foreseeability requirement in Connecticut

2002In support of its claim, CLP argues that the Scanlons' cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations, Section 52-584 of the General Statutes; that the Scanlons failed to prove facts sufficient to satisfy the foreseeability test set forth in Montinieri v. Southern New England CT Page 13075 Telephone Company , 175 Conn. 337 (1978); and that the decision in Montinieri , supra, should be "reversed and abandoned" because a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress should require pleading and proof that the emotional distress caused physical illness or bodily harm.

2002In support of its claim, CLP argues that the Scanlons' cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations, Section 52-584 of the General Statutes; that the Scanlons failed to prove facts sufficient to satisfy the foreseeability test set forth in Montinieri v. Southern New England CT Page 13075 Telephone Company , 175 Conn. 337 (1978); and that the decision in Montinieri , supra, should be "reversed and abandoned" because a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress should require pleading and proof that the emotional distress caused physical illness or bodily harm.

2019We explained that, in previous cases, we had "limited foreseeable victims of a health care provider's negligence to identifiable persons ...." Id., at 594 , 50 A.3d 802 ; see id., at 596 , 50 A.3d 802 ("the foreseeability test as applied by this court in the context of health care providers has ... required an identifiable victim because we have deemed the effect of a physician's conduct on third parties as too attenuated"); see also Jacoby v. Brinckerhoff , 250 Conn. 86 , 96-97, 735 A.2d 347 (1999) (psychiatrist owed no duty to patient's ex-spouse, who was not identifiable victim); Fraser v.

2019We explained that, in previous cases, we had "limited foreseeable victims of a health care provider's negligence to identifiable persons ...." Id., at 594 , 50 A.3d 802 ; see id., at 596 , 50 A.3d 802 ("the foreseeability test as applied by this court in the context of health care providers has ... required an identifiable victim because we have deemed the effect of a physician's conduct on third parties as too attenuated"); see also Jacoby v. Brinckerhoff , 250 Conn. 86 , 96-97, 735 A.2d 347 (1999) (psychiatrist owed no duty to patient's ex-spouse, who was not identifiable victim); Fraser v.

2015To the contrary, the majority concedes that determining the foreseeability of a plaintiff’s injuries involves a fact-sensitive inquiry; see footnote 10 of the majority opinion; and a survey of our case law reveals that we often have considered the manner in which a plaintiff’s injuries occurred to be highly relevant to the foreseeability inquiry.7 See, e.g., Lodge v. Arett Sales Corp., supra, 246 Conn. 577 (considering foreseeability of brake failure of negligently maintained fire engine that caused plaintiffs’ injuries or deaths in relation to defendants’ transmission of false fire alarm); Do

2015To the contrary, the majority concedes that determining the foreseeability of a plaintiff’s injuries involves a fact-sensitive inquiry; see footnote 10 of the majority opinion; and a survey of our case law reveals that we often have considered the manner in which a plaintiff’s injuries occurred to be highly relevant to the foreseeability inquiry.7 See, e.g., Lodge v. Arett Sales Corp., supra, 246 Conn. 577 (considering foreseeability of brake failure of negligently maintained fire engine that caused plaintiffs’ injuries or deaths in relation to defendants’ transmission of false fire alarm); Do

2015Stores, Inc., 234 Conn. 597 , 662 A.2d 753 (1995); Neal v. Shiels, Inc., supra, 166 Conn. 13 (considering foreseeability of chil- dren being struck by cars in context of defendant selling ice cream from truck parked on public streets); Merhi v. Becker, 164 Conn. 516, 522 , 325 A.2d 270 (1973) (defining harm of general nature as ‘‘harm to patrons from inade- quately deterred raucous, violent conduct’’); Smith v. Leuthner, 156 Conn. 422, 426 , 242 A.2d 728 (1968) (defining harm of general nature as ‘‘the theft of [a] car and injury to person or property from the operation of the car by the thief

2015Stores, Inc., 234 Conn. 597 , 662 A.2d 753 (1995); Neal v. Shiels, Inc., supra, 166 Conn. 13 (considering foreseeability of chil- dren being struck by cars in context of defendant selling ice cream from truck parked on public streets); Merhi v. Becker, 164 Conn. 516, 522 , 325 A.2d 270 (1973) (defining harm of general nature as ‘‘harm to patrons from inade- quately deterred raucous, violent conduct’’); Smith v. Leuthner, 156 Conn. 422, 426 , 242 A.2d 728 (1968) (defining harm of general nature as ‘‘the theft of [a] car and injury to person or property from the operation of the car by the thief

