foreseeability test in Illinois

2012The modern standard has been recognized by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 576 (1977), which states that "[t]he publication *1261 of a libel or slander is a legal cause of any special harm resulting from its repetition by a third person if, but only if, * * * (c) the repetition was reasonably to be expected." Jurisdictions that have adopted the foreseeability test include Massachusetts ( Murphy v. Boston Herald, Inc., 449 Mass.42, 865 N.E.2d 746, 763-64 (2007)), California ( Shively v. Bozanich, 31 Cal.4th 1230 , 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 576 , 80 P.3d 676, 683 (2003)), Alabama ( Barnette v. Wilson, 7

2012The modern standard has been recognized by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 576 (1977), which states that "[t]he publication *1261 of a libel or slander is a legal cause of any special harm resulting from its repetition by a third person if, but only if, * * * (c) the repetition was reasonably to be expected." Jurisdictions that have adopted the foreseeability test include Massachusetts ( Murphy v. Boston Herald, Inc., 449 Mass.42, 865 N.E.2d 746, 763-64 (2007)), California ( Shively v. Bozanich, 31 Cal.4th 1230 , 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 576 , 80 P.3d 676, 683 (2003)), Alabama ( Barnette v. Wilson, 7

2012The modern standard has been recognized by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 576 (1977), which states that “[t]he publication of a libel or slander is a legal cause of any special harm resulting from its repetition by a third person if, but only if, *** (c) the repetition was reasonably to be expected.” Jurisdictions that have adopted the foreseeability test include Massachusetts (Murphy v. Boston Herald, Inc., 865 N.E.2d 746, 763-64 (Mass. 2007)), California (Shively v. Bozanich, 80 P.3d 676, 683 (Cal. 2003)), Alabama (Barnette v. Wilson, 706 So. 2d 1164, 1166 (Ala. 1997)), Texas (Stephan v

2012The modern standard has been recognized by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 576 (1977), which states that "[t]he publication *1261 of a libel or slander is a legal cause of any special harm resulting from its repetition by a third person if, but only if, * * * (c) the repetition was reasonably to be expected." Jurisdictions that have adopted the foreseeability test include Massachusetts ( Murphy v. Boston Herald, Inc., 449 Mass.42, 865 N.E.2d 746, 763-64 (2007)), California ( Shively v. Bozanich, 31 Cal.4th 1230 , 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 576 , 80 P.3d 676, 683 (2003)), Alabama ( Barnette v. Wilson, 7

2012While there are jurisdictions that still adhere by the rule that there is no liability for unauthorized republication, such as New York (Geraci v. Probst, 938 N.E.2d 917 (N.Y. 2010)) and Missouri (Pulliam v. Bond, 406 S.W.2d 635, 643 (Mo. 1966)), that is now the minority view. ¶ 70 The older standard, under which there was no liability without authorization, was apparently based on the principle that a person who makes a defamatory statement should not be liable for its repetition by independent actors over whom the first publisher has no control, and the liability for any damages caused by th

2012While there are jurisdictions that still adhere by the rule that there is no liability for unauthorized republication, such as New York ( Geraci v. Probst, 15 N.Y.3d 336 , 912 N.Y.S.2d 484 , 938 N.E.2d 917 (2010)) and Missouri ( Pulliam v. Bond, 406 S.W.2d 635, 643 (Mo.1966)), that is now the minority view. ¶ 70 The older standard, under which there was no liability without authorization, was apparently based on the principle that a person who makes a defamatory statement should not be liable for its repetition by independent actors over whom the first publisher has no control, and the liabili

2012The modern standard has been recognized by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 576 (1977), which states that “[t]he publication of a libel or slander is a legal cause of any special harm resulting from its repetition by a third person if, but only if, *** (c) the repetition was reasonably to be expected.” Jurisdictions that have adopted the foreseeability test include Massachusetts (Murphy v. Boston Herald, Inc., 865 N.E.2d 746, 763-64 (Mass. 2007)), California (Shively v. Bozanich, 80 P.3d 676, 683 (Cal. 2003)), Alabama (Barnette v. Wilson, 706 So. 2d 1164, 1166 (Ala. 1997)), Texas (Stephan v

