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7 Iowa opinions name it 1 courts 1900–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Iowa courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Goodsealyellow2 sentences2018Our ruling is supported by a number of other states, which have likewise considered and rejected claims that the felony-murder rule violates due process because it creates an unconstitutional presumption that the defendant committed the killing with malice aforethought. 4 4See, e.g., State v. Herrera, 859 P.2d 131, 140 (Ariz. 1993) (en banc) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Arizona felony-murder rule that claimed the rule unconstitutionally presumed the defendant’s intent to kill based on the intent to commit the underlying felony); Dillon, 668 P.2d at 717–18 (holding the felony-mu 2018Our ruling is supported by a number of other states, which have likewise considered and rejected claims that the felony-murder rule violates due process because it creates an unconstitutional presumption that the defendant committed the killing with malice aforethought. 4 4See, e.g., State v. Herrera, 859 P.2d 131, 140 (Ariz. 1993) (en banc) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Arizona felony-murder rule that claimed the rule unconstitutionally presumed the defendant’s intent to kill based on the intent to commit the underlying felony); Dillon, 668 P.2d at 717–18 (holding the felony-mu | 2 | 2 |
State v. Herrera, Jr.green2 sentences2018Our ruling is supported by a number of other states, which have likewise considered and rejected claims that the felony-murder rule violates due process because it creates an unconstitutional presumption that the defendant committed the killing with malice aforethought. 4 4See, e.g., State v. Herrera, 859 P.2d 131, 140 (Ariz. 1993) (en banc) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Arizona felony-murder rule that claimed the rule unconstitutionally presumed the defendant’s intent to kill based on the intent to commit the underlying felony); Dillon, 668 P.2d at 717–18 (holding the felony-mu 2018Our ruling is supported by a number of other states, which have likewise considered and rejected claims that the felony-murder rule violates due process because it creates an unconstitutional presumption that the defendant committed the killing with malice aforethought. 4 4See, e.g., State v. Herrera, 859 P.2d 131, 140 (Ariz. 1993) (en banc) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Arizona felony-murder rule that claimed the rule unconstitutionally presumed the defendant’s intent to kill based on the intent to commit the underlying felony); Dillon, 668 P.2d at 717–18 (holding the felony-mu | 2 | 2 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Iowa. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Conner v. State
green
2 sentences2018Id. at 456 . 2018Id. at 456 . | 2 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Underwood
green
2 sentences2018Harrison is right that we have recognized that “children are constitutionally different from adults,” Seats, 865 N.W.2d at 556 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 471 , State v. Underwood, 615 P.2d 153 , 162–63 (Kan. 1980); Evans v. State, 349 A.2d 300 , 329–30, 336–37 (Md. 2018Harrison is right that we have recognized that “children are constitutionally different from adults,” Seats, 865 N.W.2d at 556 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 471 , State v. Underwood, 615 P.2d 153 , 162–63 (Kan. 1980); Evans v. State, 349 A.2d 300 , 329–30, 336–37 (Md. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Miller v. Alabama
green
2 sentences2018Harrison is right that we have recognized that "children are constitutionally different from adults," Seats , 865 N.W.2d at 556 (quoting Miller , 567 U.S. at 471 , 132 S.Ct. at 2464 ), for sentencing purposes due to "the features of youthful behavior, such as 'immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.' " Lyle , 854 N.W.2d at 404 n.10 (quoting Miller , 567 U.S. at 477 , 132 S.Ct. at 2468 ). 2018Harrison is right that we have recognized that "children are constitutionally different from adults," Seats , 865 N.W.2d at 556 (quoting Miller , 567 U.S. at 471 , 132 S.Ct. at 2464 ), for sentencing purposes due to "the features of youthful behavior, such as 'immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.' " Lyle , 854 N.W.2d at 404 n.10 (quoting Miller , 567 U.S. at 477 , 132 S.Ct. at 2468 ). | 2 | 2018–2018 |
People v. Dillon
red
