unconstitutional violation in Texas

1991Furthermore, appellant recognizes that we found that article to be an unconstitutional violation upon the separation of powers doctrine in Rose v. State, 752 S.W.2d 529 (Tex.Cr.App.1987).

1991Furthermore, appellant recognizes that we found that article to be an unconstitutional violation upon the separation of powers doctrine in Rose v. State, 752 S.W.2d 529 (Tex.Cr.App.1987).

2010See Martinez, 272 S.W.3d at 619-26 (setting out law and applying standard to facts of case); see also Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615-16, 620-22 , 124 S.Ct. at 2614-16 (same)).

2010See Martinez, 272 S.W.3d at 619-26 (setting out law and applying standard to facts of case); see also Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615-16, 620-22 , 124 S.Ct. at 2614-16 (same)).

2010See Martinez , 272 S.W.3d at 619-26 (setting out law and applying standard to facts of case); see also Seibert , 542 U.S. at 615-16, 620-22 , 124 S. Ct. at 2614-16 (same)).

2010See Martinez, 272 S.W.3d at 619-26 (setting out law and applying standard to facts of case); see also Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615-16, 620-22 , 124 S.Ct. at 2614-16 (same)).

2014Dissenting Opinion 04-14-00282-CV the entry of final judgment “is a core judicial power; it falls within that judicial realm of judicial proceedings ‘so vital to the efficient functioning of a court as to be beyond legislative power[,]’” and the provision prohibiting entry of a final judgment absent 45-days’ notice to the attorney general creates “a constitutionally intolerable imposition on a court’s power to enter a final judgment.” Id. at 29 (quoting Armadillo Bail Bonds v. State, 802 S.W.2d 237, 240 (Tex. Crim.

1992Armadillo Bail Bonds v. State, 802 S.W.2d 237 (Tex.Crim.App.1990).

1995We held in Davis that, absent the unconstitutional presumption, the proof was insufficient to support a conviction, and that Davis was “entitled to an acquittal.” Id., at 580 .

1995We held in Davis that, absent the unconstitutional presumption, the proof was insufficient to support a conviction, and that Davis was "entitled to an acquittal." Id., at 580 .

1988If it be urged that the result that we reach here is unrealistic, impractical, and inefficient, we note the words of the United States Supreme Court in the recent case of Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 at 944 (1983) (which held that the so-called `legislative veto' is an unconstitutional violation of the implied separation of powers principle of the U.S. Constitution): . . . the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.

1988If it be urged that the result that we reach here is unrealistic, impractical, and inefficient, we note the words of the United States Supreme Court in the recent case of Immiciration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 at 944 11983) fwhich held that the so-called "leaislative veto" &an unconstitutional violation of the implied separation of powers principle of the U.S. Constitution): . . . the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in fac- 'ilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.

2022Invoking the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039, 1044 (2017), as a previously unavailable legal basis, Applicant argued that his prior claim of intellectual disability had been analyzed under an unconstitutional standard.

2020To the extent he relies on Lawrence v. Texas, we note that the consensual nature of the sexual relations in that case was undisputed. 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).

2019See Buxton v. State, 526 S.W.3d 666 , 678–82 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d). 28 as predicate offenses, such as sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, and certain indecency with a child offenses—“are not themselves elements of the offense [of continuous sexual abuse], but are merely evidentiary facts, the manner and means by which the actus reus element is committed.” Id.

2019See Buxton v. State, 526 S.W.3d 666 , 678–82 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. ref’d). 28 as predicate offenses, such as sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, and certain indecency with a child offenses—“are not themselves elements of the offense [of continuous sexual abuse], but are merely evidentiary facts, the manner and means by which the actus reus element is committed.” Id.

2018I, § 13 (“All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.”); R Commc’ns v. Sharp, 875 S.W.2d 314, 318 (Tex. 1994) (striking as unconstitutional a statutory limitation on the right to seek declaratory relief regarding interpretation and application of tax laws). 4 In support of their respective positions, the two parties offer contrasting readings of precedent from the Supreme Court of Texas and this Court.

2018See Avilez v. State, 333 S.W.3d 661, 674 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d).

2017See 508 U.S. at 280–282.

2014See Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 880-81 (Tex. Crim.

2014See Ex Parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10, 29 (Tex. Crim.

2014See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 , 103 S.Ct. 1564, 1570 , 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983).

2014See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 , 103 S.Ct. 1564, 1570 , 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983).

2012Id. at 598 (voiding contempt order of confinement for failure to pay legal child support obligations because order also included an unconstitutional requirement to repay “debt”); Ex parte Davila, 718 S.W.2d 281, 282 (Tex.1986) (orig. proceeding) (per cu-riam).

2012Id. at 598 (voiding contempt order of confinement for failure to pay legal child support obligations because order also included an unconstitutional requirement to repay “debt”); Ex parte Davila, 718 S.W.2d 281, 282 (Tex.1986) (orig. proceeding) (per cu-riam).

2006See, e.g., Clark v. State, 643 S.W.2d 723, 724-25 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1982) (stating that a jury’s consideration of parole in assessing punishment is an “evil to be avoided” and that “a jury in a felony case is not authorized to consider or apply parole law in assessing punishment”); Sanders v. State, 580 S.W.2d 349, 351-52 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1978) (stating that it is improper for a jury to discuss or consider parole and that it is an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers for a jury to increase punishment based on consideration of parole laws).

