foreseeability requirement in Tennessee

2011As our Supreme Court stated in McClenahan v. Cooley, 806 S.W.2d 767 (Tenn. 1991), the foreseeability requirement: . . . is not so strict as to require the tortfeasor to foresee the exact manner in which the injury takes place, provided it is determined that the tortfeasor could foresee, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have foreseen, the general manner in which the injury or loss occurred. [citations omitted] “The fact that an accident may be freakish does not per se make it unpredictable or unforeseen.” City of Elizabethton v. Sluder, 534 S.W.2d 115, 117 (Tenn.1976).

2004As stated in Ray Carter, Inc. v. Edwards, 436 S.W.2d 864, 867 (Tenn. 1969), “an injury which could not have been foreseen nor reasonably anticipated as a probable result of an act or omission is not actionable, and such an act is either the remote cause or no cause of the injury.” As the Supreme Court stated in McClenahan, the foreseeability requirement is not so strict as to require the tortfeasor to foresee the exact manner in which the injury takes place, provided it is determined that the tortfeasor could foresee, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have foreseen, the ge

2025Id. at 775 (“The foreseeability requirement is not so strict as to require the tortfeasor to foresee the exact manner in which the injury takes place, provided it is determined that the tortfeasor could foresee, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have foreseen, the general manner in which the injury or loss occurred.”).

2020Systems, Inc., 104 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (citing McClenahan, 806 S.W.2d at 775 ) (“The foreseeability requirement is not so strict as to require the tortfeasor to foresee the exact manner in which the injury takes place, provided it is determined that the tortfeasor could foresee, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have foreseen, the general manner in which the injury or loss occurred.”).

2004As stated in Ray Carter, Inc. v. Edwards, 222 Tenn. 465 , 486 S.W.2d 864 , 867 (1969), “an injury which could not have been foreseen nor reasonably anticipated as a probable result of an act or omission is not actionable, and such an act is either the remote cause or no cause of the injury.” As the Supreme Court stated in MeClenahan, the foreseeability requirement is not so strict as to require the tortfea-sor to foresee the exact manner in which the injury takes place, provided it is determined that the tortfeasor could foresee, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have fore

2004As stated in Ray Carter, Inc. v. Edwards, 436 S.W.2d 864, 867 (Tenn. 1969), “an injury which could not have been foreseen nor reasonably anticipated as a probable result of an act or omission is not actionable, and such an act is either the remote cause or no cause of the injury.” As the Supreme Court stated in McClenahan, the foreseeability requirement is not so strict as to require the tortfeasor to foresee the exact manner in which the injury takes place, provided it is determined that the tortfeasor could foresee, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have foreseen, the ge

2007Roberts v. Robertson County Bd. of Ed., 692 S.W.2d 863, 871 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985); Wyatt v. Winnebago Industries, Inc., 566 S.W.2d 276, 280-81 (Tenn. Ct. App.1977).

2001“The foreseeability requirement is not so strict as to require the tortfeasor to foresee the exact manner in which the injury takes place, provided it is determined that the tortfeasor could foresee, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have foreseen, the general manner in which the injury or loss occurred.” McClenahan v. Cooley, 806 S.W.2d 767,775 (Tenn. 1991) (citing Roberts v. Robertson County Bd. of Ed., 692 S.W.2d 863, 871 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985); Wyatt v. Winnebago Industries, Inc., 566 S.W.2d 276, 280-81 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977)).

2007Roberts v. Robertson County Bd. of Ed., 692 S.W.2d 863, 871 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985); Wyatt v. Winnebago Industries, Inc., 566 S.W.2d 276, 280-81 (Tenn. Ct. App.1977).

2001“The foreseeability requirement is not so strict as to require the tortfeasor to foresee the exact manner in which the injury takes place, provided it is determined that the tortfeasor could foresee, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have foreseen, the general manner in which the injury or loss occurred.” McClenahan v. Cooley, 806 S.W.2d 767,775 (Tenn. 1991) (citing Roberts v. Robertson County Bd. of Ed., 692 S.W.2d 863, 871 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985); Wyatt v. Winnebago Industries, Inc., 566 S.W.2d 276, 280-81 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977)).

