unconstitutional violation in Illinois

2007This burden shifting, our supreme court held, was an unconstitutional violation of a defendant’s due process rights. 1 Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at 209 .

2007This burden shifting, our supreme court held, was an unconstitutional violation of a defendant's due process rights.1 Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at 209 .

2014M.I., 2013 IL 113776, ¶ 38 .

2014M.I., 2013 IL 113776, ¶ 38 .

2015Victor, 511 U.S. at 5 .

2015Victor, 511 U.S. at 5 .

2019People v. Ligon, 2016 IL 118023, ¶ 11 .

2019People v. Ligon, 2016 IL 118023, ¶ 11 .

2007The entirety of defendants' argument is as follows: "For the same reasons argued by Lakewood Electric Corporation in its appeal before this Court in [ Schultz v. Lakewood Electric Corp., 362 Ill.App.3d 716 , 298 Ill.Dec. 894 , 841 N.E.2d 37 (2005), defendants] contend that [section 2-1303] is an unconstitutional violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the federal and Illinois state constitutions." Rule 341(e)(7) requires that an appellate brief contain an "[a]rgument, which shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefore, with citation of the autho

2007The entirety of defendants' argument is as follows: "For the same reasons argued by Lakewood Electric Corporation in its appeal before this Court in [ Schultz v. Lakewood Electric Corp., 362 Ill.App.3d 716 , 298 Ill.Dec. 894 , 841 N.E.2d 37 (2005), defendants] contend that [section 2-1303] is an unconstitutional violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the federal and Illinois state constitutions." Rule 341(e)(7) requires that an appellate brief contain an "[a]rgument, which shall contain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefore, with citation of the autho

2006Watts, 181 Ill. 2d at 151 .

2006Watts, 181 Ill. 2d at 151 .

2005Lawrence , 539 U.S. at 579 , 156 L.

2005Lawrence , 539 U.S. at 579 , 156 L.

1998Citing Fujimura v. Chicago Transit Authority, 67 Ill.2d 506 , 10 Ill.Dec. 619 , 368 N.E.2d 105 (1977), CGH contends that there is no rational basis for holding a municipal hospital to a different statute of limitation than any other municipal entity.

1998Citing Fujimura v. Chicago Transit Authority, 67 Ill.2d 506 , 10 Ill.Dec. 619 , 368 N.E.2d 105 (1977), CGH contends that there is no rational basis for holding a municipal hospital to a different statute of limitation than any other municipal entity.

1997Ardt, 154 Ill. 2d at 155 , 607 N.E.2d at 1233-35 .

1997Ardt, 154 Ill. 2d at 155 , 607 N.E.2d at 1233-35 .

1987We believe such an assumption to be misplaced since we view as an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers doctrine that portion of section 5 — 8—4(a) of the Code that provides: “When a term of imprisonment is imposed on a defendant by an Illinois circuit court and the defendant is subsequently sentenced to a term of imprisonment by another state or by a district court of the United States, the Illinois circuit court which imposed the sentence may order that the Illinois sentence be made concurrent with the sentence imposed by the other state or district court of the United State

1987We believe such an assumption to be misplaced since we view as an unconstitutional violation of the separation of powers doctrine that portion of section 5 — 8—4(a) of the Code that provides: “When a term of imprisonment is imposed on a defendant by an Illinois circuit court and the defendant is subsequently sentenced to a term of imprisonment by another state or by a district court of the United States, the Illinois circuit court which imposed the sentence may order that the Illinois sentence be made concurrent with the sentence imposed by the other state or district court of the United State

2015The juvenile argued that the mandatory sentencing provisions of both the VJO 26 1-14-3316 provision and the HJO provision under which he was sentenced were an unconstitutional violation of the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution, as well as the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution because the mandatory nature of the provisions "removes the trial court's discretion in sentencing minors." In re Isaiah D., 2015 IL App (1st) 143507, ¶ 51 . ¶ 52 The court initially noted that our supreme court has held that neither the eighth amendment nor the proportionate pen

2012Our supreme court recently abandoned a third method, the “cross-comparison analysis,” because it had proven to be “problematic and unworkable.” Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d at 519 . ¶ 56 In the present case, defendant argues that the 15-year firearm sentencing enhancement at issue here was struck down as an unconstitutional violation of the proportionate penalties clause in People v. Hauschild, 226 Ill. 2d 63 (2007).

2012Respondent claims first that EJJ prosecution statute is an unconstitutional violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), because it imposes a longer sentence than the maximum allowed under the Juvenile Court Act alone, and it does so based on a judge’s probable cause determination rather than a jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt.

2012The State counters that the legislature subsequently passed a statutory amendment reviving the sentencing enhancement, and cites People v. Brown, 2012 IL App (5th) 100452 , and People v. Williams, 2012 IL App (1st) 100126 , in support.

2012The State counters that the legislature subsequently passed a statutory amendment reviving the sentencing enhancement, and cites People v. Brown, 2012 IL App (5th) 100452 , and People v. Williams, 2012 IL App (1st) 100126 , in support.

