8 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Giampapa v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co.green2 sentences2016See Spang Indus., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 512 F.2d 365 , 370 (2d Cir. 1975) ("[The [Hadley] rule does not require that the direct damages must necessarily follow, but only that they are likely to follow.") (emphasis added); Sunnyland Farms, 301 P.3d at 392 ("[The loss must have been foreseeable as the probable result of the breach, not merely as a possibility.") (emphasis in original); see also Denny Constr., 199 P.3d at 751 (repeatedly phrasing the foreseeability test in terms of whether certain damages would "probably" result from the breach); Giampapa, 64 P.3d at 244 (approving a j 2016See Spang Indus., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. , 512 F.2d 365 , 370 (2d Cir. 1975) (“[T]he [ Hadley ] rule does not require that the direct damages must necessarily follow, but only that they are likely to follow.”) (emphasis added); Sunnyland Farms , 301 P.3d at 392 (“[T]he loss must have been foreseeable as the probable result of the breach, not merely as a possibility.”) (emphasis in original); see also Denny Constr. , 199 P.3d at 751 (repeatedly phrasing the foreseeability test in terms of whether certain damages would “probably” result from the breach); Giampapa , 64 P.3d at 244 (appro | 3 | 3 |
Vanderbeek v. Vernon Corp.green2 sentences2016See Spang Indus., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 512 F.2d 365 , 370 (2d Cir. 1975) ("[The [Hadley] rule does not require that the direct damages must necessarily follow, but only that they are likely to follow.") (emphasis added); Sunnyland Farms, 301 P.3d at 392 ("[The loss must have been foreseeable as the probable result of the breach, not merely as a possibility.") (emphasis in original); see also Denny Constr., 199 P.3d at 751 (repeatedly phrasing the foreseeability test in terms of whether certain damages would "probably" result from the breach); Giampapa, 64 P.3d at 244 (approving a j 2016See Spang Indus., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. , 512 F.2d 365 , 370 (2d Cir. 1975) (“[T]he [ Hadley ] rule does not require that the direct damages must necessarily follow, but only that they are likely to follow.”) (emphasis added); Sunnyland Farms , 301 P.3d at 392 (“[T]he loss must have been foreseeable as the probable result of the breach, not merely as a possibility.”) (emphasis in original); see also Denny Constr. , 199 P.3d at 751 (repeatedly phrasing the foreseeability test in terms of whether certain damages would “probably” result from the breach); Giampapa , 64 P.3d at 244 (appro | 3 | 3 |
Denny Construction, Inc. v. City & County of Denver Ex Rel. Board of Water Commissionersgreen2 sentences2016See Spang Indus., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 512 F.2d 365 , 370 (2d Cir. 1975) ("[The [Hadley] rule does not require that the direct damages must necessarily follow, but only that they are likely to follow.") (emphasis added); Sunnyland Farms, 301 P.3d at 392 ("[The loss must have been foreseeable as the probable result of the breach, not merely as a possibility.") (emphasis in original); see also Denny Constr., 199 P.3d at 751 (repeatedly phrasing the foreseeability test in terms of whether certain damages would "probably" result from the breach); Giampapa, 64 P.3d at 244 (approving a j 2016See Spang Indus., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. , 512 F.2d 365 , 370 (2d Cir. 1975) (“[T]he [ Hadley ] rule does not require that the direct damages must necessarily follow, but only that they are likely to follow.”) (emphasis added); Sunnyland Farms , 301 P.3d at 392 (“[T]he loss must have been foreseeable as the probable result of the breach, not merely as a possibility.”) (emphasis in original); see also Denny Constr. , 199 P.3d at 751 (repeatedly phrasing the foreseeability test in terms of whether certain damages would “probably” result from the breach); Giampapa , 64 P.3d at 244 (appro | 3 | 3 |