2020Systems, Inc., 104 S.W.3d 1, 12 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (citing McClenahan, 806 S.W.2d at 775 ) (“The foreseeability requirement is not so strict as to require the tortfeasor to foresee the exact manner in which the injury takes place, provided it is determined that the tortfeasor could foresee, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have foreseen, the general manner in which the injury or loss occurred.”).

2004Bara v. Clarksville Mem’l Health Sys., Inc., 104 S.W.3d 1, 11-12 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting McClenahan v. Cooley, 806 S.W.2d 767, 775 (Tenn. 1991)) (citations omitted).

2008Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728 , 69 Cal.Rptr. 72 , 441 P.2d 912, 921-24 (1968).

2008Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728 , 69 Cal.Rptr. 72 , 441 P.2d 912, 921-24 (1968).

2013Partnership, 937 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Tenn. 1996); and that, 2.

2006“It is sufficient that harm in the abstract could reasonably be foreseen.” Id.

2025Bd. of Educ., 358 S.W.3d 612, 619 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011) (quoting Mason ex rel.

2025In assessing foreseeability, “the foreseeability requirement is not so strict as to require the tortfeasor to foresee the exact manner in which the injury takes place, provided it is determined that the tortfeasor could foresee, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have foreseen, the general manner in which the injury or loss occurred.” Moore, 358 S.W.3d at 619 . - 13 - In surveying Tennessee cases regarding injuries in schools, precedents have repeatedly highlighted certain facts and circumstances that are significant in making an assessment as to foreseeability.

1999Div.1991) (stating that New York law does not recognize a defamation claim where the plaintiff voluntarily republished the alleged defamatory words); Doe v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 855 S.W.2d 248 (Tex.App.1993) ("While we are aware of non-Texas authority allowing ‘self-defamation’ claims under only a foreseeability test, the Texas Supreme Court has yet to adopt or approve such a broad cause of action.

1999App. Div. 1991) (stating that New York law does not recognize a defam ation claim where th e plaintiff volun tarily republishe d the allege d defam atory word s); Doe v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 855 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. App. 1993) (“While we are aware of non-Texas authority allowing ‘self-defamation’ claims under only a foreseeability test, the Texas Supreme Court has yet to adopt or approve such a broad cause of action.

2019Rathnow v. Knox Cnty., 209 S.W.3d 629, 633-34 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Ray Carter, Inc. v. Edwards, 222 Tenn. 465 , 436 S.W.2d 864, 867 (1969)).

2013Co., Ltd., 825 F.Supp.2d 632, 638 (D.Md.2011).

2013Co., Ltd., 825 F. Supp. 2d 632, 638 (D.

2008Co., 162 N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting)); see also Taco Bell, Inc. v. Lannon, 744 P.2d 43, 46 (Colo. 1987) (stating that “the question of whether a duty should be imposed in a particular case is essentially one of fairness under contemporary standards-whether reasonable persons would recognize a duty and agree that it exists”). 38 Oliver W endell Holmes justified the foreseeability requirement as follows: “The requirement of an act is the requirement that the defendant should have made a choice.

2008Co., 162 N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928) (Andrews, J., dissenting)); see also Taco Bell, Inc. v. Lannon, 744 P.2d 43, 46 (Colo. 1987) (stating that “the question of whether a duty should be imposed in a particular case is essentially one of fairness under contemporary standards-whether reasonable persons would recognize a duty and agree that it exists”). 38 Oliver W endell Holmes justified the foreseeability requirement as follows: “The requirement of an act is the requirement that the defendant should have made a choice.

2008Co., 183 Wis.2d 627 , 517 N.W.2d 432, 434 (1994); Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 199 (Wyo.1986). [30] The Supreme Court of California was the first court to consider what we refer to as the objective standards in the context of a foreseeability analysis.

