17 New Jersey opinions name it 3 courts 1947–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Smithgreen1 sentence2021See, e.g., State v. Smith, 212 N.J. 365, 413 (2012). | 1 | 1 |
Toys \R\" Usgreen1 sentence2019See Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Twp. of Mount Olive, 300 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Richard Perez (072624)green1 sentence2018See Perez , 220 N.J. at 441, 106 A.3d 1212 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Vincent Gigante, Andrew Gigante, Sureties-Appellantsgreen1 sentence2001See United States v. Gigante, 85 F.3d 83, 85 (2d Cir.1996) (“[A] bail bond and its collateral may be forfeited not *374 only for the defendant’s failure to appeal*, but also for other violations of bond conditions, including the defendant’s commission of a crime.”); United States v. Terrell, 983 F.2d 653, 654 (5th Cir.1993) (holding that forfeiture was appropriate when defendant violated court condition of “travel restriction and his promise not to possess marijuana and drug paraphernalia”); United States v. Santiago, 826 F.2d 499, 506 (7th Cir.1987) (holding that forfeiture was appropriate be | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Rafael Santiago, Appeal of Esther Cruzgreen1 sentence2001See United States v. Gigante, 85 F.3d 83, 85 (2d Cir.1996) (“[A] bail bond and its collateral may be forfeited not *374 only for the defendant’s failure to appeal*, but also for other violations of bond conditions, including the defendant’s commission of a crime.”); United States v. Terrell, 983 F.2d 653, 654 (5th Cir.1993) (holding that forfeiture was appropriate when defendant violated court condition of “travel restriction and his promise not to possess marijuana and drug paraphernalia”); United States v. Santiago, 826 F.2d 499, 506 (7th Cir.1987) (holding that forfeiture was appropriate be | 1 | 1 |
United States v. David A. Terrellgreen1 sentence2001See United States v. Gigante, 85 F.3d 83, 85 (2d Cir.1996) (“[A] bail bond and its collateral may be forfeited not *374 only for the defendant’s failure to appeal*, but also for other violations of bond conditions, including the defendant’s commission of a crime.”); United States v. Terrell, 983 F.2d 653, 654 (5th Cir.1993) (holding that forfeiture was appropriate when defendant violated court condition of “travel restriction and his promise not to possess marijuana and drug paraphernalia”); United States v. Santiago, 826 F.2d 499, 506 (7th Cir.1987) (holding that forfeiture was appropriate be | 1 | 1 |
State v. D'AMATOgreen2 sentences1997See, e.g., State v. D’Amato, 218 N.J.Super. 595 , 602 n. 1, 528 A.2d 928 (App.Div.1987), certif. denied, 110 N.J. 170 , 540 A.2d 169 (1988); State v. DeMarco, 211 N.J.Super. 421, 423-25 , 511 A.2d 1251 (App.Div.1986). 1997See, e.g., State v. D’Amato, 218 N.J.Super. 595 , 602 n. 1, 528 A.2d 928 (App.Div.1987), certif. denied, 110 N.J. 170 , 540 A.2d 169 (1988); State v. DeMarco, 211 N.J.Super. 421, 423-25 , 511 A.2d 1251 (App.Div.1986). | 1 | 1 |
State v. D'AMATOgreen2 sentences1997See, e.g., State v. D’Amato, 218 N.J.Super. 595 , 602 n. 1, 528 A.2d 928 (App.Div.1987), certif. denied, 110 N.J. 170 , 540 A.2d 169 (1988); State v. DeMarco, 211 N.J.Super. 421, 423-25 , 511 A.2d 1251 (App.Div.1986). 1997See, e.g., State v. D’Amato, 218 N.J.Super. 595 , 602 n. 1, 528 A.2d 928 (App.Div.1987), certif. denied, 110 N.J. 170 , 540 A.2d 169 (1988); State v. DeMarco, 211 N.J.Super. 421, 423-25 , 511 A.2d 1251 (App.Div.1986). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kovackgreen2 sentences1992See, e.g., State v. Kovack, 91 N.J. 476, 479 , 453 A.2d 521 (1982); State v. Ervin, 241 N.J.Super. 458, 470 , 575 A.2d 491 (App.Div.1989). 1992See, e.g., State v. Kovack, 91 N.J. 476, 479 , 453 A.2d 521 (1982); State v. Ervin, 241 N.J.Super. 458, 470 , 575 A.2d 491 (App.Div.1989). | 1 | 1 |
STATE BY PARSONS v. Otis Elevator Co.green1 sentence1953And in the event a claim is made to the property sought to be escheated the burden is not upon the State to prove the escheat, but it is the "claimant's burden of clearly establishing by competent evidence that he was the rightful owner *21 and presently had a valid claim as such," see State v. Otis Elevator Company, 10 N.J. 504, 510 (1952), supra, which deals with a claim made in the instant escheat proceeding. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Dinitz
green
