13 Alabama opinions name it 3 courts 1906–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sandstrom v. Montanagreen2 sentences1997See also Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 265 , 109 S.Ct 2419, 2420 , 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989) (wherein the Court stated that it ‘explained in Francis [v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985),] and Sandstrom [v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979),] that courts should ask whether the presumption in question is mandatory, that is, whether the specific instruction, both alone and in the context of the overall charge, could have been understood by reasonable jurors to require them to find the presumed fact if the State proves certain predicate 1997See also Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 265 , 109 S.Ct 2419, 2420 , 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989) (wherein the Court stated that it ‘explained in Francis [v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985),] and Sandstrom [v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979),] that courts should ask whether the presumption in question is mandatory, that is, whether the specific instruction, both alone and in the context of the overall charge, could have been understood by reasonable jurors to require them to find the presumed fact if the State proves certain predicate | 2 | 2 |
Carella v. Californiagreen2 sentences1997See also Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 265 , 109 S.Ct 2419, 2420 , 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989) (wherein the Court stated that it ‘explained in Francis [v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985),] and Sandstrom [v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979),] that courts should ask whether the presumption in question is mandatory, that is, whether the specific instruction, both alone and in the context of the overall charge, could have been understood by reasonable jurors to require them to find the presumed fact if the State proves certain predicate 1997See also Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 265 , 109 S.Ct 2419, 2420 , 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989) (wherein the Court stated that it ‘explained in Francis [v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985),] and Sandstrom [v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979),] that courts should ask whether the presumption in question is mandatory, that is, whether the specific instruction, both alone and in the context of the overall charge, could have been understood by reasonable jurors to require them to find the presumed fact if the State proves certain predicate | 2 | 2 |
Francis v. Franklingreen2 sentences1997“Other instructions might explain the infirm language to the extent that a reasonable juror could not have considered the charge to have created an unconstitutional presumption.” [Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 [ 105 S.Ct. 1965 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 ] (1985)] (citing Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 [ 94 S.Ct. 396, 400 , 38 L.Ed.2d 368 ] ... (1973)).’ “Coleman v. Butler, 816 F.2d 1046, 1048 (5th Cir.1987). 1997“Other instructions might explain the infirm language to the extent that a reasonable juror could not have considered the charge to have created an unconstitutional presumption.” [Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 [ 105 S.Ct. 1965 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 ] (1985)] (citing Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 [ 94 S.Ct. 396, 400 , 38 L.Ed.2d 368 ] ... (1973)).’ “Coleman v. Butler, 816 F.2d 1046, 1048 (5th Cir.1987). | 2 | 2 |
Cupp v. Naughtengreen2 sentences1997“Other instructions might explain the infirm language to the extent that a reasonable juror could not have considered the charge to have created an unconstitutional presumption.” [Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 [ 105 S.Ct. 1965 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 ] (1985)] (citing Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 [ 94 S.Ct. 396, 400 , 38 L.Ed.2d 368 ] ... (1973)).’ “Coleman v. Butler, 816 F.2d 1046, 1048 (5th Cir.1987). 1997“Other instructions might explain the infirm language to the extent that a reasonable juror could not have considered the charge to have created an unconstitutional presumption.” [Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 [ 105 S.Ct. 1965 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 ] (1985)] (citing Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 [ 94 S.Ct. 396, 400 , 38 L.Ed.2d 368 ] ... (1973)).’ “Coleman v. Butler, 816 F.2d 1046, 1048 (5th Cir.1987). | 1 | 3 |
Wallace E. Coleman, Jr. v. Robert H. Butler, Sr., Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary, Respondentgreen2 sentences1997“Other instructions might explain the infirm language to the extent that a reasonable juror could not have considered the charge to have created an unconstitutional presumption.” [Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 [ 105 S.Ct. 1965 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 ] (1985)] (citing Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 [ 94 S.Ct. 396, 400 , 38 L.Ed.2d 368 ] ... (1973)).’ “Coleman v. Butler, 816 F.2d 1046, 1048 (5th Cir.1987). 1992If a jury could reasonably have understood that portion of the jury charge as creating a presumption that relieves the state of its burden of persuasion on an element of the offense, the potentially offending words must be considered in the context of the entire charge. 'Other instructions might explain the infirm language to the extent that a reasonable juror could not have considered the charge to have created an unconstitutional presumption.' [ Francis v. Franklin , 471 U.S. 307 [ 105 S.Ct. 1965 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 ] (1985)] (citing Cupp v. Naughten , 414 U.S. 141 , 147 [ 94 S.Ct. 396 , 400 , | 1 | 2 |
