79 California opinions name it 4 courts 1960–2025 21 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by California courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
The Regents of the University of California v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2024(Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 613 .) The Regents court explained the foreseeability inquiry was not whether the particular student’s injury was reasonably foreseeable in light of the prior conduct of the specific student who injured her, but “whether a reasonable university could foresee that its negligent failure to control a potentially violent student, or to warn students who were foreseeable targets of his ire, could result in harm to one of those students.” (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 629 .) The court then considered examples of violent attacks at other universities and concluded, 2024The second 20 embraces the public policy concerns of moral blame, preventing future harm, burden, and insurance availability.” (Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 629 .) The foreseeability factors “are assessed based on information available during the time of the alleged negligence,” while the policy factors are forward-looking. | 2 | 11 |
Castaneda v. Olshergreen2 sentences2024“Given that ‘[f]oreseeability and the extent of the burden to the defendant are ordinarily’ considered the ‘crucial’ considerations in evaluating legal duty (Castaneda, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1213 ), it is unnecessary here to separately review the remaining Rowland factors. [Citation.]” (Williams, supra, 37 Cal.App.5th at p. 673 ; Kuciemba, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1025 [the policy factors serve to assess whether, despite the foreseeability factors weighing in favor of recognizing a duty of care, public policy requires a different result]; Hanouchian, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at pp. 113– 114.) 37 2021(Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 236; see Castaneda v. Olsher (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1205, 1222 ; Hanouchian v. Steele (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 99 , 109.) The heightened foreseeability standard does not apply in the circumstances here.8 8 The heightened foreseeability standard is somewhat related to the Rowland factor that considers the burden that recognizing a tort duty would impose on the defendant and the community. | 2 | 7 |
Kesner v. Superior Court of Alameda Countygreen2 sentences2025Co. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 49 , 57–58, [“it is settled that what is required to be foreseeable is the general character of the event or harm—e.g., being struck by a car while standing in a phone booth—not its precise nature or manner of occurrence”]; Kesner, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1146 [applying Bigbee and concluding employer defendants “would not need to know the ‘precise . . . manner’ that exposure [to asbestos] occurred” in order for it to be foreseeable that those working at an asbestos-affected areas could “leav[e] an area with airborne dust-based toxins and then com[e] into contact with member 2025Co. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 49 , 57–58, [“it is settled that what is required to be foreseeable is the general character of the event or harm—e.g., being struck by a car while standing in a phone booth—not its precise nature or manner of occurrence”]; Kesner, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1146 [applying Bigbee and concluding employer defendants “would not need to know the ‘precise . . . manner’ that exposure [to asbestos] occurred” in order for it to be foreseeable that those working at an asbestos-affected areas could “leav[e] an area with airborne dust-based toxins and then com[e] into contact with member | 2 | 6 |
Doe v. United States Youth Soccer Ass'ngreen2 sentences2021In Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill, supra, 36 Cal.4th 224 the Supreme Court stated that, “as a general matter, imposition of a high burden requires heightened foreseeability, but a minimal burden may be imposed upon a showing of a lesser degree of foreseeability.” (Id. at p. 243; see United States Youth Soccer, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 1131 .) The Supreme Court, however, did not incorporate the heightened foreseeability standard into its consideration of the Rowland factors in Brown, Regents, or Hart, all of which considered the scope of the duty to protect persons from a third party’s criminal 2021(See United States Youth Soccer, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1137-1138.) *** Neither the foreseeability factors nor the policy factors under Rowland support an exception to imposing a duty on the Archdiocese to act with reasonable care to prevent the sexual abuse of minors in its custody by priests or other adults over 33 whom the Archdiocese exercises some control. | 2 | 3 |
