22 Kansas opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Overstreetgreen2 sentences2024Yet by giving the foreseeability instruction, the district court diminished the State's burden because it indicated to the jurors that they "need not find that Overstreet possessed the specific intent of premeditation if it found that premeditated murder was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of aggravated assault," and "the fact that it may be foreseeable that someone 13 may die as a result of a particular course of action does not give rise to the conclusion that the cause of death was premeditated." 288 Kan. at 11-12 . 2017We "ultimately held in Engelhardt that although it was error for the district court to give the foreseeability instruction contained in PIK Crim. 3d 54.06, the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence against the defendant." Overstreet, 288 Kan. at 11 (citing Engelhardt, 280 Kan. at 133-34 ). 12 In Overstreet, we clearly elucidated this principle: "Our decision in Engelhardt controls our resolution in this case. | 2 | 4 |
State v. Giddingsgreen2 sentences2004The court went on to hold that since the evidence showed the defendant was more than an innocent bystander, i.e., was a possible aider and abettor, “the court did not err in refusing to give the foreseeability instruction requested by appellant.” 226 Kan. at 113 . 1999See State v. Giddings, 226 Kan. 110, 112 , 595 P.2d 1115 *894 (1979) (Robbery is a crime inherently dangerous to human life; thus, the foreseeability requirement of felony murder is satisfied.). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Gleasongreen2 sentences2021In support of this statement, we cited to Gleason, in which we held that "the foreseeability requirement is established as a matter of law . . . for a murder conviction based upon aiding and abetting an inherently dangerous felony . . . ." 277 Kan. at 638 . 2020See State v. Gleason, 277 Kan. 624, 638 , 88 P.3d 218 (2004) ("[W]here the underlying felony is one inherently dangerous to human life, such as a burglary, the foreseeability requirement is established as a matter of law."). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Engelhardtgreen2 sentences2024This court agreed that the instruction negated the intent element of premeditated murder and was confusing because he was also charged with other counts such as kidnapping, criminal threat, and battery. 280 Kan. at 132-33 . 2017We "ultimately held in Engelhardt that although it was error for the district court to give the foreseeability instruction contained in PIK Crim. 3d 54.06, the error was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence against the defendant." Overstreet, 288 Kan. at 11 (citing Engelhardt, 280 Kan. at 133-34 ). 12 In Overstreet, we clearly elucidated this principle: "Our decision in Engelhardt controls our resolution in this case. | 1 | 2 |
Berry v. National Medical Services, Inc.green2 sentences2016Berry v. National Medical Services, Inc., 292 Kan. 917, 920-21 , 257 P.3d 287 (2011). 2016Berry v. National Medical Services, Inc., 292 Kan. 917, 920-21 , 257 P.3d 287 (2011). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cofieldgreen2 sentences2014See State v. Cofield, 288 Kan. 367, 373 , 203 P.3d 1261 (2009) (“reasonably foreseeable crimes” aiding and abetting instruction erroneous in that it allowed the jury to apply a foreseeability standard to support conviction requiring specific intent of premeditation); Overstreet, 288 Kan. at 13 (PIK Crim. 3d 54.06 “reasonably foreseeable crimes” instruction improper when defendant charged with attempted first-degree premeditated murder). 2014See State v. Cofield, 288 Kan. 367, 373 , 203 P.3d 1261 (2009) (“reasonably foreseeable crimes” aiding and abetting instruction erroneous in that it allowed the jury to apply a foreseeability standard to support conviction requiring specific intent of premeditation); Overstreet, 288 Kan. at 13 (PIK Crim. 3d 54.06 “reasonably foreseeable crimes” instruction improper when defendant charged with attempted first-degree premeditated murder). | 1 | 1 |
Willis v. Roche Biomedical Laboratories, Inc.green2 sentences2009The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, without undertaking a foreseeability analysis, relied on Smith-Kline Beecham in affirming the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Roche on Willis' negligence claim. 61 F.3d at 315-16. 2009The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, without undertaking a foreseeability analysis, relied on SmithKline Beecham in affirming the district court’s entiy of summary judgment in favor of Roche on Willis’ negligence claim. 61 F.3d at 315-16. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Davisgreen2 sentences2009K.S.A. 22-3414(3); see Bell, 280 Kan. at 365 (citing State v. Davis, 275 Kan. 107, 115 , 61 P.3d 701 [2003]). 2009K.S.A. 22-3414(3); see Bell, 280 Kan. at 365 (citing State v. Davis, 275 Kan. 107, 115 , 61 P.3d 701 [2003]). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bellgreen1 sentence2009K.S.A. 22-3414(3); see Bell, 280 Kan. at 365 (citing State v. Davis, 275 Kan. 107, 115 , 61 P.3d 701 [2003]). | 1 | 1 |
