event violation in Massachusetts

2025See Souza v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 462 Mass. 227 , 235 n.6 (2012) ("We provide the same procedural protections to defendants who admit to sufficient facts and those who plead guilty because if a defendant who admitted to sufficient facts were to violate his or her probation and have it revoked, a conviction would enter without a new plea hearing"); Villalobos, supra at 801 ("in the event of a violation of those conditions, the 'admission' remains and may ripen into an adjudication of guilt and imposition of sentence").

2005Commonwealth v. Villalobos, 437 Mass. 797, 801 (2002) (“admission to sufficient facts may lead to ... an immediate conviction and sentence . . . during the continuance period in the event of a violation of the continuance terms”).

1999That choice was consistent with the underlying constitutional “consideration . . . that the defendant retain[s] primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error.” United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609 (1976).

1991The important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error.” Dinitz, supra at 609 . 6 Under this analysis, it is of little consequence that in this particular case the declaration of a mistrial arguably harmed Poretta’s interests by denying him the benefit of Carr’s exculpatory, albeit perjurious, testimony.

2025See Souza v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles, 462 Mass. 227 , 235 n.6 (2012) ("We provide the same procedural protections to defendants who admit to sufficient facts and those who plead guilty because if a defendant who admitted to sufficient facts were to violate his or her probation and have it revoked, a conviction would enter without a new plea hearing"); Villalobos, supra at 801 ("in the event of a violation of those conditions, the 'admission' remains and may ripen into an adjudication of guilt and imposition of sentence").

2025See Commonwealth v. Bryan, 476 Mass. 351, 359 (2017) ("It would be a reproach to the administration of justice if a defendant[,] through his counsel, could pollute the atmosphere of a trial and then turn this to his own advantage on appeal" [citations omitted]).

2024See Commonwealth v. Williams, 455 Mass. 706, 718 (2010).

2024But, notwithstanding the difficulty -- or impossibility -- of demonstrating what happened at an event from which the defense was excluded, the case law requires that where the Commonwealth's action was merely negligent, the defendant demonstrate "a reasonable possibility, based on concrete evidence rather than a fertile imagination, that access to the 9 [material] would have produced evidence favorable to his cause." Sanford, 460 Mass. at 447 (quotation omitted).

2004While we have concluded that an admission to sufficient facts “may lead to either an immediate conviction and sentence, or may do so during the continuance period in the event of a violation of the continuance terms,” Commonwealth v. Villalobos, 437 Mass. 797, 801 (2002), and therefore is the “the functional equivalent of a guilty plea” for purposes of the statute, id. at 800 , quoting Commonwealth v. Mahadeo, 397 Mass. 314, 316 (1986), no such equivalency is present here.

2002See Yanez-Popp v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 998 F.2d 231, 234-236 (4th Cir. 1993); Molina v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 981 F.2d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1992).

2002See Yanez-Popp v. United States Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 998 F.2d 231, 234-236 (4th Cir. 1993); Molina v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 981 F.2d 14, 18 (1st Cir. 1992).

2002However, in 1988, the board of immigration appeals held that an alien acquired a “conviction” for immigration purposes whenever the alien “admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of guilty,” the judge imposed “some form of punishment, penalty, or restraint on the person’s liberty,” and an adjudication of guilt could be entered in the event of violation of the court’s terms “without availability of further proceedings regarding the person’s guilt or innocence of the original charge.” Matter of Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 546, 551-552 (BIA 1988).

2001Commonwealth v. Hardy, 47 Mass. App. Ct. 679, 681 (1999).

2000See also Churgin v. Hobble, 39 Mass.App.Ct. 302, 306-07 (1995). 5 This interpretation of the financing contingency contained in clause thirty of the agreement is also supported by other, language in that clause which gives the buyer the “right to waive this contingency.” In the event of a waiver by the buyer, this provision states that “this agreement shall remain in full force and effect.” There is no requirement that the buyer give notice to the seller in order to exercise this right.