2015Stores, Inc., 234 Conn. 597 , 662 A.2d 753 (1995); Neal v. Shiels, Inc., supra, 166 Conn. 13 (considering foreseeability of chil- dren being struck by cars in context of defendant selling ice cream from truck parked on public streets); Merhi v. Becker, 164 Conn. 516, 522 , 325 A.2d 270 (1973) (defining harm of general nature as ‘‘harm to patrons from inade- quately deterred raucous, violent conduct’’); Smith v. Leuthner, 156 Conn. 422, 426 , 242 A.2d 728 (1968) (defining harm of general nature as ‘‘the theft of [a] car and injury to person or property from the operation of the car by the thief

2015Stores, Inc., 234 Conn. 597 , 662 A.2d 753 (1995); Neal v. Shiels, Inc., supra, 166 Conn. 13 (considering foreseeability of chil- dren being struck by cars in context of defendant selling ice cream from truck parked on public streets); Merhi v. Becker, 164 Conn. 516, 522 , 325 A.2d 270 (1973) (defining harm of general nature as ‘‘harm to patrons from inade- quately deterred raucous, violent conduct’’); Smith v. Leuthner, 156 Conn. 422, 426 , 242 A.2d 728 (1968) (defining harm of general nature as ‘‘the theft of [a] car and injury to person or property from the operation of the car by the thief

2015Stores, Inc., 234 Conn. 597 , 662 A.2d 753 (1995); Neal v. Shiels, Inc., supra, 166 Conn. 13 (considering foreseeability of chil- dren being struck by cars in context of defendant selling ice cream from truck parked on public streets); Merhi v. Becker, 164 Conn. 516, 522 , 325 A.2d 270 (1973) (defining harm of general nature as ‘‘harm to patrons from inade- quately deterred raucous, violent conduct’’); Smith v. Leuthner, 156 Conn. 422, 426 , 242 A.2d 728 (1968) (defining harm of general nature as ‘‘the theft of [a] car and injury to person or property from the operation of the car by the thief

2015Stores, Inc., 234 Conn. 597 , 662 A.2d 753 (1995); Neal v. Shiels, Inc., supra, 166 Conn. 13 (considering foreseeability of chil- dren being struck by cars in context of defendant selling ice cream from truck parked on public streets); Merhi v. Becker, 164 Conn. 516, 522 , 325 A.2d 270 (1973) (defining harm of general nature as ‘‘harm to patrons from inade- quately deterred raucous, violent conduct’’); Smith v. Leuthner, 156 Conn. 422, 426 , 242 A.2d 728 (1968) (defining harm of general nature as ‘‘the theft of [a] car and injury to person or property from the operation of the car by the thief

2012App. 625 (in negligence claim involving domestic animal, “[a]ll that the law requires to be shown ... is that the owner’s negligence be the proximate cause of the injury which could reasonably have been anticipated” [internal quotation marks omitted]); Diaz v. McMahon, supra, 112 N.M. 791 (“the foreseeability requirement of negligence actions necessitates some showing that defendants knew or should have known that harm could result”); Schwartz v. Erpf Estate, supra, 255 App. Div. 2d 39 (“[A] property owner has the right to use his property as he sees fit.

2010In order to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must plead that the actor should have foreseen that her behavior would likely cause harm of a specific nature, i.e., emotional distress likely to lead to illness or bodily harm.” (Citation omitted.) Olson v. Bristol-Burlington Health District, 87 Conn. App. 1, 5 , 863 A.2d 748 , cert. granted on other grounds, 273 Conn. 914 , 870 A.2d 1083 (2005) (appeal withdrawn May 25, 2005).

2010In order to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must plead that the actor should have foreseen that her behavior would likely cause harm of a specific nature, i.e., emotional distress likely to lead to illness or bodily harm.” (Citation omitted.) Olson v. Bristol-Burlington Health District, 87 Conn. App. 1, 5 , 863 A.2d 748 , cert. granted on other grounds, 273 Conn. 914 , 870 A.2d 1083 (2005) (appeal withdrawn May 25, 2005).

2010In order to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must plead that the actor should have foreseen that her behavior would likely cause harm of a specific nature, i.e., emotional distress likely to lead to illness or bodily harm.” (Citation omitted.) Olson v. Bristol-Burlington Health District, 87 Conn. App. 1, 5 , 863 A.2d 748 , cert. granted on other grounds, 273 Conn. 914 , 870 A.2d 1083 (2005) (appeal withdrawn May 25, 2005).