cluster 326067green2 sentences2016See Spang Indus., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 512 F.2d 365 , 370 (2d Cir. 1975) ("[The [Hadley] rule does not require that the direct damages must necessarily follow, but only that they are likely to follow.") (emphasis added); Sunnyland Farms, 301 P.3d at 392 ("[The loss must have been foreseeable as the probable result of the breach, not merely as a possibility.") (emphasis in original); see also Denny Constr., 199 P.3d at 751 (repeatedly phrasing the foreseeability test in terms of whether certain damages would "probably" result from the breach); Giampapa, 64 P.3d at 244 (approving a j 2016See Spang Indus., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. , 512 F.2d 365 , 370 (2d Cir. 1975) (“[T]he [ Hadley ] rule does not require that the direct damages must necessarily follow, but only that they are likely to follow.”) (emphasis added); Sunnyland Farms , 301 P.3d at 392 (“[T]he loss must have been foreseeable as the probable result of the breach, not merely as a possibility.”) (emphasis in original); see also Denny Constr. , 199 P.3d at 751 (repeatedly phrasing the foreseeability test in terms of whether certain damages would “probably” result from the breach); Giampapa , 64 P.3d at 244 (appro | 3 | 3 |
Horne v. Beasongreen1 sentence2026See, e.g., Horne v. Beason, 331 S.E.2d 342, 344-45 (S.C. 1985); Kanayurak v. N. Slope Borough, 677 P.2d 893, 897 (Alaska 1984); Guice v. Enfinger, 389 So. 2d 270, 271 (Fla. Dist. | 1 | 1 |
Guice v. Enfingergreen1 sentence2026See, e.g., Horne v. Beason, 331 S.E.2d 342, 344-45 (S.C. 1985); Kanayurak v. N. Slope Borough, 677 P.2d 893, 897 (Alaska 1984); Guice v. Enfinger, 389 So. 2d 270, 271 (Fla. Dist. | 1 | 1 |
Kanayurak v. North Slope Boroughgreen1 sentence2026See, e.g., Horne v. Beason, 331 S.E.2d 342, 344-45 (S.C. 1985); Kanayurak v. N. Slope Borough, 677 P.2d 893, 897 (Alaska 1984); Guice v. Enfinger, 389 So. 2d 270, 271 (Fla. Dist. | 1 | 1 |
Pierce v. ALSC Architects, P.S.green2 sentences2012See Pierce v. ALSC Architects, P.S., 270 Mont. 97 , 890 P.2d 1254, 1263 (1995); Emmanuel S. Tipon, Annotation, Modern Status of Rules Regarding Tort Liability of Building or Construction Contractor for Injury or Damage to Third Person Occurring After Completion and Acceptance of Work; "Foreseeability" or "Modern" Rule, T5 AL.R.5th 413, § 4 (2000). 2012See Pierce v. ALSC Architects, P.S., 270 Mont. 97 , 890 P.2d 1254, 1263 (1995); Emmanuel S. Tipon, Annotation, Modern Status of Rules Regarding Tort Liability of Building or Construction Contractor for Injury or Damage to Third Person Occurring After Completion and Acceptance of Work; "Foreseeability" or "Modern" Rule, T5 AL.R.5th 413, § 4 (2000). | 1 | 1 |
Lynch v. Norton Construction, Inc.green1 sentence2012See Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787, 791 (Tex.1962), Lynch v. Norton Constr., Inc., 861 P.2d 1095, 1098-99 (Wyo.1993) (the completed and accepted rule is more cumbersome than traditional negligence analysis and the exceptions nearly swallow the rule). | 1 | 1 |
Cummins v. Rachnergreen1 sentence2012We also have considered whether other jurisdictions have addressed cases with similar facts. 155 In general, the law in the United States recognizes that "private contractors which perform road construction or repair work, have a common-law duty to warn motorists of the hazards created by construction or repair activities." Robert Michael Ey, Causes of Action First Series § 4 (1987); see, e.g., Golden v. Madden Contracting Co., 469 So.2d 1039, 1043 (La.Ct.App.1985) (a contractor's duty to warn motorists arises when its own work creates risks for the motoring public); Cummins v. Rackner, 257 N. | 1 | 1 |
Strakos v. Gehringgreen1 sentence2012See Strakos v. Gehring, 360 S.W.2d 787, 791 (Tex.1962), Lynch v. Norton Constr., Inc., 861 P.2d 1095, 1098-99 (Wyo.1993) (the completed and accepted rule is more cumbersome than traditional negligence analysis and the exceptions nearly swallow the rule). | 1 | 1 |
Golden v. Madden Contracting Co., Inc.green1 sentence2012We also have considered whether other jurisdictions have addressed cases with similar facts. 155 In general, the law in the United States recognizes that "private contractors which perform road construction or repair work, have a common-law duty to warn motorists of the hazards created by construction or repair activities." Robert Michael Ey, Causes of Action First Series § 4 (1987); see, e.g., Golden v. Madden Contracting Co., 469 So.2d 1039, 1043 (La.Ct.App.1985) (a contractor's duty to warn motorists arises when its own work creates risks for the motoring public); Cummins v. Rackner, 257 N. | 1 | 1 |
Seitz v. ZAC SMITH & COMPANY, INC.green1 sentence2012See Seitz v. Zac Smith & Co., 500 So.2d 706, 711 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1987) (while the completed and accepted rule is the minority rule, and "severely criticized by some," it was still the law in Florida). 141 In contrast to the completed and accepted rule, the more modern foreseeability rule provides that a construction contractor is liable for injury or damage to a third person as a result of the condition of [its] work, even after completion of the work and its acceptance by the owner where i#t was reasonably foreseeable that third persons would be injured by such work due to the contractor's m | 1 | 1 |