The People v. Edwardsgreen2 sentences2018However, it has long been the rule that reviewing courts excuse a failure to object when requiring the objection “ ‘would place an unreasonable burden on defendants to anticipate unforeseen changes in the law and encourage fruitless objections in other situations where defendants might hope that an established rule of evidence would be changed on appeal.’ ” (People v. De Santiago (1969) 71 Cal.2d 18, 23 , italics added (De Santiago), quoting People v. Kitchens (1956) 46 Cal.2d 260, 263 (Kitchens); accord People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1216 (Rangel); People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4t 2018However, it has long been the rule that reviewing courts excuse a failure to object when requiring the objection “ ‘would place an unreasonable burden on defendants to anticipate unforeseen changes in the law and encourage fruitless objections in other situations where defendants might hope that an established rule of evidence would be changed on appeal.’ ” (People v. De Santiago (1969) 71 Cal.2d 18, 23 , italics added (De Santiago), quoting People v. Kitchens (1956) 46 Cal.2d 260, 263 (Kitchens); accord People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1216 (Rangel); People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4t | 2 | 3 |
Coulter v. Superior Courtred2 sentences1984The holdings in Vesely, supra, 5 Cal.3d at page 165 , Bernhard, supra, 16 Cal.3d at page 325 , and Coulter, supra, 21 Cal.3d at pages 152-153, which likewise employed a foreseeability standard on which to base liability, were expressly abrogated. 1984The holdings in Vesely, supra, 5 Cal.3d at page 165 , Bernhard, supra, 16 Cal.3d at page 325 , and Coulter, supra, 21 Cal.3d at pages 152-153, which likewise employed a foreseeability standard on which to base liability, were expressly abrogated. | 2 | 3 |
T.H. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corporationgreen2 sentences2024(See T.H., supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 168 [distinguishing O’Neil based on brand-name drug manufacturer’s control over the content of the label].) 44 Accordingly, the foreseeability factors weigh against Gilead’s proposed expansive Rowland exception to the duty of reasonable care. ii. 2024(See T.H., supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 168 [distinguishing O’Neil based on brand-name drug manufacturer’s control over the content of the label].) 44 Accordingly, the foreseeability factors weigh against Gilead’s proposed expansive Rowland exception to the duty of reasonable care. ii. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Rangelgreen2 sentences2018However, it has long been the rule that reviewing courts excuse a failure to object when requiring the objection “ ‘would place an unreasonable burden on defendants to anticipate unforeseen changes in the law and encourage fruitless objections in other situations where defendants might hope that an established rule of evidence would be changed on appeal.’ ” (People v. De Santiago (1969) 71 Cal.2d 18, 23 , italics added (De Santiago), quoting People v. Kitchens (1956) 46 Cal.2d 260, 263 (Kitchens); accord People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1216 (Rangel); People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4t 2018However, it has long been the rule that reviewing courts excuse a failure to object when requiring the objection “ ‘would place an unreasonable burden on defendants to anticipate unforeseen changes in the law and encourage fruitless objections in other situations where defendants might hope that an established rule of evidence would be changed on appeal.’ ” (People v. De Santiago (1969) 71 Cal.2d 18, 23 , italics added (De Santiago), quoting People v. Kitchens (1956) 46 Cal.2d 260, 263 (Kitchens); accord People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1216 (Rangel); People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4t | 2 | 2 |
People v. Kitchensgreen2 sentences2018However, it has long been the rule that reviewing courts excuse a failure to object when requiring the objection “ ‘would place an unreasonable burden on defendants to anticipate unforeseen changes in the law and encourage fruitless objections in other situations where defendants might hope that an established rule of evidence would be changed on appeal.’ ” (People v. De Santiago (1969) 71 Cal.2d 18, 23 , italics added (De Santiago), quoting People v. Kitchens (1956) 46 Cal.2d 260, 263 (Kitchens); accord People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1216 (Rangel); People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4t 2018However, it has long been the rule that reviewing courts excuse a failure to object when requiring the objection “ ‘would place an unreasonable burden on defendants to anticipate unforeseen changes in the law and encourage fruitless objections in other situations where defendants might hope that an established rule of evidence would be changed on appeal.’ ” (People v. De Santiago (1969) 71 Cal.2d 18, 23 , italics added (De Santiago), quoting People v. Kitchens (1956) 46 Cal.2d 260, 263 (Kitchens); accord People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1216 (Rangel); People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4t | 2 | 2 |
Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co.green2 sentences2024Finally, Union Pacific argues the foreseeability factor “cuts two ways.” “For example,” it states, “at a speed of just 40 miles per hour, a vehicle will travel approximately 60 feet per second,” and, as a result, “obstructions located 40 feet or more from the highway’s edge easily could be in the errant vehicle’s path of travel.” Plaintiffs contend Union Pacific’s acknowledgement that the foreseeability factors “provide … weak support for the trial court’s duty ruling” is a concession that “the type of accident that occurred here … is foreseeable.” They further contend that Cabral, supra, is i 2024Finally, Union Pacific argues the foreseeability factor “cuts two ways.” “For example,” it states, “at a speed of just 40 miles per hour, a vehicle will travel approximately 60 feet per second,” and, as a result, “obstructions located 40 feet or more from the highway’s edge easily could be in the errant vehicle’s path of travel.” Plaintiffs contend Union Pacific’s acknowledgement that the foreseeability factors “provide … weak support for the trial court’s duty ruling” is a concession that “the type of accident that occurred here … is foreseeable.” They further contend that Cabral, supra, is i | 1 | 10 |
Rowland v. Christianred2 sentences2025The foreseeability factors include “the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury suffered.” ( Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 113.) In this case, Patient was under the care of physicians at the relevant times and those physicians had a duty to advise Patient about the dangers of driving. 2024Among other things, a constructive knowledge standard would be more susceptible to hindsight bias by the jury, and would therefore present more challenging policy issues than in a case in which no duty arises in the absence of proof that the manufacturer knew it had developed a safer and at least equally effective alternative. i. Foreseeability factors The first three Rowland factors are commonly referred to as the foreseeability factors: “the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, and the closeness of the connection between the def | 1 | 6 |
Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grillgreen2 sentences2025(Id. at pp. 1195–1196.) Specifically, the plaintiff argued the landlord had a duty to “keep the tenant garage brightly lit and clean, . . . hook up a previously installed security camera located over the elevator of the garage, and . . . require existing personnel to periodically walk through the garage.” (Id. at p. 1196.) But the court “questioned whether such other measures, in reality, would be significantly less burdensome than the hiring of guards (id. at pp. 1196–1197), and [thus] applied the heightened foreseeability test.” (Delgado, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 239 [summarizing and relying 2021In Delgado v. Trax Bar & Grill, supra, 36 Cal.4th 224 the Supreme Court stated that, “as a general matter, imposition of a high burden requires heightened foreseeability, but a minimal burden may be imposed upon a showing of a lesser degree of foreseeability.” (Id. at p. 243; see United States Youth Soccer, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 1131 .) The Supreme Court, however, did not incorporate the heightened foreseeability standard into its consideration of the Rowland factors in Brown, Regents, or Hart, all of which considered the scope of the duty to protect persons from a third party’s criminal | 1 | 3 |
Bigbee v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.green2 sentences2025Co. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 49 , 57–58, [“it is settled that what is required to be foreseeable is the general character of the event or harm—e.g., being struck by a car while standing in a phone booth—not its precise nature or manner of occurrence”]; Kesner, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1146 [applying Bigbee and concluding employer defendants “would not need to know the ‘precise . . . manner’ that exposure [to asbestos] occurred” in order for it to be foreseeable that those working at an asbestos-affected areas could “leav[e] an area with airborne dust-based toxins and then com[e] into contact with member 2010Co. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 49, 57 [ 192 Cal.Rptr. 857 , 665 P.2d 947 ]; Sturgeon v. Curnutt (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 301, 307 [ 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 498 ]; see Sakiyama, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 407 [the foreseeability requirement was met since “the party was ‘sufficiently likely to result in auto accidents’ which would injure both rave attendees and members of the general public”].) With criminal conduct, an “extraordinarily high degree of foreseeability” is necessary. | 1 | 3 |
Erlich v. Menezesgreen2 sentences2024Public policy factors “[F]oreseeability alone is not sufficient to create an independent tort duty. ‘ “ . . . [The] existence [of a duty] depends upon the foreseeability of the risk and a weighing of policy considerations for and against imposition of liability.” ’ ” (Erlich v. Menezes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 543, 552 .) “The overall policy of preventing future harm is ordinarily served, in tort law, by imposing the costs of negligent conduct upon those responsible. 2024Public policy factors “[F]oreseeability alone is not sufficient to create an independent tort duty. ‘ “ . . . [The] existence [of a duty] depends upon the foreseeability of the risk and a weighing of policy considerations for and against imposition of liability.” ’ ” (Erlich v. Menezes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 543, 552 .) “The overall policy of preventing future harm is ordinarily served, in tort law, by imposing the costs of negligent conduct upon those responsible. | 1 | 3 |