Wahwasuck v. Kansas Power & Light Co.green2 sentences2007See, e.g., Wahwasuck v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 250 Kan. 606, 610-12 , 828 P.2d 923 (1992); Cooper v. Eberly, 211 Kan. 657, 665 , 508 P.2d 943 (1973). 2007See, e.g., Wahwasuck v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 250 Kan. 606, 610-12 , 828 P.2d 923 (1992); Cooper v. Eberly, 211 Kan. 657, 665 , 508 P.2d 943 (1973). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Stephensgreen2 sentences2004See State v. Stephens, 266 Kan. 886, 893-94 , 975 P.2d 801 (1999). 2004See State v. Stephens, 266 Kan. 886, 893-94 , 975 P.2d 801 (1999). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Mitchellgreen2 sentences2003K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3436; see State v. Mitchell, 262 Kan. 687, 691 , 942 P.2d 1 (1997) (“Mitchell acknowledges that sale of cocaine is an inherently dangerous felony under K.S.A. 21-3436[a][14], and is therefore a sufficient underlying crime for felony murder.”). 2003K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3436; see State v. Mitchell, 262 Kan. 687, 691 , 942 P.2d 1 (1997) (“Mitchell acknowledges that sale of cocaine is an inherently dangerous felony under K.S.A. 21-3436[a][14], and is therefore a sufficient underlying crime for felony murder.”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Calhoun v. State
green
2 sentences2026Calhoun v. State, 56 Kan. 2024However, this Court finds that while Conwell's performance was deficient, there was not a real possibility that the jury would have returned a different verdict due to the lack of any emphasis on the issue of foreseeability and the evidence of premeditation that was presented." Lowery argues that this case is like Calhoun v. State, 56 Kan. | 2 | 2024–2026 |
Seibert v. Vic Regnier Builders, Inc.
green
2 sentences2005It quoted Seibert’s holding that an owner may be hable for the criminal acts of third parties in the business’ parking lot where “ ‘circumstances exist from which the owner could reasonably foresee that its customers have a risk of peril above and beyond the ordinary and that appropriate security measures should be taken,’ ” and adopted the test for determining the foreseeability requirement as “ ‘the totality of the circumstances rule.’ ” 261 Kan. at 1054 (quoting 253 Kan. 540 , Syl. ¶ 4; 253 Kan. at 548.) It further quoted: “ Tt is only where the frequency and severity of criminal conduct su 1997We went on to hold: “The test for determining the foreseeability requirement for injuries to customers by the criminal acts of third parties occurring in a business’ parking lot is determined to be the ‘totality of the circumstances’ rule as opposed to the more restrictive ‘prior similar incidents’ rule.” 253 Kan. 540 , Syl. ¶ 4. | 2 | 1997–2005 |
State v. Tully
green
2 sentences2024Cf. State v. Tully, 293 Kan. 176, 205-06 , 262 P.3d 314 (2011). 2024Cf. State v. Tully, 293 Kan. 176, 205-06 , 262 P.3d 314 (2011). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Gonzalez
green
1 sentence2024And recently in State v. Gonzalez, 311 Kan. 281 , 460 P.3d 348 (2020), the defendant was convicted of felony murder, attempted aggravated robbery, and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery after a passenger in a car he was driving shot and killed a man. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Hale v. Brown
green
2 sentences2016See Berry, 292 Kan. at 920 (applying foreseeability to duty analysis); Hale v. Brown, 287 Kan. 320, 322-23 , 197 P.3d 438 (2008) (applying foreseeability to proximate-cause analysis). 2016See Berry, 292 Kan. at 920 (applying foreseeability to duty analysis); Hale v. Brown, 287 Kan. 320, 322-23 , 197 P.3d 438 (2008) (applying foreseeability to proximate-cause analysis). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
South v. McCarter
green
2 sentences2010In South, our Supreme Court stated that "`[a]n injury is foreseeable so as to give rise to a duty of care where a defendant knows or reasonably should know that an action or the failure to act will likely result in harm. '" (Emphasis added.) 280 Kan. at 103-04 , 119 P.3d 1 (quoting Gragg, 261 Kan. at 1056 , 934 P.2d 121 ). 2010In South, our Supreme Court stated that "`[a]n injury is foreseeable so as to give rise to a duty of care where a defendant knows or reasonably should know that an action or the failure to act will likely result in harm. '" (Emphasis added.) 280 Kan. at 103-04 , 119 P.3d 1 (quoting Gragg, 261 Kan. at 1056 , 934 P.2d 121 ). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Gragg v. Wichita State University
green
