foreseeability requirement in Washington

2010Schaler's statements, in light of the surrounding circumstances, do not constitute a true threat as a matter of law. [1] This court first adopted a foreseeability requirement for First Amendment true threat analysis in State v. Williams, 144 Wash.2d 197, 207-08 , 26 P.3d 890 (2001) and State v. J.M., 144 Wash.2d 472, 477-78 , 28 P.3d 720 (2001).

2010This court first adopted a foreseeability requirement for First Amendment true threat analysis in State v. Williams, 144 Wn.2d 197, 207-08 , 26 P.3d 890 (2001) and State v. J.M., 144 Wn.2d 472, 477-78 , 28 P.3d 720 (2001).

2010After Williams and J.M., the United States Supreme Court decided Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 , 123 S. Ct. 1536 , 155 L.

2010After Williams and J.M., the United States Supreme Court decided Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 , 123 S. Ct. 1536 , 155 L.

2010Schaler's statements, in light of the surrounding circumstances, do not constitute a true threat as a matter of law. [1] This court first adopted a foreseeability requirement for First Amendment true threat analysis in State v. Williams, 144 Wash.2d 197, 207-08 , 26 P.3d 890 (2001) and State v. J.M., 144 Wash.2d 472, 477-78 , 28 P.3d 720 (2001).

2010This court first adopted a foreseeability requirement for First Amendment true threat analysis in State v. Williams, 144 Wn.2d 197, 207-08 , 26 P.3d 890 (2001) and State v. J.M., 144 Wn.2d 472, 477-78 , 28 P.3d 720 (2001).

2010Schaler's statements, in light of the surrounding circumstances, do not constitute a true threat as a matter of law. [1] This court first adopted a foreseeability requirement for First Amendment true threat analysis in State v. Williams, 144 Wash.2d 197, 207-08 , 26 P.3d 890 (2001) and State v. J.M., 144 Wash.2d 472, 477-78 , 28 P.3d 720 (2001).

2010This court first adopted a foreseeability requirement for First Amendment true threat analysis in State v. Williams, 144 Wn.2d 197, 207-08 , 26 P.3d 890 (2001) and State v. J.M., 144 Wn.2d 472, 477-78 , 28 P.3d 720 (2001).

2010Schaler's statements, in light of the surrounding circumstances, do not constitute a true threat as a matter of law. [1] This court first adopted a foreseeability requirement for First Amendment true threat analysis in State v. Williams, 144 Wash.2d 197, 207-08 , 26 P.3d 890 (2001) and State v. J.M., 144 Wash.2d 472, 477-78 , 28 P.3d 720 (2001).

2010This court first adopted a foreseeability requirement for First Amendment true threat analysis in State v. Williams, 144 Wn.2d 197, 207-08 , 26 P.3d 890 (2001) and State v. J.M., 144 Wn.2d 472, 477-78 , 28 P.3d 720 (2001).

1999NOTES [1] Enstone's counsel conceded at the trial court that "there [was] clearly a causal connection between the injuries suffered by Ms. Janes and [his] conduct." Supplemental Br. of Pet'r, App. A at 4. [2] Enstone fails to note that there is case law from the Court of Appeals which makes no mention of a foreseeability requirement, and holds that a court may order restitution as long as it is "`causally connected' to the crime [that the defendant] was convicted of." State v. Vinyard, 50 Wash.App. 888, 893 , 751 P.2d 339 (1988). [3] The Court of Appeals attempted to reconcile these cases with

1999Enstone fails to note that there is case law from the Court of Appeals which makes no mention of a foreseeability requirement, and holds that a court may order restitution as long as it is “ ‘causally connected’ to the crime [that the defendant] was convicted of.” State v. Vinyard, 50 Wn.

