unconstitutional instruction in Washington

1999We reached this conclusion despite the fact that "the unconstitutional instruction was standard in this state, In re Hagler, 97 Wash.2d 818, 819 , 650 P.2d 1103 (1982), and had been expressly approved by this court." Griffith, 102 Wash.2d at 104 , 683 P.2d 194 (Utter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citing State v. Mays, 65 Wash.2d 58, 66 , 395 P.2d 758 (1964)).

1999We reached this conclusion despite the fact that "the unconstitutional instruction was standard in this state, In re Hagler, 97 Wash.2d 818, 819 , 650 P.2d 1103 (1982), and had been expressly approved by this court." Griffith, 102 Wash.2d at 104 , 683 P.2d 194 (Utter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citing State v. Mays, 65 Wash.2d 58, 66 , 395 P.2d 758 (1964)).

2006Caritas Servs., Inc. v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 123 Wn.2d 391, 413 , 869 P.2d 28 (1994); State v. Malone, 9 Wn.

2006Caritas Servs., Inc. v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 123 Wn.2d 391, 413 , 869 P.2d 28 (1994); State v. Malone, 9 Wn.

2006Caritas Servs., Inc. v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 123 Wash.2d 391, 413 , 869 P.2d 28 (1994); State v. Malone, 9 Wash.App. 122, 131 , 511 P.2d 67 , review denied, 82 Wash.2d 1011 (1973).

2006Caritas Servs., Inc. v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 123 Wn.2d 391, 413 , 869 P.2d 28 (1994); State v. Malone, 9 Wn.

2003State v. Williams, 144 Wash.2d 197, 213 , 26 P.3d 890 (2001).

2003State v. Williams, 144 Wn.2d 197, 213 , 26 P.3d 890 (2001).

2003City of Seattle v. State, 103 Wn.2d 663, 678 , 694 P.2d 641 (1985); 16AAm.

2003City of Seattle v. State, 103 Wn.2d 663, 678 , 694 P.2d 641 (1985); 16AAm.

2003State v. Williams, 144 Wash.2d 197, 213 , 26 P.3d 890 (2001).

2003State v. Williams, 144 Wn.2d 197, 213 , 26 P.3d 890 (2001).

2025Under the unconstitutional test, this court’s task is to determine whether it is reasonably probable that, “had the error not occurred, the outcome of the trial would have been materially affected.” State v. Cunningham, 93 Wn.2d 823, 831 , 613 P.2d 1139 (1980).

2025Under the unconstitutional test, this court’s task is to determine whether it is reasonably probable that, “had the error not occurred, the outcome of the trial would have been materially affected.” State v. Cunningham, 93 Wn.2d 823, 831 , 613 P.2d 1139 (1980).

2025The nonconstitutional harmless error “analysis does not turn on whether there is sufficient evidence to convict without the inadmissible evidence.” State v. Gower, 179 Wn.2d 851, 857 , 321 P.3d 1178 (2014) (citing State v. Gresham, 173 Wn.2d 405 , 433- 34, 269 P.3d 207 (2012)).

2025The nonconstitutional harmless error “analysis does not turn on whether there is sufficient evidence to convict without the inadmissible evidence.” State v. Gower, 179 Wn.2d 851, 857 , 321 P.3d 1178 (2014) (citing State v. Gresham, 173 Wn.2d 405 , 433- 34, 269 P.3d 207 (2012)).

2024Hood Beverage Co., 149 Wn.2d at 118 .

2024Leonard v. City of Spokane, 127 Wn.2d 194, 201 , 897 P.2d 358 (1995) (quoting Hall v. Niemer, 97 Wn.2d 574, 582 , 649 P.2d 98 (1982)). 12 No. 83287-5-I/13 Stated somewhat differently, a court may “not sever an unconstitutional clause . . . if to do so would broaden the statute’s application, because we cannot presume the legislature meant it to be applied to persons it specifically excluded.” Mt.

2024Leonard v. City of Spokane, 127 Wn.2d 194, 201 , 897 P.2d 358 (1995) (quoting Hall v. Niemer, 97 Wn.2d 574, 582 , 649 P.2d 98 (1982)). 12 No. 83287-5-I/13 Stated somewhat differently, a court may “not sever an unconstitutional clause . . . if to do so would broaden the statute’s application, because we cannot presume the legislature meant it to be applied to persons it specifically excluded.” Mt.

2024Leonard v. City of Spokane, 127 Wn.2d 194, 201 , 897 P.2d 358 (1995) (quoting Hall v. Niemer, 97 Wn.2d 574, 582 , 649 P.2d 98 (1982)). 12 No. 83287-5-I/13 Stated somewhat differently, a court may “not sever an unconstitutional clause . . . if to do so would broaden the statute’s application, because we cannot presume the legislature meant it to be applied to persons it specifically excluded.” Mt.

