foreseeability test in Utah

2018Jeffs , 2012 UT 11 , ¶ 24, 275 P.3d 228 . "[F]oreseeability in [a] duty analysis is evaluated at a broad, categorical level." Id. ¶ 25.

2018Jeffs , 2012 UT 11 , ¶ 24, 275 P.3d 228 . "[F]oreseeability in [a] duty analysis is evaluated at a broad, categorical level." Id. ¶ 25.

2016First, as is usual in other fees qua damages cases,134 we required evidence showing that it was foreseeable that the insured party would incur attorney fees if the insurer breached.135 The second element, unique to cases where the fee sought is based solely on a contingency fee arrangement, required proof that the specific contingency fee arrangement entered into by the insured party was foreseeable.136 In both cases, we addressed each of these requirements and found them to both be satisfied.137 Accordingly, because the attorney fees were sought as consequential damages, and both the incurrin

2009NOTES [1] There is some discussion by the parties of the foreseeability requirement set forth in Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 2001 UT 89, ¶ 120 , 65 P.3d 1134 , rev'd on other grounds, 538 U.S. 408 , 123 S.Ct. 1513 , 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003).

2024By contrast, the supreme court held that for purposes of “a breach or 20220123-CA 22 2024 UT App 103 Richmond v. Bateman proximate cause argument,” the question would be whether, “in this specific case,” there was reason to think that the “drug interactions and psychological considerations at stake would lead a reasonable physician to take additional precautions because she could foresee that [the patient] might become violent or dangerous,” which the court saw as the “specific mechanism of injury” in that case.

2023Thus, when attorney fees are awarded as consequential damages—as opposed to pursuant to a statute or contract—the inquiry “is not whether the fee awards are reasonable, but whether they are foreseeable.” USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp, 2016 UT 20, ¶ 93 , 372 P.3d 629 . “[I]t is this foreseeability requirement that justifies an award based solely on a contingency fee.” Id.

2023Thus, when attorney fees are awarded as consequential damages—as opposed to pursuant to a statute or contract—the inquiry “is not whether the fee awards are reasonable, but whether they are foreseeable.” USA Power, LLC v. PacifiCorp, 2016 UT 20, ¶ 93 , 372 P.3d 629 . “[I]t is this foreseeability requirement that justifies an award based solely on a contingency fee.” Id.

2023Eldridge v. Johndrow, 2015 UT 21, ¶ 21 , 345 P.3d 553 .

2023Eldridge v. Johndrow, 2015 UT 21, ¶ 21 , 345 P.3d 553 .

2019But it wasn't until our Tallman decision that we abrogated the old "acceptance" doctrine. ¶13 In Tallman we "announce[d] unambiguously that Utah follows the foreseeability rule set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts and followed by a majority of states." 1999 UT 55 , ¶ 8, 985 P.2d 892 .

2019But it wasn't until our Tallman decision that we abrogated the old "acceptance" doctrine. ¶13 In Tallman we "announce[d] unambiguously that Utah follows the foreseeability rule set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts and followed by a majority of states." 1999 UT 55 , ¶ 8, 985 P.2d 892 .

2018Our supreme court has affirmed our interpretation of section 30-3-5-(8)(i)(i) and clarified that “the foreseeability inquiry requires a threshold determination of the relevant scope of information to be considered” and that “it is not enough to simply note that something is foreseeable if it can be reasonably anticipated.” See MacDonald v. MacDonald, 2018 UT 48, ¶ 31 .

2018Our supreme court has affirmed our interpretation of section 30-3-5-(8)(i)(i) and clarified that "the foreseeability inquiry requires a threshold determination of the relevant scope of information to be considered" and that "it is not enough to simply note that something is foreseeable if it can be reasonably anticipated." See Macdonald v. Macdonald , 2018 UT 48 , ¶ 31, 430 P.3d 612 .

2017This approach is consistent with the plain language of the 1995 amendment and is the standard we apply today. ¶ 16 MacDonald relies on Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 UT App 47 , 997 P.2d 903 , to argue that only where the alleged change in circumstances was expressly anticipated in the decree itself is a petition to modify alimony precluded. 5 Although the court in Bolliger quoted an earlier version of Utah Code section 30-3-5(8)(i)(i), see Bolliger, 2000 UT App 47, ¶ 11 , 997 P.2d 903 , it does not appear that the court applied the foreseeability analysis that the plain language of the statute re

2017This approach is consistent with the plain language of the 1995 amendment and is the standard we apply today. ¶ 16 MacDonald relies on Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 UT App 47 , 997 P.2d 903 , to argue that only where the alleged change in circumstances was expressly anticipated in the decree itself is a petition to modify alimony precluded. 5 Although the court in Bolliger quoted an earlier version of Utah Code section 30-3-5(8)(i)(i), see Bolliger, 2000 UT App 47, ¶ 11 , 997 P.2d 903 , it does not appear that the court applied the foreseeability analysis that the plain language of the statute re

2016See Pacific Coast Title, 325 P.2d at 908 ; Heslop, 839 P.2d at 840-41 .

2016First, as is usual in other fees qua damages cases,134 we required evidence showing that it was foreseeable that the insured party would incur attorney fees if the insurer breached.135 The second element, unique to cases where the fee sought is based solely on a contingency fee arrangement, required proof that the specific contingency fee arrangement entered into by the insured party was foreseeable.136 In both cases, we addressed each of these requirements and found them to both be satisfied.137 Accordingly, because the attorney fees were sought as consequential damages, and both the incurrin

2016The attorney fee award in Canyon Country was likewise obtained as consequential damages. 781 P.2d at 420 . 134See Pac.

2009NOTES [1] There is some discussion by the parties of the foreseeability requirement set forth in Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 2001 UT 89, ¶ 120 , 65 P.3d 1134 , rev'd on other grounds, 538 U.S. 408 , 123 S.Ct. 1513 , 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003).

2009NOTES [1] There is some discussion by the parties of the foreseeability requirement set forth in Campbell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 2001 UT 89, ¶ 120 , 65 P.3d 1134 , rev'd on other grounds, 538 U.S. 408 , 123 S.Ct. 1513 , 155 L.Ed.2d 585 (2003).

2005Moreover, we recognize that the Court in City of Columbia rejected a "conspiracy” exception to the municipality exemption. 499 U.S. at 379 , 111 S.Ct. 1344 (refusing to "allow plaintiffs to look behind the actions of state sovereigns to base their claims on ‘perceived conspiracies to restrain trade' " and reaffirming that, "with the possible market participant exception, any action that qualifies as state action” under the foreseeability test is "exempt from the operation of the antitrust laws"). 10 .

2005Moreover, we recognize that the Court in City of Columbia rejected a "conspiracy” exception to the municipality exemption. 499 U.S. at 379 , 111 S.Ct. 1344 (refusing to "allow plaintiffs to look behind the actions of state sovereigns to base their claims on ‘perceived conspiracies to restrain trade' " and reaffirming that, "with the possible market participant exception, any action that qualifies as state action” under the foreseeability test is "exempt from the operation of the antitrust laws"). 10 .

1988Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 27 Cal.3d 916 , 616 P.2d 813 , 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).

1988Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hosp., 27 Cal.3d 916 , 616 P.2d 813 , 167 Cal. Rptr. 831 (1980).