Beard v. Stategreen1 sentence1997See also Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 265 , 109 S.Ct 2419, 2420 , 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989) (wherein the Court stated that it ‘explained in Francis [v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 , 105 S.Ct. 1965 , 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985),] and Sandstrom [v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979),] that courts should ask whether the presumption in question is mandatory, that is, whether the specific instruction, both alone and in the context of the overall charge, could have been understood by reasonable jurors to require them to find the presumed fact if the State proves certain predicate | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Beck v. State
green
2 sentences1993Because that theory proved unsuccessful, at the second trial defense counsel argued that the Alabama Supreme Court's revision of the death penalty statute in Beck v. State , 396 So.2d 645 (Ala. 1980), was an unconstitutional violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. 1983VII The decision of the Alabama Supreme Court in Beck v. State , 396 So.2d 645 (1980), ruling that lesser included offenses must be considered in a death penalty case is not an unconstitutional violation of the *Page 1158 separation of powers doctrine. | 2 | 1983–1993 |
Marbury v. Madison
green
1 sentence2005In so doing, courts have taken one part of Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison but ignored another: "[I]t is apparent, that the framers of the constitution contemplated that instrument, as a rule for the government of courts .... [A]nd that courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument." Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180-81 . | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Opinion of the Justices
green
1 sentence2002In Opinion of the Justices No. 311, 469 So.2d 105 (Ala.1985), this Court considered another situation analogous to this case. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Shiland v. Yancey
neutral
1 sentence1995Yancey’s attorney struck venire-member No. 162, because, he said, “when the assembled veniremembers were asked whether they would prefer not to sit on the case, [that veniremember] gave him a look which concerned him greatly, alerting his ‘lawyer’s intuition’ to strike him.” Shiland v. Yancey, 653 So.2d at 991 . | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Raines v. State
green
1 sentence1983Edwards v. State , [Ms. 1 Div. 335 , June 29, 1982] (Ala.Cr.App. 1982); Magwood v. State , 426 So.2d 918 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982); Raines v. State , [1982] 429 So.2d 1104 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982); Clisby v. State , [Ms. 6 Div. 576 , March 2, 1982] (Ala.Cr.App. 1982). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Magwood v. State
green
1 sentence1983Edwards v. State , [Ms. 1 Div. 335 , June 29, 1982] (Ala.Cr.App. 1982); Magwood v. State , 426 So.2d 918 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982); Raines v. State , [1982] 429 So.2d 1104 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982); Clisby v. State , [Ms. 6 Div. 576 , March 2, 1982] (Ala.Cr.App. 1982). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Hawkins v. James
green
1 sentence1983In March of 1982 the Supreme Court of Alabama in Hawkins v. James, 411 So.2d 115 (Ala.1982), struck down Governor James’s executive order as an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers clause of the state constitution. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
State v. Thomas
neutral
2 sentences1979He claims that this section of the Code removed his presumption of innocence at trial and shifted the burden of proof from the state to him under a "statutorily created presumption of guilt based on mere possession." In the case of State v. Thomas , 144 Ala. 77 , 40 So. 271 , 272 (1906), we find the following: ". . . `The Legislature has the power to give greater effect to evidence than it possesses at common law, and in both civil and criminal proceedings it may declare what shall be prima facie evidence. 1979He claims that this section of the Code removed his presumption of innocence at trial and shifted the burden of proof from the state to him under a "statutorily created presumption of guilt based on mere possession." In the case of State v. Thomas , 144 Ala. 77 , 40 So. 271 , 272 (1906), we find the following: ". . . `The Legislature has the power to give greater effect to evidence than it possesses at common law, and in both civil and criminal proceedings it may declare what shall be prima facie evidence. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
California v. Green
red
2 sentences1978In California v. Green , 399 U.S. 149 , 90 S.Ct. 1930 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970), the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the California Supreme Court which had ruled the admission of a transcript of testimony given at a prior preliminary hearing an unconstitutional violation of the Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses. 1978In California v. Green , 399 U.S. 149 , 90 S.Ct. 1930 , 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970), the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the California Supreme Court which had ruled the admission of a transcript of testimony given at a prior preliminary hearing an unconstitutional violation of the Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Plant v. R. L. Reid, Inc.
green
1 sentence1975In the more recent case of Plant v. Reid, Ala., 313 So.2d 518 (1975), this court held unconstitutional, at least for certain purposes, the four-year provision of Title 7, § 23(1). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Montgomery v. Henry
green
2 sentences1906This court, without determining the constitutionality of the general election law in this respect, has held that the section requiring the numbering of the ballot was merely directory, and that a failure to comply therewith on the part of the election officers did not affect the ballots cast which were not numbered, or the result of the election. —Montgomery v. Henry, 144 Ala. 629 , 39 South. 507 , 1 L. 1906This court, without determining the constitutionality of the general election law in this respect, has held that the section requiring the numbering of the ballot was merely directory, and that a failure to comply therewith on the part of the election officers did not affect the ballots cast which were not numbered, or the result of the election. —Montgomery v. Henry, 144 Ala. 629 , 39 South. 507 , 1 L. | 1 | 1906–1906 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.