2012The modern standard has been recognized by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 576 (1977), which states that "[t]he publication *1261 of a libel or slander is a legal cause of any special harm resulting from its repetition by a third person if, but only if, * * * (c) the repetition was reasonably to be expected." Jurisdictions that have adopted the foreseeability test include Massachusetts ( Murphy v. Boston Herald, Inc., 449 Mass.42, 865 N.E.2d 746, 763-64 (2007)), California ( Shively v. Bozanich, 31 Cal.4th 1230 , 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 576 , 80 P.3d 676, 683 (2003)), Alabama ( Barnette v. Wilson, 7

2012The modern standard has been recognized by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 576 (1977), which states that “[t]he publication of a libel or slander is a legal cause of any special harm resulting from its repetition by a third person if, but only if, *** (c) the repetition was reasonably to be expected.” Jurisdictions that have adopted the foreseeability test include Massachusetts (Murphy v. Boston Herald, Inc., 865 N.E.2d 746, 763-64 (Mass. 2007)), California (Shively v. Bozanich, 80 P.3d 676, 683 (Cal. 2003)), Alabama (Barnette v. Wilson, 706 So. 2d 1164, 1166 (Ala. 1997)), Texas (Stephan v

2012The modern standard has been recognized by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 576 (1977), which states that "[t]he publication *1261 of a libel or slander is a legal cause of any special harm resulting from its repetition by a third person if, but only if, * * * (c) the repetition was reasonably to be expected." Jurisdictions that have adopted the foreseeability test include Massachusetts ( Murphy v. Boston Herald, Inc., 449 Mass.42, 865 N.E.2d 746, 763-64 (2007)), California ( Shively v. Bozanich, 31 Cal.4th 1230 , 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 576 , 80 P.3d 676, 683 (2003)), Alabama ( Barnette v. Wilson, 7

2012The modern standard has been recognized by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 576 (1977), which states that "[t]he publication *1261 of a libel or slander is a legal cause of any special harm resulting from its repetition by a third person if, but only if, * * * (c) the repetition was reasonably to be expected." Jurisdictions that have adopted the foreseeability test include Massachusetts ( Murphy v. Boston Herald, Inc., 449 Mass.42, 865 N.E.2d 746, 763-64 (2007)), California ( Shively v. Bozanich, 31 Cal.4th 1230 , 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 576 , 80 P.3d 676, 683 (2003)), Alabama ( Barnette v. Wilson, 7

2012The modern standard has been recognized by the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 576 (1977), which states that "[t]he publication *1261 of a libel or slander is a legal cause of any special harm resulting from its repetition by a third person if, but only if, * * * (c) the repetition was reasonably to be expected." Jurisdictions that have adopted the foreseeability test include Massachusetts ( Murphy v. Boston Herald, Inc., 449 Mass.42, 865 N.E.2d 746, 763-64 (2007)), California ( Shively v. Bozanich, 31 Cal.4th 1230 , 7 Cal.Rptr.3d 576 , 80 P.3d 676, 683 (2003)), Alabama ( Barnette v. Wilson, 7

2005In response to a similar vagueness challenge to the absence of a foreseeability requirement in the felony murder statute, our supreme court held that "when a felon's attempt to commit a forcible felony sets in motion a chain of events which were or should have been within his contemplation when the motion was initiated, he should be held responsible for any death which by direct and almost inevitable sequence results from the initial criminal act." People v. Lowery , 178 Ill. 2d 462, 467 (1997) (affirming the defendant's felony murder conviction as reasonably foreseeable where the intended vic

2005In response to a similar vagueness challenge to the absence of a foreseeability requirement in the felony murder statute, our supreme court held that “when a felon’s attempt to commit a forcible felony sets in motion a chain of events which were or should have been within his contemplation when the motion was initiated, he should be held responsible for any death which by direct and almost inevitable sequence results from the initial criminal act.” People v. Lowery, 178 Ill. 2d 462, 467 (1997) (affirming the defendant’s felony murder conviction as reasonably foreseeable where the intended vict

2005Under the proximate cause theory of criminal liability, "liability attaches 'for any death proximately resulting from the unlawful activity.' " People v. Dekens , 182 Ill. 2d 247, 249 (1998), quoting Lowery , 178 Ill. 2d at 465 .