Bourgeous v. Horizon Healthcare Corp.green2 sentences2003Catholic Charities, Inc., 120 N.H. 501 , 418 A.2d 224, 227 (1980) (permitting recovery of mental distress damages for a breach of contract in the exceptional situation where such damages were “within the contemplation of the parties”); Bourgeous v. Horizon Healthcare Corp., 117 N.M. 434 , 872 P.2d 852, 858 (1994) (requiring the plaintiff to make a showing that mental distress damages were contemplated by the parties). 11 While the rejection of the willful and wanton rule might not have been foreshadowed, there is some support in our precedent for the strict foreseeability rule that I propose t 2003Catholic Charities, Inc., 120 N.H. 501 , 418 A.2d 224, 227 (1980) (permitting recovery of mental distress damages for a breach of contract in the exceptional situation where such damages were “within the contemplation of the parties”); Bourgeous v. Horizon Healthcare Corp., 117 N.M. 434 , 872 P.2d 852, 858 (1994) (requiring the plaintiff to make a showing that mental distress damages were contemplated by the parties). 11 While the rejection of the willful and wanton rule might not have been foreshadowed, there is some support in our precedent for the strict foreseeability rule that I propose t | 1 | 1 |
Guerin v. New Hampshire Catholic Charities, Inc.green2 sentences2003Catholic Charities, Inc., 120 N.H. 501 , 418 A.2d 224, 227 (1980) (permitting recovery of mental distress damages for a breach of contract in the exceptional situation where such damages were “within the contemplation of the parties”); Bourgeous v. Horizon Healthcare Corp., 117 N.M. 434 , 872 P.2d 852, 858 (1994) (requiring the plaintiff to make a showing that mental distress damages were contemplated by the parties). 11 While the rejection of the willful and wanton rule might not have been foreshadowed, there is some support in our precedent for the strict foreseeability rule that I propose t 2003Catholic Charities, Inc., 120 N.H. 501 , 418 A.2d 224, 227 (1980) (permitting recovery of mental distress damages for a breach of contract in the exceptional situation where such damages were “within the contemplation of the parties”); Bourgeous v. Horizon Healthcare Corp., 117 N.M. 434 , 872 P.2d 852, 858 (1994) (requiring the plaintiff to make a showing that mental distress damages were contemplated by the parties). 11 While the rejection of the willful and wanton rule might not have been foreshadowed, there is some support in our precedent for the strict foreseeability rule that I propose t | 1 | 1 |
McKinney v. County of Santa Claragreen2 sentences1986See, e.g., McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 110 Cal.App.3d 787 , 168 Cal.Rptr. 89 (1980); First State Bank v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696 (Tex.Civ.App.1980); Grist v. Upjohn Co., 16 Mich.App. 452 , 168 N.W.2d 389 (1969). *41 This foreseeability exception to the general publication rule was urged upon the trial court by plaintiff and the court concluded that such an exception should be the law in Colorado. 1986See, e.g., McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 110 Cal.App.3d 787 , 168 Cal.Rptr. 89 (1980); First State Bank v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696 (Tex.Civ.App.1980); Grist v. Upjohn Co., 16 Mich.App. 452 , 168 N.W.2d 389 (1969). *41 This foreseeability exception to the general publication rule was urged upon the trial court by plaintiff and the court concluded that such an exception should be the law in Colorado. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Kimelman v. City of Colorado Springsgreen1 sentence2003But see Kimelman, 775 P.2d at 53 (refusing to apply the personal contract exception to a funeral contract because both Hall and Fitzsimmons had required willful and wanton conduct in the context of funeral contracts). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Day v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2016Id. 2016Id. | 3 | 2016–2016 |
Cockrum v. State
green
1 sentence2026Aligning itself with the “consistent[] hold[ings]” of courts in other jurisdictions, the court determined that a custodian 41 has a duty to protect inmates from “reasonably foreseeable self- destructive acts.” Id. ¶ 89 While the foreseeability requirement gleaned in Cockrum arose in the prison context, courts addressing jail suicides have similarly required that the risk of self-inflicted harm or death be reasonably foreseeable to impose liability. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Lewis v. La Nier
