foreseeability test in Maryland

2025The foreseeability requirement protects against the risk of incurring liability for “remote consequences[.]” Brown v. Dermer, 357 Md. 344, 358 (2000), overruled in part on other grounds by Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70 (2003), abrogated on other grounds by Ruffin Hotel Corp. of Md., Inc. v. Gasper, 418 Md. 594 (2011).

2025The foreseeability requirement protects against the risk of incurring liability for “remote consequences[.]” Brown v. Dermer, 357 Md. 344, 358 (2000), overruled in part on other grounds by Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70 (2003), abrogated on other grounds by Ruffin Hotel Corp. of Md., Inc. v. Gasper, 418 Md. 594 (2011).

2025The foreseeability requirement protects against the risk of incurring liability for “remote consequences[.]” Brown v. Dermer, 357 Md. 344, 358 (2000), overruled in part on other grounds by Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70 (2003), abrogated on other grounds by Ruffin Hotel Corp. of Md., Inc. v. Gasper, 418 Md. 594 (2011).

2025The foreseeability requirement protects against the risk of incurring liability for “remote consequences[.]” Brown v. Dermer, 357 Md. 344, 358 (2000), overruled in part on other grounds by Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 378 Md. 70 (2003), abrogated on other grounds by Ruffin Hotel Corp. of Md., Inc. v. Gasper, 418 Md. 594 (2011).

2019In dicta, the court stated that it would be "preferable" for the Ohio standard instructions to include a foreseeability instruction specific to a "reasonable medical professional." Id. at 933 .

2019In dicta, the court stated that it would be “preferable” for the Ohio standard instructions to include a foreseeability instruction specific to a “reasonable medical professional.” Id. at 933 .

2001The Court first noted that three standards of accountant liability have evolved: the privity standard, as first explained in Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170 , 174 N.E. 441 (1931); the foreseeability standard, as explained in Restatement (Second) Torts § 522; 11 and the “reasonably foresee *219 able” standard, adopted by New Jersey, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 12 Walpert, 361 Md. at 653-54 , 762 A.2d 582 .

2001The Court first noted that three standards of accountant liability have evolved: the privity standard, as first explained in Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170 , 174 N.E. 441 (1931); the foreseeability standard, as explained in Restatement (Second) Torts § 522; 11 and the “reasonably foresee *219 able” standard, adopted by New Jersey, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 12 Walpert, 361 Md. at 653-54 , 762 A.2d 582 .

2018See e.g., Kilmer v. Browning , 806 S.W.2d 75 , 83 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (from evidence of rusted venting pipes in "deplorable condition" jury could conclude that gas company employee who inspected a furnace and venting system did not conduct an adequate inspection or he would have seen how badly the pipes were rusted); Metropolitan Gas Repair v. Kulik , 621 P.2d 313 , 315 (Colo. 1980) (duty of gas service technician under contract to install a new circulation pump motor on boiler of heating system in plaintiff's home was not limited to mere installation of the motor, but extended to exercise of

2018See e.g., Kilmer v. Browning , 806 S.W.2d 75 , 83 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (from evidence of rusted venting pipes in "deplorable condition" jury could conclude that gas company employee who inspected a furnace and venting system did not conduct an adequate inspection or he would have seen how badly the pipes were rusted); Metropolitan Gas Repair v. Kulik , 621 P.2d 313 , 315 (Colo. 1980) (duty of gas service technician under contract to install a new circulation pump motor on boiler of heating system in plaintiff's home was not limited to mere installation of the motor, but extended to exercise of

2018After determining that computer software was not tangible personal property, we held that the foreseeability principle and related factors did not support a reasonable conclusion that a duty of care pertained "to the risk of harm to non-tangible personal property and economic loss consequential to injury to non-tangible personal property." Id. at 474 , 117 A.3d 52 . 9 Cases from other jurisdictions have held that a service technician's duty to its customer includes the exercise of reasonable care and skill in the performance of that service and that that duty may be breached by the failure to

2018After determining that computer software was not tangible personal property, we held that the foreseeability principle and related factors did not support a reasonable conclusion that a duty of care pertained "to the risk of harm to non-tangible personal property and economic loss consequential to injury to non-tangible personal property." Id. at 474 , 117 A.3d 52 . 9 Cases from other jurisdictions have held that a service technician's duty to its customer includes the exercise of reasonable care and skill in the performance of that service and that that duty may be breached by the failure to

2014Getting ahead of the agency, the ALJ in Taylor applied a foreseeability standard and concluded that “physical abuse had occurred because appellant had intentionally kicked the footstool and that under a foreseeability analysis that intent to kick the footstool was the equivalent of an intention to injure and thus met the ‘intent’ standard of the statute and regulation.” 384 Md. at 216 , 862 A.2d 1026 .

2014Getting ahead of the agency, the ALJ in Taylor applied a foreseeability standard and concluded that “physical abuse had occurred because appellant had intentionally kicked the footstool and that under a foreseeability analysis that intent to kick the footstool was the equivalent of an intention to injure and thus met the ‘intent’ standard of the statute and regulation.” 384 Md. at 216 , 862 A.2d 1026 .

