event claim in California

1990Assn. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 763, 770 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 580 ].) A trial court, however, is limited in its authority to vacate the award of an arbitrator, even in the event of an error of fact or law.

1990Assn. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 763, 770 [ 137 Cal.Rptr. 580 ].) A trial court, however, is limited in its authority to vacate the award of an arbitrator, even in the event of an error of fact or law.

2016(See Baltazar, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1241 [‘“primary question before us is whether [a] clause [stating ‘that, in the event a claim proceeds to arbitration, the parties are authorized to seek prelintinary injunctive relief in the superior court’] renders the arbitration agreement unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable, because it unreasonably favors the employer”].) But it did address the plaintiff’s argument ‘“the arbitration agreement at issue is unfairly one-sided because it lists only employee claims as examples of the types of claims that are subject to arbitration.” (Id. at p. 1248

2016(See Baltazar, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1241 [―primary question before us is whether [a] clause [stating ‗that, in the event a claim proceeds to arbitration, the parties are authorized to seek preliminary injunctive relief in the superior court‘] renders the arbitration agreement unconscionable, and therefore unenforceable, because it unreasonably favors the employer‖].) But it did address the plaintiff‘s argument ―the arbitration agreement at issue is unfairly one-sided because it lists only employee claims as examples of the types of claims that are subject to arbitration.‖ (Id. at p. 1248.)

1989Co. v. Whitaker (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 532, 537 [ 226 Cal.Rptr. 435 ].) 5 The insureds attempt to meet their burden by arguing that the losses on the tax shelter schemes were unexpected and therefore they were an “accidental event.” They then assert that the complaints give rise to potential liability under the policy because they allege the insureds “failed to properly manage and care for the plaintiffs’ personal property,” and “the plaintiffs’ property has been negligently and carelessly damaged.” These claims, according to the insureds, fall within the provisions defining bodily injury and p

1989Co. v. Whitaker (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 532, 537 [ 226 Cal.Rptr. 435 ].) 5 The insureds attempt to meet their burden by arguing that the losses on the tax shelter schemes were unexpected and therefore they were an “accidental event.” They then assert that the complaints give rise to potential liability under the policy because they allege the insureds “failed to properly manage and care for the plaintiffs’ personal property,” and “the plaintiffs’ property has been negligently and carelessly damaged.” These claims, according to the insureds, fall within the provisions defining bodily injury and p

2023Co. v. Superior Court (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 1014, 1017 .) The phrase “ ‘trigger of coverage’ ” is a “term of ‘convenience’ ” used to denote the occurrence of an event that “ ‘must happen in the policy period in order for the potential of coverage to arise.

2022Co. v. Superior Court (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 1014, 1017 .) The phrase “ ‘trigger of coverage’ ” is a “term of ‘convenience’ ” used to denote the occurrence of an event that “ ‘must happen in the policy period in order for the potential of coverage to arise.

2023In the event of error, a miscarriage of justice requiring reversal “should be declared only when the court, ‘after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,’ is of the ‘opinion’ that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).) D.

2014(People v. Ross (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1054-1055 ; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 .) As we have explained, while the jurors were not instructed with the exact words of CALCRIM No. 121, they nevertheless received the substance of that instruction through CALJIC Nos. 1.00 and 1.03, the trial 21 On this record, it is not even clear that the inclusion of the language about giving a note to the bailiff in the event of an error in the translation would have made any difference in the timing of the jury’s notification because it is not clear any of the jurors perceived any error at

1988Finally, if these requirements are met, and if, when material that is the subject of the alleged falsity or reckless disregard is set to one side, there remains sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to support a finding of probable cause, no hearing is required. . . .” ( Franks, supra, 438 U.S. 154, 171-172 [ 57 L.Ed.2d 667, 682 ].) The “retesting” of the affidavit applies as well, of course, in deciding whether to order suppression: “In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and,

1988Finally, if these requirements are met, and if, when material that is the subject of the alleged falsity or reckless disregard is set to one side, there remains sufficient content in the warrant affidavit to support a finding of probable cause, no hearing is required. . . .” ( Franks, supra, 438 U.S. 154, 171-172 [ 57 L.Ed.2d 667, 682 ].) The “retesting” of the affidavit applies as well, of course, in deciding whether to order suppression: “In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and,

2015(Schrillo Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 766, 775-776 [ 226 Cal.Rptr. 717 ].) Under the first-party policy in this case, after Lloyds explained its reason for denying coverage, Windsor had the burden “ ' “to prove that an event is a claim within the scope of the basic coverage.” ’ ” (Central Nat.