2024Leonard v. City of Spokane, 127 Wn.2d 194, 201 , 897 P.2d 358 (1995) (quoting Hall v. Niemer, 97 Wn.2d 574, 582 , 649 P.2d 98 (1982)). 12 No. 83287-5-I/13 Stated somewhat differently, a court may “not sever an unconstitutional clause . . . if to do so would broaden the statute’s application, because we cannot presume the legislature meant it to be applied to persons it specifically excluded.” Mt.

2001A statute does not create an unconstitutional presumption “unless it requires a trier of fact to presume from the State’s proof of one fact some other fact that constitutes a necessary element of the crime.” State v. Crediford, 130 Wn.2d 747, 757 , 927 P.2d 1129 (1996).

2001A statute does not create an unconstitutional presumption “unless it requires a trier of fact to presume from the State’s proof of one fact some other fact that constitutes a necessary element of the crime.” State v. Crediford, 130 Wn.2d 747, 757 , 927 P.2d 1129 (1996).

2000Spokane County v. State, 136 Wn.2d 663, 670-72 , 966 P.2d 314 (1998) (act is not an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers because courts retain final judicial review of resolutions issued by the Public Employment Relations Commission); State v. Manussier, 129 Wn.2d 652, 667-69 , 921 P.2d 473 (1996) (Initiative 593, the “three strikes law,” is a constitutional delegation of the Legislature’s authority to alter the sentencing process); State v. Lewis, 115 Wn.2d 294, 304-07 , 797 P.2d 1141 (1990) (Sentencing Reform Act giving prosecutors discretion in charging decisions does not usur

2000Spokane County v. State, 136 Wn.2d 663, 670-72 , 966 P.2d 314 (1998) (act is not an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers because courts retain final judicial review of resolutions issued by the Public Employment Relations Commission); State v. Manussier, 129 Wn.2d 652, 667-69 , 921 P.2d 473 (1996) (Initiative 593, the “three strikes law,” is a constitutional delegation of the Legislature’s authority to alter the sentencing process); State v. Lewis, 115 Wn.2d 294, 304-07 , 797 P.2d 1141 (1990) (Sentencing Reform Act giving prosecutors discretion in charging decisions does not usur

2000Spokane County v. State, 136 Wn.2d 663, 670-72 , 966 P.2d 314 (1998) (act is not an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers because courts retain final judicial review of resolutions issued by the Public Employment Relations Commission); State v. Manussier, 129 Wn.2d 652, 667-69 , 921 P.2d 473 (1996) (Initiative 593, the “three strikes law,” is a constitutional delegation of the Legislature’s authority to alter the sentencing process); State v. Lewis, 115 Wn.2d 294, 304-07 , 797 P.2d 1141 (1990) (Sentencing Reform Act giving prosecutors discretion in charging decisions does not usur

2000Partnership v. Department of Soc. & Health Servs., 113 Wn.2d 19, 25 , 775 P.2d 947 (1989) (Legislature may delegate administrative power if it defines generally what is to be done, which administrative body is to accomplish specified purposes, and what procedural safeguards are in effect to control arbitrary administrative action); State v. Lee, 87 Wn.2d 932, 933 , 558 P.2d 236 (1976) (habitual criminal statute is a constitutional delegation of legislative authority to determine appropriate punishment for criminal violations). 74 Wn.2d 865, 870 , 447 P.2d 593 (1968).

2000Partnership v. Department of Soc. & Health Servs., 113 Wn.2d 19, 25 , 775 P.2d 947 (1989) (Legislature may delegate administrative power if it defines generally what is to be done, which administrative body is to accomplish specified purposes, and what procedural safeguards are in effect to control arbitrary administrative action); State v. Lee, 87 Wn.2d 932, 933 , 558 P.2d 236 (1976) (habitual criminal statute is a constitutional delegation of legislative authority to determine appropriate punishment for criminal violations). 74 Wn.2d 865, 870 , 447 P.2d 593 (1968).