green
2 sentences2012Indeed, existing case law establishes that a contractor's liability, after its work has been completed and accepted, is defined according to the foreseeability rule, at least in regard to construction, repair, installation, and performance pursuant to a construction contract. 46 The Colorado Supreme Court appears to have first addressed the question of the duty that a road construction contractor owes to third persons in Lewis v. La Nier, 84 Colo. 376 , 270 P. 656 (1928). 2012Indeed, existing case law establishes that a contractor's liability, after its work has been completed and accepted, is defined according to the foreseeability rule, at least in regard to construction, repair, installation, and performance pursuant to a construction contract. 46 The Colorado Supreme Court appears to have first addressed the question of the duty that a road construction contractor owes to third persons in Lewis v. La Nier, 84 Colo. 376 , 270 P. 656 (1928). | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Suneson v. Holloway Construction Co.
green
1 sentence2012For example, some courts hold that liability can exist for negli-genee without privity, and conclude that the completed and accepted rule is based on a privity-of-contract theory "that has become virtually extinet in American jurisprudence." See Sumeson, 992 S.W.2d at 84 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Trimble v. City and County of Denver
green
1 sentence2003In Trimble , we held that mental distress damages are available if they were foreseeable at the time of contracting and they were caused by the breach of a “personal” contract, which is a similar, though not identical, approach to that which I would adopt today. 697 P.2d at 731-32 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co.
green
2 sentences1988The trial court granted Coors’ motion for summary judgment because it found “nothing to indicate the defendant knew or should have foreseen the likelihood of publication by the plaintiff of the reasons for termination at the time it communicated those reasons to her.” The court of appeals affirmed on different grounds, rejecting the foreseeability exception and concluding that it was undisputed that there had been no unprivileged communication of the grounds of Churchey’s termination to anyone other than herself. 725 P.2d at 41 . 1988The trial court granted Coors' motion for summary judgment because it found "nothing to indicate the defendant knew or should have foreseen the likelihood of publication by the plaintiff of the reasons for termination at the time it communicated those reasons to her." The court of appeals affirmed on different grounds, rejecting the foreseeability exception and concluding that it was undisputed that there had been no unprivileged communication of the grounds of Churchey's termination to anyone other than herself. 725 P.2d at 41 . | 1 | 1988–1988 |
First State Bank of Corpus Christi v. Ake
green
1 sentence1986See, e.g., McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 110 Cal.App.3d 787 , 168 Cal.Rptr. 89 (1980); First State Bank v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696 (Tex.Civ.App.1980); Grist v. Upjohn Co., 16 Mich.App. 452 , 168 N.W.2d 389 (1969). *41 This foreseeability exception to the general publication rule was urged upon the trial court by plaintiff and the court concluded that such an exception should be the law in Colorado. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Grist v. Upjohn Company
green
2 sentences1986See, e.g., McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 110 Cal.App.3d 787 , 168 Cal.Rptr. 89 (1980); First State Bank v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696 (Tex.Civ.App.1980); Grist v. Upjohn Co., 16 Mich.App. 452 , 168 N.W.2d 389 (1969). *41 This foreseeability exception to the general publication rule was urged upon the trial court by plaintiff and the court concluded that such an exception should be the law in Colorado. 1986See, e.g., McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 110 Cal.App.3d 787 , 168 Cal.Rptr. 89 (1980); First State Bank v. Ake, 606 S.W.2d 696 (Tex.Civ.App.1980); Grist v. Upjohn Co., 16 Mich.App. 452 , 168 N.W.2d 389 (1969). *41 This foreseeability exception to the general publication rule was urged upon the trial court by plaintiff and the court concluded that such an exception should be the law in Colorado. | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.