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9 Maryland opinions name it 2 courts 1967–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maryland courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp.green1 sentence2013We explicitly distinguished Best in Owens-Corning v. Walatka, 125 Md.App. 313, 335-37 , 725 A.2d 579 (1999), abrogated on other grounds by John Crane, Inc. v. Scribner, 369 Md. 369 , 800 A.2d 727 (2002), finding it inconsistent with the Court of Appeals' opinion in Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342 , 601 A.2d 102 (1992), and quoting Judge Niemeyer's opinion in Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F.Supp. 1325, 1331 (D.Md.1989), in which Judge Niemeyer explained: [I]f the legislature can, without violating separation of powers principles, establish statutes of limitations, establish statutes of repo | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rollegreen2 sentences2006By contrast, subsection (c) of the Florida *512 statute provides in pertinent part: “If there was at that time [of testing] 0.10 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the person’s blood, that fact shall be prima facie evidence that the person was under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that his normal faculties were impaired.” (Emphasis added.) The Supreme Court of Florida held, in State v. Rolle, 560 So.2d 1154, 1157 (Fla.1990), that subsection (c) of the statute “creates a permissive inference not an unconstitutional presumption----The legislature clearly understood the la 2006By contrast, subsection (c) of the Florida *512 statute provides in pertinent part: “If there was at that time [of testing] 0.10 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the person’s blood, that fact shall be prima facie evidence that the person was under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that his normal faculties were impaired.” (Emphasis added.) The Supreme Court of Florida held, in State v. Rolle, 560 So.2d 1154, 1157 (Fla.1990), that subsection (c) of the statute “creates a permissive inference not an unconstitutional presumption----The legislature clearly understood the la | 1 | 1 |
News American Division v. Stategreen2 sentences1983See also News American v. State, supra, 294 Md. at 35-36 , 447 A.2d at 1267 . 1983See also News American v. State, supra, 294 Md. at 35-36 , 447 A.2d at 1267 . | 1 | 1 |
Schneider v. Duergreen2 sentences1967Schneider v. Duer, 170 Md. 326, 340 , 184 Atl. 914, 921 (1936). 1967Schneider v. Duer, 170 Md. 326, 340 , 184 Atl. 914, 921 (1936). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maryland. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Jon Craig Nelson
green
1 sentence2022Id. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Owens Corning v. Walatka
green
2 sentences2013We explicitly distinguished Best in Owens-Corning v. Walatka, 125 Md.App. 313, 335-37 , 725 A.2d 579 (1999), abrogated on other grounds by John Crane, Inc. v. Scribner, 369 Md. 369 , 800 A.2d 727 (2002), finding it inconsistent with the Court of Appeals' opinion in Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342 , 601 A.2d 102 (1992), and quoting Judge Niemeyer's opinion in Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F.Supp. 1325, 1331 (D.Md.1989), in which Judge Niemeyer explained: [I]f the legislature can, without violating separation of powers principles, establish statutes of limitations, establish statutes of repo 2013We explicitly distinguished Best in Owens-Corning v. Walatka, 125 Md.App. 313, 335-37 , 725 A.2d 579 (1999), abrogated on other grounds by John Crane, Inc. v. Scribner, 369 Md. 369 , 800 A.2d 727 (2002), finding it inconsistent with the Court of Appeals' opinion in Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342 , 601 A.2d 102 (1992), and quoting Judge Niemeyer's opinion in Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F.Supp. 1325, 1331 (D.Md.1989), in which Judge Niemeyer explained: [I]f the legislature can, without violating separation of powers principles, establish statutes of limitations, establish statutes of repo | 1 | 2013–2013 |
John Crane, Inc. v. Scribner
green
2 sentences2013We explicitly distinguished Best in Owens-Corning v. Walatka, 125 Md.App. 313, 335-37 , 725 A.2d 579 (1999), abrogated on other grounds by John Crane, Inc. v. Scribner, 369 Md. 369 , 800 A.2d 727 (2002), finding it inconsistent with the Court of Appeals' opinion in Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342 , 601 A.2d 102 (1992), and quoting Judge Niemeyer's opinion in Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F.Supp. 1325, 1331 (D.Md.1989), in which Judge Niemeyer explained: [I]f the legislature can, without violating separation of powers principles, establish statutes of limitations, establish statutes of repo 2013We explicitly distinguished Best in Owens-Corning v. Walatka, 125 Md.App. 313, 335-37 , 725 A.2d 579 (1999), abrogated on other grounds by John Crane, Inc. v. Scribner, 369 Md. 369 , 800 A.2d 727 (2002), finding it inconsistent with the Court of Appeals' opinion in Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342 , 601 A.2d 102 (1992), and quoting Judge Niemeyer's opinion in Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F.Supp. 1325, 1331 (D.Md.1989), in which Judge Niemeyer explained: [I]f the legislature can, without violating separation of powers principles, establish statutes of limitations, establish statutes of repo | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Murphy v. Edmonds
green