2000Spokane County v. State, 136 Wn.2d 663, 670-72 , 966 P.2d 314 (1998) (act is not an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers because courts retain final judicial review of resolutions issued by the Public Employment Relations Commission); State v. Manussier, 129 Wn.2d 652, 667-69 , 921 P.2d 473 (1996) (Initiative 593, the “three strikes law,” is a constitutional delegation of the Legislature’s authority to alter the sentencing process); State v. Lewis, 115 Wn.2d 294, 304-07 , 797 P.2d 1141 (1990) (Sentencing Reform Act giving prosecutors discretion in charging decisions does not usur

2000Spokane County v. State, 136 Wn.2d 663, 670-72 , 966 P.2d 314 (1998) (act is not an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers because courts retain final judicial review of resolutions issued by the Public Employment Relations Commission); State v. Manussier, 129 Wn.2d 652, 667-69 , 921 P.2d 473 (1996) (Initiative 593, the “three strikes law,” is a constitutional delegation of the Legislature’s authority to alter the sentencing process); State v. Lewis, 115 Wn.2d 294, 304-07 , 797 P.2d 1141 (1990) (Sentencing Reform Act giving prosecutors discretion in charging decisions does not usur

2000Partnership v. Department of Soc. & Health Servs., 113 Wn.2d 19, 25 , 775 P.2d 947 (1989) (Legislature may delegate administrative power if it defines generally what is to be done, which administrative body is to accomplish specified purposes, and what procedural safeguards are in effect to control arbitrary administrative action); State v. Lee, 87 Wn.2d 932, 933 , 558 P.2d 236 (1976) (habitual criminal statute is a constitutional delegation of legislative authority to determine appropriate punishment for criminal violations). 74 Wn.2d 865, 870 , 447 P.2d 593 (1968).

2000Partnership v. Department of Soc. & Health Servs., 113 Wn.2d 19, 25 , 775 P.2d 947 (1989) (Legislature may delegate administrative power if it defines generally what is to be done, which administrative body is to accomplish specified purposes, and what procedural safeguards are in effect to control arbitrary administrative action); State v. Lee, 87 Wn.2d 932, 933 , 558 P.2d 236 (1976) (habitual criminal statute is a constitutional delegation of legislative authority to determine appropriate punishment for criminal violations). 74 Wn.2d 865, 870 , 447 P.2d 593 (1968).

2000Spokane County v. State, 136 Wn.2d 663, 670-72 , 966 P.2d 314 (1998) (act is not an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers because courts retain final judicial review of resolutions issued by the Public Employment Relations Commission); State v. Manussier, 129 Wn.2d 652, 667-69 , 921 P.2d 473 (1996) (Initiative 593, the “three strikes law,” is a constitutional delegation of the Legislature’s authority to alter the sentencing process); State v. Lewis, 115 Wn.2d 294, 304-07 , 797 P.2d 1141 (1990) (Sentencing Reform Act giving prosecutors discretion in charging decisions does not usur

2000Partnership v. Department of Soc. & Health Servs., 113 Wn.2d 19, 25 , 775 P.2d 947 (1989) (Legislature may delegate administrative power if it defines generally what is to be done, which administrative body is to accomplish specified purposes, and what procedural safeguards are in effect to control arbitrary administrative action); State v. Lee, 87 Wn.2d 932, 933 , 558 P.2d 236 (1976) (habitual criminal statute is a constitutional delegation of legislative authority to determine appropriate punishment for criminal violations). 74 Wn.2d 865, 870 , 447 P.2d 593 (1968).

2000Partnership v. Department of Soc. & Health Servs., 113 Wn.2d 19, 25 , 775 P.2d 947 (1989) (Legislature may delegate administrative power if it defines generally what is to be done, which administrative body is to accomplish specified purposes, and what procedural safeguards are in effect to control arbitrary administrative action); State v. Lee, 87 Wn.2d 932, 933 , 558 P.2d 236 (1976) (habitual criminal statute is a constitutional delegation of legislative authority to determine appropriate punishment for criminal violations). 74 Wn.2d 865, 870 , 447 P.2d 593 (1968).

1989Va. 1986), reh'g denied, 672 F. Supp. 915 (1987), a federal district court, applying both Virginia and federal constitutional law, determined that Virginia's legislative damage limit— which placed a flat limit on noneconomic damages — was an unconstitutional violation of the right to trial by jury.

1989Va. 1986), reh'g denied, 672 F. Supp. 915 (1987), a federal district court, applying both Virginia and federal constitutional *657 law, determined that Virginia's legislative damage limit — which placed a flat limit on noneconomic damages — was an unconstitutional violation of the right to trial by jury.

1984State v. Mays, 65 Wn.2d 58, 66 , 395 P.2d 758 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 953 (1965).

1984State v. Mays, 65 Wn.2d 58, 66 , 395 P.2d 758 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 953 (1965).

1984However, the dissent then proceeded to apply the "overwhelming evidence" test, and concluded that since the State's evidence was *218 uncontradicted, 6 the unconstitutional presumption was unnecessary to the jury's determination of the intent issue. 460 U.S. at 101-02 .