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20 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Glasselgreen2 sentences2012Arizona’s death statute creates an unconstitutional presumption of death and places an unconstitutional burden on Appellant to prove mitigation is “sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” State v. Glassel, 211 Ariz. 33, 52 , 116 P.3d 1193, 1212 (2005). 20. 2012Arizona’s death statute creates an unconstitutional presumption of death and places an unconstitutional burden on Appellant to prove mitigation is “sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” State v. Glassel, 211 Ariz. 33, 52 , 116 P.3d 1193, 1212 (2005). 20. | 11 | 11 |
State v. Danngreen2 sentences2011State v. Dann (Dann I), 205 Ariz. 557, 575-76, ¶ 74 , 74 P.3d 231 (2003). (14) Arizona’s death statute creates an unconstitutional presumption of death and places an unconstitutional burden on Appellant to prove mitigation is “sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 , 110 S.Ct. 3047 , 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990); State v. Glassel, 211 Ariz. 33, 52, ¶ 72 , 116 P.3d 1193, 1212 (2005). (15) The failure to provide the jury with a special verdict on Appellant’s proffered mitigation deprived him of his rights to not be subject to ex post facto legislation and 2011State v. Dann (Dann I), 205 Ariz. 557, 575-76, ¶ 74 , 74 P.3d 231 (2003). (14) Arizona’s death statute creates an unconstitutional presumption of death and places an unconstitutional burden on Appellant to prove mitigation is “sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 , 110 S.Ct. 3047 , 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990); State v. Glassel, 211 Ariz. 33, 52, ¶ 72 , 116 P.3d 1193, 1212 (2005). (15) The failure to provide the jury with a special verdict on Appellant’s proffered mitigation deprived him of his rights to not be subject to ex post facto legislation and | 3 | 4 |
State v. Lopezgreen2 sentences2011In assessing the constitutionality of jury instructions dealing with presumptions, "we must first determine if the presumption is mandatory or permissive." State v. Lopez, 134 Ariz. 469, 472 , 657 P.2d 882, 885 (App. 1982). 2011In assessing the constitutionality of jury instructions dealing with presumptions, "we must first determine if the presumption is mandatory or permissive." State v. Lopez, 134 Ariz. 469, 472 , 657 P.2d 882, 885 (App. 1982). | 2 | 2 |
Francis v. Franklingreen2 sentences2011See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985). ¶ 14 We next consider the instruction in the context of the jury instructions as a whole, as "[o]ther instructions might explain the infirm language to the extent that a reasonable juror could not have considered the charge to have created an unconstitutional presumption." Id. at 315 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 . 2011See Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985). ¶ 14 We next consider the instruction in the context of the jury instructions as a whole, as "[o]ther instructions might explain the infirm language to the extent that a reasonable juror could not have considered the charge to have created an unconstitutional presumption." Id. at 315 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Roseberrygreen2 sentences2011State v. Roseberry, 210 Ariz. 360, 373 , ¶ 74 & n. 12, 111 P.3d 402 (2005). (16) The trial court improperly omitted penalty phase instructions that the jury could consider mercy or sympathy in evaluating the mitigation evidence and determining whether to sentence the defendant to death. 2011State v. Roseberry, 210 Ariz. 360, 373 , ¶ 74 & n. 12, 111 P.3d 402 (2005). (16) The trial court improperly omitted penalty phase instructions that the jury could consider mercy or sympathy in evaluating the mitigation evidence and determining whether to sentence the defendant to death. | 1 | 3 |
Crawford v. Washingtongreen1 sentence2021See, e.g., R.S. v. Thompson, 251 Ariz. 111, 117, ¶ 14 (2021) (“[T]he legitimate needs of fairness may outweigh an absolute privilege.”) (citation omitted); see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004); Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24 (guaranteeing the accused in criminal prosecutions the right “to meet the witnesses against him face to face”); State v. Karp, 236 Ariz. 120, 123, ¶ 9 (App. 2014) (“The [Confrontation Clause] reaches ‘formalized testimonial materials,’ such as depositions . . . .”) (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 379 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring)). | 1 | 1 |
