unconstitutional violation in Louisiana

2013Defendant further argues that the lack of uniformity in the application of different statutes in different states is an unconstitutional violation of due process and of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. | nMcDonald was a gun control case, and the court in that case did state that it would be “incongruous” to apply different standards “depending on whether the claim was asserted in a state or federal court.” Id. at 3035 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 , 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1495 , 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964)).

2013Defendant further argues that the lack of uniformity in the application of different statutes in different states is an unconstitutional violation of due process and of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. | nMcDonald was a gun control case, and the court in that case did state that it would be “incongruous” to apply different standards “depending on whether the claim was asserted in a state or federal court.” Id. at 3035 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 , 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1495 , 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964)).

2013Defendant further argues that the lack of uniformity in the application of different statutes in different states is an unconstitutional violation of due process and of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. | nMcDonald was a gun control case, and the court in that case did state that it would be “incongruous” to apply different standards “depending on whether the claim was asserted in a state or federal court.” Id. at 3035 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 , 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1495 , 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964)).

2012We further noted in Cunningham that the requirement of former La.R.S. 15:501 (B)(2), that the defendant or defense counsel certify he intended in good faith to conduct cross-examination of the analyst, a burden imposed only upon the defendant, had the potential of impairing the accused’s confrontation rights and therefore had to be “construed so as not to be an unconstitutional violation of the confrontation clause.” Cunningham , 04-2200 at 18, 903 So.2d at 1122 .

2012We rendered the burden "featherweight” by holding that a defendant could satisfy the good faith requirement "by merely indicating a preference for live testimony by requesting a subpoena issue for the preparer of the certificate of analysis.” Id.

2005He contends that admission of the statement was a violation of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), and Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), which address a defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him, that he was prejudiced thereby, and that his convictions must be reversed.

2005He contends that admission of the statement was a violation of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), and Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), which address a defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him, that he was prejudiced thereby, and that his convictions must be reversed.

2005He contends that admission of the statement was a violation of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), and Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), which address a defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him, that he was prejudiced thereby, and that his convictions must be reversed.

2005He contends that admission of the statement was a violation of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), and Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 , 88 S.Ct. 1620 , 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), which address a defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him, that he was prejudiced thereby, and that his convictions must be reversed.

2001App. 1 Cir.1993), writ denied, 94-0291 (La.6/3/94), 637 So.2d 497 (holding that "requiring this defendant to register pursuant to Revised Statutes 540-549 is an unconstitutional violation of the ex post facto provisions in the United States and Louisiana Constitutions.").

2001See, e.g., Simmons v. Houston, 98-2662 (La.App. 4 Cir.5/12/99), 737 So.2d 220 (claimant improperly disqualified from receiving UCB on the ground that he voluntarily left his employment without good cause connected to his employment); Hughes v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 98-1007 (La.App. 5 Cir.3/10/99), 735 So.2d 44 (claimant allowed to reactivate a UCB claim after his severance pay had ended); Hensel v. State, 95-135 (La.App. 5 Cir.5/30/95), 656 So.2d 1077 (district court ordered to properly address claimant's equal protection claim); Grider v. Administrator, Department of Employment Securit

2001See, e.g., Simmons v. Houston, 98-2662 (La.App. 4 Cir.5/12/99), 737 So.2d 220 (claimant improperly disqualified from receiving UCB on the ground that he voluntarily left his employment without good cause connected to his employment); Hughes v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 98-1007 (La.App. 5 Cir.3/10/99), 735 So.2d 44 (claimant allowed to reactivate a UCB claim after his severance pay had ended); Hensel v. State, 95-135 (La.App. 5 Cir.5/30/95), 656 So.2d 1077 (district court ordered to properly address claimant's equal protection claim); Grider v. Administrator, Department of Employment Securit

2001See, e.g., Simmons v. Houston, 98-2662 (La.App. 4 Cir.5/12/99), 737 So.2d 220 (claimant improperly disqualified from receiving UCB on the ground that he voluntarily left his employment without good cause connected to his employment); Hughes v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 98-1007 (La.App. 5 Cir.3/10/99), 735 So.2d 44 (claimant allowed to reactivate a UCB claim after his severance pay had ended); Hensel v. State, 95-135 (La.App. 5 Cir.5/30/95), 656 So.2d 1077 (district court ordered to properly address claimant's equal protection claim); Grider v. Administrator, Department of Employment Securit

1998However, in State v. Smith, 91-0749 (La.5/23/94), 637 So.2d 398 , cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1045 , 115 S.Ct. 641 , 130 L.Ed.2d 546 (1994), this court found that an instruction equating a reasonable doubt with "a serious doubt for which you could give a good reason" was not constitutionally infirm.

