7 South Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1992–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gehrts v. Batteengreen2 sentences2019See Rowland , 2003 S.D. 20 , ¶ 8, 658 N.W.2d at 78 (quoting Gehrts , 2001 S.D. 10 , ¶ 9, 620 N.W.2d at 778 ). [¶17.] Ridley first points to evidence in the record that she believes shows that pit bull type dogs have inherently dangerous breed tendencies. 2019See Rowland, 2003 S.D. 20 , ¶ 8, 658 N.W.2d at 78 (quoting Gehrts, 2001 S.D. 10 , ¶ 9, 620 N.W.2d at 778 ). [¶17.] Ridley first points to evidence in the record that she believes shows that pit bull type dogs have inherently dangerous breed tendencies. | 2 | 2 |
Rowland v. Log Cabin, Inc.green2 sentences2019See Rowland , 2003 S.D. 20 , ¶ 8, 658 N.W.2d at 78 (quoting Gehrts , 2001 S.D. 10 , ¶ 9, 620 N.W.2d at 778 ). [¶17.] Ridley first points to evidence in the record that she believes shows that pit bull type dogs have inherently dangerous breed tendencies. 2019See Rowland, 2003 S.D. 20 , ¶ 8, 658 N.W.2d at 78 (quoting Gehrts, 2001 S.D. 10 , ¶ 9, 620 N.W.2d at 778 ). [¶17.] Ridley first points to evidence in the record that she believes shows that pit bull type dogs have inherently dangerous breed tendencies. | 2 | 2 |
Deuchar v. Foland Ranch, Inc.green2 sentences2008Francis Hosp., 126 P.3d 602, 607 (Okla.2005) (applying § 245, cmt. f). [¶ 24.] Therefore, given our precedent applying the foreseeability test and the commentary contained in the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 245, when considering the intentional use of force by an employee, the fact finder must first determine whether the use of force was wholly motivated by the agent's personal interests or whether the act had a dual purpose, "that is, to serve the master and to further personal interests." Deuchar, 410 N.W.2d at 181 . 2008Francis Hosp., 126 P.3d 602, 607 (Okla.2005) (applying § 245, cmt. f). [¶ 24.] Therefore, given our precedent applying the foreseeability test and the commentary contained in the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 245, when considering the intentional use of force by an employee, the fact finder must first determine whether the use of force was wholly motivated by the agent’s personal interests or whether the act had a dual purpose, “that is, to serve the master and to further personal interests.” Deuchar, 410 N.W.2d at 181 . | 1 | 1 |
Baker Ex Rel. Baker v. Saint Francis Hospitalgreen2 sentences2008Francis Hosp., 126 P.3d 602, 607 (Okla.2005) (applying § 245, cmt. f). [¶ 24.] Therefore, given our precedent applying the foreseeability test and the commentary contained in the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 245, when considering the intentional use of force by an employee, the fact finder must first determine whether the use of force was wholly motivated by the agent's personal interests or whether the act had a dual purpose, "that is, to serve the master and to further personal interests." Deuchar, 410 N.W.2d at 181 . 2008Francis Hosp., 126 P.3d 602, 607 (Okla.2005) (applying § 245, cmt. f). [¶ 24.] Therefore, given our precedent applying the foreseeability test and the commentary contained in the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 245, when considering the intentional use of force by an employee, the fact finder must first determine whether the use of force was wholly motivated by the agent’s personal interests or whether the act had a dual purpose, “that is, to serve the master and to further personal interests.” Deuchar, 410 N.W.2d at 181 . | 1 | 1 |
Musch v. H-D Cooperative, Inc.green2 sentences1992(Emphasis added.) Further, this court recently adopted the foreseeability requirement in Musch v. H-D Coop., Inc., 487 N.W.2d 623, 626 (S.D. 1992), which was obviously decided long after this case was tried. 1992(Emphasis added.) Further, this court recently adopted the foreseeability requirement in Musch v. H-D Coop., Inc., 487 N.W.2d 623, 626 (S.D.1992), which was obviously decided long after this case was tried. