 547-50 , 399 A.2d 225, 230-32 (1979) (holding that the County Board’s regulation was directoiy because it “provide[d] no penalty and ma[d]e no provision in the event of a violation of the limit imposed”); Maryland State Bar Association v. Frank, 272 Md. 528, 533 , 325

2003Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56 , 98 S.Ct. 2674 .

2003Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56 , 98 S.Ct. 2674 .

2002“The important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error.” 437 U.S. at 94 , 98 S.Ct. at 2195 , 57 L.Ed.2d at 76 (quoting United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609 , 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1079 , 47 L.Ed.2d 267, 275 (1976)).

2002“The important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error.” 437 U.S. at 94 , 98 S.Ct. at 2195 , 57 L.Ed.2d at 76 (quoting United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609 , 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1079 , 47 L.Ed.2d 267, 275 (1976)).

1992In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit’s false material set to one side, the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit.” United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 , 104 S.Ct. 3296 , 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984), was a case where the outcome was directly controlled by the Franks principle.

1992In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit’s false material set to one side, the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit.” United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 , 104 S.Ct. 3296 , 82 L.Ed.2d 530 (1984), was a case where the outcome was directly controlled by the Franks principle.

1981Rule 746 Maryland Rule 746 a in its present form provides that, "Within 30 days after the earlier of the *219 appearance of counsel or the first appearance of the defendant before the court pursuant to Rule 723, a trial date shall be set which shall be not later than 180 days after the appearance or waiver of counsel or after the appearance of defendant before the court pursuant to Rule 723.” Since the mandate of State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310 , 403 A.2d 356 (1979), which issued July 25, 1979, Rule 746 has had a mandatory effect, requiring dismissal in the event of violation.

1981Rule 746 Maryland Rule 746 a in its present form provides that, "Within 30 days after the earlier of the *219 appearance of counsel or the first appearance of the defendant before the court pursuant to Rule 723, a trial date shall be set which shall be not later than 180 days after the appearance or waiver of counsel or after the appearance of defendant before the court pursuant to Rule 723.” Since the mandate of State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310 , 403 A.2d 356 (1979), which issued July 25, 1979, Rule 746 has had a mandatory effect, requiring dismissal in the event of violation.

1980More significant are Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 359 A.2d 174 (Pa., 1976); State v. Johnson, 217 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa, 1974); and Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 345 N.E.2d 386 (Mass., 1976), where, as here, there was no statutory direction in terms of re-prosecution. *649 Whitaker involved a Pennsylvania rule requiring trial within 270 days following arrest, and permitting the court to "dismiss the charges with prejudice” in the event of a violation (see Pa. R.

1980More significant are Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 359 A.2d 174 (Pa., 1976); State v. Johnson, 217 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa, 1974); and Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 345 N.E.2d 386 (Mass., 1976), where, as here, there was no statutory direction in terms of re-prosecution. *649 Whitaker involved a Pennsylvania rule requiring trial within 270 days following arrest, and permitting the court to "dismiss the charges with prejudice” in the event of a violation (see Pa. R.

1980More significant are Commonwealth v. Whitaker, 359 A.2d 174 (Pa., 1976); State v. Johnson, 217 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa, 1974); and Commonwealth v. Ludwig, 345 N.E.2d 386 (Mass., 1976), where, as here, there was no statutory direction in terms of re-prosecution. *649 Whitaker involved a Pennsylvania rule requiring trial within 270 days following arrest, and permitting the court to "dismiss the charges with prejudice” in the event of a violation (see Pa. R.

1979“The important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error.” Id. at 609 . 6 It is manifest that a defendant loses primary control over the course to be followed when the error is caused by judicial or prosecutorial overreaching.

1935In the event of an error or abuse in the exercise of that power by the jury, the traverser’s remedy was by application to the court for a new trial.” Delcher v. State, 161 Md. 475, 486 , 158 A. 37, 42 ; Beard v. State, 71 Md. 275, 280 ; Broll v. State, 45 Md. 356, 360 .

1935In the event of an error or abuse in the exercise of that power by the jury, the traverser’s remedy was by application to the court for a new trial.” Delcher v. State, 161 Md. 475, 486 , 158 A. 37, 42 ; Beard v. State, 71 Md. 275, 280 ; Broll v. State, 45 Md. 356, 360 .

1935In the event of an error or abuse in the exercise of that power by the jury, the traverser’s remedy was by application to the court for a new trial.” Delcher v. State, 161 Md. 475, 486 , 158 A. 37, 42 ; Beard v. State, 71 Md. 275, 280 ; Broll v. State, 45 Md. 356, 360 .

1935In the event of an error or abuse in the exercise of that power by the jury, the traverser’s remedy was by application to the court for a new trial.” Delcher v. State, 161 Md. 475, 486 , 158 A. 37, 42 ; Beard v. State, 71 Md. 275, 280 ; Broll v. State, 45 Md. 356, 360 .