2015(Schrillo Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 766, 775-776 [ 226 Cal.Rptr. 717 ].) Under the first-party policy in this case, after Lloyds explained its reason for denying coverage, Windsor had the burden “ ' “to prove that an event is a claim within the scope of the basic coverage.” ’ ” (Central Nat.

2015In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit’s false material set to one side, the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit.” (Franks v. Delaware, supra, 438 U.S. at pp. 155-156.) Our Supreme Court has said that “ ‘[a] defendant who challenges a search warrant based upon an affidavit

2015In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit’s false material set to one side, the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit.” (Franks v. Delaware, supra, 438 U.S. at pp. 155-156.) Our Supreme Court has said that “ ‘[a] defendant who challenges a search warrant based upon an affidavit

2015In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit’s false material set to one side, the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit.” (Franks v. Delaware, supra, 438 U.S. at pp. 155-156.) Our Supreme Court has said that “ ‘[a] defendant who challenges a search warrant based upon an affidavit

2015In the event that at that hearing the allegation of perjury or reckless disregard is established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, and, with the affidavit’s false material set to one side, the affidavit’s remaining content is insufficient to establish probable cause, the search warrant must be voided and the fruits of the search excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the affidavit.” (Franks v. Delaware, supra, 438 U.S. at pp. 155-156.) Our Supreme Court has said that “ ‘[a] defendant who challenges a search warrant based upon an affidavit

2017If a parole violation occurs, section 3000.08, subdivision (d), permits the supervising parole agency to impose additional conditions of supervision and "intermediate sanctions" without court intervention: "Upon review of the alleged violation and a finding of good cause that the parolee has committed a violation of law or violated his or her conditions of parole, the supervising parole agency may impose additional and appropriate conditions of supervision, including rehabilitation and treatment services and appropriate incentives for compliance, and impose immediate, structured, and intermedi

2017If a parole violation occurs, section 3000.08, subdivision (d), permits the supervising parole agency to impose additional conditions of supervision and "intermediate sanctions" without court intervention: "Upon review of the alleged violation and a finding of good cause that the parolee has committed a violation of law or violated his or her conditions of parole, the supervising parole agency may impose additional and appropriate conditions of supervision, including rehabilitation and treatment services and appropriate incentives for compliance, and impose immediate, structured, and intermedi

2017If a parole violation occurs, section 3000.08, subdivision (d), permits the supervising parole agency to impose additional conditions of supervision and "intermediate sanctions" without court intervention: "Upon review of the alleged violation and a finding of good cause that the parolee has committed a violation of law or violated his or her conditions of parole, the supervising parole agency may impose additional and appropriate conditions of supervision, including rehabilitation and treatment services and appropriate incentives for compliance, and impose immediate, structured, and intermedi

2017If a parole violation occurs, section 3000.08, subdivision (d), permits the supervising parole agency to impose additional conditions of supervision and "intermediate sanctions" without court intervention: "Upon review of the alleged violation and a finding of good cause that the parolee has committed a violation of law or violated his or her conditions of parole, the supervising parole agency may impose additional and appropriate conditions of supervision, including rehabilitation and treatment services and appropriate incentives for compliance, and impose immediate, structured, and intermedi

2015Co. v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 926, 932 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 622 ], both defendant and respondent, the Underwriters of Lloyds of London, and the majority state that on a motion for summary judgment the burden rests with the nonmoving plaintiff (insured) to prove that “ ‘ “an event is a claim within the scope of the basic coverage.” ’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1185.) I disagree; this statement runs counter to basic summary judgment law.

2015Co. v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 926, 932 [ 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 622 ], both defendant and respondent, the Underwriters of Lloyds of London, and the majority state that on a motion for summary judgment the burden rests with the nonmoving plaintiff (insured) to prove that “ ‘ “an event is a claim within the scope of the basic coverage.” ’ ” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 1185.) I disagree; this statement runs counter to basic summary judgment law.

