event violation in Washington

2015In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit's false material set to one side, the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit. 438 U.S. at 155-56 .

1992In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit's false material set to one side, the affidavit's remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must he voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit." Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56 .

2010State v. Horton, 116 Wn.

2010Because Lewis concedes this argument serves as a backup in the event we rule he failed to preserve for review his prosecutorial misconduct claim, we need not reach it. [8] State v. Horton, 116 Wash.App. 909, 921 , 68 P.3d 1145 (2003). [9] "Prosecutorial remarks that may otherwise be improper do not constitute grounds for reversal if they are made in reply to defense arguments, unless a curative instruction would not have cured them." Jones, 71 Wash.App. at 809 , 863 P.2d 85 (citing State v. Swan, 114 Wash.2d 613, 663 , 790 P.2d 610 (1990)).

2009We rephrase the dancers’ second contention as a question of whether the auditor’s failure to exercise discretion by considering the facts and circumstances of the case constituted an abuse of discretion. 2 State v. Pettitt, 93 Wn.2d 288, 295 , 609 P.2d 1364 (1980). ¶10 Again, PCC 5.14.230(B) provides: The Auditor shall revoke [3] or suspend, for a specified period of not more than one year, any dancer[ ] license if he/she determines that the licensee or applicant has: . . . violated or permitted violation of any provisions of this Chapter. ¶11 Brunson, Johnson, and Tucker argue that although t

2009We rephrase the dancers’ second contention as a question of whether the auditor’s failure to exercise discretion by considering the facts and circumstances of the case constituted an abuse of discretion. 2 State v. Pettitt, 93 Wn.2d 288, 295 , 609 P.2d 1364 (1980). ¶10 Again, PCC 5.14.230(B) provides: The Auditor shall revoke [3] or suspend, for a specified period of not more than one year, any dancer[ ] license if he/she determines that the licensee or applicant has: . . . violated or permitted violation of any provisions of this Chapter. ¶11 Brunson, Johnson, and Tucker argue that although t

1990Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782 ; Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 479-80 ; State v. Carlson, 27 Wn.

1980Ed. 2d 656 , 93 S. Ct. 1756 (1973); (c) The hearing in revocation of parole is a 2-step proceeding which includes a factual determination of a violation and a determination of appropriate sanctions in the event a violation is established.

1990Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782 ; Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 479-80 ; State v. Carlson, 27 Wn.

1980Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 , 33 L.

2024App. 859, 861 , 786 P.2d 798 (1990).

2024“Probation revocation is a [two]-step process which includes a factual determination of a violation and a determination of appropriate sanctions in the event a violation is established.” City of Seattle v. Lea, 56 Wn.

2010We further note that it is more difficult for Lewis to show that such argument was flagrant and ill-intentioned when the prosecutor made it only in rebuttal argument, after Lewis's counsel had, in closing argument, expressed his personal opinion that Crocker was not credible as follows: "I'm going to pointed [sic] out a few reasons why I think that he's just not—has not come into this courtroom and told you the truth." RP (Oct. 14, 2008) at 103. [10] Division One of this court held: "[I]t is misconduct for a prosecutor to argue that in order to acquit a defendant, the jury must find that the S

2010We further note that it is more difficult for Lewis to show that such argument was flagrant and ill-intentioned when the prosecutor made it only in rebuttal argument, after Lewis's counsel had, in closing argument, expressed his personal opinion that Crocker was not credible as follows: "I'm going to pointed [sic] out a few reasons why I think that he's just not—has not come into this courtroom and told you the truth." RP (Oct. 14, 2008) at 103. [10] Division One of this court held: "[I]t is misconduct for a prosecutor to argue that in order to acquit a defendant, the jury must find that the S

2010Because Lewis concedes this argument serves as a backup in the event we rule he failed to preserve for review his prosecutorial misconduct claim, we need not reach it. [8] State v. Horton, 116 Wash.App. 909, 921 , 68 P.3d 1145 (2003). [9] "Prosecutorial remarks that may otherwise be improper do not constitute grounds for reversal if they are made in reply to defense arguments, unless a curative instruction would not have cured them." Jones, 71 Wash.App. at 809 , 863 P.2d 85 (citing State v. Swan, 114 Wash.2d 613, 663 , 790 P.2d 610 (1990)).

2010Because Lewis concedes this argument serves as a backup in the event we rule he failed to preserve for review his prosecutorial misconduct claim, we need not reach it. [8] State v. Horton, 116 Wash.App. 909, 921 , 68 P.3d 1145 (2003). [9] "Prosecutorial remarks that may otherwise be improper do not constitute grounds for reversal if they are made in reply to defense arguments, unless a curative instruction would not have cured them." Jones, 71 Wash.App. at 809 , 863 P.2d 85 (citing State v. Swan, 114 Wash.2d 613, 663 , 790 P.2d 610 (1990)).

2010Because Lewis concedes this argument serves as a backup in the event we rule he failed to preserve for review his prosecutorial misconduct claim, we need not reach it. [8] State v. Horton, 116 Wash.App. 909, 921 , 68 P.3d 1145 (2003). [9] "Prosecutorial remarks that may otherwise be improper do not constitute grounds for reversal if they are made in reply to defense arguments, unless a curative instruction would not have cured them." Jones, 71 Wash.App. at 809 , 863 P.2d 85 (citing State v. Swan, 114 Wash.2d 613, 663 , 790 P.2d 610 (1990)).

2010Because Lewis concedes this argument serves as a backup in the event we rule he failed to preserve for review his prosecutorial misconduct claim, we need not reach it. [8] State v. Horton, 116 Wash.App. 909, 921 , 68 P.3d 1145 (2003). [9] "Prosecutorial remarks that may otherwise be improper do not constitute grounds for reversal if they are made in reply to defense arguments, unless a curative instruction would not have cured them." Jones, 71 Wash.App. at 809 , 863 P.2d 85 (citing State v. Swan, 114 Wash.2d 613, 663 , 790 P.2d 610 (1990)).

2010Because Lewis concedes this argument serves as a backup in the event we rule he failed to preserve for review his prosecutorial misconduct claim, we need not reach it. [8] State v. Horton, 116 Wash.App. 909, 921 , 68 P.3d 1145 (2003). [9] "Prosecutorial remarks that may otherwise be improper do not constitute grounds for reversal if they are made in reply to defense arguments, unless a curative instruction would not have cured them." Jones, 71 Wash.App. at 809 , 863 P.2d 85 (citing State v. Swan, 114 Wash.2d 613, 663 , 790 P.2d 610 (1990)).

1990Woolbright cites State v. Stannard, 109 Wn.2d 29 , 742 P.2d 1244 (1987) in support of her argument that the implied consent statute requires a breath test be given.

1990Woolbright cites State v. Stannard, 109 Wn.2d 29 , 742 P.2d 1244 (1987) in support of her argument that the implied consent statute requires a breath test be given.

1990Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782 ; Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 479-80 ; State v. Carlson, 27 Wn.

1947In Higgins v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 312 Ill. 11 , 143 N. E. 482 , the court states: “A fiduciary relation, however, is not limited to cases of trustee and cestui que trust, guardian and ward, attorney *733 and client, or other recognized legal relations, but it exists in all cases in which influence has been acquired and abused, in which confidence has been reposed and betrayed.

1947In Higgins v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 312 Ill. 11 , 143 N. E. 482 , the court states: “A fiduciary relation, however, is not limited to cases of trustee and cestui que trust, guardian and ward, attorney *733 and client, or other recognized legal relations, but it exists in all cases in which influence has been acquired and abused, in which confidence has been reposed and betrayed.