Parsons v. Crown Disposal Co.green2 sentences2024Rowland Policy Factors “Even if the foreseeability factors of Rowland … weigh in favor of recognizing a duty of care, the courts ‘must also consider whether public policy requires a different result.’ [Citations.] ‘A duty of care will not be held to exist even as to foreseeable injuries ... where the social utility of the activity concerned is so great, and avoidance of the injuries so burdensome to society, as to outweigh the compensatory and cost- internalization values of negligence liability.’ ” (Jabo v. YMCA of San Diego County (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 853, 885 .) “ ‘[S]ocial policy must at 2023“Even if the foreseeability factors of Rowland … weigh in favor of recognizing a duty of care, the courts ‘must also consider whether public policy requires a different result.’ [Citations.] ‘ “A duty of care will not be held to exist even as to foreseeable injuries ... where the social utility of the activity concerned is so great, and avoidance of the injuries so burdensome to society, as to outweigh the compensatory and cost-internalization values of negligence liability.” ’ ” (Jabo v. YMCA of San Diego County (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 853, 885 ; see also Parsons, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 476 [“ | 1 | 2 |
Vasilenko v. Grace Family Churchgreen2 sentences2023“In assessing duty, however, we do not merely count up the factors on either side.” (Vasilenko, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1092 .) Some factors may be so weighty as to tip the balance one way or the other. 2021(Regents, supra, 4 Cal.5th at p. 631 ; see Vasilenko v. Grace Family Church, supra, 3 Cal.5th at p. 1086 [the existence of a duty also depends on policy considerations for and against imposing liability].) “‘A duty of care will not be held to exist even as to foreseeable injuries . . . where the social utility of the activity concerned is so great, and avoidance of the injuries so burdensome to society, as to outweigh the compensatory and cost-internalization values of negligence liability.’” (Regents, at p. 631; accord, Vasilenko, at pp. 1086-1087.) Moral blame. | 1 | 2 |
Phillips v. TLC Plumbing, Inc.green2 sentences2019(See Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc . (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566 , 591, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 156 ["To prevail on his negligent hiring/retention claim, Lopez will be required to prove Campos was Watchtower's agent and Watchtower knew or had reason to believe Campos was likely to engage in sexual abuse."]; Phillips v. TLC Plumbing, Inc . (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1133 , 1139, 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 864 ["Negligence liability will be imposed on an employer if it 'knew or should have known that hiring the employee created a particular risk or hazard and that particular harm materialize 2019(See Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc . (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566 , 591, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 156 ["To prevail on his negligent hiring/retention claim, Lopez will be required to prove Campos was Watchtower's agent and Watchtower knew or had reason to believe Campos was likely to engage in sexual abuse."]; Phillips v. TLC Plumbing, Inc . (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1133 , 1139, 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 864 ["Negligence liability will be imposed on an employer if it 'knew or should have known that hiring the employee created a particular risk or hazard and that particular harm materialize | 1 | 2 |
Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc.green2 sentences2019(See Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc . (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566 , 591, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 156 ["To prevail on his negligent hiring/retention claim, Lopez will be required to prove Campos was Watchtower's agent and Watchtower knew or had reason to believe Campos was likely to engage in sexual abuse."]; Phillips v. TLC Plumbing, Inc . (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1133 , 1139, 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 864 ["Negligence liability will be imposed on an employer if it 'knew or should have known that hiring the employee created a particular risk or hazard and that particular harm materialize 2019(See Lopez v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc . (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 566 , 591, 201 Cal.Rptr.3d 156 ["To prevail on his negligent hiring/retention claim, Lopez will be required to prove Campos was Watchtower's agent and Watchtower knew or had reason to believe Campos was likely to engage in sexual abuse."]; Phillips v. TLC Plumbing, Inc . (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1133 , 1139, 91 Cal.Rptr.3d 864 ["Negligence liability will be imposed on an employer if it 'knew or should have known that hiring the employee created a particular risk or hazard and that particular harm materialize | 1 | 2 |