Michigan v. Bryantgreen1 sentence2021See, e.g., R.S. v. Thompson, 251 Ariz. 111, 117, ¶ 14 (2021) (“[T]he legitimate needs of fairness may outweigh an absolute privilege.”) (citation omitted); see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004); Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24 (guaranteeing the accused in criminal prosecutions the right “to meet the witnesses against him face to face”); State v. Karp, 236 Ariz. 120, 123, ¶ 9 (App. 2014) (“The [Confrontation Clause] reaches ‘formalized testimonial materials,’ such as depositions . . . .”) (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 379 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring)). | 1 | 1 |
R.S./s.E. v. Hon. thompson/teddy Vandersgreen1 sentence2021See, e.g., R.S. v. Thompson, 251 Ariz. 111, 117, ¶ 14 (2021) (“[T]he legitimate needs of fairness may outweigh an absolute privilege.”) (citation omitted); see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004); Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24 (guaranteeing the accused in criminal prosecutions the right “to meet the witnesses against him face to face”); State v. Karp, 236 Ariz. 120, 123, ¶ 9 (App. 2014) (“The [Confrontation Clause] reaches ‘formalized testimonial materials,’ such as depositions . . . .”) (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 379 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring)). | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Montgomery v. Karpgreen1 sentence2021See, e.g., R.S. v. Thompson, 251 Ariz. 111, 117, ¶ 14 (2021) (“[T]he legitimate needs of fairness may outweigh an absolute privilege.”) (citation omitted); see also Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004); Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24 (guaranteeing the accused in criminal prosecutions the right “to meet the witnesses against him face to face”); State v. Karp, 236 Ariz. 120, 123, ¶ 9 (App. 2014) (“The [Confrontation Clause] reaches ‘formalized testimonial materials,’ such as depositions . . . .”) (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 379 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rutherfordgreen2 sentences2014Defendant further argues that the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act is a valid exercise of the state’s police power, that Arizona’s Attorney General has issued an opinion (No. 112-001) that use of marijuana by a qualifying patient is not preempted by federal law, and that the court’s role required it to strike this illegal probation condition while keeping the balance of the plea agreement in effect. ¶ 13 As indicated above, the trial judge determined that the marijuana provision in the plea agreement was an illegal stipulation pursuant to State v. Rutherford, 154 Ariz. 486, 489 , 744 P.2d 13, 16 2014Defendant further argues that the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act is a valid exercise of the state’s police power, that Arizona’s Attorney General has issued an opinion (No. 112-001) that use of marijuana by a qualifying patient is not preempted by federal law, and that the court’s role required it to strike this illegal probation condition while keeping the balance of the plea agreement in effect. ¶ 13 As indicated above, the trial judge determined that the marijuana provision in the plea agreement was an illegal stipulation pursuant to State v. Rutherford, 154 Ariz. 486, 489 , 744 P.2d 13, 16 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Carreongreen2 sentences2009State v. Roseberry, 210 Ariz. 360 , 373 ¶ 74 & n. 12, 111 P.3d 402, 415 (2005). (20) The trial court improperly omitted penalty phase instructions that the jury could consider mercy or sympathy in evaluating the mitigation evidence and determining whether to sentence the defendant to death. *25 State v. Carreon, 210 Ariz. 54 , 70-71 ¶¶ 81-87, 107 P.3d 900, 916-17 (2005). (21) Arizona’s cmrent protocols and procedures for execution by lethal injection constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 2009State v. Roseberry, 210 Ariz. 360 , 373 ¶ 74 & n. 12, 111 P.3d 402, 415 (2005). (20) The trial court improperly omitted penalty phase instructions that the jury could consider mercy or sympathy in evaluating the mitigation evidence and determining whether to sentence the defendant to death. *25 State v. Carreon, 210 Ariz. 54 , 70-71 ¶¶ 81-87, 107 P.3d 900, 916-17 (2005). (21) Arizona’s cmrent protocols and procedures for execution by lethal injection constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Thomas v. Granvillegreen1 sentence2008Rejected in Baldwin, 211 Ariz. at 471-72, ¶¶ 9-17, 123 P.3d [at] 665-66. 5. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Laragreen2 sentences2003Compare State v. Rodriguez, 114 Ariz. 331, 333 , 560 P.2d 1238, 1240 (1977) ("The law in Arizona is that a specific intent to do an act may be inferred from the circumstances of the doing of the act itself.’’) with State v. Lara, 183 Ariz. 233 , 235 n. 4, 902 P.2d 1337 , 1339 n. 4 (1995) (distinguishing the permissible inference of intent from the unconstitutional presumption of intent addressed in Sandstrom v. Montana ). 