2010In order to state a claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must plead that the actor should have foreseen that her behavior would likely cause harm of a specific nature, i.e., emotional distress likely to lead to illness or bodily harm.” (Citation omitted.) Olson v. Bristol-Burlington Health District, 87 Conn. App. 1, 5 , 863 A.2d 748 , cert. granted on other grounds, 273 Conn. 914 , 870 A.2d 1083 (2005) (appeal withdrawn May 25, 2005).

2008Accordingly, the foreseeability test encapsulated in the Montinieri test essentially requires “that the fear or distress experienced by the plaintiffs be reasonable in light of the conduct of the defendants. . . . [I]f the fear were unreasonable in light of the defendants’ conduct, the defendants would not have recognized that their conduct could cause this distress and, therefore, they would not be liable.” Barrett v. Danbury Hospital, 232 Conn. 242, 261-62 , 654 A.2d 748 (1995).

2008Accordingly, the foreseeability test encapsulated in the Montinieri test essentially requires “that the fear or distress experienced by the plaintiffs be reasonable in light of the conduct of the defendants. . . . [I]f the fear were unreasonable in light of the defendants’ conduct, the defendants would not have recognized that their conduct could cause this distress and, therefore, they would not be liable.” Barrett v. Danbury Hospital, 232 Conn. 242, 261-62 , 654 A.2d 748 (1995).

2005Scanlon v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 258 Conn. 436, 446-47 , 782 A.2d 87 (2001).

2005Scanlon v. Connecticut Light & Power Co., 258 Conn. 436, 446-47 , 782 A.2d 87 (2001).

2002Our Supreme Court has held that a contractor owes a legal duty to a plaintiff-user if an ordinary person in that contractor's position knew or should have known that harm of the general nature sustained was likely to result (the foreseeability analysis test) and, as a matter of public policy, it is appropriate to extend the contractor's responsibility for his alleged negligent conduct to the particular consequences of that particular plaintiff (public policy test). 255 Conn. 245 .

2000The plaintiffs rely upon Clohessy v. Bachelor, 237 Conn. 31 , 675 A.2d 852 (1996), for their argument that bystander emotional distress is a recognized cause of action and that the foreseeability rule applies.

2000The plaintiffs rely upon Clohessy v. Bachelor, 237 Conn. 31 , 675 A.2d 852 (1996), for their argument that bystander emotional distress is a recognized cause of action and that the foreseeability rule applies.

1996Mariana Islands 1981)." (Emphasis added.) State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98 , 110 , 547 A.2d 10 (1988).

1996Mariana Islands 1981)." (Emphasis added.) State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98 , 110 , 547 A.2d 10 (1988).

1996Recognizing this artificiality, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Sinn v. Burd, 486 Pa. 146, 157 , 404 A.2d 642 (1979), concluded that the zone of danger requirement “creates the very evil that the test was designed to eliminate, i.e., arbitrariness,” and therefore abandoned it for the foreseeability rule. 10 In addition to noting the arbitrariness of the zone of danger rule, the Sinn court found a basic flaw in the rule: “[Ejxperience has taught us that the zone of danger requirement can be unnecessarily restrictive and prevent recovery in instances where there is no sound policy basis sup

1996Based on the doctrine of foreseeability, Clohessy held that there was a cause of action for bystander emotional distress in Connecticut, subject to four conditions. "`It is an established rule of law that a later decision overrules prior decisions which conflict with it, whether such prior decisions are mentioned and commented upon or not.' In re Lane, 58 Cal.2d 99 , 105 , 372 P.2d 897 , 22 Cal.Rptr. 857 (1962); see Soblen Construction Co. v. Government of the Territory of the Pacific Islands, 526 F. Sup. 135 , 142 (D.C.

1996Based on the doctrine of foreseeability, Clohessy held that there was a cause of action for bystander emotional distress in Connecticut, subject to four conditions. "`It is an established rule of law that a later decision overrules prior decisions which conflict with it, whether such prior decisions are mentioned and commented upon or not.' In re Lane, 58 Cal.2d 99 , 105 , 372 P.2d 897 , 22 Cal.Rptr. 857 (1962); see Soblen Construction Co. v. Government of the Territory of the Pacific Islands, 526 F. Sup. 135 , 142 (D.C.