C.A. v. William S. Hart Union High School Districtgreen2 sentences2019(See C.A., supra , 53 Cal.4th at p. 869-870, 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 270 P.3d 699 ; CACI No. 426.) Evidence tending to prove either of these elements was relevant to her claim. 6 Here, the trial court appeared to conclude that the evidence related to touching was relevant to the foreseeability analysis, while any other evidence, even if sexual in nature and directed toward female students, was not. 2019(See C.A., supra , 53 Cal.4th at p. 869-870, 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 1 , 270 P.3d 699 ; CACI No. 426.) Evidence tending to prove either of these elements was relevant to her claim. 6 Here, the trial court appeared to conclude that the evidence related to touching was relevant to the foreseeability analysis, while any other evidence, even if sexual in nature and directed toward female students, was not. | 1 | 2 |
| Vesely v. Sagerred | 1 | 2 |
| Bernhard v. Harrah's Clubgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Bily v. Arthur Young & Co.green | 1 | 2 |
| Hergenrether v. Eastgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Romero v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Peterson v. San Francisco Community College Districtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Gallardogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bussard v. Minimed, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Merrill v. Navegar, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Salem v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sturgeon v. Curnuttgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sakiyama v. AMF Bowling Centers, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Isaacs v. Huntington Memorial Hospitalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Boydegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Kriventsov v. San Rafael Taxicabs, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Industrial Indemnity Co. v. Touche Ross & Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Childers v. Shasta Livestock Auction Yard, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Debbie Reynolds Professional Rehearsal Studios v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Akins v. County of Sonomagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pappert v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Blue Bell, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in California. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center
green
2 sentences2005As we explained in Delgado, plaintiff's expansive view of our heightened foreseeability doctrine "is facially inconsistent with our decisions in Ann M., supra, 6 Cal.4th 666 , 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 137 , 863 P.2d 207 , and its progeny, all of which, when articulating and applying the heightened foreseeability doctrine, expressly reaffirm the sliding-scale balancing formula articulated prior to and in our decision in Isaacs [ v. Huntington Memorial Hospital (1985)] 38 Cal.3d 112, 125 , 211 Cal.Rptr. 356 , 695 P.2d 653 , under which we have recognized that, as a general matter, imposition of a high bur 2005As we explained in Delgado, plaintiff's expansive view of our heightened foreseeability doctrine "is facially inconsistent with our decisions in Ann M., supra, 6 Cal.4th 666 , 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 137 , 863 P.2d 207 , and its progeny, all of which, when articulating and applying the heightened foreseeability doctrine, expressly reaffirm the sliding-scale balancing formula articulated prior to and in our decision in Isaacs [ v. Huntington Memorial Hospital (1985)] 38 Cal.3d 112, 125 , 211 Cal.Rptr. 356 , 695 P.2d 653 , under which we have recognized that, as a general matter, imposition of a high bur | 7 | 1999–2025 |
Dillon v. Legg
green
2 sentences2010Rather, applying the foreseeability test, the courts have held that the mere act of leaving a key in an automobile, although it may possibly raise a foreseeable risk that the car will be stolen, does not increase the risk of injury . . . ‘[because the owner] had no reason to believe that the thief would be an incompetent driver.’ [Citation.] In short, ‘each case must be considered on its own facts to determine whether the [situation] in toto justifies the conclusion that the foreseeable risk of harm imposed is unreasonable, and that the defendant owner or one in charge of a vehicle has a duty 1989(Id. at p. 1113.) Appellants asserted below, and claim on appeal, that the holding in Cohen , decided in 1964, is outdated; the proper analysis should be based *603 upon a foreseeability analysis as engaged in by the California Supreme Court in Dillon v. Legg (1968) 68 Cal.2d 728 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 72 , 441 P.2d 912 , 29 A.L.R.3d 1316 ]. | 4 | 1975–2010 |
Sharon P. v. Arman, Ltd.
green
2 sentences2013(See, e.g., Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center (1993) 6 Cal.4th 666 (Ann M.), disapproved on another ground in Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512 ; Sharon P., supra, 21 Cal.4th 1181 .) Balanced against this burden is the great unlikelihood that this incident could have been foreseen. 2005(Id., at pp. 1195-1199.) We questioned whether such other measures, in reality, would be significantly less burdensome than the hiring of guards (id., at pp. 1196-1197), and applied the heightened foreseeability test: “[A]bsent any prior similar incidents or other indications of a reasonably foreseeable risk of violent criminal assaults in that location,[ 19 ] we cannot conclude defendants were required to secure the area against such crime.” (Sharon P., at p. 1199.) 20 In summary, as explained in Ann M., supra, 6 Cal.4th 666 , and Sharon P., supra, 21 Cal.4th 1181, only when “heightened” fore | 3 | 2005–2013 |
Rodgers v. Kemper Construction Co.