2 sentences2018Our ruling is supported by a number of other states, which have likewise considered and rejected claims that the felony-murder rule violates due process because it creates an unconstitutional presumption that the defendant committed the killing with malice aforethought. 4 4See, e.g., State v. Herrera, 859 P.2d 131, 140 (Ariz. 1993) (en banc) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Arizona felony-murder rule that claimed the rule unconstitutionally presumed the defendant’s intent to kill based on the intent to commit the underlying felony); Dillon, 668 P.2d at 717–18 (holding the felony-mu 2018Our ruling is supported by a number of other states, which have likewise considered and rejected claims that the felony-murder rule violates due process because it creates an unconstitutional presumption that the defendant committed the killing with malice aforethought. 4 4See, e.g., State v. Herrera, 859 P.2d 131, 140 (Ariz. 1993) (en banc) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Arizona felony-murder rule that claimed the rule unconstitutionally presumed the defendant’s intent to kill based on the intent to commit the underlying felony); Dillon, 668 P.2d at 717–18 (holding the felony-mu | 2 | 2018–2018 |
Evans v. State
green
2 sentences2018Harrison is right that we have recognized that “children are constitutionally different from adults,” Seats, 865 N.W.2d at 556 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 471 , State v. Underwood, 615 P.2d 153 , 162–63 (Kan. 1980); Evans v. State, 349 A.2d 300 , 329–30, 336–37 (Md. 2018Harrison is right that we have recognized that “children are constitutionally different from adults,” Seats, 865 N.W.2d at 556 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 471 , State v. Underwood, 615 P.2d 153 , 162–63 (Kan. 1980); Evans v. State, 349 A.2d 300 , 329–30, 336–37 (Md. | 2 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Bussmann
green
2 sentences2014Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 Am. U. L. Rev. 359 , 367 (1998) (“Thus, the overbreadth challenger might claim that he or she is asserting a personal right to be 75 N.W.2d at 337 (explaining statute may be unconstitutional if it reaches “substantial amount of protected conduct” (internal quotation marks omitted)); State v. Bussman, 741 N.W.2d 79 , 91-92 (Minn. 2007) (concluding sexual exploitation statute was unconstitutional as applied to clergy member, and noting it might reach any relationship in which clergy member and congregant had s 2014Isserles, Overcoming Overbreadth: Facial Challenges and the Valid Rule Requirement, 48 Am. U. L. Rev. 359 , 367 (1998) (“Thus, the overbreadth challenger might claim that he or she is asserting a personal right to be free from prosecution because an overbroad law that permits some unconstitutional applications cannot be enforced against anyone.”). 75 omitted)); State v. Bussman, 741 N.W.2d 79 , 91-92 (Minn. 2007) (concluding sexual exploitation statute was unconstitutional as applied to clergy member, and noting it might reach any relationship in which clergy member and congregant had sexual c | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Miller v. Boone County Hospital
green
2 sentences2007We voided another part of the statute in Miller v. Boone County Hospital, 394 N.W.2d 776 (Iowa 1986), holding the statute’s requirement that a plaintiff commence an action within six months, after injury unless notice is provided to the municipality within sixty days was an unconstitutional violation of the equal protection provisions of the Iowa and United States Constitutions. 2007We voided another part of the statute in Miller v. Boone County Hospital, 394 N.W.2d 776 (Iowa 1986), holding the statute’s requirement that a plaintiff commence an action within six months after injury unless notice is provided to the municipality within sixty days was an unconstitutional violation of the equal protection provisions of the Iowa and United States Constitutions. | 2 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Lyle
green
1 sentence2018Harrison is right that we have recognized that "children are constitutionally different from adults," Seats , 865 N.W.2d at 556 (quoting Miller , 567 U.S. at 471 , 132 S.Ct. at 2464 ), for sentencing purposes due to "the features of youthful behavior, such as 'immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.' " Lyle , 854 N.W.2d at 404 n.10 (quoting Miller , 567 U.S. at 477 , 132 S.Ct. at 2468 ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Presser v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1900Ed. 759 ); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252 (6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 580, 29 L. 1900Ed. 759 ); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U. S. 252 (6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 580, 29 L. | 1 | 1900–1900 |
Lutcher v. United States
green
2 sentences1900Some courts have said that, if an unconstitutional clause of a statute cannot be rejected without affecting the intent of the legislature, the whole statute must fall [Pollock v. Trust Co., 157 U. S. 427 (15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 673, 39 L. 1900Some courts have said that, if an unconstitutional clause of a statute cannot be rejected without affecting the intent of the legislature, the whole statute must fall [Pollock v. Trust Co., 157 U. S. 427 (15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 673, 39 L. | 1 | 1900–1900 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.