2 sentences1997A defendant’s motion for a mistrial constitutes “a deliberate election on his part to forgo his valued right to have his guilt or innocence determined before the first trier of fact.” United States v. Scott, [ 437 U.S. 82, 93 , 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2195 , 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978).] Where prosecutorial error even of a degree sufficient to warrant a mistrial has occurred, “[t]he important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error.” United States v. Dinitz, [ 424 U.S. at 609 , 96 S.Ct. at 1997A defendant’s motion for a mistrial constitutes “a deliberate election on his part to forgo his valued right to have his guilt or innocence determined before the first trier of fact.” United States v. Scott, [ 437 U.S. 82, 93 , 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2195 , 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978).] Where prosecutorial error even of a degree sufficient to warrant a mistrial has occurred, “[t]he important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error.” United States v. Dinitz, [ 424 U.S. at 609 , 96 S.Ct. at | 2 | 1976–1997 |
Griggs v. Bertram
green
2 sentences2026Although the defendant’s insurance policy excluded coverage for an intentional tort, the insurer “gave no indication that any potential claim or legal action arising from this incident would not be covered under the policy or that it would disclaim coverage in the event such a claim or action were brought.” Ibid. 2026Although the defendant’s insurance policy excluded coverage for an intentional tort, the insurer “gave no indication that any potential claim or legal action arising from this incident would not be covered under the policy or that it would disclaim coverage in the event such a claim or action were brought.” Ibid. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Kuchera
green
2 sentences2021The defendant posed no objection, id. at 489 , however, on appeal, he contended the court should have held "a hearing on the security issue and [issued] an appropriate jury instruction in the event that the hearing led to restraints being kept on [the co-defendant]." Id. at 493 . 2021The defendant posed no objection, id. at 489 , however, on appeal, he contended the court should have held "a hearing on the security issue and [issued] an appropriate jury instruction in the event that the hearing led to restraints being kept on [the co-defendant]." Id. at 493 . | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Bank of New York v. Laks
green
2 sentences2012Had the Legislature intended that a foreclosure action be dismissed whenever a timely served notice omitted even a single item listed in N.J.S.A. 2A:50-5G(c), it would have so stated. 4 Accordingly, the Court overrules the holding of Laks, supra, 422 N.J.Super. 201 , 27 A.3d 1222 , barring courts of equity from imposing remedies other than dismissal without prejudice in the event of a violation of N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56(c)(ll). 2012Had the Legislature intended that a foreclosure action be dismissed whenever a timely served notice omitted even a single item listed in N.J.S.A. 2A:50-5G(c), it would have so stated. 4 Accordingly, the Court overrules the holding of Laks, supra, 422 N.J.Super. 201 , 27 A.3d 1222 , barring courts of equity from imposing remedies other than dismissal without prejudice in the event of a violation of N.J.S.A. 2A:50-56(c)(ll). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
State v. Russell
green
2 sentences2009According to defendant, “[h]e was, at the very least, entitled to a hearing on the security issue and an appropriate jury instruction in the event that the hearing led to restraints being kept on Mr. Kettle.” Quoting Russell, supra, 384 N.J.Super. at 600 , 895 A2d 1163 , defendant asserts that “[t]his is particularly so because Mr. Kettle “while clad in clothing clearly denoting guilt and his status as a prisoner, testified to a criminal association with the defendant. 2009According to defendant, “[h]e was, at the very least, entitled to a hearing on the security issue and an appropriate jury instruction in the event that the hearing led to restraints being kept on Mr. Kettle.” Quoting Russell, supra, 384 N.J.Super. at 600 , 895 A2d 1163 , defendant asserts that “[t]his is particularly so because Mr. Kettle “while clad in clothing clearly denoting guilt and his status as a prisoner, testified to a criminal association with the defendant. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Matulewicz
green
2 sentences2006Matulewicz, supra, 101 N.J. at 32 -33 n. 2, 499 A. 2d 1363 . [7] On remand "the report was not admitted into evidence due to the inability of the State to produce complete records of the standard tests performed on the gas chromatograph. 2006Matulewicz, supra, 101 N.J. at 32 -33 n. 2, 499 A. 2d 1363 . [7] On remand "the report was not admitted into evidence due to the inability of the State to produce complete records of the standard tests performed on the gas chromatograph. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Borough of Tenafly v. Centex Homes Corp.