green
2 sentences1995In this regard, Justice Kennard's analysis, like that of Justice Mosk, disregards settled law that vicarious liability is inappropriate unless the tortious actions arise from the conduct of the employer's enterprise or are engendered by events or conditions relating to the duties or tasks of employment. [18] At this juncture, we decline to adopt a bright line rule that all sexual harassment falls outside the scope of employment as a matter of law under all circumstances. [19] As in fact happened in this case, all three of Nelson's victims obtained substantial judgments against the County on th 1981While Rodgers establishes that the foreseeability test for respondeat superior is broader than that for negligence, the decision also limits liability to those torts which “may fairly be said to be characteristic” of the enterprise’s activities. ( 50 Cal.App.3d at p. 618 .) A quarrel among employees over the use of equipment at a construction site might fairly be considered characteristic of the construction industry. | 3 | 1981–1995 |
Westbrooks v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board & Greyhound Lines, Inc.
green
2 sentences2024Appeals Bd., supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at page 254 . 2024Appeals Bd., supra, 203 Cal.App.3d at page 254 . | 2 | 2024–2024 |
LaTourette v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board
green
2 sentences2024Any reasonable doubt as to whether the act is contemplated by the employment, in view of this state’s policy of liberal construction in favor of the employee, should be resolved in favor of the employee.” ’ ” ( LaTourette, supra, 17 Cal.4th. at pp. 651-652.) Another test for determining whether the activity can reasonably be expected to be incident to the employment away from home is by applying the foreseeability test used in respondeat superior law, as was done in the worker’s compensation case of Westbrooks v. Workers’ Comp. 2024Any reasonable doubt as to whether the act is contemplated by the employment, in view of this state’s policy of liberal construction in favor of the employee, should be resolved in favor of the employee.” ’ ” ( LaTourette, supra, 17 Cal.4th. at pp. 651-652.) Another test for determining whether the activity can reasonably be expected to be incident to the employment away from home is by applying the foreseeability test used in respondeat superior law, as was done in the worker’s compensation case of Westbrooks v. Workers’ Comp. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
Jabo v. Ymca of San Diego Cnty.
green
2 sentences2024Rowland Policy Factors “Even if the foreseeability factors of Rowland … weigh in favor of recognizing a duty of care, the courts ‘must also consider whether public policy requires a different result.’ [Citations.] ‘A duty of care will not be held to exist even as to foreseeable injuries ... where the social utility of the activity concerned is so great, and avoidance of the injuries so burdensome to society, as to outweigh the compensatory and cost- internalization values of negligence liability.’ ” (Jabo v. YMCA of San Diego County (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 853, 885 .) “ ‘[S]ocial policy must at 2023“Even if the foreseeability factors of Rowland … weigh in favor of recognizing a duty of care, the courts ‘must also consider whether public policy requires a different result.’ [Citations.] ‘ “A duty of care will not be held to exist even as to foreseeable injuries ... where the social utility of the activity concerned is so great, and avoidance of the injuries so burdensome to society, as to outweigh the compensatory and cost-internalization values of negligence liability.” ’ ” (Jabo v. YMCA of San Diego County (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 853, 885 ; see also Parsons, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 476 [“ | 2 | 2023–2024 |
People v. Guillen
green
2 sentences2022(Guillen, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 998 .) Moreover, the jurors could have reasonably deduced from Gonzalez’s statement that he wanted to avoid being caught with evidence of a robbery, not that he was surprised by Garcia’s taking. 2022(Guillen, supra, 227 Cal.App.4th at p. 998 .) Moreover, the jurors could have reasonably deduced from Gonzalez’s statement that he wanted to avoid being caught with evidence of a robbery, not that he was surprised by Garcia’s taking. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
Hinman v. Westinghouse Electric Co.
