foreseeability analysis in New Jersey

2022In considering the fairness and policy implications of imposing a duty, courts identify, weigh, and balance four factors: "the relationship of the parties, the nature of the attendant risk, the opportunity and ability to exercise care, and the public interest in the proposed solution." Ibid. (quoting Hopkins v. Fox & Lazo Realtors, 132 N.J. 426, 439 (1993)). "[W]hereas the foreseeability inquiry is rooted in the specific facts of a particular case, the fairness and policy inquiry focuses on the ability to derive from those facts a general rule that can 'sensibly, predictably, and fairly govern

2021The Court noted that, “where the nature of the risk or the extent of harm is difficult to ascertain, foreseeability may require that the defendant have a special reason to know that a particular plaintiff . . . would likely suffer a particular type of injury.” 155 N.J. at 338 .

2010That second consideration, that is, the manufacturer's expectation, was related to the Court's reliance on a foreseeability analysis, and remains entirely consistent with the traditional inquiry about whether defendant could reasonably anticipate being "haled into court." Id. at 475, 508 A. 2d 1127 .

2010That second consideration, that is, the manufacturer’s expectation, was related to the Court’s reliance on a foreseeability analysis, and remains entirely consistent with the traditional inquiry about whether defendant could reasonably anticipate being “haled into court.” Id. at 475, 508 A.2d 1127 .

2004Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324 , 461 A.2d 138 (1983), Professor Feinman states: Of the jurisdictions that have adopted the requirement that there be a relationship approaching privity, nearly all have done so by using the [test in Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 536 , 493 N.Y.S.2d 435 , 483 N.E.2d 110 , 118-19 (1985)] as an appropriate standard.

2004Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 93 N.J. 324 , 461 A.2d 138 (1983), Professor Feinman states: Of the jurisdictions that have adopted the requirement that there be a relationship approaching privity, nearly all have done so by using the [test in Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 65 N.Y.2d 536 , 493 N.Y.S.2d 435 , 483 N.E.2d 110 , 118-19 (1985)] as an appropriate standard.

1998Specifically, we held that it was foreseeable that an intoxicated minor might engage in “aggressive, combative, and often reckless behavior” as well as “damage property.” Id. at 303 , 551 A.2d 535 (quoting Alumni Ass’n v. Sullivan, 369 Pa.Super. 596 , 535 A.2d 1095, 1100-01 (1987)).

1998Specifically, we held that it was foreseeable that an intoxicated minor might engage in “aggressive, combative, and often reckless behavior” as well as “damage property.” Id. at 303 , 551 A.2d 535 (quoting Alumni Ass’n v. Sullivan, 369 Pa.Super. 596 , 535 A.2d 1095, 1100-01 (1987)).

1996App. 3d 657 , 151 Ill.Dec. 749 , 565 N.E. 2d 20 (1990) (rather than a rigid application of the prior incidents rule, the proper inquiry is to consider all relevant circumstances in order to determine whether a landlord has assumed the duty to protect the tenant from reasonably foreseeable criminal attacks); Jardel Co., Inc. v. Hughes, 523 A. 2d 518, 525 (Del. 1987) (Foreseeability standard is not limited to specific crimes; "[s]o called `property crimes,' such as shoplifting, may turn violent if a chase ensues and ... family quarrels may become violent with the risk that deadly weapons may be

1996App. 3d 657 , 151 Ill.Dec. 749 , 565 N.E. 2d 20 (1990) (rather than a rigid application of the prior incidents rule, the proper inquiry is to consider all relevant circumstances in order to determine whether a landlord has assumed the duty to protect the tenant from reasonably foreseeable criminal attacks); Jardel Co., Inc. v. Hughes, 523 A. 2d 518, 525 (Del. 1987) (Foreseeability standard is not limited to specific crimes; "[s]o called `property crimes,' such as shoplifting, may turn violent if a chase ensues and ... family quarrels may become violent with the risk that deadly weapons may be

1994In denying the mother’s right to recover in those circumstances, the court rejected the idea that foreseeability alone should determine liability, observing that Dillon provided virtually no limit on liability for nonphysical harm, id. 257 Cal.Rptr. at 877-78 , 771 P.2d at 826 , and that since Dillon , California courts had given little consideration to avoiding the limitless exposure to liability created by the foreseeability test.

1994In denying the mother’s right to recover in those circumstances, the court rejected the idea that foreseeability alone should determine liability, observing that Dillon provided virtually no limit on liability for nonphysical harm, id. 257 Cal.Rptr. at 877-78 , 771 P.2d at 826 , and that since Dillon , California courts had given little consideration to avoiding the limitless exposure to liability created by the foreseeability test.

1992Perini distinguishes Paris of Wayne, Inc. v. Richard A. Hajjar Agency, 174 N.J.Super. 310 , 416 A.2d 436 (App.Div.1980), certif. denied, 85 N.J. 454 , 427 A.2d 555 (1981).

1992Perini distinguishes Paris of Wayne, Inc. v. Richard A. Hajjar Agency, 174 N.J.Super. 310 , 416 A.2d 436 (App.Div.1980), certif. denied, 85 N.J. 454 , 427 A.2d 555 (1981).

1992Perini argues that this language suggests that the court was “articulatfing] a fundamental principle of disproportionality — allocation of risk.” Sands argues that there was no implicit disproportionality argument; that in Seaman the court simply made the usual foreseeability analysis and determined that an award of lost profits was too speculative because the purchaser had conveyed no information to the seller about its use of the steel plate for “any particular contract or work.” See id. at 472 , 400 A. 2d 90 .

1992Perini argues that this language suggests that the court was “articulatfing] a fundamental principle of disproportionality — allocation of risk.” Sands argues that there was no implicit disproportionality argument; that in Seaman the court simply made the usual foreseeability analysis and determined that an award of lost profits was too speculative because the purchaser had conveyed no information to the seller about its use of the steel plate for “any particular contract or work.” See id. at 472 , 400 A. 2d 90 .

1992Perini distinguishes Paris of Wayne, Inc. v. Richard A. Hajjar Agency, 174 N.J.Super. 310 , 416 A.2d 436 (App.Div.1980), certif. denied, 85 N.J. 454 , 427 A.2d 555 (1981).

1992Perini distinguishes Paris of Wayne, Inc. v. Richard A. Hajjar Agency, 174 N.J.Super. 310 , 416 A.2d 436 (App.Div.1980), certif. denied, 85 N.J. 454 , 427 A.2d 555 (1981).

1985See Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88 (1980); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728 , 69 Cal.Rptr. 72 , 441 P.2d 912 (1968) (abandoning zone of danger rule in favor of a foreseeability test to determine whether the plaintiff may recover for mental distress arising from physical harm to another).

1985See Portee v. Jaffee, 84 N.J. 88 (1980); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728 , 69 Cal.Rptr. 72 , 441 P.2d 912 (1968) (abandoning zone of danger rule in favor of a foreseeability test to determine whether the plaintiff may recover for mental distress arising from physical harm to another).

1985In this context, see, e.g., Portee v. Jaffee, supra, as well as in variant settings, see Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535 (1978), we have subordinated the threat of potential baseless claims to the right of an aggrieved individual to pursue a just and fair claim for redress attributable to the wrongdoing of another.