2006See, e.g., Clark v. State, 643 S.W.2d 723, 724-25 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1982) (stating that a jury's consideration of parole in assessing punishment is an "evil to be avoided" and that "a jury in a felony case is not authorized to consider or apply parole law in assessing punishment"); Sanders v. State, 580 S.W.2d 349, 351-52 (Tex. Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1978) (stating that it is improper for a jury to discuss or consider parole and that it is an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers for a jury to increase punishment based on consideration of parole laws).

2006See, e.g., Clark v. State, 643 S.W.2d 723, 724-25 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1982) (stating that a jury’s consideration of parole in assessing punishment is an “evil to be avoided” and that “a jury in a felony case is not authorized to consider or apply parole law in assessing punishment”); Sanders v. State, 580 S.W.2d 349, 351-52 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1978) (stating that it is improper for a jury to discuss or consider parole and that it is an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers for a jury to increase punishment based on consideration of parole laws).

2006See, e.g., Clark v. State, 643 S.W.2d 723, 724-25 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1982) (stating that a jury's consideration of parole in assessing punishment is an "evil to be avoided" and that "a jury in a felony case is not authorized to consider or apply parole law in assessing punishment"); Sanders v. State, 580 S.W.2d 349, 351-52 (Tex. Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1978) (stating that it is improper for a jury to discuss or consider parole and that it is an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers for a jury to increase punishment based on consideration of parole laws).

2000See Leary, 89 S.Ct. at 1545-57 .

2000See Leary, 89 S.Ct. at 1545-57 .

1999Torres, 966 S.W.2d at 726-29 ; Norton, 918 S.W.2d at 27-29 ; see also Mallares, 953 S.W.2d at 762 n. 4; Nix v. State, 882 S.W.2d 474, 475-76 ((Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd); Nguyen v. State, 882 S.W.2d 471, 472-73 ((Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd) (noting that Meshell struck down as an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers only the dismissal and bar of prosecution based on speedy trial grounds, which had no effect on dismissal and bar for untimely indictment).

1999Torres, 966 S.W.2d at 726-29 ; Norton, 918 S.W.2d at 27-29 ; see also Mallares, 953 S.W.2d at 762 n. 4; Nix v. State, 882 S.W.2d 474, 475-76 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd); Nguyen v. State, 882 S.W.2d 471, 472-73 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd) (noting that Meshell struck down as an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers only the dismissal and bar of prosecution based on speedy trial grounds, which had no effect on dismissal and bar for untimely indictment).

1999See State v. Condran, 977 S.W.2d 144, 144-47 (Tex.Cr.App. 1998) (Keller, J., dissenting to dismissal of defendant's discretionary review petition as improvidently granted) ("portion of former Article 28.061 that applies to former Article 32.01 is an unconstitutional violation of the Separation of Powers Clause of the Texas Constitution"); Norton, 969 S.W.2d at 3 (McCormick, P.J., dissenting to dismissal of State's discretionary review petition as improvidently granted).

1999See State v. Condran, 977 S.W.2d 144, 144-47 (Tex.Cr.App.1998) (Keller, J., dissenting to dismissal of defendant’s discretionary review petition as improvidently granted) (“portion of former Article 28.061 that applies to former Article 32.01 is an unconstitutional violation of the Separation of Powers Clause of the Texas Constitution”); Norton, 969 S.W.2d at 3 (McCormick, P.J., dissenting to dismissal of State’s discretionary review petition as improvidently granted).

1999Torres, 966 S.W.2d at 726-29 ; Norton, 918 S.W.2d at 27-29 ; see also Mallares, 953 S.W.2d at 762 n. 4; Nix v. State, 882 S.W.2d 474, 475-76 ((Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd); Nguyen v. State, 882 S.W.2d 471, 472-73 ((Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd) (noting that Meshell struck down as an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers only the dismissal and bar of prosecution based on speedy trial grounds, which had no effect on dismissal and bar for untimely indictment).

1999Torres, 966 S.W.2d at 726-29 ; Norton, 918 S.W.2d at 27-29 ; see also Mallares, 953 S.W.2d at 762 n. 4; Nix v. State, 882 S.W.2d 474, 475-76 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd); Nguyen v. State, 882 S.W.2d 471, 472-73 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd) (noting that Meshell struck down as an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers only the dismissal and bar of prosecution based on speedy trial grounds, which had no effect on dismissal and bar for untimely indictment).

1999Torres, 966 S.W.2d at 726-29 ; Norton, 918 S.W.2d at 27-29 ; see also Mallares, 953 S.W.2d at 762 n. 4; Nix v. State, 882 S.W.2d 474, 475-76 ((Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd); Nguyen v. State, 882 S.W.2d 471, 472-73 ((Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd) (noting that Meshell struck down as an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers only the dismissal and bar of prosecution based on speedy trial grounds, which had no effect on dismissal and bar for untimely indictment).

1999Torres, 966 S.W.2d at 726-29 ; Norton, 918 S.W.2d at 27-29 ; see also Mallares, 953 S.W.2d at 762 n. 4; Nix v. State, 882 S.W.2d 474, 475-76 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd); Nguyen v. State, 882 S.W.2d 471, 472-73 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref'd) (noting that Meshell struck down as an unconstitutional violation of separation of powers only the dismissal and bar of prosecution based on speedy trial grounds, which had no effect on dismissal and bar for untimely indictment).