green
2 sentences2018California's risks-of-the-enterprise principle places responsibility for such foreseeable losses on the employer because the employer (compared to the plaintiff) " 'is better able to absorb them, and to distribute them, through prices, rates or liability insurance, to the public, and so to shift them to society, to the community at large.' " ( Hinman , supra , 2 Cal.3d at p. 959 , 88 Cal.Rptr. 188 , 471 P.2d 988 ; see State ex rel. 2018California's risks-of-the-enterprise principle places responsibility for such foreseeable losses on the employer because the employer (compared to the plaintiff) " 'is better able to absorb them, and to distribute them, through prices, rates or liability insurance, to the public, and so to shift them to society, to the community at large.' " ( Hinman , supra , 2 Cal.3d at p. 959 , 88 Cal.Rptr. 188 , 471 P.2d 988 ; see State ex rel. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. De Santiago
green
2 sentences2018However, it has long been the rule that reviewing courts excuse a failure to object when requiring the objection “ ‘would place an unreasonable burden on defendants to anticipate unforeseen changes in the law and encourage fruitless objections in other situations where defendants might hope that an established rule of evidence would be changed on appeal.’ ” (People v. De Santiago (1969) 71 Cal.2d 18, 23 , italics added (De Santiago), quoting People v. Kitchens (1956) 46 Cal.2d 260, 263 (Kitchens); accord People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1216 (Rangel); People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4t 2018However, it has long been the rule that reviewing courts excuse a failure to object when requiring the objection “ ‘would place an unreasonable burden on defendants to anticipate unforeseen changes in the law and encourage fruitless objections in other situations where defendants might hope that an established rule of evidence would be changed on appeal.’ ” (People v. De Santiago (1969) 71 Cal.2d 18, 23 , italics added (De Santiago), quoting People v. Kitchens (1956) 46 Cal.2d 260, 263 (Kitchens); accord People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1216 (Rangel); People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4t | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Verdugo v. Target Corp.
green
2 sentences2018Public Policy Even if the foreseeability factors of Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d 108 , 70 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 443 P.2d 561 weigh in favor of recognizing a duty of care, the courts "must also consider whether public policy requires a different result." ( Regents of University of California , supra , 4 Cal.5th 607 , 631 ; Kesner, supra , 1 Cal.5th at pp. 1149-1150, 210 Cal.Rptr.3d 283 , 384 P.3d 283 ; Cabral, supra , 51 Cal.4th at p. 781 , 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 313 , 248 P.3d 1170 [public policy factors include moral blame of defendant's conduct, policy to prevent future harm, extent of burden on defendant, c 2018Public Policy Even if the foreseeability factors of Rowland, supra, 69 Cal.2d 108 , 70 Cal.Rptr. 97 , 443 P.2d 561 weigh in favor of recognizing a duty of care, the courts "must also consider whether public policy requires a different result." ( Regents of University of California , supra , 4 Cal.5th 607 , 631 ; Kesner, supra , 1 Cal.5th at pp. 1149-1150, 210 Cal.Rptr.3d 283 , 384 P.3d 283 ; Cabral, supra , 51 Cal.4th at p. 781 , 122 Cal.Rptr.3d 313 , 248 P.3d 1170 [public policy factors include moral blame of defendant's conduct, policy to prevent future harm, extent of burden on defendant, c | 2 | 2018–2018 |
| Reid v. Google, Inc. green | 2 | 2013–2013 |
| People v. Honig green | 2 | 1998–1998 |
| People v. Cervantes green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| S. Cal. Gas Co. v. Superior Court of L. A. Cnty.(In Re S. Cal. Gas Leak Cases) green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Williams v. Fremont Corners, Inc. green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| Doe v. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. green | 1 | 2024–2024 |
| People v. Caldwell green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| Melton v. Boustred green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Bryant v. Glastetter green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Laabs v. Southern California Edison Co. green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| People v. Perez neutral | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. v. Department of Transportation green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Harris v. Johnson green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Webb v. Special Electric Co., Inc. green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Garcia v. Paramount Citrus Assn., Inc. green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| Johnston v. Fontana green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Taylor v. Centennial Bowl, Inc. green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Marois v. Royal Investigation & Patrol, Inc. green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| People v. Mickle green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Thing v. La Chusa green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Trapp v. Schuyler Construction green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Robison v. Six Flags Theme Parks Inc. green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Briggs v. Sterner green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| International Mortgage Co. v. John P. Butler Accountancy Corp. green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Citizens State Bank v. Timm, Schmidt & Co. green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.