Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
10 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Higgason v. Indiana Department of Correctiongreen1 sentence2010Higgason v. Ind. Dep't of Correction, 883 N.E.2d 814, 815-16 (Ind.2008). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Williamsgreen1 sentence2000Also, we reject the defendant’s contention that the phrase ‘real possibility,’ as opposed to ‘possibility,’ impermissibly shifts the burden of proof.”); United States v. Williams, 20 F.3d 125, 131 (5th Cir.1994); United States v. Bustillo, 789 F.2d 1364, 1368 (9th Cir.1986). 4 *1097 In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by giving the instruction a majority of this Court recommended in Winegeart 5 Conclusion The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Quincy J. Conwaygreen1 sentence2000See Rodriguez, 162 F.3d at 146 (“The phrase ‘real doubt’ does not suffer the infirmity of requiring the jury to have ‘grave uncertainty,’ ‘substantial doubt,’ and a ‘real tangible substantial basis’ for doubt, before they can acquit, as the unconstitutional instruction did in Cage v. Louisiana.”) (citation omitted) 3 ; United States v. Artero, 121 F.3d 1256, 1258 (9th Cir.1997); United States v. Conway, 73 F.3d 975, 980 (10th Cir.1995) (“[T]he ‘firmly convinced’ language, juxtaposed with the insistence that a jury must acquit in the presence of ‘a real possibility’ that the defendant is not gu | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Rodriguezgreen1 sentence2000See Rodriguez, 162 F.3d at 146 (“The phrase ‘real doubt’ does not suffer the infirmity of requiring the jury to have ‘grave uncertainty,’ ‘substantial doubt,’ and a ‘real tangible substantial basis’ for doubt, before they can acquit, as the unconstitutional instruction did in Cage v. Louisiana.”) (citation omitted) 3 ; United States v. Artero, 121 F.3d 1256, 1258 (9th Cir.1997); United States v. Conway, 73 F.3d 975, 980 (10th Cir.1995) (“[T]he ‘firmly convinced’ language, juxtaposed with the insistence that a jury must acquit in the presence of ‘a real possibility’ that the defendant is not gu | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Alvin R. Bustillogreen1 sentence2000Also, we reject the defendant’s contention that the phrase ‘real possibility,’ as opposed to ‘possibility,’ impermissibly shifts the burden of proof.”); United States v. Williams, 20 F.3d 125, 131 (5th Cir.1994); United States v. Bustillo, 789 F.2d 1364, 1368 (9th Cir.1986). 4 *1097 In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by giving the instruction a majority of this Court recommended in Winegeart 5 Conclusion The judgment of the trial court is affirmed. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Arterogreen1 sentence2000See Rodriguez, 162 F.3d at 146 (“The phrase ‘real doubt’ does not suffer the infirmity of requiring the jury to have ‘grave uncertainty,’ ‘substantial doubt,’ and a ‘real tangible substantial basis’ for doubt, before they can acquit, as the unconstitutional instruction did in Cage v. Louisiana.”) (citation omitted) 3 ; United States v. Artero, 121 F.3d 1256, 1258 (9th Cir.1997); United States v. Conway, 73 F.3d 975, 980 (10th Cir.1995) (“[T]he ‘firmly convinced’ language, juxtaposed with the insistence that a jury must acquit in the presence of ‘a real possibility’ that the defendant is not gu | 1 | 1 |
19 Fair empl.prac.cas. 418, 19 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 9188 Raymond E. Trafelet v. James R. Thompsongreen1 sentence1980See, e. g., Trafelet v. Thompson (7th Cir. 1979), 594 F.2d 623 (questioning the current status of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine); O'Neil v. Baine (Mo.1978), 568 S.W.2d 761 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Francis v. Franklin
green
2 sentences2003Other instructions might explain the particular infirm language to the extent that a reasonable juror could not have considered the [instruction] to have created an unconstitutional presumption.'" Id. at 1168 (quoting Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 315 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)). 2003Other instructions might explain the particular infirm language to the extent that a reasonable juror could not have considered the [instruction] to have created an unconstitutional presumption.'" Id. at 1168 (quoting Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 315 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)). | 5 | 1987–2003 |
Trevor L. Morgan v. State of Indiana
green
1 sentence2018This court held that the revised statute was not an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers because "it remains the trial court's duty to determine whether revocation will be ordered." Morgan , 87 N.E.3d at 510 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Walker v. State
green
1 sentence2003Other instructions might explain the particular infirm language to the extent that a reasonable juror could not have considered the [instruction] to have created an unconstitutional presumption.'" Id. at 1168 (quoting Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 315 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Sandstrom v. Montana
green
2 sentences2002Other instructions might explain the particular infirm language to the extent that a reasonable juror could not have considered the [instruction] to have created an unconstitutional presumption." Francis, 471 U.S. at 315 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 . *1169 In Sandstrom, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the following instruction: "[The law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts." 442 U.S. at 515 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 . 2002Other instructions might explain the particular infirm language to the extent that a reasonable juror could not have considered the [instruction] to have created an unconstitutional presumption." Francis, 471 U.S. at 315 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 . *1169 In Sandstrom, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the following instruction: "[The law presumes that a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary acts." 442 U.S. at 515 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Barco Beverage Corp. v. Indiana Alcoholic Beverage Commission
green
2 sentences2002Id. at 254 (quoting Ind.Code § 7.1-2-3-31 (1982)). 2002Id. at 254 (quoting Ind.Code § 7.1-2-3-31 (1982)). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
O'NEIL v. Baine
green
1 sentence1980See, e. g., Trafelet v. Thompson (7th Cir. 1979), 594 F.2d 623 (questioning the current status of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine); O'Neil v. Baine (Mo.1978), 568 S.W.2d 761 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.