1998As one court stated: “ ‘It would surely be an unreasonable burden on all human activity if a defendant who has endangered one person were to be compelled to pay for the lacerated feelings of every other person disturbed by reason of it. . . ” Gain, 114 Wn.2d at 260 (quoting Budavari v. Barry, 176 Cal. App. 3d 849, 855 , 222 Cal. Rptr. 446 (1986) (quoting Scherr v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 168 Cal. App. 3d 908 , 214 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1985))). 1 Although Gain recognized that specific limitations must be placed on the foreseeability standard, the court did not embrace Cunningham’s rule that a claimant

1998As one court stated: “ ‘It would surely be an unreasonable burden on all human activity if a defendant who has endangered one person were to be compelled to pay for the lacerated feelings of every other person disturbed by reason of it. . . ” Gain, 114 Wn.2d at 260 (quoting Budavari v. Barry, 176 Cal. App. 3d 849, 855 , 222 Cal. Rptr. 446 (1986) (quoting Scherr v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 168 Cal. App. 3d 908 , 214 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1985))). 1 Although Gain recognized that specific limitations must be placed on the foreseeability standard, the court did not embrace Cunningham’s rule that a claimant

1998As one court stated: “ ‘It would surely be an unreasonable burden on all human activity if a defendant who has endangered one person were to be compelled to pay for the lacerated feelings of every other person disturbed by reason of it. . . ” Gain, 114 Wn.2d at 260 (quoting Budavari v. Barry, 176 Cal. App. 3d 849, 855 , 222 Cal. Rptr. 446 (1986) (quoting Scherr v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 168 Cal. App. 3d 908 , 214 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1985))). 1 Although Gain recognized that specific limitations must be placed on the foreseeability standard, the court did not embrace Cunningham’s rule that a claimant

1998As one court stated: “ ‘It would surely be an unreasonable burden on all human activity if a defendant who has endangered one person were to be compelled to pay for the lacerated feelings of every other person disturbed by reason of it. . . ” Gain, 114 Wn.2d at 260 (quoting Budavari v. Barry, 176 Cal. App. 3d 849, 855 , 222 Cal. Rptr. 446 (1986) (quoting Scherr v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 168 Cal. App. 3d 908 , 214 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1985))). 1 Although Gain recognized that specific limitations must be placed on the foreseeability standard, the court did not embrace Cunningham’s rule that a claimant

1998As one court stated: “ ‘It would surely be an unreasonable burden on all human activity if a defendant who has endangered one person were to be compelled to pay for the lacerated feelings of every other person disturbed by reason of it. . . ” Gain, 114 Wn.2d at 260 (quoting Budavari v. Barry, 176 Cal. App. 3d 849, 855 , 222 Cal. Rptr. 446 (1986) (quoting Scherr v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 168 Cal. App. 3d 908 , 214 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1985))). 1 Although Gain recognized that specific limitations must be placed on the foreseeability standard, the court did not embrace Cunningham’s rule that a claimant

1998As one court stated: "`It would surely be an unreasonable burden on all human activity if a defendant who has endangered one person were to be compelled to pay for the lacerated feelings of every other person disturbed by reason of it....'" Gain, 114 Wash.2d at 260 , 787 P.2d 553 (quoting Budavari v. Barry, 176 Cal.App.3d 849, 855 , 222 Cal.Rptr. 446 (1986) (quoting Scherr v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 168 Cal.App.3d 908 , 214 Cal.Rptr. 393 (1985))). [1] Although Gain recognized that specific limitations must be placed on the foreseeability standard, the court did not embrace Cunningham `s rule that

2025The court thus did not conduct a foreseeability analysis based on the school’s duty to protect Kok from a general field of danger while acting as a parental substitute. 13 See McLeod, 42 Wn.2d at 319-22 ; Meyers, 197 Wn.2d at 288-89.

2024App. 123 , 130 n.12, 340 P.3d 915 (2014), aff’d, 186 Wn.2d 1 , 375 P.3d 636 (2016), we consider the following questions properly before us: (1) Did the Asphys present sufficient evidence to support a duty of care by the State where there was no direct evidence of dependency, and (2) Did the Asphys’ evidence meet the foreseeability requirement?

2024App. 123 , 130 n.12, 340 P.3d 915 (2014), aff’d, 186 Wn.2d 1 , 375 P.3d 636 (2016), we consider the following questions properly before us: (1) Did the Asphys present sufficient evidence to support a duty of care by the State where there was no direct evidence of dependency, and (2) Did the Asphys’ evidence meet the foreseeability requirement?

