unconstitutional violation in Kansas

2024In Marsh, the defendant argued the equipoise provision "establishes an unconstitutional presumption in favor of death." 548 U.S. at 166-67 .

2024In Marsh, the defendant argued the equipoise provision "establishes an unconstitutional presumption in favor of death." 548 U.S. at 166-67 .

2008I believe that to the extent the statute permits such a result, it represents an unconstitutional violation of the due process right of natural parenthood as that right is defined in such cases as In re Guardianship of Williams, *1049 254 Kan. 814 , 869 P.2d 661 (1994).

2008I believe that to the extent the statute permits such a result, it represents an unconstitutional violation of the due process right of natural parenthood as that right is defined in such cases as In re Guardianship of Williams, *1049 254 Kan. 814 , 869 P.2d 661 (1994).

2004The statute at issue in Walton required imposition of the sentence of death if any aggravating circumstances were established and there were `"no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial"' to warrant leniency. 497 U.S. at 644 (quoting Ariz. Rev.

2004The statute at issue in Walton required imposition of the sentence of death if any aggravating circumstances were established and there were ‘ “no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial” ’ to warrant leniency. 497 U.S. at 644 (quoting Ariz. Rev.

1997In support of this argument, the plaintiffs cite to Bair v. Peck, 248 Kan. 824 , 811 P.2d 1176 (1991), which provides: *953 “We recognize that there is a limit which the legislature may not exceed in altering the statutory remedy previously provided when a common-law remedy was statutorily abolished.

1997In support of this argument, the plaintiffs cite to Bair v. Peck, 248 Kan. 824 , 811 P.2d 1176 (1991), which provides: *953 “We recognize that there is a limit which the legislature may not exceed in altering the statutory remedy previously provided when a common-law remedy was statutorily abolished.

2021While the analysis focuses initially on the specific language challenged, if that portion could be reasonably understood as creating a presumption that relieves the State of its burden on an element of offense, the challenged language must be 6 considered in context of all the instructions, which might explain the language "to the extent that a reasonable juror could not have considered the charge to have created an unconstitutional presumption." 471 U.S. at 315 .

2021The Francis Court explained that while a mandatory rebuttable presumption might be "less onerous" on the defendant, it is still unconstitutional if it shifts the burden of persuasion on a fact from the State. 471 U.S. at 317 .

2016The Enjady court held the admission of evidence pursuant to Federal Rule 413 was not an unconstitutional violation of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution because of tire safeguards of Federal Rule of Evidence 403. 134 F.3d at 1433 .

2013Dozier, 163 W.

2004Furthermore, I observe that the Kansas Supreme Court also apparently interpreted Walton in this fashion in State v. Spain, 269 Kan. 54 , 4 P.3d 621 (2000)—just 1 year before State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894 , 40 P.3d 139 (2001)—when it stated: "In Walton, five justices agreed the Arizona death penalty statute did not create an unconstitutional presumption in favor of the death penalty.

2004Furthermore, I observe that the Kansas Supreme Court also apparently interpreted Walton in this fashion in State v. Spain, 269 Kan. 54 , 4 P.3d 621 (2000)—just 1 year before State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894 , 40 P.3d 139 (2001)—when it stated: "In Walton, five justices agreed the Arizona death penalty statute did not create an unconstitutional presumption in favor of the death penalty.

2004Furthermore, I observe that the Kansas Supreme Court also apparently interpreted Walton in this fashion in State v. Spain, 269 Kan. 54 , 4 P.3d 621 (2000)—just 1 year before State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894 , 40 P.3d 139 (2001)—when it stated: "In Walton, five justices agreed the Arizona death penalty statute did not create an unconstitutional presumption in favor of the death penalty.

2004Furthermore, I observe that the Kansas Supreme Court also apparently interpreted Walton in this fashion in State v. Spain, 269 Kan. 54 , 4 P.3d 621 (2000)—just 1 year before State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894 , 40 P.3d 139 (2001)—when it stated: "In Walton, five justices agreed the Arizona death penalty statute did not create an unconstitutional presumption in favor of the death penalty.

2004The court acknowledged that this action enlarged the scope of the two criminal statutes, but observed that other states in numerous cases had applied the “same principles in eliminating an unconstitutional exception from a criminal statute and thereby enlarging the scope of the statute.” 64 N.Y.2d at 172 (see cases cited there).

2002It is only where he has ignored the restraints, which appellant argues must be considered as a form of custody, that he can be recommitted without regard to the time spent in the parole status.” 487 Pa. at 437 . *258 Conflict Between Statutes Here, the district court found that as interpreted, K.S.A. 21-4608(f)(5) was an unconstitutional violation of a prisoner’s due process rights because the statute conflicted with K.S.A. 22-3722.

2002In Faulkner , the Court of Appeals also relied on the language in K.S.A. 22-3722 in concluding that time spent on parole is time spent in custody. 22 Kan.

1998In State, ex rel., v. Lamont, 105 Kan. 134, 138 , 181 Pac. 617 (1919), involving the right of electors to determine whether they would organize a school district, it was said: “So it may be said here that the will of the petitioners does not govern, but when the provision made by the legislature is accepted by the electors themselves by the proper vote, it becomes operative.

1998In State, ex rel., v. Lamont, 105 Kan. 134, 138 , 181 Pac. 617 (1919), involving the right of electors to determine whether they would organize a school district, it was said: “So it may be said here that the will of the petitioners does not govern, but when the provision made by the legislature is accepted by the electors themselves by the proper vote, it becomes operative.

1997Since the State did not enumerate a rational basis to justify treating these two similarly situated groups differently, this court found the statute was. an unconstitutional violation of equal protection. 250 Kan. at 781-82 .

1996Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (D.

1993The district court granted defendant’s motion on the following grounds: “[T]here is no statutory authority for roadblock traffic stops and the roadblock traffic stop of the defendant’s vehicle on November 20, 1991 is an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches of Kansas government; that the roadblock traffic stop on November 20, 1991 violates the defendant’s right of travel; that the roadblock traffic stop of November 20, 1991 was not conducted in compliance with the requirements of State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529 , 673 P.2d 1174 (198

1993The district court granted defendant’s motion on the following grounds: “[T]here is no statutory authority for roadblock traffic stops and the roadblock traffic stop of the defendant’s vehicle on November 20, 1991 is an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches of Kansas government; that the roadblock traffic stop on November 20, 1991 violates the defendant’s right of travel; that the roadblock traffic stop of November 20, 1991 was not conducted in compliance with the requirements of State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529 , 673 P.2d 1174 (198

1993The defendant’s car was searched by a drug dog without probable cause being established on the record in that no evidence was introduced from the handler of the dog as to training, background, characteristics and capabilities of the dog which would justify intrusion into the defendant’s vehicle and no evidence of scientific reliability or acceptance per the Frye test was *952 introduced to suggest reliability of the handler’s perceptions and/or the dog’s reactions; and that, therefore, for all of the above and foregoing reasons, as fully set forth on the record of the hearing, the evidence obt

1993The defendant’s car was searched by a drug dog without probable cause being established on the record in that no evidence was introduced from the handler of the dog as to training, background, characteristics and capabilities of the dog which would justify intrusion into the defendant’s vehicle and no evidence of scientific reliability or acceptance per the Frye test was *952 introduced to suggest reliability of the handler’s perceptions and/or the dog’s reactions; and that, therefore, for all of the above and foregoing reasons, as fully set forth on the record of the hearing, the evidence obt