green
1 sentence2005Nothing herein shall preclude abandonment at any time by mutual consent of the parties. [N.J.S.A. 20:3-35 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).] Centex reasoned that a declaration of taking was a device created “to put persons on notice of an impending condemnation action and to trigger the transfer of possession from the con-demnee to the condemnor.” Id. at 501 , 354 A.2d 382 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Walcott v. Allstate NJ Ins. Co.
green
1 sentence2005Nothing herein shall preclude abandonment at any time by mutual consent of the parties. [N.J.S.A. 20:3-35 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).] Centex reasoned that a declaration of taking was a device created “to put persons on notice of an impending condemnation action and to trigger the transfer of possession from the con-demnee to the condemnor.” Id. at 501 , 354 A.2d 382 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Oregon v. Kennedy
green
2 sentences1997A defendant’s motion for a mistrial constitutes “a deliberate election on his part to forgo his valued right to have his guilt or innocence determined before the first trier of fact.” United States v. Scott, [ 437 U.S. 82, 93 , 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2195 , 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978).] Where prosecutorial error even of a degree sufficient to warrant a mistrial has occurred, “[t]he important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error.” United States v. Dinitz, [ 424 U.S. at 609 , 96 S.Ct. at 1997A defendant’s motion for a mistrial constitutes “a deliberate election on his part to forgo his valued right to have his guilt or innocence determined before the first trier of fact.” United States v. Scott, [ 437 U.S. 82, 93 , 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2195 , 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978).] Where prosecutorial error even of a degree sufficient to warrant a mistrial has occurred, “[t]he important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error.” United States v. Dinitz, [ 424 U.S. at 609 , 96 S.Ct. at | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. DeMarco
green
2 sentences1997See, e.g., State v. D’Amato, 218 N.J.Super. 595 , 602 n. 1, 528 A.2d 928 (App.Div.1987), certif. denied, 110 N.J. 170 , 540 A.2d 169 (1988); State v. DeMarco, 211 N.J.Super. 421, 423-25 , 511 A.2d 1251 (App.Div.1986). 1997See, e.g., State v. D’Amato, 218 N.J.Super. 595 , 602 n. 1, 528 A.2d 928 (App.Div.1987), certif. denied, 110 N.J. 170 , 540 A.2d 169 (1988); State v. DeMarco, 211 N.J.Super. 421, 423-25 , 511 A.2d 1251 (App.Div.1986). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Marcus
green
1 sentence1997The “ceiling principle” assumes the existence “of some degree of population substructure and generates more conservative population frequency statistics than the product rule.” Marcus, supra, 294 N.J.Super. at 282, 683 A.2d 221 . | 1 | 1997–1997 |
United States v. Scott
green
2 sentences1997A defendant’s motion for a mistrial constitutes “a deliberate election on his part to forgo his valued right to have his guilt or innocence determined before the first trier of fact.” United States v. Scott, [ 437 U.S. 82, 93 , 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2195 , 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978).] Where prosecutorial error even of a degree sufficient to warrant a mistrial has occurred, “[t]he important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error.” United States v. Dinitz, [ 424 U.S. at 609 , 96 S.Ct. at 1997A defendant’s motion for a mistrial constitutes “a deliberate election on his part to forgo his valued right to have his guilt or innocence determined before the first trier of fact.” United States v. Scott, [ 437 U.S. 82, 93 , 98 S.Ct. 2187, 2195 , 57 L.Ed.2d 65 (1978).] Where prosecutorial error even of a degree sufficient to warrant a mistrial has occurred, “[t]he important consideration, for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, is that the defendant retain primary control over the course to be followed in the event of such error.” United States v. Dinitz, [ 424 U.S. at 609 , 96 S.Ct. at | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Ervin
green
2 sentences1992See, e.g., State v. Kovack, 91 N.J. 476, 479 , 453 A.2d 521 (1982); State v. Ervin, 241 N.J.Super. 458, 470 , 575 A.2d 491 (App.Div.1989). 1992See, e.g., State v. Kovack, 91 N.J. 476, 479 , 453 A.2d 521 (1982); State v. Ervin, 241 N.J.Super. 458, 470 , 575 A.2d 491 (App.Div.1989). | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Pollack v. Bowman
green
2 sentences1950Wisdom after the event is not the test of responsibility." See also Pollack v. Bowman, 139 N.J. 1950Eq. 47 , 49 A. 2d 40 ( E. & A. 1946). | 1 | 1950–1950 |
In Re Cross
green
1 sentence1947In re Cross, 117 N.J. | 1 | 1947–1947 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.