2015Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 681, 694 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 430 ].) Courts have taken their cue from the Legislature in enforcing the letter of the law, consoled by the Legislature’s “ ‘ “determination that the importance of deterring unlicensed persons from engaging in the contracting business outweighs any harshness between the parties.” ’ ” (MW Erectors, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 423 , italics omitted.) Accordingly, if a contractor is unlicensed for any period of time while delivering construction services, the contractor forfeits all compensation for the work, not merely compensation for the peri

2015Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 681, 694 [ 130 Cal.Rptr.3d 430 ].) Courts have taken their cue from the Legislature in enforcing the letter of the law, consoled by the Legislature’s “ ‘ “determination that the importance of deterring unlicensed persons from engaging in the contracting business outweighs any harshness between the parties.” ’ ” (MW Erectors, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 423 , italics omitted.) Accordingly, if a contractor is unlicensed for any period of time while delivering construction services, the contractor forfeits all compensation for the work, not merely compensation for the peri

1999V, § 8; § 4852.16; Green v. Superior Court (1934) 2 Cal.2d 1, 3 [ 37 P.2d 694 ].) Moreover, a governor could order the parole of a special circumstances murderer as part of a clemency grant thereby speeding up the process where cost recoupment could occur in the event of a violation of a condition of release by a parolee; albeit there is no evidence the Legislature ever contemplated or intended recoupment to occur under such unlikely circumstances.

1999V, § 8; § 4852.16; Green v. Superior Court (1934) 2 Cal.2d 1, 3 [ 37 P.2d 694 ].) Moreover, a governor could order the parole of a special circumstances murderer as part of a clemency grant thereby speeding up the process where cost recoupment could occur in the event of a violation of a condition of release by a parolee; albeit there is no evidence the Legislature ever contemplated or intended recoupment to occur under such unlikely circumstances.

1986(People v. Banks (1959) 53 Cal.2d 370, 385 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 669 , 348 P.2d 102 ]; People v. Brasley, supra, at p. 315 .) Accordingly, “the sentenced defendant is held in the custody, actual or constructive, of the court and is entitled to only such privileges as the court may affirmatively prescribe in its order.” 3 (People v. Banks, supra, *121 at pp. 385-386.) In the event of violation of the terms of probation, the court has authority during the term of probation to order probation revoked; and where sentence was previously imposed, the defendant will then be committed to state prison for that

1986(People v. Banks (1959) 53 Cal.2d 370, 385 [ 1 Cal.Rptr. 669 , 348 P.2d 102 ]; People v. Brasley, supra, at p. 315 .) Accordingly, “the sentenced defendant is held in the custody, actual or constructive, of the court and is entitled to only such privileges as the court may affirmatively prescribe in its order.” 3 (People v. Banks, supra, *121 at pp. 385-386.) In the event of violation of the terms of probation, the court has authority during the term of probation to order probation revoked; and where sentence was previously imposed, the defendant will then be committed to state prison for that

2025(Ben C., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 542.) “ ‘In order to establish that a person is gravely disabled, the evidence must support an objective finding that the person, due to [a] mental disorder, is incapacitated or rendered unable to carry out the transactions necessary for survival or otherwise provide for his or her basic needs of food, clothing, or shelter.’ [Citation.] ‘On review, we apply the substantial evidence test to determine whether the record supports a finding of grave disability. [Citation.] The testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support the trial court’s finding.’ 4 [Cit

2025(Ben C., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 542.) “ ‘In order to establish that a person is gravely disabled, the evidence must support an objective finding that the person, due to [a] mental disorder, is incapacitated or rendered unable to carry out the transactions necessary for survival or otherwise provide for his or her basic needs of food, clothing, or shelter.’ [Citation.] ‘On review, we apply the substantial evidence test to determine whether the record supports a finding of grave disability. [Citation.] The testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support the trial court’s finding.’ 4 [Cit

2022(See Yeomans, supra, 485 F.Supp.3d at pp. 1188−1189.) In addition to these two sections, there was a third similar term under section I, subpart 6, of the Glossary not considered by the Yeomans court, which itself defined “Extraordinary Relief” in a circular manner to include “other extraordinary relief (such [as] orders, injunctions and other relief referred to as ‘Extraordinary Relief’).” In California, “[c]ourts have found one-sided employer-imposed arbitration provisions unconscionable where they provide that employee claims will be arbitrated, but the employer retains the right to file a