1998Moreover, the court's charge did not equate substantial doubt with grave uncertainty as did the unconstitutional instruction read in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 , 111 S.Ct. 328 , 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990). [12] See Victor, 511 U.S. at 5 , 114 S.Ct. at 1243 . *718 The defendant also complains about the portion of the definition which equated a reasonable doubt with a doubt for which the jurors could give a good reason.

1998Moreover, the court's charge did not equate substantial doubt with grave uncertainty as did the unconstitutional instruction read in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 , 111 S.Ct. 328 , 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990). [12] See Victor, 511 U.S. at 5 , 114 S.Ct. at 1243 . *718 The defendant also complains about the portion of the definition which equated a reasonable doubt with a doubt for which the jurors could give a good reason.

1998Moreover, the court's charge did not equate substantial doubt with grave uncertainty as did the unconstitutional instruction read in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 , 111 S.Ct. 328 , 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990). [12] See Victor, 511 U.S. at 5 , 114 S.Ct. at 1243 . *718 The defendant also complains about the portion of the definition which equated a reasonable doubt with a doubt for which the jurors could give a good reason.

1998Moreover, the court's charge did not equate substantial doubt with grave uncertainty as did the unconstitutional instruction read in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 , 111 S.Ct. 328 , 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990). [12] See Victor, 511 U.S. at 5 , 114 S.Ct. at 1243 . *718 The defendant also complains about the portion of the definition which equated a reasonable doubt with a doubt for which the jurors could give a good reason.

1998However, in State v. Smith, 91-0749 (La.5/23/94), 637 So.2d 398 , cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1045 , 115 S.Ct. 641 , 130 L.Ed.2d 546 (1994), this court found that an instruction equating a reasonable doubt with "a serious doubt for which you could give a good reason" was not constitutionally infirm.

1998However, in State v. Smith, 91-0749 (La.5/23/94), 637 So.2d 398 , cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1045 , 115 S.Ct. 641 , 130 L.Ed.2d 546 (1994), this court found that an instruction equating a reasonable doubt with "a serious doubt for which you could give a good reason" was not constitutionally infirm.

1998However, in State v. Smith, 91-0749 (La.5/23/94), 637 So.2d 398 , cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1045 , 115 S.Ct. 641 , 130 L.Ed.2d 546 (1994), this court found that an instruction equating a reasonable doubt with "a serious doubt for which you could give a good reason" was not constitutionally infirm.

1997State v. Roy, supra at 1239 (misstatements of law by the prosecutor during voir dire and penalty phase closing argument concerning an unconstitutional presumption on intent struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court were not prejudicial, given that jurors were correctly charged and that it was possible to conclude that the error "was not so dominant that the jurors could not adhere to their charged duty to accept and to apply the law as given by the court.") See also State v. Edwards, 420 So.2d 663, 681 (La.1982) (prosecutor's erroneous statement of law on intent at closing argument cured by reques

1996The Payne court stated that the prohibition against ex post facto laws "extends to the enforcement of any enactment which changes the punishment to inflict a greater penalty than that authorized for the crime at the time of its commission." Payne, 633 So.2d at 702 .

1993State v. Corley, 587 So.2d 193 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1991), writ denied, 590 So.2d 1199 (La.1992).

1993State v. Corley, 587 So.2d 193 (La.App. 3rd Cir.1991), writ denied, 590 So.2d 1199 (La.1992).

1989Murray, id. at 564 .

1988In our original opinion we held this provision to be an unconstitutional violation of due process because it was not reasonably related to the objective of the statute of securing prompt filing of the record and prompt judicial review. 521 So.2d at 409 .

1982However, we point out that that decision has been reversed on appeal in the case of Hammontree v. Phelps, 605 F.2d 1371 (U.S.App. 5th Cir. 1979).