2021Restraint 14 Johnson (Darcy L.) v. Liquor & Cannabis Bd. (No. 98726-2) of Domingo, 155 Wn.2d 356, 366 , 119 P.3d 816 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Malted Mousse, Inc. v. Steinmetz, 150 Wn.2d 518, 531 , 79 P.3d 1154 (2003)).

2021Second, Mucsi invoked this rule again when issuing instructions as to what the trial court was to consider on remand: There must be evidence of actual or constructive notice or foreseeability, and a reasonable time to alleviate the situation. [Iwai, 129 Wn.2d at 94 .] Mucsi has presented sufficient evidence, and when all inferences are viewed most favorably to him, the case must be submitted to the jury.

2021Restraint 14 Johnson (Darcy L.) v. Liquor & Cannabis Bd. (No. 98726-2) of Domingo, 155 Wn.2d 356, 366 , 119 P.3d 816 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Malted Mousse, Inc. v. Steinmetz, 150 Wn.2d 518, 531 , 79 P.3d 1154 (2003)).

2021Restraint 14 Johnson (Darcy L.) v. Liquor & Cannabis Bd. (No. 98726-2) of Domingo, 155 Wn.2d 356, 366 , 119 P.3d 816 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Malted Mousse, Inc. v. Steinmetz, 150 Wn.2d 518, 531 , 79 P.3d 1154 (2003)).

2021Restraint 14 Johnson (Darcy L.) v. Liquor & Cannabis Bd. (No. 98726-2) of Domingo, 155 Wn.2d 356, 366 , 119 P.3d 816 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Malted Mousse, Inc. v. Steinmetz, 150 Wn.2d 518, 531 , 79 P.3d 1154 (2003)).

2021In Wiltse, “[t]he plaintiff . . . slipped and fell in water that came from a hole in the roof of the defendant[’s] . . . self-service grocery store.” 116 Wn.2d at 453 .

2019Construction Entities Snohomish argues that the trial court denied its motion to amend its answer as a sanction for late disclosure and asks this court to reverse because the trial court failed to conduct a §_u;rl_et test on the record and failed to consider whether lesser sanctions would have sufficed Burnet v. Spokane Ambulance, 131 Wn.2d 484, 494 , 933 P.2d 1036 (1997).

2019Construction Entities Snohomish argues that the trial court denied its motion to amend its answer as a sanction for late disclosure and asks this court to reverse because the trial court failed to conduct a §_u;rl_et test on the record and failed to consider whether lesser sanctions would have sufficed Burnet v. Spokane Ambulance, 131 Wn.2d 484, 494 , 933 P.2d 1036 (1997).

2019App 816, 819, 975 P.2d 518 (1999).

2018Washburn, 178 Wash.2d at 747 , 310 P.3d 1275 (quoting Crossen, 100 Wash.2d at 359 , 669 P.2d 1244 ). ¶ 29 This corollary rule cannot help Hendrickson because she never asked for a foreseeability instruction other than the erroneous Proposed Instruction No. 7.

2018Washburn, 178 Wash.2d at 747 , 310 P.3d 1275 (quoting Crossen, 100 Wash.2d at 359 , 669 P.2d 1244 ). ¶ 29 This corollary rule cannot help Hendrickson because she never asked for a foreseeability instruction other than the erroneous Proposed Instruction No. 7.

2018Washburn, 178 Wash.2d at 747 , 310 P.3d 1275 (quoting Crossen, 100 Wash.2d at 359 , 669 P.2d 1244 ). ¶ 29 This corollary rule cannot help Hendrickson because she never asked for a foreseeability instruction other than the erroneous Proposed Instruction No. 7.

2018Washburn, 178 Wash.2d at 747 , 310 P.3d 1275 (quoting Crossen, 100 Wash.2d at 359 , 669 P.2d 1244 ). ¶ 29 This corollary rule cannot help Hendrickson because she never asked for a foreseeability instruction other than the erroneous Proposed Instruction No. 7.

1999Whatever role foreseeability may play in the latter cases, it plays no role in deciding whether defendants should pay for the physical injuries to their victims." Enstone, 89 Wash. App. at 885 , 951 P.2d 309 .

1999Whatever role foreseeability may play in the latter cases, it plays no role in deciding whether defendants should pay for the physical injuries to their victims." Enstone, 89 Wash. App. at 885 , 951 P.2d 309 .