2005Under the proximate cause theory of criminal liability, “liability attaches ‘for any death proximately resulting from the unlawful activity.’ ” People v. Dekens, 182 Ill. 2d 247, 249 (1998), quoting Lowery, 178 Ill. 2d at 465 .

1998Ignarski v. Norbut, 271 Ill.

1998Ignarski v. Norbut, 271 Ill.App.3d 522, 526 , 207 Ill.Dec. 829, 833 , 648 N.E.2d 285, 289 (1995) (foreseeability may be established through the avenue of the voluntary undertaking doctrine itself); but see Shea v. Preservation Chicago, Inc., 206 Ill.App.3d 657, 662-63 , 151 Ill.Dec. 749, 753 , 565 N.E.2d 20, 24 (1990) (declining to adopt plaintiff's suggestion of two separate and independent bases for potential landlord liability for third-party criminal attacks and concluding that "[t]he proper inquiry is to determine whether, on a case-by-case basis, a particular landlord has retained contro

2014See LaFever v. Kemlite Co., 185 Ill. 2d 380, 396 (1998) (“finding that a landowner may reasonably be expected in certain instances to predict that an invitee may suffer harm from an open and obvious danger is conclusive only of the possessor’s duty, and then only partially so, since foreseeability alone is not determinative of duty”); see also Rusch v. Leonard, 399 Ill.

2014See LaFever v. Kemlite Co., 185 Ill. 2d 380, 396 (1998) (“finding that a landowner may reasonably be expected in certain instances to predict that an invitee may suffer harm from an open and obvious danger is conclusive only of the possessor’s duty, and then only partially so, since foreseeability alone is not determinative of duty”); see also Rusch v. Leonard, 399 Ill.

1996Bentley v. Saunemin Township, 83 Ill.2d 10, 15 , 46 Ill.Dec. 129 , 413 N.E.2d 1242 (1980).

1996Bentley v. Saunemin Township, 83 Ill. 2d 10, 15 (1980).

1987"A foreseeability test, however, is not intended to bring within the scope of the defendant's liability every injury that might possibly occur." ( 57 Ill.2d 7, 12 ; see also Riordan v. International Armament Corp. (1985), 132 Ill.

1987“A foreseeability test, however, is not intended to bring within the scope of the defendant’s liability every injury that might possibly occur.” ( 57 Ill. 2d 7, 12 ; see also Riordan v. International Armament Corp. (1985), 132 Ill.

1982See also Yates v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 415 Ill. 16, 21-22 (1953)." 70 Ill.

1982App.2d 542 , 132 N.E.2d 692 .) The Marsh court described the foreseeability standard as follows: "The test of foreseeability in these circumstances appears to be an objective one, phrased in terms of a contingency `known to all sensible men as likely to follow' as a natural result of one's conduct. ( Hutton v. States Accident Insurance Co., 267 Ill. 267, 269 (1915).) It has also been phrased in the objective terms of a contingency which `any man with ordinary intelligence and prudence * * * could have reasonably foreseen.' Cory v. Woodmen Accident Co., 333 Ill. 175, 182 (1928).

1982(Hutton v. States Accident Insurance Co., 267 Ill. 267, 269 (1915).) It has also been phrased in the objective terms of a contingency which ‘any man with ordinary intelligence and prudence *** could have reasonably foreseen.’ Cory v. Woodmen Accident Co., 333 Ill. 175, 182 (1928).

1982App.2d 542 , 132 N.E.2d 692 .) The Marsh court described the foreseeability standard as follows: "The test of foreseeability in these circumstances appears to be an objective one, phrased in terms of a contingency `known to all sensible men as likely to follow' as a natural result of one's conduct. ( Hutton v. States Accident Insurance Co., 267 Ill. 267, 269 (1915).) It has also been phrased in the objective terms of a contingency which `any man with ordinary intelligence and prudence * * * could have reasonably foreseen.' Cory v. Woodmen Accident Co., 333 Ill. 175, 182 (1928).

1982(Hutton v. States Accident Insurance Co., 267 Ill. 267, 269 (1915).) It has also been phrased in the objective terms of a contingency which ‘any man with ordinary intelligence and prudence *** could have reasonably foreseen.’ Cory v. Woodmen Accident Co., 333 Ill. 175, 182 (1928).