2 sentences2010In South, our Supreme Court stated that "`[a]n injury is foreseeable so as to give rise to a duty of care where a defendant knows or reasonably should know that an action or the failure to act will likely result in harm. '" (Emphasis added.) 280 Kan. at 103-04 , 119 P.3d 1 (quoting Gragg, 261 Kan. at 1056 , 934 P.2d 121 ). 2010In South, our Supreme Court stated that "`[a]n injury is foreseeable so as to give rise to a duty of care where a defendant knows or reasonably should know that an action or the failure to act will likely result in harm. '" (Emphasis added.) 280 Kan. at 103-04 , 119 P.3d 1 (quoting Gragg, 261 Kan. at 1056 , 934 P.2d 121 ). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Cooper v. Eberly
green
2 sentences2007See, e.g., Wahwasuck v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 250 Kan. 606, 610-12 , 828 P.2d 923 (1992); Cooper v. Eberly, 211 Kan. 657, 665 , 508 P.2d 943 (1973). 2007See, e.g., Wahwasuck v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 250 Kan. 606, 610-12 , 828 P.2d 923 (1992); Cooper v. Eberly, 211 Kan. 657, 665 , 508 P.2d 943 (1973). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Chism
green
2 sentences2003The most recent of the cases cited by Beach, State v. Chism, 243 Kan. 484, 490 , 759 P.2d 105 (1988), held that “[w]here the underlying felony is one inherently dangerous to human life, the foreseeability requirement is established as *626 a matter of law.” Since Chism , the legislature has made the sale of methamphetamine an inherently dangerous felony. 2003The most recent of the cases cited by Beach, State v. Chism, 243 Kan. 484, 490 , 759 P.2d 105 (1988), held that “[w]here the underlying felony is one inherently dangerous to human life, the foreseeability requirement is established as *626 a matter of law.” Since Chism , the legislature has made the sale of methamphetamine an inherently dangerous felony. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Springston v. IML Freight, Inc.
green
1 sentence1995In Springston, a worker’s injuries resulted from a quarrel “over who had the right to drive a particular truck.” The parties disagreed over company policy concerning priority among drivers. 10 Kan. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
State v. Bey
green
2 sentences1979(See, State v. Bey, 217 Kan. 251 , 535 P.2d 881 ; State v. Turner, [ 193 Kan. 189 , 392 P.2d 863 ]; State v. Bundy, 147 Kan. 4 , 75 P.2d 236 .)” (pp. 382-384.) It is therefore readily apparent that in the case at bar where the evidence clearly established appellant was more than an innocent bystander being coerced by Clayton, the court did not err in refusing to give the foreseeability instruction requested by appellant. 1979(See, State v. Bey, 217 Kan. 251 , 535 P.2d 881 ; State v. Turner, [ 193 Kan. 189 , 392 P.2d 863 ]; State v. Bundy, 147 Kan. 4 , 75 P.2d 236 .)” (pp. 382-384.) It is therefore readily apparent that in the case at bar where the evidence clearly established appellant was more than an innocent bystander being coerced by Clayton, the court did not err in refusing to give the foreseeability instruction requested by appellant. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
State v. Bundy
neutral
2 sentences1979(See, State v. Bey, 217 Kan. 251 , 535 P.2d 881 ; State v. Turner, [ 193 Kan. 189 , 392 P.2d 863 ]; State v. Bundy, 147 Kan. 4 , 75 P.2d 236 .)” (pp. 382-384.) It is therefore readily apparent that in the case at bar where the evidence clearly established appellant was more than an innocent bystander being coerced by Clayton, the court did not err in refusing to give the foreseeability instruction requested by appellant. 1979(See, State v. Bey, 217 Kan. 251 , 535 P.2d 881 ; State v. Turner, [ 193 Kan. 189 , 392 P.2d 863 ]; State v. Bundy, 147 Kan. 4 , 75 P.2d 236 .)” (pp. 382-384.) It is therefore readily apparent that in the case at bar where the evidence clearly established appellant was more than an innocent bystander being coerced by Clayton, the court did not err in refusing to give the foreseeability instruction requested by appellant. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
State v. Turner
green
2 sentences1979(See, State v. Bey, 217 Kan. 251 , 535 P.2d 881 ; State v. Turner, [ 193 Kan. 189 , 392 P.2d 863 ]; State v. Bundy, 147 Kan. 4 , 75 P.2d 236 .)” (pp. 382-384.) It is therefore readily apparent that in the case at bar where the evidence clearly established appellant was more than an innocent bystander being coerced by Clayton, the court did not err in refusing to give the foreseeability instruction requested by appellant. 1979(See, State v. Bey, 217 Kan. 251 , 535 P.2d 881 ; State v. Turner, [ 193 Kan. 189 , 392 P.2d 863 ]; State v. Bundy, 147 Kan. 4 , 75 P.2d 236 .)” (pp. 382-384.) It is therefore readily apparent that in the case at bar where the evidence clearly established appellant was more than an innocent bystander being coerced by Clayton, the court did not err in refusing to give the foreseeability instruction requested by appellant. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.