1999“The fact that the defendant . . . might have gambled and lost,” Commonwealth v. McMaster, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 722, 735 (1986), does not entitle him to second-guess his deliberate trial strategy on appeal, so long as his “trial was fair, ... the verdict was not ‘against the weight of the evidence considered in a large or nontechnical sense’ ” (Commonwealth v. Toney, 385 Mass. 575, 589 [1982]), and his counseled choice was not “suicidal” (Commonwealth v. Adams, 374 Mass. 722 , 730 n.4 [1978]).

1999“The fact that the defendant . . . might have gambled and lost,” Commonwealth v. McMaster, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 722, 735 (1986), does not entitle him to second-guess his deliberate trial strategy on appeal, so long as his “trial was fair, ... the verdict was not ‘against the weight of the evidence considered in a large or nontechnical sense’ ” (Commonwealth v. Toney, 385 Mass. 575, 589 [1982]), and his counseled choice was not “suicidal” (Commonwealth v. Adams, 374 Mass. 722 , 730 n.4 [1978]).

1998Common law exclusionary rules may be “inherent in the purpose of a statute which the government has violated . . . [but] only in statutes closely associated with constitutional rights, rights groimded in fundamental fairness.” Commonwealth v. Lyons, 397 Mass. 644, 647 (1986).

1993See also Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 374 Mass. 142 (1977). 14 *49 The theoretical underpinning of Franks is that the Fourth Amendment’s protection against arbitrary governmental action would be eviscerated if the police did not make a truthful showing of probable cause.

1993In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance óf the evidence, and, with the affidavit’s false material set to one side, the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit.” See Commonwealth v. Amral, 407 Mass. 511, 519-520 (1990), quoting Franks, supra at 155-165 ; Commonwealth v. Douzanis, 384 Mass. 434, 437 (1981); Commonwealth

1993In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance óf the evidence, and, with the affidavit’s false material set to one side, the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit.” See Commonwealth v. Amral, 407 Mass. 511, 519-520 (1990), quoting Franks, supra at 155-165 ; Commonwealth v. Douzanis, 384 Mass. 434, 437 (1981); Commonwealth

1993In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance óf the evidence, and, with the affidavit’s false material set to one side, the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit.” See Commonwealth v. Amral, 407 Mass. 511, 519-520 (1990), quoting Franks, supra at 155-165 ; Commonwealth v. Douzanis, 384 Mass. 434, 437 (1981); Commonwealth

1992In the event of error in the proceedings “[w]e should set aside the conviction unless we are ‘sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect.’ ” Commonwealth v. Gilday, 382 Mass. 166, 178 (1980), quoting from United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976).

1992In the event of error in the proceedings “[w]e should set aside the conviction unless we are ‘sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect.’ ” Commonwealth v. Gilday, 382 Mass. 166, 178 (1980), quoting from United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112 (1976).

1991We reject the defendant’s claim, that the statute violates his right to a jury trial on the issue of the need for the restraint or removal, for those reasons discussed in Commonwealth v. United Food Corp., 374 Mass. 765, 778-781 (1978), and further explained in Commonwealth v. One 1972 Chevrolet Van, 385 Mass. 198, 199-201 (1982).

1991We reject the defendant’s claim, that the statute violates his right to a jury trial on the issue of the need for the restraint or removal, for those reasons discussed in Commonwealth v. United Food Corp., 374 Mass. 765, 778-781 (1978), and further explained in Commonwealth v. One 1972 Chevrolet Van, 385 Mass. 198, 199-201 (1982).

1980See United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 93-94 (1978); United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 609 (1976); United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 486 (1970).

1980See Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 469, 471 (1973). 22 The Commonwealth’s position overlooks the possibility of an acquittal. 23 Moreover, the Commonwealth’s position also overlooks the many factors that must be considered before a mistrial is declared, such as the right to have a particular tribunal decide a person’s fate once and for all, as well as *620 the right of an accused to retain control over the proceedings in the event of error.