foreseeability test in Pennsylvania

2019This Court reversed DHS' order, "finding that foreseeability alone was an insufficient basis to sustain a conclusion that the injury resulted from abuse rather than an accident." Id. at 479 .

2019This Court reversed DHS’ order, “finding that foreseeability alone was an insufficient basis to sustain a conclusion that the injury resulted from abuse rather than an accident.” Id. at 479 .

2025Appx. 79, 81 (3d Cir. 2006) (same); R.W. v. Manzek, 888 A.2d 740, 743-44 , 752 n.14 (Pa. 2005) (declining to address “how the ‘foreseeable and fairly direct’ element of a state created danger cause of action compares to the foreseeability analysis necessary to establish a duty in a state negligence cause of action” (emphasis added)). 8 Plaintiff counters that the District ignores that a negligence claim does not require any specific statutory duty.

2012In declining to follow Palco Linings, supra, and Linde Enterprises, supra, the Bilt-Rite court stated that “we hereby adopt section 552 as the law in Pennsylvania in cases where information is negligently supplied by one in the business of supplying information, such as an architect or design professional, and where it is foreseeable that the information will be used and relied upon by third persons, even if the third parties have no direct contractual relationship with the supplier of information.” Id., at 482, 866 A.2d at 287 .

2009Without disapproving the discrete use of the foreseeable use concept in crashworthiness cases (i.e., motor vehicle accidents), the Supreme Court refused to extend the foreseeability test to other products: [W]e are of the view that the metamorphosis of the particularized crashworthiness doctrine into a generalized eondi-tions-of-use/outside-cause-or-instigator exception to the bar against resort to foreseeability concepts in the strict liability arena would, in fact, represent an extension of the type that was disapproved by a majority of Justices in Phillips . 4 Id. at 257, 898 A.2d at 603 .

2009Without disapproving the discrete use of the foreseeable use concept in crashworthiness cases (i.e., motor vehicle accidents), the Supreme Court refused to extend the foreseeability test to other products: [W]e are of the view that the metamorphosis of the particularized crashworthiness doctrine into a generalized conditions-of-use/outside-cause-or-instigator exception to the bar against resort to foreseeability concepts in the strict liability arena would, in fact, represent an extension of the type that was disapproved by a majority of Justices in Phillips . [4] Id. at 257, 898 A.2d at 603 .

2005While this is an interesting issue, because of our disposition of this case is based on the different parties to the state and federal cases, it is not before us and must consequently await another day. [1] This is in contrast to Emerich v. Philadelphia Center for Human Development, Inc., 554 Pa. 209 , 720 A.2d 1032 (1998).

2005While this is an interesting issue, because of our disposition of this case is based on the different parties to the state and federal cases, it is not before us and must consequently await another day. [1] This is in contrast to Emerich v. Philadelphia Center for Human Development, Inc., 554 Pa. 209 , 720 A.2d 1032 (1998).

1995In adopting this foreseeability test and enunciating the factors to determine foreseeability, the court cited with approval the California case of Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728 , 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 , 441 P.2d 912 (1968), in which the California Supreme Court set forth three factors determinative of whether the injury to the plaintiff was reasonably 'foreseeable, those being: “(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and cont

1995In adopting this foreseeability test and enunciating the factors to determine foreseeability, the court cited with approval the California case of Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728 , 69 Cal. Rptr. 72 , 441 P.2d 912 (1968), in which the California Supreme Court set forth three factors determinative of whether the injury to the plaintiff was reasonably 'foreseeable, those being: “(1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and cont

1992The bystander rule incorporates a foreseeability analysis which involves three factors: “(1) whether the plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident; “(2) whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon the plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observation of the accident; and “(3) whether the plaintiff and the victim were closely related.” Outten, 928 F.2d at 78 . .

1992In Mazzagatti , after reviewing the foreseeability test enacted in Sinn , the supreme court stated that it had confined its holding "solely to those cases in which plaintiff alleges psychic injury as a result of actually witnessing the defendant's negligent act." Id., 512 Pa. at 276 , 516 A.2d at 677 , quoting Sinn, 486 Pa. at 166 -167 n. 15, 404 A.2d at 683 n. 15 (emphasis added). *241 This court has addressed the elements which a plaintiff must demonstrate in order to substantiate a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

1992In Mazzagatti , after reviewing the foreseeability test enacted in Sinn , the supreme court stated that it had confined its holding "solely to those cases in which plaintiff alleges psychic injury as a result of actually witnessing the defendant's negligent act." Id., 512 Pa. at 276 , 516 A.2d at 677 , quoting Sinn, 486 Pa. at 166 -167 n. 15, 404 A.2d at 683 n. 15 (emphasis added). *241 This court has addressed the elements which a plaintiff must demonstrate in order to substantiate a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

1985In Dziokonski v. Babineau, 380 N.E.2d 1295 (Sup. Jud.

1985The court stated that: “The requirement of ‘direct . . . sensory and contemporaneous observance’ stated in the [Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (the New Jersey Supreme Court case which adopted the foreseeability test of Dillon)] opinion relates not to witnessing the moment of actual impact, but to witnessing the suffering of the victim.” Mercado v. Transport, 422 A.2d at 802 .

1985The court stated that: “The requirement of ‘direct . . . sensory and contemporaneous observance’ stated in the [Portee v. Jaffee, 417 A.2d 521 (Sup. Ct. 1980) (the New Jersey Supreme Court case which adopted the foreseeability test of Dillon)] opinion relates not to witnessing the moment of actual impact, but to witnessing the suffering of the victim.” Mercado v. Transport, 422 A.2d at 802 .