1996See Beck v. Dept. of Transportation & Public Facilities, 837 P.2d 105, 110 (Alaska 1992) (retained liberal interpretation of Dillon guidelines and rejected restrictive approach taken by court in Thing regarding contemporaneous observation requirement); Dunphy v. Gregor, 136 N.J. 99, 106-108 , 642 A.2d 372 (1994) (noting that it previously narrowed Dillon, the court rejected “a departure from our accustomed application of the traditional principles of tort law” or adoption of “hastily-drawn ‘bright line’ distinction[s]”); Gain v. Carroll Mill Co., 114 Wash. 2d 254, 260-61 , 787 P.2d 553 (1990)

1996See Beck v. Dept. of Transportation & Public Facilities, 837 P.2d 105, 110 (Alaska 1992) (retained liberal interpretation of Dillon guidelines and rejected restrictive approach taken by court in Thing regarding contemporaneous observation requirement); Dunphy v. Gregor, 136 N.J. 99, 106-108 , 642 A.2d 372 (1994) (noting that it previously narrowed Dillon, the court rejected “a departure from our accustomed application of the traditional principles of tort law” or adoption of “hastily-drawn ‘bright line’ distinction[s]”); Gain v. Carroll Mill Co., 114 Wash. 2d 254, 260-61 , 787 P.2d 553 (1990)

1996See Beck v. Dept. of Transportation & Public Facilities, 837 P.2d 105, 110 (Alaska 1992) (retained liberal interpretation of Dillon guidelines and rejected restrictive approach taken by court in Thing regarding contemporaneous observation requirement); Dunphy v. Gregor, 136 N.J. 99, 106-108 , 642 A.2d 372 (1994) (noting that it previously narrowed Dillon, the court rejected “a departure from our accustomed application of the traditional principles of tort law” or adoption of “hastily-drawn ‘bright line’ distinction[s]”); Gain v. Carroll Mill Co., 114 Wash. 2d 254, 260-61 , 787 P.2d 553 (1990)

1996See Beck v. Dept. of Transportation & Public Facilities, 837 P.2d 105, 110 (Alaska 1992) (retained liberal interpretation of Dillon guidelines and rejected restrictive approach taken by court in Thing regarding contemporaneous observation requirement); Dunphy v. Gregor, 136 N.J. 99, 106-108 , 642 A.2d 372 (1994) (noting that it previously narrowed Dillon, the court rejected “a departure from our accustomed application of the traditional principles of tort law” or adoption of “hastily-drawn ‘bright line’ distinction[s]”); Gain v. Carroll Mill Co., 114 Wash. 2d 254, 260-61 , 787 P.2d 553 (1990)

1995Despite the dissent’s suggestion to the contrary, ordinarily we decide the case before us on the basis on which it was tried, briefed and argued; Centerbrook, Architects & Planners v. Laurel Nursing Services, Inc., 224 Conn. 580 , 590 n.5, 620 A.2d 127 (1993); rather than on abasis on which the plaintiffs did not rely and to which the defendants had no opportunity to respond.

1995Despite the dissent’s suggestion to the contrary, ordinarily we decide the case before us on the basis on which it was tried, briefed and argued; Centerbrook, Architects & Planners v. Laurel Nursing Services, Inc., 224 Conn. 580 , 590 n.5, 620 A.2d 127 (1993); rather than on abasis on which the plaintiffs did not rely and to which the defendants had no opportunity to respond.

1991In Buckman v. People Express, Inc., 205 Conn. 166, 173-74 , 530 A.2d 596 (1987), this court disregarded similar omissions because the appeal was not before the court pursuant to a motion to strike, the defendant had not objected to the court’s charge on those grounds and the defendant could not claim that it was not fairly apprised of the claim for emotional damages.

1991In Buckman v. People Express, Inc., 205 Conn. 166, 173-74 , 530 A.2d 596 (1987), this court disregarded similar omissions because the appeal was not before the court pursuant to a motion to strike, the defendant had not objected to the court’s charge on those grounds and the defendant could not claim that it was not fairly apprised of the claim for emotional damages.

1983It further found that the defendant’s contacts with the state of Connecticut did not comply with the foreseeability requirement of World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 , 100 S. Ct. 559 , 62 L.

1983It further found that the defendant’s contacts with the state of Connecticut did not comply with the foreseeability requirement of World-Wide Volkswagen Corporation v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 , 100 S. Ct. 559 , 62 L.