2 sentences2013We explicitly distinguished Best in Owens-Corning v. Walatka, 125 Md.App. 313, 335-37 , 725 A.2d 579 (1999), abrogated on other grounds by John Crane, Inc. v. Scribner, 369 Md. 369 , 800 A.2d 727 (2002), finding it inconsistent with the Court of Appeals' opinion in Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342 , 601 A.2d 102 (1992), and quoting Judge Niemeyer's opinion in Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F.Supp. 1325, 1331 (D.Md.1989), in which Judge Niemeyer explained: [I]f the legislature can, without violating separation of powers principles, establish statutes of limitations, establish statutes of repo 2013We explicitly distinguished Best in Owens-Corning v. Walatka, 125 Md.App. 313, 335-37 , 725 A.2d 579 (1999), abrogated on other grounds by John Crane, Inc. v. Scribner, 369 Md. 369 , 800 A.2d 727 (2002), finding it inconsistent with the Court of Appeals' opinion in Murphy v. Edmonds, 325 Md. 342 , 601 A.2d 102 (1992), and quoting Judge Niemeyer's opinion in Franklin v. Mazda Motor Corp., 704 F.Supp. 1325, 1331 (D.Md.1989), in which Judge Niemeyer explained: [I]f the legislature can, without violating separation of powers principles, establish statutes of limitations, establish statutes of repo | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Best v. Taylor MacHine Works
green
2 sentences2013Particularly, the Espinas point to the Illinois case of Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill.2d 367 , 228 Ill.Dec. 636 , 689 N.E.2d 1057 (1997), in which the Supreme Court of Illinois struck down a cap on noneconomic damages as an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers doctrine. 2013Particularly, the Espinas point to the Illinois case of Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill.2d 367 , 228 Ill.Dec. 636 , 689 N.E.2d 1057 (1997), in which the Supreme Court of Illinois struck down a cap on noneconomic damages as an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers doctrine. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
In Re the Personal Restraint of Hagler
green
2 sentences2010We reached this conclusion despite the fact that “the unconstitutional instruction was standard in this state, In re Hagler, 97 Wash.2d 818, 819 , 650 P.2d 1103 (1982), and had been expressly approved by this court.” Griffith, 102 Wash.2d at 104, 683 P.2d 194 [J Id. at 1055-56. 2010We reached this conclusion despite the fact that “the unconstitutional instruction was standard in this state, In re Hagler, 97 Wash.2d 818, 819 , 650 P.2d 1103 (1982), and had been expressly approved by this court.” Griffith, 102 Wash.2d at 104, 683 P.2d 194 [J Id. at 1055-56. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
In Re the Personal Restraint of Griffith
green
1 sentence2010We reached this conclusion despite the fact that “the unconstitutional instruction was standard in this state, In re Hagler, 97 Wash.2d 818, 819 , 650 P.2d 1103 (1982), and had been expressly approved by this court.” Griffith, 102 Wash.2d at 104, 683 P.2d 194 [J Id. at 1055-56. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
County Court of Ulster Cty. v. Allen
green
2 sentences2006By contrast, subsection (c) of the Florida *512 statute provides in pertinent part: “If there was at that time [of testing] 0.10 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the person’s blood, that fact shall be prima facie evidence that the person was under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that his normal faculties were impaired.” (Emphasis added.) The Supreme Court of Florida held, in State v. Rolle, 560 So.2d 1154, 1157 (Fla.1990), that subsection (c) of the statute “creates a permissive inference not an unconstitutional presumption----The legislature clearly understood the la 2006By contrast, subsection (c) of the Florida *512 statute provides in pertinent part: “If there was at that time [of testing] 0.10 percent or more by weight of alcohol in the person’s blood, that fact shall be prima facie evidence that the person was under the influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that his normal faculties were impaired.” (Emphasis added.) The Supreme Court of Florida held, in State v. Rolle, 560 So.2d 1154, 1157 (Fla.1990), that subsection (c) of the statute “creates a permissive inference not an unconstitutional presumption----The legislature clearly understood the la | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Francis v. Franklin
green
1 sentence2003This analysis “requires careful attention to the words actually spoken to the jury ..., for whether a defendant has been accorded his constitutional rights depends upon the way in which a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction.” Id. (quoting Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 514 , 99 S.Ct. at 2454 ) (citation omitted). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Sandstrom v. Montana
green
2 sentences2003This analysis “requires careful attention to the words actually spoken to the jury ..., for whether a defendant has been accorded his constitutional rights depends upon the way in which a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction.” Id. (quoting Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 514 , 99 S.Ct. at 2454 ) (citation omitted). 2003This analysis “requires careful attention to the words actually spoken to the jury ..., for whether a defendant has been accorded his constitutional rights depends upon the way in which a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction.” Id. (quoting Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 514 , 99 S.Ct. at 2454 ) (citation omitted). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Coupard
green
2 sentences1985In Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Coupard, 304 Md. 340 , 499 A.2d 178 (1985), a statute of limitations for actions against architects or professional engineers, § 5-108(b) of the Courts Article, was also challenged as an unconstitutional violation of Article 19. 1985In Whiting-Turner Contracting Co. v. Coupard, 304 Md. 340 , 499 A.2d 178 (1985), a statute of limitations for actions against architects or professional engineers, § 5-108(b) of the Courts Article, was also challenged as an unconstitutional violation of Article 19. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Clark's Brooklyn Park, Inc. v. Hranicka & Kopasek
green
2 sentences1975It is “the duty of the Court to separate the valid from the invalid provisions [of a statute] wherever possible.” Clark’s Park v. Hranicka, 246 Md. 178, 185 , 227 A. 2d 726 (1967). 1975It is “the duty of the Court to separate the valid from the invalid provisions [of a statute] wherever possible.” Clark’s Park v. Hranicka, 246 Md. 178, 185 , 227 A. 2d 726 (1967). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.