2003Compare State v. Rodriguez, 114 Ariz. 331, 333 , 560 P.2d 1238, 1240 (1977) ("The law in Arizona is that a specific intent to do an act may be inferred from the circumstances of the doing of the act itself.’’) with State v. Lara, 183 Ariz. 233 , 235 n. 4, 902 P.2d 1337 , 1339 n. 4 (1995) (distinguishing the permissible inference of intent from the unconstitutional presumption of intent addressed in Sandstrom v. Montana ). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rodriguezgreen2 sentences2003Compare State v. Rodriguez, 114 Ariz. 331, 333 , 560 P.2d 1238, 1240 (1977) ("The law in Arizona is that a specific intent to do an act may be inferred from the circumstances of the doing of the act itself.’’) with State v. Lara, 183 Ariz. 233 , 235 n. 4, 902 P.2d 1337 , 1339 n. 4 (1995) (distinguishing the permissible inference of intent from the unconstitutional presumption of intent addressed in Sandstrom v. Montana ). 2003Compare State v. Rodriguez, 114 Ariz. 331, 333 , 560 P.2d 1238, 1240 (1977) ("The law in Arizona is that a specific intent to do an act may be inferred from the circumstances of the doing of the act itself.’’) with State v. Lara, 183 Ariz. 233 , 235 n. 4, 902 P.2d 1337 , 1339 n. 4 (1995) (distinguishing the permissible inference of intent from the unconstitutional presumption of intent addressed in Sandstrom v. Montana ). | 1 | 1 |
Lewis v. Jeffersgreen2 sentences1990See also Lewis v. Jeffers, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3092 , 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990). 1990See also Lewis v. Jeffers, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 3092 , 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Walton v. Arizona
red
2 sentences2012A’izona’s death statute creates an unconstitutional presumption of death and places an unconstitutional burden on Appellant to prove mitigation is “sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 , 110 S.Ct. 3047 , 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990); State v. Glassel, 211 Ariz. 33, 52, ¶ 72 , 116 P.3d 1193, 1212 (2005). 14. 2012A’izona’s death statute creates an unconstitutional presumption of death and places an unconstitutional burden on Appellant to prove mitigation is “sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.” Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 , 110 S.Ct. 3047 , 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990); State v. Glassel, 211 Ariz. 33, 52, ¶ 72 , 116 P.3d 1193, 1212 (2005). 14. | 3 | 2011–2012 |
Lynn v. Reinstein
green
1 sentence2009Lynn, 205 Ariz. at 191 ¶ 16, 68 P.3d at 417 . (20) The trial court improperly omitted penalty phase instructions that the jury could consider mercy or sympathy in evaluating the mitigation evidence and determining whether to sentence the defendant to death. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Caldwell v. Mississippi
green
2 sentences2009Id. ¶ 53 Relying on Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. at 333 , 105 S.Ct. 2633 , Dann asserts that the preliminary instruction violates the Eighth Amendment and constitutes fundamental error because it improperly shifted the sense of responsibility for the sentencing decision from the present jury to the previous jury. 2009Id. ¶ 53 Relying on Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. at 333 , 105 S.Ct. 2633 , Dann asserts that the preliminary instruction violates the Eighth Amendment and constitutes fundamental error because it improperly shifted the sense of responsibility for the sentencing decision from the present jury to the previous jury. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Baker v. State
green
2 sentences1998In 1972, in Baker , this court held that A.R.S. § 13-895(B) established an unconstitutional presumption. 16 Ariz.App. at 466-67 , 494 P.2d at 71-72 . 1998In 1972, in Baker , this court held that A.R.S. § 13-895(B) established an unconstitutional presumption. 16 Ariz.App. at 466-67 , 494 P.2d at 71-72 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Marquez
green
2 sentences1989In State v. Marquez, 127 Ariz. 98 , 618 P.2d 592 (1980), the defendant argued that A.R.S. § 13-1206 1 was an unconstitutional violation of the powers of the executive and judicial branches because it provided for a mandatory prison term without the possibility of an early release. 1989In State v. Marquez, 127 Ariz. 98 , 618 P.2d 592 (1980), the defendant argued that A.R.S. § 13-1206 1 was an unconstitutional violation of the powers of the executive and judicial branches because it provided for a mandatory prison term without the possibility of an early release. | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.