2010In Gourdine, 405 Md. at 745-46 , 955 A.2d at 783 , quoting Patton, 381 Md. at 637 , 851 A.2d at 571 (citations omitted), we discussed the interrelationship of duty and foreseeability, of primary importance in instances of personal injury: Where the failure to exercise due care creates risks of personal injury, “the principal determinant of duty becomes foreseeability.” The foreseeability test “is simply intended to reflect current societal standards with respect to an acceptable nexus between the negligent acts and the ensuing harm.” In determining whether a duty exists, “it is important to co

2010In Gourdine, 405 Md. at 745-46 , 955 A.2d at 783 , quoting Patton, 381 Md. at 637 , 851 A.2d at 571 (citations omitted), we discussed the interrelationship of duty and foreseeability, of primary importance in instances of personal injury: Where the failure to exercise due care creates risks of personal injury, “the principal determinant of duty becomes foreseeability.” The foreseeability test “is simply intended to reflect current societal standards with respect to an acceptable nexus between the negligent acts and the ensuing harm.” In determining whether a duty exists, “it is important to co

2005“By the same token, a duty is readily found if it appears highly likely that the conduct in question should have brought about the harm.” B.N., 312 Md. at 142 , 538 A.2d 1175 .

2005“By the same token, a duty is readily found if it appears highly likely that the conduct in question should have brought about the harm.” B.N., 312 Md. at 142 , 538 A.2d 1175 .

2004Id. at 174 , 770 A.2d 1072 .

2004Id. at 174 , 770 A.2d 1072 .

2001The Court first noted that three standards of accountant liability have evolved: the privity standard, as first explained in Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170 , 174 N.E. 441 (1931); the foreseeability standard, as explained in Restatement (Second) Torts § 522; 11 and the “reasonably foresee *219 able” standard, adopted by New Jersey, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 12 Walpert, 361 Md. at 653-54 , 762 A.2d 582 .

2001The Court first noted that three standards of accountant liability have evolved: the privity standard, as first explained in Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170 , 174 N.E. 441 (1931); the foreseeability standard, as explained in Restatement (Second) Torts § 522; 11 and the “reasonably foresee *219 able” standard, adopted by New Jersey, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. 12 Walpert, 361 Md. at 653-54 , 762 A.2d 582 .

2001We note that this is substantially similar to the foreseeability test used in the misuse inquiry, see Simpson v. Standard Container Co., 72 Md.App. 199, 206 , 527 A.2d 1337 (1987), so that actions constituting misuse are necessarily a superseding cause of the injury.

2001We note that this is substantially similar to the foreseeability test used in the misuse inquiry, see Simpson v. Standard Container Co., 72 Md.App. 199, 206 , 527 A.2d 1337 (1987), so that actions constituting misuse are necessarily a superseding cause of the injury.

1995The Court reasoned that “the foreseeability requirement, coupled with the requirement of recklessness ... will prevent the possibility of harsh or unjust results in involuntary manslaughter cases.” Id.

1976The “enhanced risk” theory of Johnston and Braitman, supra, combined with a foreseeability requirement, is the solution offered by the Restatement of Torts (Second) § 448 (1965): “The act of a third person in committing an intentional tort or crime is a superseding cause of harm to another resulting therefrom, although the actor’s negligent conduct created a-situation which offered an opportunity to the third person to commit such a tort or crime, unless the actor at the time of his negligent conduct realized or should *173 have realized the likelihood that such a situation might be created, a

1975E.g., Segerman v. Jones, 256 Md. 109 , 259 A. 2d 794 (1969); Sacks v. Pleasant, 253 Md. 40 , 251 A. 2d 858 (1969); Farley v. Yerman, 231 Md. 444 , 190 A. 2d 773 (1963); Baltimore v. Terio, 147 Md. 330 , 128 A. 353 (1925).

1975E.g., Segerman v. Jones, 256 Md. 109 , 259 A. 2d 794 (1969); Sacks v. Pleasant, 253 Md. 40 , 251 A. 2d 858 (1969); Farley v. Yerman, 231 Md. 444 , 190 A. 2d 773 (1963); Baltimore v. Terio, 147 Md. 330 , 128 A. 353 (1925).

1975E.g., Segerman v. Jones, 256 Md. 109 , 259 A. 2d 794 (1969); Sacks v. Pleasant, 253 Md. 40 , 251 A. 2d 858 (1969); Farley v. Yerman, 231 Md. 444 , 190 A. 2d 773 (1963); Baltimore v. Terio, 147 Md. 330 , 128 A. 353 (1925).

1975E.g., Segerman v. Jones, 256 Md. 109 , 259 A. 2d 794 (1969); Sacks v. Pleasant, 253 Md. 40 , 251 A. 2d 858 (1969); Farley v. Yerman, 231 Md. 444 , 190 A. 2d 773 (1963); Baltimore v. Terio, 147 Md. 330 , 128 A. 353 (1925).