2008Co., 183 Wis.2d 627 , 517 N.W.2d 432, 434 (1994); Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 199 (Wyo.1986). [30] The Supreme Court of California was the first court to consider what we refer to as the objective standards in the context of a foreseeability analysis.

2008Co., 183 Wis.2d 627 , 517 N.W.2d 432, 434 (1994); Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 199 (Wyo.1986). [30] The Supreme Court of California was the first court to consider what we refer to as the objective standards in the context of a foreseeability analysis.

1996See, e.g., Taylor v. Hocker, 57 Ill.Dec. at 114-15 , 428 N.E.2d at 664-65 (holding that previous crimes against property were insufficient to give rise to a duty to protect customers from personal assaults); Polomie v. Golub Corp., 640 N.Y.S.2d at 701 (“[TJhere is no requirement that the past experience relied on to establish foreseeability be of the same type of criminal conduct to which plaintiff was subjected....”); Jardel Co., Inc. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d at 525 (limiting the foreseeability standard to the same crime as the one complained of is unrealistic because “[s]o called ‘property crimes

1996See, e.g., Taylor v. Hocker, 57 Ill.Dec. at 114-15 , 428 N.E.2d at 664-65 (holding that previous crimes against property were insufficient to give rise to a duty to protect customers from personal assaults); Polomie v. Golub Corp., 640 N.Y.S.2d at 701 (“[TJhere is no requirement that the past experience relied on to establish foreseeability be of the same type of criminal conduct to which plaintiff was subjected....”); Jardel Co., Inc. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d at 525 (limiting the foreseeability standard to the same crime as the one complained of is unrealistic because “[s]o called ‘property crimes

1996See, e.g., Taylor v. Hocker, 57 Ill.Dec. at 114-15 , 428 N.E.2d at 664-65 (holding that previous crimes against property were insufficient to give rise to a duty to protect customers from personal assaults); Polomie v. Golub Corp., 640 N.Y.S.2d at 701 (“[TJhere is no requirement that the past experience relied on to establish foreseeability be of the same type of criminal conduct to which plaintiff was subjected....”); Jardel Co., Inc. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d at 525 (limiting the foreseeability standard to the same crime as the one complained of is unrealistic because “[s]o called ‘property crimes

1996See, e.g., Taylor v. Hocker, 57 Ill.Dec. at 114-15 , 428 N.E.2d at 664-65 (holding that previous crimes against property were insufficient to give rise to a duty to protect customers from personal assaults); Polomie v. Golub Corp., 640 N.Y.S.2d at 701 (“[TJhere is no requirement that the past experience relied on to establish foreseeability be of the same type of criminal conduct to which plaintiff was subjected....”); Jardel Co., Inc. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d at 525 (limiting the foreseeability standard to the same crime as the one complained of is unrealistic because “[s]o called ‘property crimes

1996The modern trend, however, does not deem foreseeability as necessarily dependent upon evidence of the same type of prior crimes occurring on or near defendant’s premises, Doud v. Las Vegas Hilton Corp., 864 P.2d at 799-800 , but requires “inquiry [into] the location, nature and extent of previous criminal activities and their similarity, proximity or other relationship to the crime in question.” Polomie v. Golub Corp., 640 N.Y.S.2d at 701 .

1996See, e.g., Taylor v. Hocker, 57 Ill.Dec. at 114-15 , 428 N.E.2d at 664-65 (holding that previous crimes against property were insufficient to give rise to a duty to protect customers from personal assaults); Polomie v. Golub Corp., 640 N.Y.S.2d at 701 (“[TJhere is no requirement that the past experience relied on to establish foreseeability be of the same type of criminal conduct to which plaintiff was subjected....”); Jardel Co., Inc. v. Hughes, 523 A.2d at 525 (limiting the foreseeability standard to the same crime as the one complained of is unrealistic because “[s]o called ‘property crimes