2012Our supreme court recently abandoned a third method, the “cross-comparison analysis,” because it had proven to be “problematic and unworkable.” Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d at 519 . ¶ 56 In the present case, defendant argues that the 15-year firearm sentencing enhancement at issue here was struck down as an unconstitutional violation of the proportionate penalties clause in People v. Hauschild, 226 Ill. 2d 63 (2007).

2009Woodrum, 223 Ill. 2d at 314 ; see also People v. Jordan, 218 Ill. 2d 255, 267 (2006) (“A statutory provision containing an unconstitutional presumption may be severed from the rest of the statute when what remains is complete in itself and is capable of being executed wholly independently of the severed portion”).

2009Dec. 605 , 860 N.E.2d 259 ; see also People v. Jordan, 218 Ill.2d 255, 267 , 300 Ill.Dec. 270 , 843 N.E.2d 870 (2006) ("A statutory provision containing an unconstitutional presumption may be severed from the rest of the statute when what remains is complete in itself and is capable of being executed wholly independently of the severed portion").

2007In making that argument, the State relies on People v. Taylor, 344 Ill.

2007As defendant asserts, this court recently addressed a near identical argument in People v. Quinones, 362 Ill.

2001Respondent bases this court's jurisdiction to hear her appeal on section 2-28(3) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2-28(3) (West 1998)), which provides in pertinent part: "Any order entered pursuant to this subsection * * * shall be immediately appealable as a matter of right under Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(1)." However, both the Fourth District ( In re C.B., 322 Ill.App.3d 1011 , 255 Ill.Dec. 886 , 750 N.E.2d 1271 (2001)) and the Fifth District ( In re D.D.H., 319 Ill.App.3d 989 , 255 Ill.Dec. 251 , 749 N.E.2d 31 (2001)) of this court have found that this provision enabling an a

2001Respondent bases this court's jurisdiction to hear her appeal on section 2-28(3) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2-28(3) (West 1998)), which provides in pertinent part: "Any order entered pursuant to this subsection * * * shall be immediately appealable as a matter of right under Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(1)." However, both the Fourth District ( In re C.B., 322 Ill.App.3d 1011 , 255 Ill.Dec. 886 , 750 N.E.2d 1271 (2001)) and the Fifth District ( In re D.D.H., 319 Ill.App.3d 989 , 255 Ill.Dec. 251 , 749 N.E.2d 31 (2001)) of this court have found that this provision enabling an a

2001Respondent bases this court's jurisdiction to hear her appeal on section 2-28(3) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2-28(3) (West 1998)), which provides in pertinent part: "Any order entered pursuant to this subsection * * * shall be immediately appealable as a matter of right under Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(1)." However, both the Fourth District ( In re C.B., 322 Ill.App.3d 1011 , 255 Ill.Dec. 886 , 750 N.E.2d 1271 (2001)) and the Fifth District ( In re D.D.H., 319 Ill.App.3d 989 , 255 Ill.Dec. 251 , 749 N.E.2d 31 (2001)) of this court have found that this provision enabling an a

2001Respondent bases this court's jurisdiction to hear her appeal on section 2-28(3) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2-28(3) (West 1998)), which provides in pertinent part: "Any order entered pursuant to this subsection * * * shall be immediately appealable as a matter of right under Supreme Court Rule 304(b)(1)." However, both the Fourth District ( In re C.B., 322 Ill.App.3d 1011 , 255 Ill.Dec. 886 , 750 N.E.2d 1271 (2001)) and the Fifth District ( In re D.D.H., 319 Ill.App.3d 989 , 255 Ill.Dec. 251 , 749 N.E.2d 31 (2001)) of this court have found that this provision enabling an a

1992The United States Supreme Court has held that commercial speech, like other varieties of speech, is protected under the first amendment. ( Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. (1976), 425 U.S. 748 , 96 S.Ct. 1817 , 48 L.Ed.2d 346 .) The Court has summarized the commercial speech doctrine as follows: "Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to the protections of the First Amendment.

1992The United States Supreme Court has held that commercial speech, like other varieties of speech, is protected under the first amendment. ( Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. (1976), 425 U.S. 748 , 96 S.Ct. 1817 , 48 L.Ed.2d 346 .) The Court has summarized the commercial speech doctrine as follows: "Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to the protections of the First Amendment.

1990Defendant cites People v. Bradley (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 410 , 403 N.E.2d 1029 , in support of his contention that the alleged sentencing disparity of section 32 — 10 results in a denial of due process.

1990Defendant cites People v. Bradley (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 410 , 403 N.E.2d 1029 , in support of his contention that the alleged sentencing disparity of section 32 — 10 results in a denial of due process.

1988(See County Court of Ulster County v. Allen (1979), 442 U.S. 140, 167 , 60 L.

1988(See County Court of Ulster County v. Allen (1979), 442 U.S. 140, 167 , 60 L.

1988App. 3d 11, 23 , 492 N.E.2d 612, 619 .) Furthermore, even if the defendant could have shown the use of an unconstitutional presumption, which we find he has not, such an error does not require a reversal where there is sufficient corroborating evidence of specific intent.

1987Annunzato v. Deegan (2d Cir. 1971), 440 F.2d 304, 306 .) Just as the police officer could not use the unconstitutional rule as an excuse for his perjury to the grand jury, Ogden-Fairmount should not be permitted to rely upon the improper promulgation of the three-bid resolution as an excuse for its submission of false documents to the Board.