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Zerfas v. AMCO Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences2019To avoid subsuming the element of proximate causation into the foreseeability analysis incidental to duty, it is important to independently examine each foreseeability inquiry. [¶41.] Existence of a duty turns on "whether a 'relationship exists between the parties such that the law will impose upon the defendant a legal obligation of reasonable conduct for the benefit of the plaintiff.' " Zerfas , 2015 S.D. 99 , ¶ 10, 873 N.W.2d at 69 (quoting First Am. 2019To avoid subsuming the element of proximate causation into the foreseeability analysis incidental to duty, it is important to independently examine each foreseeability inquiry. [¶41.] Existence of a duty turns on “whether a ‘relationship exists between the parties such that the law will impose upon the defendant a legal obligation of reasonable conduct for the benefit of the plaintiff.’” Zerfas, 2015 S.D. 99 , ¶ 10, 873 N.W.2d at 69 (quoting First Am. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
Hass v. Wentzlaff
green
2 sentences2021Jurgens argues that the circuit court erred in applying the going and coming rule rather than attributing vicarious liability to the City and the PVFD based upon the foreseeability factors set forth in Hass, 2012 S.D. 50, ¶ 28 , 816 N.W.2d 96 , 104–05, taken from the Restatement (Second) of Agency. 11 Jurgens also relies upon the enterprise theory of vicarious liability to avoid the going and coming rule. 12 Tammen, on the other hand, urges this Court to 10. 2021Jurgens argues that the circuit court erred in applying the going and coming rule rather than attributing vicarious liability to the City and the PVFD based upon the foreseeability factors set forth in Hass, 2012 S.D. 50, ¶ 28 , 816 N.W.2d 96 , 104–05, taken from the Restatement (Second) of Agency. 11 Jurgens also relies upon the enterprise theory of vicarious liability to avoid the going and coming rule. 12 Tammen, on the other hand, urges this Court to 10. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Peterson v. Spink Electric Cooperative, Inc.
green
2 sentences2010"The foreseeability inquiry requires us to consider the circumstances and the knowledge [Prairie Market] possessed[.]" See id. [¶ 22.] The facts and circumstances of this case demonstrate that the risk of harm was foreseeable. 2010“The foreseeability inquiry requires us to consider the circumstances and the knowledge [Prairie Market] possessed[.]” See id. [¶ 22.] The facts and circumstances of this case demonstrate that the risk of harm was foreseeable. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Leafgreen v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co.
green
2 sentences2008In applying the foreseeability test, the Leafgreen court broadly considered four factors which suggested that the agent's conduct was unforeseeable: 1) No benefit ran to the principal, 2) The burglary was remote in time from the principal's involvement with the victims, 3) The opportunity to commit the act arose out of the agent's personal relationship with the victims, outside of the agent's employment, and 4) Imposing liability on employers in these circumstances would be "unfair." Leafgreen, 393 N.W.2d at 281 . [¶ 18.] The Restatement (Second) of Agency has also been used as a source of oth 2008In applying the foreseeability test, the Leaf-green court broadly considered four factors which suggested that the agent’s conduct was unforeseeable: 1) No benefit ran to the principal, 2) The burglary was remote in time from the principal’s involvement with the victims, 3) The opportunity to commit the act arose out of the agent’s personal relationship with the victims, outside of the agent’s employment, and 4) Imposing liability on employers in these circumstances would be “unfair.” Leafgreen, 393 N.W.2d at 281 . [¶ 18.] The Restatement (Second) of Agency has also been used as a source of ot | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Dillon v. Legg
green
2 sentences1999The three *441 factors considered in Dillon to determine foreseeability were: (1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant relationship. 69 Cal.Rptr. 72 , 441 P. 1999The three *441 factors considered in Dillon to determine foreseeability were: (1) Whether plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident as contrasted with one who was a distance away from it. (2) Whether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence. (3) Whether plaintiff and the victim were closely related, as contrasted with an absence of any relationship or the presence of only a distant relationship. 69 Cal.Rptr. 72 , 441 P. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.